

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Race has a special power in American history. Racial divisions are woven deeply into the nation's social fabric, and egalitarian ideals have never been sufficient to ensure their eradication. For black Americans, the Civil War brought slavery to an end only to usher in an era of Jim Crow laws, pervasive racism, lynching, and rigid codes of racial etiquette. When World War I sparked the Great Migration and thousands of blacks moved from field to factory, racial inequality was recast in an urban, industrial context. For the Chinese, a wave of hostility crested in 1882 and induced Congress to end the nation's tradition of open immigration. The Chinese Exclusion Act was the first of many immigration restrictions targeting citizens of Asian countries, and the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II represented an extension of these discriminatory policies. These and other examples demonstrate how the architecture of racial inequality was reconstituted rather than dismantled in the decades following the Civil War. Although the forms of racial injustice embodied in law and custom varied regionally and evolved over time, it took nearly a century before the most egregious manifestations of discrimination—in voting, education, public accommodations, and employment—became the focus of concerted federal action.

Class conflict has been pervasive since the nation's founding. In countless instances it has intersected and even infused the processes of racial inequality and conflict alluded to above. As workers battled collectively to secure decent wages, safe working conditions, and even the right to unionize, the contours of their struggle were frequently etched

in racial terms. Eligibility for union membership often stopped at the color line, which was particularly true in the nineteenth century, during the Progressive Era, and into the 1930s. As the labor movement gained ground during the New Deal years and beyond, its membership policies became increasingly progressive, but in practice, unions continued to reinforce white privilege. Given the historical salience of race and class prior to the Civil Rights Movement, when were people able to pursue common objectives across racial lines? How did different groups balance the frequently competing imperatives of class and racial identity? What factors promoted interracial cooperation, and what are the implications for improving race relations in the future?

This book examines how race influenced the trajectory of the American labor movement between the 1850s and the 1950s, a period that witnessed profound changes in work, labor markets, and politics. Cycles of discrimination, hostility, and distrust shaped race relations among U.S. workers. Even as workers confronted employers demanding better wages and working conditions, racial antagonism often divided workers' interests and loyalties. There were, however, rare moments during which cooperation and coordinated action replaced racial animus. Despite palpable legacies of racial conflict and discrimination, workers were occasionally able to forge interracial coalitions, often as class conflict escalated. Though they were generally limited or fleeting, there is much to be learned from instances of solidarity. This book considers how and why those moments emerged.

GENERAL THEORETICAL QUESTIONS

A unified theory of race relations should explain both conflict and solidarity, the Janus faces of racial interaction. But the lure of drama in history and the analytical separation of topics in sociology have compartmentalized theorizing about these countervailing processes. Interracial conflict, particularly between black and white workers, has long been a source of working-class division, but its impact and prevalence has obscured instances of interracial solidarity in historical research. Because racial divisions have been significant for the failure of particular strikes, sociological analyses have also been overly focused on racial conflict. As a result, theories of ethnic and racial antagonism fail to explain why and when workers overcome an environment of racism to achieve stable, interracial unionism.

General theories of racial competition, including the split labor market variant that informs our analysis, reflect this conceptual underdevelopment (Bonacich 1972; Wilson 1978; Marks 1981; Boswell 1986). The split labor market approach analyzes how workers' wages, resources, and motives are linked to ethnicity and race (we focus exclusively on race). As racial groups' labor market positions become more divergent, the potential for competition and conflict increases. The theory has helped to explain how and why workers' labor market positions may be influenced by race, and in turn, how these differences affect the dynamics of job competition and union organizing (see Bonacich 1975, 1976; Bonacich and Cheng 1984; Hilton 1979; Christiansen 1979; Makabe 1981; Boswell 1986; Peled and Shafir 1987). However, split labor market research has focused on minority strikebreaking and subsequent racial antagonism, and sojourning migration was central to the explanation.¹ Seldom have split labor market studies concentrated on solidarity (Brown and Boswell 1995), and few studies have compared cases (Boswell and Jorjani 1988) to assess the factors that contribute to strikebreaking versus solidarity.

Given the accumulation of separate case studies, a comparative approach to split labor markets is long overdue. This study examines solidarity versus strikebreaking by comparing cases of union organizing drives in particular industries. Because our goal is not merely to demonstrate the theory but to expand and refine it, we address a number of specific issues and questions about the theory in the next chapter. We do not argue that class and race may *only* intersect in labor market configurations. Split labor market theory takes a preexisting level of racism as an historical given. For all our cases, noneconomic factors as well as labor market considerations influenced interracial dynamics among workers (see Frederickson 2002). However, we also duly note where, and under what conditions, workers have been active agents in the construction of racism, rather than solely focusing on the results of white worker "privilege" (Roediger 1991, p. 10, 1994). As Sugrue (1996, p. 393) suggests, we seek to identify the reasons white workers draw on racist ideologies in one situation and pursue interracial solidarity in another. Our goal is to explain why and when racism may appear to be a rational response to competition and conflict. We do not discount the ideological or cultural salience of "felt" racism. Racial attitudes are resilient and may transcend processes of urbanization, bureaucratization, industrialization, or political mobilization (Allen 1994; Hill 1968, 1996,

1998; Goldfield 1997; Lamont 2000). At the same time, however, our work considers class formation and class struggle to be mechanisms through which racial competition and racism are created, regenerated, and maintained (Greenberg 1980; Saxton 1990).

We acknowledge that the experience and meaning of “solidarity” are not necessarily simple or straightforward. Workers may join interracial unions without ever feeling solidarity across racial lines, much less becoming integrated in their families and friendships. Rank and file workers often hold racist beliefs, yet still decide to support interracial organizing and integrated unions because it is in their interests. And, union organizations may actively support interracial solidarity, even if their members do not. We would argue that interracial unions are necessary for class solidarity; they break cycles of racial competition and conflict. By evening labor costs and thus narrowing the racial split in the labor market, interracial alliances offer an alternative to competition.

Split labor market theory focuses specifically on minority motives and the degree to which political resources (e.g., rights of citizenship and electoral representation) and economic resources (e.g., wages and living expenses) converge in the labor market. A divergence in political and economic resources between racial groups increases the likelihood of minority strikebreaking; sojourners or other highly mobile minorities will be especially difficult to organize. Does the logic of competition apply in the converse? As articulated by Bonacich and others, the unstated assumption of past research is that the absence of a split labor market explains interracial solidarity. This assumption results in part from the primacy of sojourning migration in the theory. Bonacich (1972, 1975, 1976), Wilson (1978), and others fail to consider instances when minority strikebreaking took place without sojourning. Is it the case, then, that interracial solidarity is most likely when few minority workers are sojourners? Or, is sojourning secondary to other factors? Past research has not explored whether other factors are necessary for interracial union solidarity aside from an absence of sojourning. In addition, the effects of sojourning migration (or its equivalent) need to be untangled from other important political and ideological factors that condition labor relations. For instance, repression by the militia raises the costs of labor activity, legislation can empower workers by granting them new rights, employer benevolence may increase workers’ loyalty, and racially progressive union policies can be important for bridging racial divisions. We examine the impact of state repression and legisla-

tion on union efficacy and the institutionalization of racial ideologies in the form of employer paternalism and union policies.

We explain these factors in detail in the next chapter, but here we should mention several additional questions that we will address in the course of the book. First, when do dominant workers and unions actively discriminate against racial minorities? Racial prejudice and individual acts of discrimination were common, but large-scale racial conflict came in waves, with only scattered events interceding. Explaining when racial antagonism flares has been a standard focus of split labor market analysis, which, we will see, applies here as well, but what factors led dominant unions to pursue strategies of interracial solidarity? We examine the circumstances that led union leaders to institutionalize strategies of interracial organizing in specific cases. Unlike craft unions that can limit membership to skilled workers, industrial unions attempted to organize the entire work force, including less skilled labor that could be replaced by excluded minorities. Industrial unions typically included statements affirming nondiscrimination, yet they often did little to counter discrimination and some faced strikebreaking by minorities. In spite of the obvious benefits, labor leaders repeatedly encountered difficulty in forging interracial coalitions. The exceptions were often radical, short-lived unions, such as the Industrial Workers of the World or the National Miners Union. Consistent success, we will find, came from tactical innovations in organizing, driven by past failures, and copied from defunct radical unions. What they literally called a “formula” of proto-affirmative action proved necessary (although not sufficient) for success. This formula remains a guide for organizing today.

We must ask not only when do white workers pursue racial inclusion, but also when do minority workers look past white racism to join in class solidarity? If the “formula” was not sufficient, why did it fail? Many of the same variables that encourage white workers to support unions also condition the extent of allegiance among racial minorities. We will also identify particular sources of minority participation, such as labor costs, stable residence in a community, and relations with employers. And in a final twist, while our theories assume that minority solidarity with dominant workers would enhance the prospects of union victory, we must explain the case of postwar southern textiles, where an inclusive union met with defeat.

A final question is, When do employers discriminate? Racial competition theories posit a relatively passive role for employers, who will

hire the cheapest workers possible (holding skill constant) to minimize labor costs. In this view, employers do not discriminate or consciously maintain a reserve army of minority labor. Employers may be racist, but those who discriminate would have to pay higher wages and have fewer workers to choose from, especially during a strike. Past versions of the theory consider discrimination in the workplace solely as the outgrowth of intra-class struggles between dominant and minority labor. However, it is clear that in some of our cases employers did actively engage in discriminatory policies. In the later chapters, we address how and when employers discriminated and how they avoided the costs of their racism.

JUSTIFICATION OF CASES

“If the new Committee for Industrial Organization follows the pattern of the United Mine Workers of America—and there seems no reason to doubt that it will—in the matter of the color line in labor, then Negro workers ought to flock to the CIO unhesitatingly, for the UMW are known far and wide for their absolute equality, regardless of color” (*Crisis* 1936, quoted in Foner and Lewis 1981, p. 339). In the 1930s, leaders of the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) took a number of unprecedented steps to recruit black workers. In so doing, they earned this extraordinary endorsement in the NAACP’s publication *Crisis*. A series of political and economic factors converged that made such a strategy plausible and effective. Having learned from successes and failures in other organizing drives, industrial union leaders understood the special circumstances of the 1930s.

“The President wants you to join the union!” In 1933 John L. Lewis urged mineworkers through the narrow window of political opportunity provided by the Roosevelt administration’s ambivalent backing of industrial labor. In the case of bituminous coal mining, the New Deal’s support went beyond the symbolic encouragement that the National Industrial Recovery Act signified to workers in most industries. At the same time, black out-migration from the South abated during the Depression, which helped to stabilize the workforce, and more significantly, aligned interests among black and white mineworkers who increasingly shared dissatisfaction with their treatment at the hands of coal operators.

As the circumstances changed, the UMW, led by Lewis, adopted bold new organizing strategies that were specifically oriented toward the recruitment of black mineworkers. For more than a decade the use of black strikebreakers had consistently undermined organizing efforts and reproduced interracial worker antagonism. Thus, the UMW's new tactics, which were borrowed from the more radical but marginal National Miners Union, signified a turning point in the industrial union movement. As "the last hired, first fired," black mineworkers harbored no particular loyalty to coal operators, but a decade of empty rhetoric and racist hostility on the part of white-dominated unions had generated distrust on that front as well.

The crucial tactical innovation was the integration of black unionists into the leadership structure of local unions. According to the "miners' formula," a forerunner to affirmative action, the unions systematically used black organizers and union executives to convince black workers of their sincerity (Nyden 1977). After a long organizing drive throughout the summer of 1933, the UMW won recognition and favorable contracts in the fall of that year, and thereby provided the inspiration and strategic template for interracial organizing campaigns of industrial workers throughout the decade. Confronting similarly difficult challenges and unlikely odds, steel and auto workers subsequently employed variants of the strategy and met with comparable success.

Each of these cases is part of a larger narrative linked to the history of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. CIO unions in all three industries overcame both white racism and black strikebreaking to forge a stable interracial solidarity based on the common interests of workers. This narrative encompasses six union drives, two each in the coal, steel, and auto industries. The first drive for each union was defeated in part because of racial division. The second drive was won in equal proportion because the union institutionalized its rhetoric about racial equality in the miners' formula (Foner 1974, p. 218; Brueggemann and Boswell 1998). The formula worked. However exaggerated the NAACP's favorable assessment of the CIO in 1936, those original industrial unions remain today among the country's most integrated institutions and most powerful advocates for racial equality and common class interests.

Powerful and ruthless employers, indifferent or hostile government, deep-seated interracial antagonism, and material vulnerability among workers in the coal, steel, and auto industries made these successes

extraordinary. These cases stand in stark contrast to the more typical instances of interracial hostility that characterize much of American labor history. In 1869, for example, some four hundred white silver miners in Comstock, Nevada, attacked Chinese workers and ran them out of the district. The miners, all men and all white, feared that the mine owners would hire the Chinese workers, who would soon be laid off from the nearly complete railway. In an area of the country where just about everybody was from some place else, they considered the Chinese permanent foreigners. And in a time when unions were rare, racist antagonism against the Chinese united the miners like nothing before. The white miners knew that Chinese wages were one-third their own. They also knew that those low wages were worth a fortune in China, where most of the sojourning Chinese would soon return. Miners, however, were hard to replace and they were fierce about sticking together. No Chinese worked underground in Comstock (Lingenfelter 1974, pp. 114–16).

“The Great Steel Strike” of 1919 produced similar results but under different circumstances. As had been the case decades earlier with Chinese workers on the West Coast, this is a story of minority migrants, this time poor southern blacks seeking a better life, pitted against dominant unions trying to prevent a decline in their wages. But in this strike, strategies of both exclusion and integration failed. Although some union locals actively encouraged black membership, most discriminated. Northern industrial labor markets were swelled by returning American soldiers and thousands of blacks who sought refuge from the poverty and racial oppression of the South. In this context, most blacks allied themselves with employers rather than support a strike led by the craft-oriented and generally conservative American Federation of Labor (AFL). The widespread use of black strikebreakers from the South helped defeat the union, and ongoing racial antagonism weakened the labor movement for more than a decade.

Move forward in history to 1948 and we find a dramatically different set of actions and results: minorities support the union while white workers defect; the union preaches integration and the employers practice discrimination. While all involved were citizens and none were sojourning migrants, none of this prevented one of the biggest defeats in U.S. labor history. The union in that case was the CIO itself, which launched “Operation Dixie,” the biggest drive to date, to organize the textiles and other industries of the modernizing “New South.” The minorities were poor southern blacks who “blessed the CIO” for what

it could bring. The dominant workers were poor southern whites who blessed their employers for what they had (Griffith 1988; Goldfield 1994).

Although they comprised different sets of historical circumstances, the cases of Comstock, the Great Steel Strike, and Operation Dixie are similar in their outcomes, all of which provide a striking contrast to the more unusual CIO drives of the 1930s. The historical rarity of cases that parallel the progressivism of the New Deal-era industrial drives partly accounts for the neglect of interracial solidarity in theories dealing with race and collective action. However, the comparison of multiple cases is the key to understanding the range of labor outcomes that obtained prior to the Civil Rights Movement. The success of the early CIO efforts reflects the effectiveness of specifically defined affirmative action programs in combination with other favorable conditions. Yet because CIO unions subsequently failed to breach racist paternalism in the South, mass unionization remained weak in a region that grew proportionally in terms of jobs, population, and political influence. How best to realize interracial solidarity is still a burning question for the U.S. labor movement and for American society.

Each of these organizing drives deals with a pivotal episode in the history of race and labor relations. We use these cases to test deductive propositions and to construct inductive generalizations for a competition theory of racial conflict and class solidarity.

SCOPE CONDITIONS

In subsequent chapters, we examine the patterns of race relations that accompanied nine individual labor organizing drives and associated strikes from 1869 to 1952 in U.S. history. The cases are bracketed, more or less, by the Civil War and the Civil Rights Movement, each of which brought a qualitative shift in race relations. The choice of scope conditions is always theoretically significant. Our choice is relevant for two theoretical reasons, one historical and the other analytical.

Historically, the social structure, political environment, and “taken-for-granted” ideological presumptions of actors start to shift noticeably at the margins of our time period. Delineating the period between such shifts allows for a guileless comparability of cases. Within this time frame, “all else equal” is a relatively unchallenged and reasonable assumption, though some will always assail a scope as too wide. Wilson’s (1978) influential book on race relations describes our period as one

where split labor market dynamics are the dominant determinants of race relations, in contrast to caste and class dynamics before and after. For labor relations, the usual turning points are 1881, with the rise of the AFL, and the 1950s, which witnessed the AFL-CIO merger. Relative stability and then decline follow (Goldfield 1987; Foner 1988; Rayback 1966). We are perhaps entering a new period as the current AFL-CIO leadership is trying to revitalize the labor movement, drawing in some ways on lessons of interracial organizing learned during the earlier period. Our relatively early starting point introduces the risk that our first case may not be fully comparable to the others, as mass production had yet to become commonplace. However, we feel that this risk is acceptable given the industrial nature of mining by the 1860s, and, we think, outweighed by the benefits of including the Chinese case.

Each case was selected for its historic impact on the labor movement and race relations. These were pivotal cases, we find, because they provided models that many others followed. We limit the comparison to large and lasting industrial unions so as to focus on racial distinctions that are not heavily confounded with skill differences. Industrial unions were the most powerful and lasting in mining, and we draw three cases from that industry. Discrimination against Chinese immigrants in the western states between 1850–82 reveals the impact of international sojourning migration on racial competition during the origins of the U.S. labor movement. The surge of racial violence by miners in the late 1860s kept Chinese workers out of the underground mines throughout the West. It also contributed to the passage of the 1882 Exclusion Act, which prohibited further Chinese immigration. In addition, such violence aided the resurgence of the pro-exclusion Democratic Party among the white working class (Saxton 1990).

The Great Steel strike of 1919 was one of the largest and most important of a series of post-World War I class conflicts that employers broke by importing black strikebreakers. It was coincident with race riots and other conflicts that established the tenor of race relations in northern industrial centers. The failure of the 1919 steel strike was symbolic of the decline in organized labor that would occur during the 1920s, a decline largely attributable to the political power of employers and owners as well as internal divisions in the ranks of labor. Due to the large-scale migration of rural, southern blacks to the industrial cities of the North, this period initiated a new phase of race relations within

the labor movement. Prior to that time, with some exceptions such as the Chinese in California, racial conflict was not woven into the dynamics of labor organizing as blacks were largely confined to southern agriculture.

Perhaps the most obvious cases to include for this study are the mass production organizing drives of the CIO in the 1930s and early 1940s (see Goldfield 1998). After the AFL failed to build an industrial union in the steel industry, the United Mine Workers became the progenitor of the CIO. That the CIO managed to organize across racial lines on a massive scale made possible a union movement that could take advantage of the New Deal and which could muster the resources to support it. As example and as advocate, the CIO unions sparked and fueled nearly every major move toward racial integration thereafter (despite burning less brightly during the early Civil Rights Movement, Draper 1994; Hill 1996).²

In the South, industrialization incorporated black labor alongside whites in some cases, notably timber, longshoremen, or coal. There was even successful unionization of blacks and whites by the UMW (and earlier by the Knights of Labor). But textiles, the South's largest industry from 1865 through the 1960s, employed a highly segregated workforce. Whites held the vast majority of operative positions. Blacks, if hired at all, held menial positions and served as an obvious and threatening "reserve army" (McLaurin 1978; Rachleff 1984). This is the industry that counted the most when interracial unionization failed during Operation Dixie, our last case.

The failure of the CIO's Operation Dixie to overcome racial division in the postwar South's dominant industry diminished those gains. The case of Operation Dixie extends our analysis past the end of World War II, into the early 1950s. It illustrates the extent to which labor failed to consolidate the gains made during the New Deal era into lasting and pervasive industrial mobilization. Thus, the failure of Operation Dixie limited future union expansion and greatly contributed to a relative decline that subsequent amelioration of race relations in the South has not reversed (Goldfield 1994). The case also underscores the particular difficulties faced by labor organizers fighting the southern institution of racist paternalism maintained by employers. Especially interesting is that minority workers were more favorably disposed to labor organizing than their white counterparts, who more often sided with their employers.

Of course, there were many other major events in labor history in which race did not play a central part. Haymarket and Homestead come to mind, as do Pullman, Patterson, and, more recently, PATCO (Gordon 1964, 1978, 1981; Dunbar 1981; Clawson and Clawson 1999). Also left out are short-lived radical unions that achieved interracial solidarity, such as the Industrial Workers of the World, which failed to institutionalize their sometimes spectacular union drives or strikes. Why they failed is a different story than the one we tell here. We also do not examine white ethnic divisions. By focusing on race we largely jump over the period of 1880-1914 when labor relations were heavily shaped by the immense immigration of South and East Europeans, about which there have been numerous excellent studies (Piore 1979; Gutman 1976). After World War I, race, more than white ethnic differences or skill distinctions, was the major division within the working class that impeded industrial union organizing (Northrup 1944). European immigration had fallen off during the war and became tightly regulated thereafter, while deskilling and mechanization had displaced craft labor in mass production. Of course, examples abound of racial conflict outside the labor market, and there are numerous cases where citizens forged interracial solidarity outside of labor unions, especially during the heyday of the Civil Rights Movement. A linear history of race and labor relations could also enumerate many more cases similar to the ones we present here and connect them with intervening narrative. We sacrifice a continuous flow of history in selecting cases, but we contend that the racial conflicts and interracial solidarities examined here epitomize the types of struggles commonly found.

Understanding the historical events surrounding race and labor is the focus of the narrative chapters. We use these narratives for the purposes of building a general theory of racial competition. Analytically, we sought to include critical comparisons, where outcomes differ but determinants are similar in all but one major instance, and crucial tests, where the theory's precepts so obviously apply that explanatory failure would constitute refutation of the model (Eckstein 1979). Despite the historical brackets described above, the period is expansive enough to include exceptions to theoretical expectations and to consider reasonable alternatives. It is also a period where the possibilities are more open and more visible than they would be later. National unions, employers, and other actors had greater leniency to publicly express racist beliefs prior to the successes of the Civil Rights Movement. The conditions and institutions that fostered interracial solidarity—which

constitute one of our major foci—were also in formation. The possibilities for alternatives, such as radical class coalitions or racist fascism, even though unrealized, were also greater during this era than after World War II. This is not to say that more sweeping temporal and/or cross-national comparisons are inappropriate; on the contrary, they will be necessary to further develop the generality of the theory. For this project, however, the scope allows us to obtain our twin goals: narrative explanations of how pivotal events unfolded and comparative analysis of common processes in diverse cases.

Split labor market theory is applicable in each case of industrial organizing as clear racial differences exist in the price of labor, political resources, or motives, independent from skill or other personal attributes. Racism is nearly ubiquitous, although for each case its social origins and intensity may differ. Racial ideologies are thus part of the available “tool kit” with which actors made sense of the world during this period (Swidler 1986). Also available were ideologies and examples of equality and interracial solidarity. Though racist beliefs were common in all cases, as we explain in the next chapter, how actors responded was conditioned by both the short-term rationality of market competition and the long-term institutionalization of race relations. While each case has unique conditions and institutions, in the conclusions we compare the following common variants: the levels of union success, the degree of working-class interracial solidarity, the forms of competition and conflict, the role of the state and local government repression, union policies of minority inclusion or exclusion, and levels of employer discrimination and/or paternalism. This comparison affords an opportunity to explore the factors that give rise to divergent outcomes across a number of instances of the split labor market.

Notably, the Chinese case offers particular insight into the enactment of anti-immigration legislation, the role of the state, and the reproduction of split labor markets. It also provides a contrast with the remaining cases, which focus on black-white conflict. The post-World War I racial conflicts in northern industrial cities precipitated new conceptions of race relations as an urban issue among workers and serve as the “crucial tests” of racial competition theories. The unstated assumption that solidarity follows from an absence of a split labor market is investigated by way of the CIO organizing drives of the 1930s. The contrary results found in Operation Dixie provide an ideal crucial comparison for testing the usefulness of the theory.

We limit the analysis to determinants of race and labor relations in industrial unions, mainly but not exclusively to black-white relations. This excludes white ethnic (including Hispanic) conflict, gender stratification, craft union racism, and community relations. While split labor market theory may be important for any of these issues, they fall outside the scope of our inquiry and represent qualitatively different processes of discrimination. Additionally, we do not provide analyses of labor conflict involving Japanese, Native American, or other minority groups that represented a very small percentage of the labor force during the period in question. The exclusion of white ethnic variation may be the most troubling limitation to some, and we do not intend to imply that this is an unimportant consideration. But as Lieberman's (1980) authoritative study documents, the mobility patterns of blacks (and Chinese in our period)³ differ qualitatively from those of white ethnics. The qualitative difference justifies analytical separation.

ANALYTIC STRATEGY

This book examines a number of historically important cases that reveal the crosscutting effects of race and class on worker interests, mobilization, and the efficacy of the organized labor movement. Our goal is to explain when racial competition produces strikebreaking and when workers can overcome racial divisions through interracial class solidarity. The "analytic narratives" (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, and Weingast 1998) in the following chapters underscore the salience of race relations for understanding the history of the labor movement in the United States. At the same time, race relations cannot adequately be studied without considering processes of class conflict and intra-class competition that may reinforce racial identity. Because the trajectories of race relations and the labor movement are historically linked, neither can be appropriately understood in isolation. Producing a comprehensive model and method of analysis is necessary for achieving our goal.

To help us analyze union organizing in split labor markets, we use Heckathorn's (1988, 1989, 1990a, 1990b) game theory models of collective action to simulate labor organizing (chapter 2). The model starts with the simple premise that unions reward strikers and punish strikebreakers, at least those it can monitor. Sanctions are applied and rewards gained by both the individual worker and the worker's group as a whole. Thus, all workers have an interest in encouraging the coopera-

tion of others (even more so than their interest in their own cooperation), which they achieve through their interpersonal connections. These connections contribute mightily to the effectiveness of the strike. Game theory often stops at the point of simulation, but we want to know how well the model applies empirically. This means comparing the narratives to see whether the predicted sequence of events occurs, and if so, under what conditions. By characterizing each strike in terms of the organizing sequence that it resembles, we can combine the game theory model with systematic case comparisons.

Starting with Skocpol's (1980) comparison of social revolutions, applications of formal comparative methods have become increasingly common and increasingly sophisticated. Ragin's (1987) development of QCA was a leap forward, principally because it provided a replicable methodology grounded in explicit logical principals. Its application requires analysts to confront contrary evidence, dismissed exceptions, and flawed assumptions; QCA makes explicit what researchers have to emphasize, dismiss, and assume in order to arrive at a particular interpretation. While QCA is useful as a comparative strategy, it relies on case simplification and thus does not provide the historical texture found in our narrative chapters, which are condensed from larger studies. Our approach is to present detailed case histories that can be analyzed in a comparative fashion with the goal of delineating those factors that account for minority strikebreaking and the varying levels of class solidarity associated with union organizing drives. Our use of QCA helps make our approach replicable, systematic, and explicit. However, because many of our conclusions will be obvious from the case histories themselves, and because readers primarily interested in the case histories may find the mechanics of QCA somewhat tedious, we have relegated our formal analyses to an appendix.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

In the next chapter, we trace the development and review the precepts of racial competition and split labor market theories. Following the review, we use game theory principles to expand upon the theory's basic premises and derive models of working-class solidarity versus strikebreaking. Chapter 3 supplements the prior theoretical discussion by analyzing split labor markets in terms of the larger world economy. We argue that the uneven pattern of global economic development is

associated with three distinct types of labor migration, each of which has implications for the reproduction of split labor markets, and hence, racial antagonism. Specifically, we review the sojourning immigration of Chinese into the United States in the nineteenth century and discuss significance of the Great Migration, which began to bring large numbers of black agricultural workers into northern cities circa 1916.

Chapters 4 through 7 present the case studies in chronological order, beginning with the Comstock miners' discrimination against Chinese workers in the nineteenth century in chapter 4, the 1919 steel strike in chapter 5, six organizing drives that became the heart of the CIO during the Great Depression in Chapter 6, and the postwar case of Operation Dixie in chapter 7. Each of these historical chapters provides a narrative sequence for the specific period. While we devote particular attention to the theoretical factors outlined in chapter 2, these narrative chapters contain all the major ingredients that our sources deemed historically relevant.

Comparing cases and testing theory in historical sociology differs in purpose from traditional social history, which seeks to offer novel interpretations of events. Social history necessarily draws on primary sources, while comparing cases requires an authoritative source or convergence among multiple sources. Critical case studies fall somewhere in between depending on how much past research has established the relevant facts. For instance, the narrative of the 1919 steel strike is well known, less so for the case of Chinese miners, while we offer a novel interpretation from primary sources of that less known case of Operation Dixie.

In chapter 8, we consider the results of our work for the development of racial competition theory and for understanding race and class relations in general. Our conclusions are informed by our case comparison, and for interested readers, we provide the technical details of our methodology in an appendix to the book. Our cases show that racial competition and conflict frequently become acute during labor organizing drives and strikes. More difficult to explain are the sources of employer discrimination and interracial solidarity, especially when the latter emerges despite racial competition. Utilizing our case comparison, we seek to further develop a theoretical framework and an appropriate methodology for the study of these phenomena. Our goal is the development of general theory, which we think is the ultimate

but surely not singular purpose of comparative historical sociology (see Kiser and Hechter 1991, 1998). With this goal in mind, we conclude with a discussion of our empirical results and our revisions to the original split labor market approach.