

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary migration waves pose a clear challenge to the European conception of the nation-state as the political framework of a culturally homogenous citizenry. In fact, the presentation of the nation-state as the spontaneous corollary of commonality of language, historical continuity, common descent, and shared religion or religious tradition has usually been based on the expurgation from the collective memory of the actual homogenization of the nation, through the transcendence or suppression of local and super-national identities by a centralizing state. But global factors once again increase the heterogeneity of nation-states. The growing number of migrants and their descendants, having forsaken one nation-state but not yet merged into another, therefore, pose legal and cultural anomalies.

Although immigration is hardly a new phenomenon, in the past few decades the rate of migration has accelerated considerably over previous periods and more countries are affected by global migration than before. In the era of reconstruction after the Second World War, many Western European employers, with the assistance and active involvement of their governments, set up organized schemes for the recruitment, control, and regulation of temporary migrant workers from lesser developed countries.¹ When the same governments, at a time of economic recession and with the global dispersal of investments, sought to slow or stem the tide of immigration they discovered that global forces of change had overtaken them. By the 1990s, the marketization of many of the command economies, the disappearance of old empires, the redrawing of boundaries, and the consequent national conflicts added their huddled masses of immigrants and refugees to the earlier "guestworkers," many of whom also elected to remain in their host societies and raise their families there. The new international migration waves are part of a transnational transformation that is reordering many societies and their politics around the globe. Increased immigration will undoubtedly continue into the developed societies and transform their demographic com-

positions and social structures and, by increasing their heterogeneity, lead to a crisis and reevaluation of their collective identities.

My aim, in this study, is to examine *the variation in the reception of masses of immigrants* in developed states or regions that, at the same time, are also known as possessing distinct cultures and nationalist movements of their own. Immigrants to developed regions pose only a limited threat of economic competition and, therefore, rarely jeopardize the economic well-being of its relatively prosperous people. Furthermore, these immigrants associate the culture of their host societies with their high level of economic development. Conferring high prestige on the culture of their adopted societies, the immigrants are usually willing to be integrated into their customs and culture, learn their language, and intermarry with their inhabitants. These immigrants are not likely to "denationalize" their new societies or significantly dilute their culture and its manifestations. Nevertheless, even in developed states or regions there are nationalist protests against the threat that large-scale immigration seems to pose to the region's economic well-being or cultural identity.

A special case of immigration involves migration from one national territory to another without, however, requiring immigration from one state to another. *Internal migration* usually takes the form of movement from the countryside or small towns to cities as part of the process of industrialization that in some cases favors one region over others within a multiethnic state. There is an obvious difference between the two kinds of migrants in that international immigrants cross political borders and, therefore, are subject to state regulation through naturalization and the acquisition of citizenship whereas internal migrants are by and large free to come and go.

The current emphasis among students of immigration, however, is less on the division between citizen and noncitizen immigrants and more on the variety of intermediary statuses and additional changes required for the immigrants' successful integration. Hammar, for example, locates between citizens and foreigners a new status group of "denizens" who, though not naturalized have attained a secure resident status due to length of stay or other ties.² Others point out that substantial citizenship does not follow automatically from formal citizenship (or in T. H. Marshall's distinction, possession of political citizenship does not have to afford access to full civil or social citizenship rights)³ nor does it protect against widespread discrimination on the basis of ethnic, national, or gender difference.⁴ Under conditions of migration within a multiethnic state, therefore, the vulnerability due

to nationalist hostility might exist in spite of inalienable political citizenship rights.

Instead of singularly focusing on issues related to the access of immigrants to citizenship we will be better served by inquiring how sharply and rigidly the line of demarcation is drawn between them and the native born. Where the insistence on the cultural homogeneity of the nation is strong, political citizenship will be less valuable and other vulnerabilities are more likely to accompany the lack of or limitations on citizenship. Conversely, where the division between hosts and immigrants is ambiguous or muted and a multiplicity of cultures is tolerated, the potential for the integration of immigrants is enhanced. Theories of immigrant-host relations that examine the pre-conditions for assimilation and segregation will allow us to place the question of citizenship within this broader framework of cultural and structural relations.

Though differential access to citizenship denotes a crucial difference between international and internal immigrants and has to be examined on its own right, many of the other economic and cultural characteristics of migration are shared by the two types of migrants. The subject of this study will be internal but inter-national migration to developed regions because it directs us to focus on the broader parameters of immigrant-host relations of which the willingness to grant political citizenship is but one manifestation.

To examine immigrant-host relations and their variations I will place in a comparative framework four developed regions at opposite ends of Europe: Catalonia and the Basque provinces (known together as Euskadi) in Spain and the Republics of Latvia and Estonia on the Baltic shore of the former Soviet Union. Starting at different historical moments, these regions became economically more developed than the state of which they are, or were, part of as indicated by per capita incomes above the national average. Though Euskadi lost ground since the mid 1970s it still is—as are the other three—a relatively developed industrialized region. The four regions also possess distinctive cultural attributes that potentially set them apart from Spain and Russia, and later the USSR, respectively. The special combination of economic development and cultural distinctiveness sustained in all four significant national movements that have been intermittently active for over a century and left a distinct imprint on their history.

The cases under study also share a demographic condition. As developed regions that are part of less-developed states they lacked the political power to stem or prevent the arrival of internal immigrants.

These regions, like so many southern Californias, attracted immigrant workers or cadres from other, less developed, parts of Spain and the USSR, respectively. As a result, the percentage of the native born has declined in the Basque country to 67.5 percent, in Catalonia to 63.7 percent, in Estonia to 61.5 percent, and in Latvia it became as low as 52 percent of the total population.⁵ Furthermore, in the urban population, particularly in capital cities such as Barcelona, Bilbao, Riga, and Tallinn, the concentration of immigrants is even heavier.⁶

Immigrants relocate to other prosperous areas and states as well, but the populations of the regions in this study are relatively small: 1.5 million in Estonia; 2.6 million in Latvia; 2.3 million in the three Basque provinces; and 6.1 million in Catalonia. Because of the size of the population and their inability to control the influx, immigration carries a special onus for the nationalists of these regions. The process of "demographic denationalization" seems to threaten the professed uniqueness of their ethnic or cultural identity, and migration has served in three of these regions as a rallying cry for the nationalist movements. The clear exception is Catalonia, where immigration has not generated sustained opposition or served as the trigger of its nationalism. While Catalans sought to assimilate Andalusians, Murcians, and Castilians, the hostile attitude toward the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian residents of the Baltic republics was expressed through the speedy adoption of restrictive electoral and language laws by the first relatively freely elected republican Supreme Councils (i.e., Parliaments) under *glasnost*.⁷ After independence, these exclusionary policies were incorporated into citizenship laws, though in Latvia in a more extreme fashion than in Estonia. The Estonians, with a legacy of a liberal minority policy in the interwar years and less massive Soviet intervention than in neighboring Latvia, still seem to be unsure of their ultimate approach toward the immigrants. In the Basque country, the relationship to Spanish immigrants had undergone significant change: in the last decade of the nineteenth century, Sabino Arana, the founder of Basque nationalism, agitated to have them expelled, but since the 1960s the many factions of the, otherwise extremist, ETA adopted a more accommodationist perspective toward immigrants, though one of dubious coherence. Basque nationalism, therefore, is somewhere in between the Catalan integrationist view and the exclusionary Baltic one.

I would like to reiterate that the attitude of the immigrants toward integration cannot explain the divergence in the nationalists' positions toward them. In all four regions, there exist many distinct

and separate indicators of the willingness of the majority of the immigrants, though far from all, to integrate into their new societies, and in this respect they are not different from most immigrants to other well-developed regions. The imbalance between the immigrants' readiness and the measure of the nationalist opposition indicates that the causes of antiimmigrant hostility are usually found among the hosts. My goal in this study will be to locate and present the factors that explain this variation in host societies and evaluate its consequences.

The intersection of migration and nationalist and ethnic conflict within the structure and ethos of the modern nation-state also demands a theoretical effort to join the literatures on immigration and nationalism that, so far, have addressed these areas of research as separate concerns.⁸ My theoretical aim in this study is to juxtapose *theories of immigrant-host relations*, which examine the conditions and patterns of conflict and accommodation within immigration societies, with *theories of nationalism*, which seek to understand the origins and dynamics of nationalist sentiments and movements in developed regions.

The extent of the willingness to integrate immigrants is, in large part, a reflection of the task set by the nationalists for themselves that, itself, is the product of the conditions under which nationalism emerged and is being reproduced. The major split seems to be between nationalists who view their task as defensive, that is, the protection of their nation from the ravages of external, usually modernizing, political, cultural, and economic forces, and those who believe that they are well positioned to ride the forces of modernization to advance their nation's fortunes. Immigrants usually arrive as a direct result of the regions' industrialization and, therefore, become emblematic of modernity. Opposition to the winds of modernity *eo ipso* entails fear of immigrants just as sympathy to modernity reduces the potential of anxiety vis-à-vis immigrants.

I will label the defensive form of nationalism, which simultaneously favors excluding immigrants or viewing them as a separate ethnic minority, *corporate nationalism*, and the modernizing one, which also tends toward the assimilation of immigrants or is ready to tolerate multiple cultures, *hegemonic nationalism*.⁹ As the Basque case—where a transition from a rigidly corporate to a less coherent but clearly hegemonic conception of the nation—demonstrates, these attitudes are not fixed in an immutable conception of the nation. Similarly, the opposite shift from granting the most far-reaching

cultural autonomy to minorities in independent Estonia in the inter-war years to a more restrictive policy toward Slavic immigrants after the restoration of their independence in 1991, points to the decisive influence of the changing conditions under which nationalists operate.

Hostility toward immigrants in relatively developed regions is rooted neither in the threat of "denationalization" nor in economic competition but, I wish to argue, in the danger they pose to the *way of life and privileges* of traditional and to the *privileged position* of modern political, economic, and cultural *elites* already unsettled by the uneven pattern of development that set their regions at a variance with the state of which it is a part. These threatened elites consequently transform regional cultural distinctions into nationalist sentiments and the latter into antiimmigration movements.

The extent of the readiness to grant political citizenship and collective cultural and linguistic rights to immigrants and view them as contributing to the dominant national group's own culture is strongly influenced by the intensity of the host societies' own struggle for democracy. Nationalists in each of the four region have struggled not just for autonomy or independence but were also at the forefront of the battles to overthrow authoritarian regimes: Primo de Rivera's and Franco's dictatorships in Catalonia and the Basque provinces, Czarism and Soviet authoritarianism in the Baltic republics. Where the struggles for independence and democracy coincided and were sufficiently drawn out, the gap between host and immigrants usually lessened.

Conversely, hostility toward immigrants, whether taking the form of xenophobia, discrimination, or the restriction of access to civil, political, and social citizenship rights jeopardizes the immigrant populations as well as the stability and democracy of the host society. There was, and continues to be, a close association between economic modernization, in-migration, national aspirations, and the struggle for democracy in these regions. In the long run it is doubtful whether democratic societies, which are based on the political equality of their citizens, will be able to remain stable if they are composed of citizens and a significant portion of denizens and foreigners.

I will now present the theories of immigration to be followed by a theory of nationalism in developed regions. Then, I will examine the limitations of our theory of nationalism in developed regions for the study of issues relevant to immigration. The final section will pose the question of immigrant-host relations in the theoretical terms proposed in this Introduction. In Chapter 2 I will argue for the

comparability of the cases under study, and Chapters 3, 4, and 5 will be devoted to detailed studies of nationalism and the relevant issues of immigration in Catalonia, the Basque country, and the Baltic republics of Estonia and Latvia, respectively. The sixth chapter will present the conclusions of this study.

Immigrants and Hosts

The study of immigrant-host relations may be divided into three fairly distinct theoretical frameworks: push and pull or assimilation, structural inequality or segmentation, and multiculturalism. The first of these theories—a theory of social mobility and assimilation—originated in the quintessential immigration society: the United States, between the 1920s and the mid 1960s as a reflection of the experience of the largest wave of immigrants to it. The second one—a theory of segmentation—evolved in response to migration to both the United States and western Europe, in the years following the Second World War. Finally, multiculturalism, the most recent of the theories, has emerged in Canada, Australia, Great Britain, and Sweden in the early 1970s and surfaced in the United States more recently.

Push-and-pull theories viewed immigration as a mechanism for restoring economic disequilibrium between societies at different levels of development. Potential migrants were pushed out of their unrewarding agrarian societies and pulled by a modernizing society's promise of available jobs, higher income, and social mobility. This liberal, or *laissez-faire*, perspective is associated with the Chicago School of sociology, and expressed in the assimilation theory developed by its foremost proponent, Robert Park.¹⁰

Although newcomers often live under wretched conditions and struggle to find their way in the mazes of a new culture, Park posited a cycle of host-immigrant relations that leads from initial contact to competition, and from conflict to accommodation and, finally, assimilation. By assimilation he essentially meant the fading of ethnic differences and the disappearance of ethnic groups in the process of the Americanization of individual immigrants. Although cultural differences and racial characteristics determine the length of assimilation and, where differences between immigrants and hosts are bigger, might prolong this process, he expected all immigrants to eventually reach the final destination of assimilation.

A more complex, and open-ended, version of assimilation is found in Milton Gordon's work. He distinguished seven stages of

assimilation, spawning from cultural to structural, to marital, to identificational, to attitudinal, to receptional, and finally, to civic assimilation. Though Gordon might have been carried away in breaking down the process of assimilation into so many constituent units and others might arrange the stages in a different order, he, nevertheless, established some important relationships between the more important subtypes. He contended that cultural assimilation, or acculturation, though the first attained upon immigrant-host contact, does not necessarily lead to structural assimilation. Only once structural assimilation, or "large scale entry into cliques, clubs, and institutions of host society," takes place, Gordon concluded, will "all of the other types of assimilation...naturally follow."¹¹

For the purposes of this study, I will be satisfied with the more modest distinction between two stages in the incorporation of immigrants into their adopted society. I will refer to Gordon's structural assimilation by the term *integration*, that is, structural incorporation into local economic, political, and other organizations, and to all other aspects of incorporation by the term *assimilation*, that is cultural incorporation through, for example, learning the local language and marrying local spouses.

As part of their larger dilemma of assimilation-separation, most immigrants face in their adopted land a linguistic dilemma: their native language ties them to their old society whereas their new society speaks another language. Inglehart and Woodward presented a theory that fits in with the assimilationist approach. They set out two conditions under which a language exerts a strong assimilative influence on the speakers of other tongues in a multilingual situation: it has to be the language of a prosperous country and no barriers should exist to its acquisition. In the absence of such barriers the path of social mobility is open to bilingual members of linguistic minority groups.¹² The prevalence of each of these two conditions encourages linguistic assimilation and their coincidence makes it a likely outcome, whereas the absence of each, or both, will contribute to the continued separation of the groups from one another and to linguistic diversity.

The push-and-pull theory expects social mobility and entry into the manifold institutions of the host society to lead, in most cases, to a gradual assimilation of the immigrants. Though usually called an *assimilation theory* it could therefore, with equal justice, be termed the *mobility theory* of host-immigrant relations.

The second set of theories argues that the result of immigration is not the reduction of inequality but its maintenance or even

enhancement. The neo-Marxist theories, for example in Castels and Kosack's and Portes and Walton's versions,¹³ still view immigration as a result of the unevenness of the world economy but approach it with the tools of political economy. In this view, cheap labor is the key to profit appropriation by capitalist entrepreneurs in the developed world, while the departure of immigrant workers simultaneously removes the pressure for socioeconomic change on the dominant classes of the lesser developed regions. Immigration, in short, is an integral part of the capitalist system's worldwide inequality and interregional domination. Consequently, within the developed economies immigrants are channelled into sectors of the labor market where incomes are lower. Immigrant workers cannot attain the social mobility expected by push-and-pull theory and remain segregated in the lower segments of the market or in ethnic enclaves. The ethnicization of the lower segments of the working class and the establishment of permanent barriers to occupational mobility and cultural assimilation makes their exclusion long lasting.

The most recent, and still not very well defined, of the theories of host-immigrant relations, is multiculturalism. The adoption of self-styled multiculturalist policies by the governments of the typical immigration countries of Australia and Canada in the early 1970s resulted from the replacement of quota system with universal immigration policies in the former and the desire to limit the ethnic appeal and range of demands of francophone Québécois in the latter. Sweden and Great Britain also espoused multiculturalist policies by extending their already established approach of integrating the working class into society through the extension of social citizenship rights to immigrants. In the Netherlands multiculturalism rests on the precedent of religious tolerance and the establishment of confessional economic, political, and cultural institutions.¹⁴ In short, the origins of multiculturalism are diverse though its aims in different countries seem to be similar.

In contrast to both push-and-pull and segmentation theories that describe spontaneous phenomena, multiculturalism is a governmental policy and in some places also emerged as a social movement. Multiculturalist policies use tax money to set up, for example, ethnic schools and cultural institutions, research institutions for writing ethnic histories, ethnic radio stations, but also of diversifying school curricula in public schools, and so on. In some cases the policy includes institutional watchdogs to guard against discrimination of individual immigrants in employment and housing. Nevertheless,

multiculturalism addresses inequality on a narrow front only. Its proponents attack direct discrimination while ignoring the larger economic dynamic that placed the immigrants at the lower rungs of the developed economy in the first place. Multiculturalists usually accept the political practices of the host state as a common, public framework for all residents.

The goal of multiculturalism, simply stated, is to allow and facilitate each ethnic group's right to develop its own culture and values within the context of the founding majority's political framework while diversifying the majority's culture and including as an integral part the contributions made by immigrants. Both immigrants and hosts, in this view, have to traverse part of way to meet each other. In Castles and Miller's words: "immigrants are not forced to conform to a dominant cultural or linguistic model but rather can maintain their native languages and cultural life if they choose to do so. The diversity produced by immigration is seen as an enrichment rather than as a threat to the predominant culture."¹⁵

Diversity is viewed as a value in itself, but advocates of multiculturalism qualify it in two ways. First, insofar as diversity is justified in the name of greater democracy, they reject religious and legal practices in the immigrants' cultures that are incompatible with human rights—such as those that violate gender equality—accepted in the host societies. Second, they warn against the danger of treating culture as preset and fixed values. After all, viewing culture in an "essentialist" fashion might stifle the development of cultural change, for example, the combination of cultural elements from the immigrant and host cultures, and thus slow the process of integration and ultimately assimilation of the children of immigrants.¹⁶

It seems that multiculturalism represents the uncertainty typical to an interregnum, the era when it is not yet known whether the post-Second World War migrants will assimilate or remain in restricted segments of the economy and evolve the permanent features of an ethnic minority. The statistical and anecdotal evidence presented from Catalonia and the Basque country points to signs of social mobility and occupational integration among Spanish immigrants, but also to continued residential and cultural separation. In short, the jury is still out on the fate of the post-1945 immigrants; it is not clear how far will their integration proceed, and if it does whether it will lead to assimilation, as was the case with most immigrants who arrived before the Second World War.

Multiculturalist policies in Sweden, like almost everywhere where they are being tried out, are based on the expectation that the immigrants affected by them will eventually be integrated into Swedish society although only with the passing of a number of generations.¹⁷ In Australia, high levels of intermarriage between children of immigrants and native-born Australians also indicate the temporary span of multicultural practices.¹⁸ The British sociologist John Rex states this expectation most clearly:

it is wrong to suggest that European societies will move from being monocultural to being permanently multicultural. Indeed I do not think that they should be. What is likely to happen over three or four generations is that some members of the minorities will voluntarily enter the mainstream and that, as they do, they may well modify the shared culture of the society. What will remain will be the symbolic ethnicity which is common among those descended from European immigrant groups in the United States.¹⁹

If multiculturalist aims correspond to a temporary stage, then their vagueness, for which this approach is criticized so frequently, might be one of its main assets. This ambiguity allows multiculturalism to cohabit with either assimilation or segmentation, though permanent compromise between these views is unlikely. The evolution of multiculturalism into a permanent quota system, for example, cannot be squared with the civic conception of individual rights. Pervasive occupational and residential segmentation will also severely limit the chances of multiculturalist accommodation.

Another way to recognize the novelty of multiculturalism and the greater flexibility it affords to interethnic relations is to compare it with an alternative approach, the offspring of an earlier era that evolved as part of the theory and practice of nationalism for national groups that found themselves under conditions where self-determination was impossible. With the victory of the principle of self-determination in the wake of the First World War, the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires were broken into nation-states and the national groups that were too small or too dispersed, and therefore did not gain a territory of their own, were placed under the protection of the League of Nation's *national minority* system. Though the league's covenant did not address the issue of minorities, it signed specific treaties with the successor states under which the latter agreed to

guarantee the rights of their national minorities to enjoy equal civil rights, the right to establish at their own expense cultural and welfare institutions and schools, the right to practice their religion and use their language in private and public, and so forth.²⁰

In contrast to the League of Nations' haphazard system of treaties that, therefore, did not lead to the creation of customary international law, the United Nations adopted a new approach. Although its charter again ignores minorities and emphasizes the protection of individual human rights, Article 27 of its International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (known as the *Political Covenant*) from 1966 states that "in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of the group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language."²¹

This declaration still suffers from four obvious weaknesses: it does not define what a minority is, it guarantees the rights of individuals and not groups, the rights it seeks to protect are presented only in a negative fashion, and finally, it implicitly refers only to citizens and thus excludes foreigners and stateless people from its purview.²² Even the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities settles only one of these ambiguities by restating minority rights in positive terms. At the same time, the declaration does not resolve clearly any of the other ambiguities, though it refers alternatively to "persons belonging to minorities" and to "minorities." This treaty, in Lerner's view, "is not innovative" and "on the whole...is...mild." He concludes that "the international community is not ready to embody rules regarding minorities in an obligatory treaty."²³

At a time when traditional minorities enjoy only "a rudimentary regime for the protection of minorities,"²⁴ Wolfrum points out, "new minorities," such as migrant workers, trading diasporas, and Russians who remained outside Russia in the process of the USSR's break up, came into being. Do the "new minorities," he asks, enjoy even the partially developed rights guaranteed to the old minorities? A United Nations memorandum from 1949 defines minorities as groups "which have long formed a group different from the main population," such as groups that had a state of their own or were living in a part of their own state that lost jurisdiction over their area of residence.²⁵ The Slavic populations of Latvia and Estonia are neither a classical old nor a typical new minority. They indeed lived

in part of the USSR that used to be and now is again independent Latvia and Estonia. But the presence of most Russians and Ukrainians in the Latvian and Estonian SSR is relatively recent, they immigrated after the annexation of the region to the USSR and, consequently, hardly constitute a historical national minority. Furthermore, they are concentrated only in some regions of the Baltic republics, most are dispersed in many cities and towns. Consequently, they might be considered either a minority or a group of immigrants. A multiculturalist approach, therefore, might serve as an alternative to their recognition as a national minority.

The relevant question is, What would the differences be between considering the Russian and Ukrainian residents of Latvia and Estonia a national minority or an ethnic group with blurred boundaries within a multicultural society?

Territorially concentrated national minorities and political institutions are more distinct and stabler than immigrant groups made of mostly dispersed individuals. The recognition of a group as a national minority, which often predates the modern state, accepts the society's permanent cultural and national fragmentation whereas multiculturalism seeks to fashion a new national culture made up of many diverse strands and is usually contemplated for a limited duration. The protection of minorities seeks unity in spite of diversity, multiculturalism pursues unity through diversity.

In the Baltic context, Russians and Ukrainians might evolve either into a permanent national minority or, given the indications many of them gave of their readiness to identify with the new Baltic states, become integrated into them depending, in large part, on the policy adopted by the Estonian and Latvian authorities toward them.

Immigrants and stateless people, as our survey of national minority protection has shown, rarely have the rights that national minorities may claim, in large part because they are not citizens of that state.²⁶ Granting citizenship to the majority of the Slavic inhabitants in Estonia and Latvia will go a long way toward dampening their hostility toward their hosts, but only in combination with a multiculturalist approach is it likely to lead to the integration of the Russian-speakers over time. Granting secure minority rights to the Slavic populations to establish their own cultural institutions is likely to lower the level of suspicion and conflict but will simultaneously enhance the separation between the groups. The potential for conflict will be the highest if the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians will become recognized as a permanent Russian-

speaking minority without being granted rights of citizenship. Such approach enhances the very dangers that the official recognition, protection, and cultivation of cultural and national distinctiveness of a group, by granting it minority rights, seeks to avoid; it might lead to expressions of peripheral nationalism and irredentist aspirations.

One more facet of multiculturalism ties it not into the theoretical frameworks of host-immigrant relations but to the process of globalization. Although it is customary to point to the ways in which globalization reduces differences between societies far apart, it has another side. Globalization also enhances specialization and with it the occupational, regional, and technological *diversification* of modern industrial societies. Multiculturalism might be one of the approaches that successfully expresses the diversity of developed societies already cross-cut by the requirements of a complex or, in Emile Durkheim's terms, organic division of labor and organic solidarity.

Though multiculturalist tolerance is most likely to work as a facilitator during periods of uncertainty, it probably also expresses a diminished aspiration for the homogeneity of industrial societies and the recognition of the potential benefits of cultural heterogeneity for expediting the absorption of outside influences in an increasingly more cosmopolitan world. Multiculturalism, if so, is a step beyond the liberal goal of "pluralism," though along the same route, and it entails both the recognition of diversity of immigration societies and the weakening of the purported goal of nation-states to homogenize their populations.

Hegemonic and Corporate Nationalism

Attitudes to immigrants in the modern era are frequently articulated by nationalist movements or justified by reference to nationalist sentiments. Examining immigration reception by nationalists in relatively developed regions requires that we consider the relationship of nationalism and development in general.

Influential theories of nationalism, both neo-Marxist approaches derived from Trotsky's writings and liberal perspectives, view it as a response to the *uneven pattern of development* in the modern era. The pressure of the early developers' rapid economic and military buildup on their less modernized neighbors, argue Hechter and Nairn, led to the subjugation of some of the latter, put others at the risk of becoming colonies of the former, and therefore compelled many of them to try to catch up.²⁷ Nationalism proved to be the most

potent mobilizing ideology for the sacrifices required by modernization at a neck-breaking speed and for the creation of a solidarity that overrides traditional infra- and supranational divisions as well as competing modern class divisions. Nationalism is a unique synthesis of economics, culture, and politics; namely, politicized culture in pursuit of economic development. This creative synthesis is focused on the attainment of an independent state uniquely equipped to protect and promote the economy and raise the status of a given culture.

Liberal versions of uneven development, for example, Ernest Gellner's work, also hold that the unequal and gradual spread of industrialization created or enhanced gaps of development between the regions it penetrated and by "engender[ing] very sharp and painful and conspicuous inequality"²⁸ between them became one of the causes of nationalist dissension. Nationalism, in both neo-Marxist and liberal theories of uneven development, is the reaction of suffering regions and social groups; and their protests against the misfortune, or injustice, of unequal growth is also a strategy for rectifying it through massive interclass mobilization and accelerated development.

According to Tom Nairn, however, nationalist movements may also emerge in small regions with relatively scant populations that are more prosperous, due to their rapid capitalist development, than the rest of the state of which they are a part. The aim of nationalist movements in well developed regions is "to free their own strong development from what they had come to perceive as the backwardness around them—from some larger, politically dominant power whose stagnation or archaism had become an obstacle to their further progress."²⁹

In 1979, another version of the same explanation was developed by Peter Gourevitch. Movements of "peripheral nationalism," in this view, emerge in ethnically distinct regions that are economically dynamic but play a limited role in the leadership of the state's central political institutions. This lack of congruence may result either from the ability of the periphery to improve its economic position or from the faltering of the state's original core.³⁰ The examples Nairn provides are Belgium in decaying mercantile Netherlands,³¹ the Czech-speaking Bohemians in the parasitic Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Basque and Catalan regions in a backward former imperial Spain, and Scotland in Great Britain.³² Gourevitch lists most of the same cases and adds Quebec in Canada. The very first systematic study of nationalist movements from developed regions is Juan Diez Medrano's comparative study of Catalonia and the Basque country.³³

When we add to Nairn's, Gourevitch's, and Diez Medrano's lists contemporary examples: the breakup of the USSR ignited by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, where per capita income was higher than in other parts of the USSR, and of Yugoslavia by Slovenia and Croatia, which are more developed than Serbia and the other three republics that used to make up Yugoslavia, and the more developed Czech districts rapid consent to Slovakia's hasty demands of independence, we are led to acknowledge that, contrary to existing views, an important terrain of nationalist upheaval and political transformation is the developed region of the less developed state. Nationalism of relatively developed regions contributes a sizeable share of nationalist movements and constitutes many of the most current ones.

Nairn's and Gourevitch's perspectives further accentuate Hechter's emphasis on the nationalist concern with the instrumental role played by the state vis-à-vis the economy. Nationalist separatism, whether in underdeveloped or developed regions, is rooted in the diminished value of the state for further economic development.³⁴ The fateful, and fitful, shifts of Ukrainian public opinion between the retention of close ties with Russia and independence since 1991 is a fine illustration of this instrumental relationship. It also explains why for some two centuries Catalans were content to accept the hegemony of the Spanish state and why in the early 1960s so many Balts were proud of the economic development their republics attained within the USSR.

In examining the impact of uneven development on the legitimating ideas adopted by early and late modernizers, or developed and developing societies, Nairn observes the preference of the former for the universalist framework of the Enlightenment and of the latter for the particularism of Romanticism. The Enlightenment idea of "an even and progressive development of material civilization and mass culture...both outwards and downwards" to be diffused by commercial capitalism and the copying of the early developers' institutions was typical of the elites of societies that enjoyed the advantages of unevenness and, therefore, were convinced that progress was identified with their traits and virtues.³⁵

Many peripheric elites, however, were filled with anxiety because they experienced the predominance of the early modernizers as foreign domination and invasion. To stand up to this tidal wave, without modern economic and political institutions, these elites sought to mobilize the one resource they possessed—their masses—through a Romantic culture of distinctiveness.³⁶ Though Nairn's

theory of nationalism in developed regions is not very extensive, there is little doubt that he considers them as belonging in the same category with early developers and, therefore, as proponents of Enlightenment universalism.

The distinction drawn between the Enlightenment and Romantic fountainheads of nationalism leads to alternative criteria of membership in the nation. In reproducing one of the most celebrated distinctions in the study of nationalism, Liah Greenfeld distinguishes between types of "criteria of membership in the national collective, which may be either 'civic', that is, identical with citizenship, or 'ethnic.' In the former case, nationality is at least in principle open and voluntaristic; it can and sometimes must be acquired. In the latter, it is believed to be inherent—one can neither acquire it if one does not have it, nor change it if one does; it has nothing to do with individual will, but constitutes a genetic characteristic."³⁷ This categorization lays the foundation for two types of host-immigrant relations. Where the criterion of membership is *civic*, that is, based on individual rights of participation in the political life of the community in disregard of the variation in the cultural attributes of the individuals concerned, the integration of foreigners should be easier than where the criteria of membership in the community is *ethnic*, that is, based on putative origins and deeply anchored cultural markers.

In a study focused specifically on the relationship between nationalism and citizenship Rogers Brubaker clarifies the alternative legal frameworks that articulate the distinction presented by Greenfeld. In all societies, he points out, citizenship is bestowed on children of citizens on the basis of the legal principle of *jus sanguinis* (right of blood). In Germany, this is the only criterion for citizenship and, consequently, immigrants and even their descendants do not automatically become citizens.

But in other societies, such as France, this principle is complemented by another. *Jus soli* (right of the soil) accords persons born on the state's territory its citizenship. Though not an immigration society, France is nevertheless an assimilationist one: until recently it automatically naturalized the children of its immigrants, at birth if one parent was born in France or at age 18 when both parents are foreign born.³⁸ In Brubaker's view, the reason for the differential legal bases of citizenship in Germany and France reflects the historical legacy of the formation of the French nation by the state, which preceded it, and the ethno-cultural basis of the German nation, which preceded the state. He points out that although German and French

citizenship and naturalization laws have undergone changes, the revised versions do not depart from these "deeply rooted habits of national self-understanding."³⁹

I will tie, in the present work, the criteria of citizenship or membership in the nation, presented in Greenfeld's and Brubaker's works, directly to immigration reception, on the basis of Hechter's, Gellner's, Nairn's, and Gourevich's theories of nationalism, by designating the nationalism of host societies that offer a measure of integration to immigrants and favor further modernization as *hegemonic nationalism* and the nationalism in societies in which opposition to immigrants and their integration is exhibited and accompanied by a fear of modernization as *corporate nationalism*.

The hegemonic conception of society is usually rooted in confidence in the continuous process of economic expansion and attendant cultural hegemony, typical to the Enlightenment, which underwrites the possibility of social expansion through the absorption of newcomers. Conversely, the corporate view of society is derived from viewing outside forces as a threat against which protection is required. In relatively developed regions, it is anticipated that nationalist sentiments and movements will possess a hegemonic dimension, that is the intellectual and moral authority to lead all the social strata in the region at critical historical junctures.⁴⁰ This hegemonic influence will limit the ability of the foes of integration to mobilize wide support for their unease with and opposition to the inclusionary attitude. The political predominance of nationalist parties and the attraction of their region's cultural prestige—the former toward other parties, the latter vis-à-vis immigrants—are two sides of the same coin, the coin of hegemonic leadership.

Concomitantly, the willingness of immigrants to voluntarily loosen or abandon some aspects of their native culture and be absorbed into the population of the host society is a likely response in relatively developed regions where a higher standard of living and high cultural prestige reinforce each other. Individual members of the immigrant group are likely to feel that their interests are best served, as Inglehart and Woodward would expect, by acquiescing in the cultural hegemony of the host society, even at the risk of submerging their previous identity in the latter's language and culture.⁴¹ In relatively developed regions the linguistic tug-of-war of immigrants and hosts is frequently resolved through the compromise of bilingualism: the learning of the new tongue by the younger members of the first generation of the immigrants in addition to their old language (and by

members of the second generation, frequently in lieu of their parents' ancestral language), due to the attractions of social mobility it promises.

Conversely, the fear of the early modernizers' predominance and "denationalization" due to migration from less developed regions merge in late developers and developing regions and lead to a defensive conception of the nation. The beleaguered nation is inward looking, and its concern with "survival" leads to the erection of protective walls around its culture and domain and foreigners are seen as diluting its uniqueness. Full democratization would require the political integration of ethnically different newcomers and, therefore, is rarely sought.

In times of economic recession, the same logic that led to self-confidence in continuous economic expansion, social mobility and hence to a readiness, typical to hegemonic nationalism in developed regions, to assimilate immigrants is likely to steer in the opposite direction. Immigrants at such times might be seen as a threat to prosperity and national identity and exclusionary measures will be called for. But recession, a single section of the capitalist economic cycle, is likely to lead only to a *temporary reversal* in the inclusionary sentiment toward immigrants.

In the next section I will present the conditions under which the nationalist movements of relatively developed regions will adopt not hegemonic but corporate views of their society and, therefore, will express *permanent opposition* to the integration of immigrants. Conversely, I will present two situations in which potential conflict between immigrants and hosts is attenuated by shared interests or presence of third parties that override potential antagonism between them.

The Contexts and Limits of Hegemonic Nationalism

Nairn's theory, like so many other theories of nationalism, suffers from overgeneralization. As was already pointed out by Diez Medrano, assuming an aspiration for economic modernization behind all nationalist movements in relatively developed regions is mistaken.⁴² Developed regions have spun not only movements of modernizing nationalism as in Catalonia, Latvia, and Estonia but, on occasion, such as in the Basque provinces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a nationalist movement that was opposed to large-scale industrialization and its modern consequences tout court.

This form of defensiveness is the product of *traditional elites*, sometimes including the religious hierarchy, that derive their privilege from a corporate system of power distribution or religious status order and, therefore, are threatened by modernization and the creation of new economic strata, the universalization of civil rights, and cultural homogenization. Such elite strata are usually the product of continued diversity, typical to empires, or the medieval system of corporate privilege. Unable to translate their customary political advantage into modern economic assets, they are unable to spearhead the drive for modernization. With a lack of effective modern resources, traditional elite strata are likely to adopt a "defensive nationalism."⁴³ To shield their region from the forces of modernity they seek to mobilize their followers with highly charged traditional cultural appeals usually of a religious sort.

We need to keep in mind the balance between pro- and anti-modernist nationalism. Overall, most antimodernist nationalists operate in underdeveloped regions. Antimodernist nationalism in developed peripheral regions is relatively rare. Where corporate nationalism makes its appearance, this will be part of its attempt "to modernize" its premodern political privileges, arrangements, and traditions. When nationalist movements that are more likely to appear in underdeveloped regions make their appearance in a relatively developed region, they carry many discordant and odd elements with them into the modern era. The traditional leaders of such movements frequently adopt extreme language, and sometimes programs, because not only are their status and privilege threatened by a competing modern elite stratum but also their *whole way of life* without which they cannot imagine their existence.

The study of Basque nationalism and its hostility toward Spanish immigrants will allow me to confront one of the most frequently invoked perspectives to the study of relations between culturally distinct groups that span its own view of nationalism—the theory of *primordial nationalism*. Primordialist explanations are especially prevalent in the analysis of the intense, and sometimes violent, nationalist sentiments in postcommunist Eastern Europe and Central Asia and also of the rising hostility toward immigrants in Western Europe. I find it important, therefore, to examine the uses and limits of primordialist theory in the context of this study.

Primordial attachments were defined by Clifford Geertz as the "'givens'...[of] congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, [that] are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness