

Introduction

Denkwege, für die Vergangenes zwar vergangen, Gewesendes jedoch im Kommen bleibt, warten, bis irgendwann Denkende sie gehen.

“Paths of thought, past and gone, yet in having been still in advent, await a time for thinkers to ply them.”

(Foreword to *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 1954)

“For as you began, so will you remain” (US 93/7). This citation from Hölderlin’s hymn to “The Rhine” is about as close as the old Heidegger comes to giving justification to the kinds of investigation embodied in the following group of “essais,” which “venture” to read Heidegger’s vast opus from the very start. The same “Dialogue on/from Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer” at once deprecates the texts transmitted from those earliest beginnings, since the courses under discussion belong to his “juvenilia” and so are “quite imperfect,” and the student transcripts made of them are “muddy sources” (US 91/6). Nevertheless, just as the old Husserl had “generously tolerated” the young Heidegger’s penchant for the *Logical Investigations* twenty years after their first appearance, at a time when Husserl himself no longer held this early work “in very high esteem,” so the old Heidegger was prone to “generously tolerate” the interest in his own “youthful starts [*Sprünge*]” expressed by “the gentlemen from Japan,” by Otto Pöggeler, and even earlier by Karl Löwith, even though one can “easily do injustice by them” (US 90f./5f., 128/35).¹ Nevertheless, in the end, the old Heidegger hesitated to include his earliest Freiburg courses (1915–1923) in the posthumously published *Gesamtausgabe* (Collected Edition), leaving the decision to his literary heirs. Yet it is these texts in particular that warrant the maxim that the old Heidegger affixed to his *Gesamtausgabe* shortly before his death, “Ways—not Works.” Thus, of the “quite imperfect” early course under discussion in the Dialogue, Heidegger adds: “And yet stirring within it was the attempt to walk a path of which I did not know where it would lead” (US 91/6). “The entire course remained a suggestion. I never did more than follow a faint trace of a trail [*Wegspur*], but follow I did. The trace was a barely perceptible promise announcing a liberating release into the open, now dark and confusing, now lightning-sharp like a sudden insight, which then again long eluded

every attempt to say it" (US 137/41). The following "ventures" to retrace these fleeting initial trails from one start to another (*anderer Anfang*)² thus themselves serve to turn the extant early works into ways.

The problem that the old Heidegger discovers in retrospect to be faintly stirring in the "startling [*erregenden*] years" (FS X) of his first ways, in the guise of early terms like "hermeneutics," is the topic (*Sache*) that dominated the last decades of his career, namely, that of the relation of language and being, or the question of the language *of* being. Indeed, he can point to the Scotus habilitation of 1915 as the place where the two poles were already thematized as separate questions, the question of being in the guise of the problem of the categories of being, the question of language in the doctrine of signification, or what Scotus called his speculative grammar. What was obscured, however, was the profound interrelation of the two questions (US 91f./6), whose very obscurity was itself left in the dark by the dominant authority of the doctrine of judgment then prevalent in every "onto-logic" (FS IX).

The same cluster of questions was already operative in the background of an even earlier start made by the young Heidegger, namely, his theological studies, through which he first became familiar with the term "hermeneutics." "Without this theological start, I would never have come onto the path of thought. But antecedents [*Herkunft*] always come to meet us out of the future [*Zukunft*], provenance always remains adventure" (US 96/10). It is this unique combination of starts, theological and philosophical, that spawned the unique line of questioning that the later Heidegger opted to pursue. "Not that I already knew then all that I am still asking today" (US 93/7). "In the meantime I have learned a bit more, so that I can ask questions better than I did several decades ago" (US 94/8). Nevertheless, operative in the background from the start "was the same relationship, namely, that between language and being, only veiled and inaccessible to me, so that I sought in vain for a guiding thread through many a detour and false start" (US 96/10). One such detour or dead end is *Being and Time* itself, Heidegger's major work of 1927, in which, in his later judgment, "I ventured forward too far too soon" (US 93/7). This master work, published as a fragment, was doomed to remain incomplete because of a "failure of language." According to the old Heidegger's own assessment, the path to the problem of language and being first struck in 1915 did not find its true bearings until his third academic course entitled simply "Logic," the one in SS 1934, in which his first public interpretations of Hölderlin developed into a deliberation on the sense of *logos*, which itself is still not the fitting word for the larger problem (US 93/8).

So much for the old Heidegger's sense of the relationship of his beginnings to his later thought. Suffice it to say that his own assessment of already published works, like the 1915 habilitation and *Being and Time*,

varied according to the station at which he had newly arrived in the course of his own thought. "At every stop, the indicated way in retrospect and prospect appears in another light and another tone and evokes other interpretations" (FS IX). Thus, with the completion of the published version of *Being and Time*, the habilitation itself was understood as the start of the effort "to go all out after the *factic* in order to make *facticity* into a problem at all."³ The dominant problem of this effort toward a hermeneutics of facticity becomes the "formal indication" of that facticity of our already "being here" willy nilly, already caught up in life and underway in existence. And this still very Scotian problem of "formal indication" is precisely the form that the problem of "language and being" took in the period in which the early Heidegger was under way toward his magnum opus, as a number of the essays below will point out. So there is more to the exploration of his first stops and starts than the old Heidegger's hesitant invitation warrants us to do. First of all, it is not at all clear whether the old Heidegger ever took more than a cursory look at the accumulated mass of unpublished papers from these beginnings, which are now gradually being edited and published by way of the posthumous decision recently made by his literary heirs. His very hesitation may perhaps reflect a clear sense on his part of how archivally imperfect the literary "remains" (*Nachlass*) of his juvenilia have been found to be: incomplete and missing autographs of the lecture courses, such that they have had to be supplemented from the start by sketchy notes and even "muddy" student transcripts; a complex note structure within the autographs themselves, whose assembly was perhaps no longer transparent even to Heidegger himself; incomplete records of sometimes pivotal seminar exercises; shards and scraps of loose notes out of chronological order scattered throughout his papers, likewise in need of clarifying supplementation, say, from his voluminous correspondence. It is this archival material, some of which may never be published, that some of the essays below have already applied in their venture to follow Heidegger from the very start.

We of course are in a very different position than Heidegger himself when it comes to appreciating his earliest starts. Witness the marvelling reaction in our lead essay by Heidegger's oldest living student, Hans-Georg Gadamer, in the first startling encounter with a side of Heidegger hitherto unknown to him, with the 1985 publication of the lecture course of WS 1921–22, the very first of the early Freiburg courses to appear in print. Against Heidegger's low estimation of his "juvenilia," Gadamer counters: "One must have the courage to admit that even a great man himself can underestimate his own brilliance and, above all, the rich promise of his beginnings. . . . I can imagine that Martin Heidegger himself might have found many new things in this text of his juvenilia had he been able to read it with someone else's eyes." It is therefore left to us to read these

startling “new” texts from Heidegger’s youthful opus in the new situation for the study of Heidegger created by their very exposition, starting all over again by finding new resonances in them appropriate for our time, traversing paths suggested by them left unexplored by Heidegger himself, retracing how Heidegger himself developed “the rich promise of his beginnings” in his more mature works, at times reading Heidegger destructively against himself, against his own express wishes, hesitations, and the depreciative, forgetful, and thus factually incorrect self-interpretation of his very first ways. This is the variegated task of reading Heidegger from the start and toward a new start to which the following essays are dedicated. They represent some of the first responses to a growing new opus that exposes hitherto unknown sides to Heidegger, and are driven not only by the ongoing publication of the *Gesamtausgabe* but also by new archival discoveries by independent researchers. The collection thus represents a cross-section of sometimes “differing” responses to the newly found texts and fragments by leading scholars in Europe and America. The gathering of these essays as chapters, organized into nine separate parts, is roughly chronological and topical to suggest both the progression of emergence of the topics and the sometimes conflicting interpretations and styles of interpretation of those topics in the present “hermeneutic situation” of the reception of Heidegger’s work. The following schematic summary of these contributions seeks to further this sense of progression and regression in the twists, turns, and new starts of Heidegger’s vaunted way(s), with the conviction that the conflict of interpretations will find its best resolution through a more intensive explication of Heidegger’s start(s). Especially the old Heidegger, waxing autobiographical and not above self-romanticization, has given us a partial record of this plurality of early starts: the excitement over his reading list during the student years of 1910–14 (FS X), a religious conversion in 1917, the breakthrough to a hermeneutics of facticity in 1919 (GA56/57 73–75, 115–7), the sudden self-recognition in which “the scales fell from my eyes” in rereading Kant in late 1925 (GA25 431), and especially the startling “flash of genius” (*Geistesblitz*) in 1923, in the midst of a period of intense exegesis of Aristotle, when he first recognized that *ousia* for the Greeks means constant presence. The old Heidegger came to regard this “start” as the real beginning of his life’s work, such that 1923 became the watershed year serving to divide his authentic opus from his juvenilia, which in part also accounts for his reluctance to publish the latter.⁴

I. Topic Indication Way

Needless to say, many an old interpretation of Heidegger’s thought falls by the wayside with the revelations contained in the newly published

texts from the early years. In our lead essay, "Martin Heidegger's Single Way," Gadamer goes so far as to find the "turning" in Heidegger's thought long before the usual "turning" that has been used to divide Heidegger into two Heideggers, an early and a later Heidegger. Ontological formulations of the single topic of thought like "It's worlding" and "It's happening by properizing" (*Es er-eignet sich*),⁵ which already occur in the breakthrough "war emergency" semester of 1919, anticipate by at least a decade the official turning in Heidegger's thought, which should then be understood as a turning back or re-turn to incipient traces of the topic already present in Heidegger's first beginnings. There is therefore no radical break among the plurality of ways traversed by Heidegger's long career of thought. Even the detours, false starts, and deadends (*Holzwege*) are all but a continuation of a single path from the very beginning of his first ways. In turn, a central formulation like "formal indication" that is found only in his early thought, in which we find Heidegger already "wrestling" with the language of being, "formulates something that holds for the whole of his thought." This is precisely the invitation to concretize the indicated topic in our own way, demanding of each individual to carry out one's own fulfillment of the indicated topic (way).

Wouter Oudemans, in an essay that outspokenly differs with the usual "Heidegger literature," seeks to highlight the paradoxical extremities of this hortatory demand for individual self-enactment already operative in subtle ways in the very unpoetic texts of the early Heidegger. The essay is accordingly not about "Heidegger" (content sense) since what Heidegger himself is about is to point individuals toward the individualized philosophical asking (enactment sense) that arises from and turns back upon the full oneness of one's concrete facticity in its concrete world. The issue (topic, matter) is accordingly not what is declaratively said by Heidegger but rather whether the I here and now responds to Heidegger's protreptic indication to address its solitary "that" and to give this facticity its own and full "say." Oudemans explores all of the cryptically subtle nuances of these formally indicative strategies broached especially at the "totally mobilized" extremities of everyday representation (ruinance) and of everyday boredom.

II. The First Years of Breakthrough

Steven Crowell takes us back to Heidegger's earliest concerns, not just with logic but in fact with a "logic of logic," a "transcendental" (philosophical, ontological, phenomenological, hermeneutical) logic, by summarizing the nexus of questions that revolve around categories in their truth and meaning in the very Neo-Kantian period that culminates with the 1916 Conclusion of Heidegger's published habilitation. As Crowell shows,

the phenomenological backtrack from truth as judicative correspondence to truth as demonstrative meaning, from category to world, from scientific theory to the “living spirit,” from metaphysics to fundamental ontology, aided and abetted by the pivotal work of Emil Lask, is already underway in the 1915 habilitation. Heidegger’s earliest logical works thus anticipate later developments, like the “ontological difference” (first in the guise of the Neo-Kantian impersonal *es gilt*, “it holds”) and the ordering of the world according to human relevance (*Bewandtnis*). Logic is already assuming the form that Heidegger’s more mature courses entitled simply “Logic” will fully develop, namely, that of an “original logic” or a “logic of origins” of fundamental concepts (categories) from the pretheoretical pragmatic life or “matter” of the historical world. But in late 1916, despite the initial release provided by Husserl’s doctrine of intentionality, the hampering influence of the old “doctrine of judgment” (e.g., Lask’s second book) upon Heidegger is still very much in evidence.

István Fehér also begins with the issues of the early logical writings in order to fully trace the complex “proto-hermeneutic situation” out of which Heidegger carries out his hermeneutic-ontological transformation of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, with the help of elements assimilated from the life-philosophies of Dilthey and Jaspers. Thus, from early on, an anti-psychologistic “psychology” centered on the sense of intentional acts gradually transforms logic as the doctrine of *logos* into a concern for the being possessed by *logos* in all of its acts, namely, the human being, a concern that results in embedding logic first in a “hermeneutics of facticity” and then in an “existential analysis of Dasein.” For example, Fehér finds a “hermeneutic logic of question and answer” already anticipated as early as the 1914 dissertation against psychologism. The postwar turns toward a radicalized sense of pretheoretical experience is tentatively explored in its two methodological phases, namely, Heidegger’s halting transformation (1919–21) of received phenomenology into one more sensitive to a non-theoretical language growing out of life-experience at its origins (an account based in part on unpublished course transcripts), and his explicit deconstructive critique of Husserl (SS 1925) for still being too theoretical in his overly naturalistic description of the natural attitude of life. But since the primacy of the theoretical that still prejudices Husserl is not a modern development but rather goes back to the Greeks, the phenomenological quest for a more natural language also calls for the destruction of the conceptuality inherited from the entire history of philosophy, the study of which the ahistorical Husserl wished to eschew.

As Fehér indicates, the early Heidegger identifies philosophy with phenomenology and phenomenology with hermeneutical ontology. The essay by George Kovacs roots this lifelong question, “What is Philosophy?,”

in the definition it first receives in the breakthrough courses of 1919, namely, philosophy (phenomenology) as the pretheoretical originary science of life's origins. On the one hand radically separating philosophy from any concern whatsoever for worldviews, on the other, the full paradox of seeking to make it over into a wholly non-theoretical "science": both already signal the end of philosophy as it has been millennially understood. Kovacs at first characterizes this radical reconceiving of philosophy as the "search for a method" apropos of this wholly pretheoretical "matter" of philosophy. But, ultimately, matter and method become one as Way, so that the problem then becomes how to understand a matter that is always under way, in short, how to understand its being and our inescapable relation to this being, our incessant being under way in It and toward It. Thus, at the end of Heidegger's own Way, "philosophy" is no longer the original science, strictly speaking not scientific at all, not even philosophy, but "simply (poetic) thinking."

III. Destruction

Several of the essays point out how "destructive" Heidegger virtually from the start was in hammering out his own unique niche among the leading philosophical movements of the day, typically criticizing them for not following their most radical impulses, noting that historicism was not historical enough, that scientism was not scientific enough, that phenomenology was still too unphenomenological, etc. (cf. Fehér). By the opening day of SS 1919, therefore, Heidegger is explicitly defining the character of such an originary "Kritik" of all "standpoint" philosophies, a critique that is always positive by being attuned to the "genuine motives" of their problems, and making this positive critique an indispensable part of his phenomenological method (GA56/57 125–128). By the end of WS 1919–20, he clearly identifies "critical-phenomenological destruction" as the method of returning any and all presuppositions back to their origins in factic life experience, a procedure which in SS 1920 is also called "systematic deconstruction [*Abbau*]." We accordingly bring together three essays that especially thematize this staple of Heidegger's method both early and late.

Jeffrey Barash brings his unique perspective of intellectual historian to bear on the thoroughgoing destruction of Western humanism that the ontologically minded early Heidegger is already mapping out. The postwar cynicism over "Western culture" and its progressivist assumptions, popularized especially by Spengler's *The Decline of the West* (1918), receives its ontological expression in Heidegger's deconstruction of the metaphysical residue of Greek permanence and constant presence in modern "historical

consciousness," insofar as it still clings to "the comforting illusion of the timeless presence of the past in the continuous development of an overarching cultural and world historical context." The anti-continuity or anti-contextualist thrust of this destruction receives its more positive note in Heidegger's proposal to situate authentic historicity instead in the "repetition" of the authentic meaning still implicit in the past in the light of the future possibilities of any interpreter of the past. But the mere continuity of repetition in the finite context of the singular Dasein oriented toward its singular future, based as it is on the discontinuity of an eschatological time borrowed from otherworldly Christianity, is too constraining for Barash in his historian's craft. The only "overarching" continuity that Heidegger seems to allow, in what he later calls the history of Being, is the inauthentic forgetfulness which harbors the unthought human finitude from which future thinkers draw their own great thought. What Barash the historian especially misses, and what Heidegger's currently influential idea of the essential historicity of interpretation seems to disallow, is accessibility to the past intentions of an author or historical actor within the linguistic horizon of a past sociopolitical context, and a contextual analysis of the circumstances that mark the reception and influence of such thoughts and actions. Such a critique clearly has immediate ramifications, for example, in the present historian's endeavor to understand Heidegger's Nazism in its incipience, influence, and consequences.

Beginning in 1922 (PIA), Heidegger repeatedly stressed that the critique of history is always but a critique of the present. This critique of a tradition rigidified into "self-evident" public fashions of the present, like the ethnological rage for exotic cultures, is the only negative facet that Robert Bernasconi will allow in the otherwise thoroughly positive movement of deconstruction to appropriate one's own past through repetition. He exemplifies the liberation from a constraining present and the expansive breakthrough to the future of the past by way of Heidegger's "phenomenological critique" (so still in SS 1927) of some of the traditional theses of being. Deconstructing is here more a re-constructive genealogy that decides whether the "birth certificate" of our prevalent ontological concepts is genuine or illegitimate within the unity of a Western tradition that Heidegger tends to read in reverse order in tracking it back to its Greek sources. But only with the later Heidegger's rethinking of the history of Being does it become clear that deconstructing is more than genealogy, since the tradition, once cleared, delivers us over to the unthought yet to be thought from it. This granting of access to the unthought is the ultimate positivity of deconstructing.

Destruction and construction, the historical and the systematic, thus belong together in philosophy; they are the same. Philosophy is temporal

interpretation through and through. Otto Pöggeler develops its positive thrust by emphasizing that destruction is always oriented toward the eschatological moment that is not at our disposal, that it appropriates its unique tradition in order to construct the site of the unique historical moment that would illuminate our time for those rare few who are ready to make the inaugurating leap (*Ur-sprung*). Destruction is to uncover "an orientation towards the moment, which alone makes destruction possible," inasmuch as the originating moment is "the most proper essence of time." Pöggeler's destructive analysis accordingly recites the litany of traditional forms of the moment: the Greek dialectical moment of sudden transformation of concepts, the Christian moment of decision, the Judaic crisis of discrimination within a temporal whole still accented by the ancient "passing," the forerunning retrieve schematized by the existential Heidegger, Nietzsche's moment of eternal return, Hölderlin's moment of divine hinting, the desacralized moments of the postmodern novel. This new philosophy pointing to the fitting moment is however not just an exhortation to existentiell decision, but likewise calls for a new formally indicative logic that not only formalizes the moment itself but also, by way of situating that inaugural moment in its fulness, schematizes the structures of all of the other temporal spheres in which the human being has to lead its life.

IV. The Retrieval of Primal Christianity

The young theologian Heidegger became a Catholic phenomenologist of religion and mysticism as early as 1915 and inclined toward the Protestant retrieval of primal Christianity by 1917. The archival record, still largely unpublished, suggests that his youthful interest in the atheoretical dimension of religious life not only became a proving ground for shaping his unique brand of the phenomenological method, but also provided direct parallels for that method which would get back "to the things themselves," such as the "reduction" implied in Eckhart's ascetic-mystical concept of "detachment." Thus, John van Buren points to biblical texts glossed by Luther as a source of Heidegger's own sense of *destruere* of the "wisdom" of the Greeks by way of the more factic life experience found in original Christianity. Probing deeply into Luther's texts and subsequent Luther scholarship, van Buren even finds the positive thrust of a destruction of ontology already exemplified in Luther's developing attitude toward Aristotle, who is at first vilified in his patristic-scholastic garb for cloaking Christian realities over the centuries with categories alien to them, but whose practical writings are then acknowledged for their telling penetration into the kinetic unfinished character of life experience. Much of the

early Heidegger's own positive interpretation of Aristotle, as well as the vocabulary of his early courses leading up to *Being and Time*, like the strikingly idiosyncratic terminology in which the *ruina* (fall) of ruinance is couched in WS 1921–22, is in great detail traced back to the same Lutheran-biblical sources.

The power to schematize structures and formally order concepts contained in the formal indication, say, of intentionality, is graphically illustrated by the two diagrams on “becoming a Christian” that the teacher Heidegger sketched on the blackboard in the two religion courses of 1920–21. Such visual concretizations of the formally indicative method serve to highlight the degree to which the early Heidegger is already pondering the structural possibilities (and limits) of Indo-European grammars to express the experientially tensed character of being itself, in what Theodore Kisiel calls Heidegger's “grammaontology.”

V. Aristotle

Heidegger gave his first postwar seminar on Aristotle in SS 1921, and did not miss a semester until the end of 1924 to submit various aspects of the Aristotelian opus to an unrelenting exegesis that was driven by the concurrent all-out effort to prepare a treatise on Aristotle for publication. It is out of this academic exigency that the plan and first draft of *Being and Time* came into being. We should therefore not be surprised to find that its two extant Divisions draw their manifestly pretheoretical paradigms of human disclosure from *Nicomachean Ethics* 6, the art of making things and using tools in the First and the prudential insight into self-referential human action in the Second.

Franco Volpi pursues this deconstructive retrieve of Aristotle's practical philosophy into *Being and Time* by developing Heidegger's ontologizing of praxis into the basic way of being human, such that “theorizing,” traditionally the highest of human vocations, is reordered with “making” into a mode of concern, and both are made derivative to the praxis that Dasein itself is, structured as “care.” This refiguration accounts in *Being and Time* for the shift in temporal priority from the present to the future, the prudential emphasis on “mineness,” the radical distinction between Dasein and all other beings, and the shift from lucid self-reflection to perspicuous self-recovery down to the opaque levels of moods. The transformation is outlined by a series of correspondences of the specific concepts, like *phronesis* (prudential insight) “violently” understood as conscience, that Heidegger “translates” from Aristotle into his own temporally ontological frame.

Utilizing Derridean strategies of interpretation, Walter Brogan follows the same trajectory, with particular concern for the truth problem, by leaping from the very first Aristotelian “staging area” for the book *Being and Time*, the Aristotle Introduction of October 1922, to the very last, the course of WS 1925–26 on the logic of truth. In view of Heidegger’s intensive development at this time, the last is virtually three “light years” removed from the first. Indeed, the Aristotle *Einleitung* embodies the very first intensive treatment of *aletheia* as unconcealment that we have from Heidegger. But in WS 1925–26, Aristotle’s most fundamental form of truth, that of *nous*, is deconstructed to its very end, exposing the need to understand truth in all of its forms, the theoretical as well as the practical dia-noetic virtues, out of the phenomenon of time. Thus, in *Being and Time* itself, the eternal *nous* of the Greeks is for the first time re-placed by the “lighted clearing” (*Lichtung*) of original temporality, a novel term destined to play a pivotal role in the later Heidegger.

VI. Husserl

As Fehér points out, Heidegger’s transformation of Husserl’s phenomenology into his own brand of hermeneutic phenomenology, by way of the method of formal indication, is virtually complete by 1921. The first “ex post facto” overt critique (deconstruction) of the Cartesian Husserl’s “concern for known knowledge” occurs in Heidegger’s first Marburg course in WS 1923–24, “Introduction to Phenomenological Research.” The second direct critique, following the same pattern by way of a detailed deconstruction of the Sixth Logical Investigation, and especially significant inasmuch as it is made to preface the penultimate draft of *Being and Time*, occurs in SS 1925. The following three essays pick up the story at that point. Their divergence suggests the need to examine all of the earlier archival documents in order to truly comprehend the complex phenomenological transition from Husserl to Heidegger from the start.

Daniel Dahlstrom traces Husserl’s significant shift in the locus of truth from the valid proposition to the intentional relation between intention in absence and intuition in presence, where truth thus becomes their identification across time. Already utilizing word-play, Heidegger accuses Husserl of obscuring his insight by regarding this truth-relation (*Wahrverhalt*) as a fact-relation (*Sachverhalt*). Further methodological infidelity crops up in Husserl’s unconscious reliance on the traditional concept of being as presence in regarding the natural attitude in a prejudicially naturalistic way. Yet this reproach is belied by the feature of empty intending in truth and being, which prevents Husserl’s analyses of the preobjective

flow of internal time-consciousness from lapsing into the “prejudice of the now.” Heidegger’s silence about such stark similarities with his sense of time is in part excused by his fundamentally different ecstatic-horizonal sense of time with its primacy placed upon a finite future.

Working out of the recent French discussion of the phenomenological reduction, Rudolf Bernet compares the surprisingly similar structure of manifestation yet distinctly different mode of accessibility of the “double life” found, by way of the reduction, in both Husserl’s transcendental subject and Heidegger’s *Dasein*. Just as the reduction extracts the constituting subject from its blind involvement in constituting the world, by way of the intervention of the phenomenologizing “impartial spectator,” thereby disclosing both constituting agent and its new-found observer, so the anxiety-ridden *Dasein* is brought out of lostness in the Anyone and back to itself in all of its solitude by the call of conscience, dividing the self into its present inauthentic existence and its endlessly possible modification into authentic existence. But Husserl’s leap of reduction occurs by way of the overt will to scientific evidence, while Heidegger’s follows an unwilling “reduction” occurring by way of an unexpected event subjugating *Dasein* to a sudden illumination in passage across a forced absence. Controlled methodological artifice yields to more spontaneous “leaps and splits,” like the malfunctioning of a tool and the crisis of the self. Finally, the anxiety-ridden *Dasein* does not first offer itself as an object of a self-reflective gaze, but experiences its individualization in a self-affection that instead offers an ineluctably prereflective phenomenon of enigmatic depth to endless exploration. The impartial gaze of the spectator, by contrast, does not rest until the manifesting object is given to it fully and in person.

Starting from the old Heidegger’s own admission that Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition first enabled him to reawaken the question of being in *Being and Time*, Jacques Taminiaux energetically defends the stark thesis that Heidegger’s ontologizing of this Husserlian heritage, whereby categorial intuition becomes the understanding of being, remains intuitionist through and through. One has only to highlight the recurrent references to understanding’s “sight”—its transparent perspicuity of the whole of existence, its attestation by the intimate cognitive insight of conscience, the eye’s glance (*Augen-blick*) in the resolute clarity of the moment of vision—to measure the potential sweep of this thesis. The closer we approach the full ipseity (its *solus ipse*) of the matter “itself,” which marks phenomenology’s move of return to ontology, the more evident it becomes that this must ultimately be an intuitionist and not a hermeneutic ontology. After the pattern of Husserl’s First Logical Investigation, Heidegger still reduces the everyday order of expression, indication, indeed the entire symbolic order ever infected by absence, covertness, and impli-

cation, in order to return to the fully concentrated vigilance of the authentic self's simply seeing "itself," in a pure philosophical act of meaningfulness divested of any sign and mediating expression. The *logos* of phenomenology is ultimately not linguistic or hermeneutic, but purely and simply the self-visibility of self-showing.

VII. Back to Kant

The most seminal individual influences on the student Heidegger's initial development are Aristotle and Husserl, in that order. But when was Heidegger not also a Kantian by Teutonic osmosis, imbibing the very air (*Geist*) of the university that he attended as a student of the "Southwest German school of Neo-Kantianism"? Yet this atmospheric influence endures a period of relative latency as well as revolt during Heidegger's early teaching career, only to materialize unexpectedly in mid-course just before Christmas 1925, in a startling jolt of discovery and self-recognition that waxed enthusiastically through to the composition of the Kant-book of 1929. The nature of this revelation, its timing and duration, its motivation and tendency as reflected in its impact upon the final draft of *Being and Time* and upon the works that follow, are traced in the following two essays.

Daniel Dahlstrom distills the essence of Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation and critique (destruction) of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, during this period of two Kant-courses ripening into the Kant-book, into five central theses from Kant himself, unified in their anticipation, albeit timid and hesitant, of the themes of *Being and Time*. Counterpoint to Heidegger's "violent" reading is provided by the then current Neo-Kantian interpretation of the strange ordering of the first parts of the Critique, and of the original sense of the "manifold." For Heidegger, Kant's original "manifold" of "thick" time is a horizon-constituting succession that is pre-conceptual, unthematic, and given in intuition, not produced in a synthesis and confined to the inner sense, nor a mere series of nows or something empirically on hand.

Frank Schalow summarizes the same period of retrieval of transcendental philosophy around the dominant theme of finite transcendence, the new formal indication of *Being and Time* that now "makes possible" and grounds the earlier indications of intentionality and ex-sistence. He then wonders whether this new destructive retrieval truly supplements the earlier phenomenological retrieval of the experience of factic life or instead breaks and departs from it, whether, for example, the horizontal schemata of original time that objectify being itself for a new temporal science in

fact lose touch with the old "It's worlding" of life in and for itself. Finite transcendence is explicated in its usual middle-voiced Kantian facultative manifestations of the self-affection of intuition, the receptive spontaneity of imagination and its schematizing of sensitized concepts that demarcates the horizon and leeway of manifestation of objects. But Schalow in the end also wishes to return to a metontology of the practical issues of "being here" by refracting the essence of freedom through the lens of Kant's account of moral respect.

VIII. The Question of Ethics

Heidegger's remarkable reticence toward this question over a long career eventually prompted Jean Beaufret's question, after the cataclysms of the Second World War, on the relationship of his ontology to a possible ethics. Even the young Heidegger was clearly interested more in "the true" and "the one" among the transcendentals of being and the Neo-Kantian scheme of values than in "the good." A repeated promise to pursue the latter was repeatedly put aside for more pressing aletheiological issues. The absence of an outspoken ethics is made all the more acute for us now, as we learn more and more about both the "ontic" and "ontological" career of this prominent native son of a Germany caught up in the thick of the world-historical events of our century.

John Caputo examines the early Heidegger's retrieval of primal Christianity and finds his reading of the biblical narratives woefully one-sided in favor of a tough-minded Pauline-Lutheran machismo, of taking up one's cross and resolutely putting one's shoulder to the heavy weight of life. What Heidegger misses in the biblical message is the tender-hearted dimension of *kardia*, mercy, lifting the burden of the enfeebled other who is afflicted and downtrodden, solicitude (*Fürsorge*) for the flesh of the suffering and disabled other, and the facticity of the pain of the other exercising its claim over me. For us earth-dwellers the remote essentialist ethics in the later Heidegger, for whom the staggeringly incomprehensible mega-deaths of annihilation camps and nuclear holocausts are but grim spinoffs of the technological efficiency of global agricultural/industrial complexes, where the new global plague of AIDS meets its match in the global mobilization of medical demographics, clearly becomes even more insensitive to the concrete suffering subjects of actual history.

Inverting the implications of Emmanuel Levinas's critique of the absence of an ethics in a Heideggerian ontology thus subject to totalitarianism like all ontologies, Jean Grondin demonstrates instead that a presuppositionally attuned ontology of Dasein is in fact the overt rehabilitation of

the radically ethical and practical from the start, in reaction to the overly theoretized epistemological and methodological bent of philosophies then current. The futurally conative “to-be” of care is ethically even more formal than Kant’s *Sollen* (ought), and the tendency to fall from self-determination is akin to the young Hegelian “self-alienation.” The latter adoption by Heidegger suggests that a formalization of the critique of ideology, its unmasking of the obstacles of false consciousness to the exercise of human freedom, is at work here. But the ultimate ethical thrust of all of Heidegger’s formal indications is in their indexical exhortation to individual appropriation and self-actualization in accord with our differing situations. This ethical exhortation to our own occasionality, both individual and collective, is itself ontologically formalized in the existential of the call of conscience. The absence of a specific ethics is a reaction against the traditionally sharp division and fragmentation of disciplines in a philosophy that always must re-turn such divisions to the whole of experience. Thus the ethical motive in the later Heidegger expresses itself in the even larger concern of preparing a transformed dwelling (*ethos*) on this earth for the human being subject to the epochal destiny of technological nihilism. The utopian magnifications of such a messianic orientation, also reminiscent of the young Hegelians, may account for Heidegger’s own political errancy, and indeed that of any philosophical ethics.

IX. Toward the Later Heidegger and Back

That “life,” like being, “is said in many ways” was regarded by the early Heidegger not as a disadvantage but rather as a sign of its proximity to the “matter itself” of philosophy, and thus as a fitting and proper focus for phenomenology. In this spirit, in the breakthrough years of 1919–1923, Heidegger variously identifies his lifetime topic in terms like “life in and for itself,” “factic life,” and “factic life experience,” while deconstructing its plurivocity in both the Greek and the Christian traditions as well as in current disciplines like *psychology* and *biography*. David Krell picks up the story at the juncture where “factual life” is terminologically re-placed by the ontological neuter, “Dasein” (SS 1923), while both looking forward to the bracketing of ‘life’ in the scare-quotes of *Being and Time* and glancing backward to its thoroughgoing phenomenological-grammatological exegesis in WS 1921–22. This frame provides a genetic perspective for examining the direction of the renewed deconstruction of ‘life’ in a more biological context in WS 1929–30 and during the Nietzsche years of the late thirties, as well as for Krell’s own disseminative critique of Heidegger’s critique of ‘life.’

John Sallis frames the tautological bond between truth and knowledge, and the related nousiological bond between knowledge and intuition (ergo presence), that are still intact in the Logic course of WS 1925–26, between the two final drafts (SS 1925 and March 1926) of *Being and Time*. Both drafts undo these traditional bonds by way of displacement toward a more radical truth that is not of knowledge but of praxis, not of oriented consciousness but of situated Dasein, not of insight but of the more circumspective sight of understanding. The regress is more specifically from truth to its condition of possibility in disclosedness, which Heidegger, by way of a peculiar doubling, also calls truth, originary truth. This doubling virtually writes the story of the later Heidegger, in the truth of art, in the history of being from Plato to Nietzsche, until the old Heidegger retracts the very name of truth for this unconcealment in 1964. But the double remains decisive as the granting of truth, and still calls upon us to *think* how this unconcealment “itself” (also a doubling?) is not of knowledge.

Will McNeill’s deliberation on the ultimately “precursory” movement of hermeneutics and essential thinking provides a fitting climax to this series of essays that attempt to read Heidegger from the start, as well as to learn how and to understand why. For his reading of a late text by Heidegger at “the end of philosophy” compels McNeill to circle back and return to the very “onset” (*Ansatz*) of the question in *Being and Time*, inasmuch as all of the later Heidegger is but an attempt to recast that precursory question “more incipiently” (*anfänglicher*). Working Heidegger’s *Denkweg* from one end to the other, from end to beginning and back, McNeill finds it driven by the same regressing forerunning movement back to a fore-structure of presuppositions and a preunderstanding governed by the ambiguous prefix “Vor” (pre-, fore), which is at once “before” and “ahead,” preceded and anticipatory, such that one advances forward by stepping back, and one steps back in order to advance forward, back to the future. Since our heritage of “antecedents always comes to meet us only out of the future,” McNeill finds that Heidegger’s later thought is governed by a “futuricity” more radical and “earlier” than the future inscribed in originary temporality. Earlier than the “point of departure” provided by any of the series of formal indications demarcating the *Denkweg* is the initial “onset,” the start, of questioning marked by the existentiell engagement of a Dasein that is in each case mine. This is the final message behind those peculiar philosophical concepts that the early Heidegger calls formal indications. And since all philosophical concepts are merely formally indicative, what where when exactly in this endless circling is the end of philosophy?⁶

THEODORE KISIEL