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Themes and Variations in the Sociology of Emotions

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Like the basic elements of matter, intellectual fashions have a finite half-life. For a generation, the cognitive perspective dominated the social sciences. Simply as style, it seemed appropriate for a post-industrial, Boolean age that is automated, computerized, and founded on higher and higher refinements in organizational rationality. Although countervailing ideologies flourished in the popular realm—in New Age movements, the drug culture, cultist spiritual enterprises—most social scientists staked their theoretical fortunes on examining their subjects' cognitions. Emotions were relegated to the fringes of scientific work, the property of quasi-scientific disciplines such as psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology, although emotions were often unwittingly smuggled in under such rubrics as attitudes, charisma, and social class identity. Among philosophers, too, emotions remained of interest, a troublesome feature of the troublesome mind-body problem.

But with the inevitable cresting of a virtually exclusive interest in cognition and its problems—this is an instance of the exhaustion of the possibilities of Kuhnian "normal science"—emotion has reemerged as a legitimate and interesting topic of inquiry. The beginning of the current attention to emotions among sociologists illustrates the oft-cited principle that new knowledge emerges when the intellectual climate favors it. That this is not tautology is shown by the fact that usually, unknown to each other, several investigators commence work on the new topic at about the same time. Possibly the most famous instance of this was the simultaneous work of Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace, both of whom arrived at approximately similar conclusions concerning the evolution of species through environmental selection.

In the sociology of emotions, 1975 was the watershed year: Arlie Russell Hochschild (1975) published an article on emotions in a feminist collection; Thomas Scheff organized the first session on emotions at the American Sociological Association meetings in San Francisco; and Randall
Collins (1975) theorized a central place for emotions in the microdynamics of stratification in his book Conflict Sociology. Of course, lead time on all such work is considerable, therefore we may date the turn to emotions from the early 1970s. Why just then? It is tempting to speculate that sociologists were responding to the Zeitgeist of the decade of the 1960s, with its attack on linear logic, its emphasis on the importance of expressiveness, and its concentrated focus on the self.

By the end of the 1970s, there were also the first and second books specifically devoted to emotions by sociologists (A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions [Kemper, 1978a], and Scheff's Catharsis in Healing, Ritual and Drama [1979]); the appearance of an article on emotions in a special issue of The American Sociologist devoted to new theoretical approaches (Kemper, 1978b); and the dynamizing articles in the The American Journal of Sociology by Shott (1979) and by Hochschild (1979). At the brink of the 1980s, the sociology of emotions was poised for developmental take off. And indeed it has, centered in the recruitment of many new participants and publications, and culminating in the successful organization of a section on emotions in the American Sociological Association.

This work arises from the section's first two thematic sessions, presented at the 1987 meetings of the American Sociological Association in Chicago. I proposed as a theme for those sessions: Research Hypotheses in the Sociology of Emotions. True to the spirit of all collective undertakings, the title was revised to Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions, with Candace Clark and Steven Gordon as organizers and chairs of the sessions.

The origin of the theme was the idea that, given the nascent status of the emotions sub-field in sociology, it would be useful for some of those with developed theories to present both an overview of their position and a program of research that would help to elaborate and test the theory they espoused. A research-oriented approach would enable interested scholars and students to see where they themselves might fit in the sociological study of emotions.

Although each contribution here stands on its own merit in exploring a specific theoretical facet of the sociology of emotions, each also, by design or by default, partakes of a particular choice, option, or alternative that is available in social scientific work today. These choices are organizing matrices for thought and for research. They aid implicitly (and often unconsciously) in assembling certain ideas and, as certainly, in precluding others. Some of the alternatives are simply that; others contest the terrain between them, fighting, one might say, for the soul of the sociology of emotions and for the allegiance of students and scholars who might be attracted to it. As one opts for one or another side of each of the alternatives, one achieves a definite position that comprises a metatheory over
and above the substantive core of one's work. I shall discuss these alternatives now and where the contributions fit. (N.B. Some contributions will appear under a single rubric, others under several, as dictated by the content of the contribution.)

**Micro Versus Macro.** Sociology began as the study of society, with major attention to social institutions—family, polity, economy, religion, and so forth—and how their shape and form determine stability or instability, progress or decay, justice or injustice, in society as a whole. The great early thinkers, including Comte, St. Simon, Marx, Durkheim, Spencer, Weber, Simmel, Mannheim, Cooley, and Mead confronted these grand themes in original works that carved out the first scientific analyses of society.

But, despite their main concern with macro and evolutionary or historical issues, these thinkers also treated micro questions. Individual happiness, suicidal despair, alienation, conscience, religious fervor, the nuances of love, self-regard—all found a place in early sociological work. Society and the individual, so seamlessly mitered together by Cooley, were indeed obverse to each other. But the growth of knowledge and its complexity also promoted the specialization and segregation of scholarly interests into either macro or micro-sociology questions and careers. However, today, more self-consciously than before, sociologists are examining the micro-macro mix and the nexus between them. Randall Collins (1981), who helped initiate the new interest in micro-macro analysis presents here a synthesis of his approach, in which some of the central processes of macro-sociology—social order, conflict, and stratification—are seen to rest on the long unappreciated micro-level foundation of emotion.

For Collins, social order is Durkheimian solidarity and moral commitment. These emerge in the course of “interaction rituals” at the micro level, when two or more actors focus on a common activity. In the proper circumstances, a common mood is experienced, and this leads to a sense of unity among the actors, as in Durkheim’s analysis of religious rituals in small face-to-face groups. Conflict, too, rests on a foundation of emotion, in as much as it involves a mobilization of sentiments of anger toward carriers of opposing social interests. Both solidarity and conflict perspectives are joined in Collins’ micro-macro analysis of stratification.

Collins views stratification in terms of two dimensions, namely, power and status (see also Kemper, this volume). Power rituals are interactions structured by the division of roles into order-givers and order-takers, mainly in large-scale organizations, which Collins sees as the principal arena of modern stratification systems. Although these actors participate with different goals and interests, crucially a common mood of shared emotions arises nonetheless. Because of their dominance, order-givers derive
"emotional energy" from the interaction—their interests have been satisfied, their commands obeyed. On the other hand, order-takers frequently experience loss of emotional energy. Their interests are being neglected, their wishes ignored.

Status rituals, which are somewhat independent of the power-based rituals, are interactions that involve membership inclusion or exclusion, centrality or peripherality of location in the interaction sphere, cosmopolitanism or localism of one's network of interaction partners. In Collins' view, these respectively increase or diminish emotional energy.

Broadly speaking, these interaction patterns provide a foundation of emotional resources for participation in further interactions, therefore Collins' idea of "interaction ritual chains," which cumulate across time and space to constitute the macro structure of stratification. Successful interactions in the power-status spheres breed enthusiasm, confidence, and a sense of meaningful affiliation with the groups in which emotional energy was gained. Unsuccessful interactions in the power-status spheres breed depression, embarrassment, and alienation from the group and its interests. Collins sees such emotions as anger, fear, elation, and the like, as short-term resultants that emerge from especially frustrating or especially pleasing pulses of interaction that punctuate the long-term pattern of greater or lesser emotional energy.

Like Collins, Michael Hammond examines macro social organization—especially stratification systems—from a micro perspective. Taking an evolutionary view, he contends that, as a species, we have an inbuilt need for dependable, long-term affective gratification. Hammond's argument, which advances by a series of heuristic, logical surmises, considers what social strategies are likely to be adopted to ensure what he calls "affective maximization."

In the paradigmatic case, individuals are confronted with choices among possible sources of affective maximization. These may be persons, objects, experiences, and so forth. Hammond reasons that to be able to choose efficiently among these requires some knowledge about them. This would prompt the emergence of an information scheme that would differentiate among possible choices according to their potential for providing affective maximization. Logically, this would lead to a classificatory matrix through which individuals could become aware of all their possible choices, for example, at a very simple level, the differentiation of fruits into oranges, apples, plums, peaches, and so forth, and humans into male and female, old and young, short and tall, and so on.

But, Hammond suggests, an even more efficient system would be to create a hierarchically differentiated classification, so that potentially gratifying objects are ordered according to a scale of preference, established by the
cumulated prior experiences of others—in our examples: plums, peaches, oranges, and apples, and males and females, old and young, tall and short in that order. Applied to human actors, who are, of course, the fundamental source of affective maximization, this preferential scheme provides the rudiments of a stratification system, since some characteristics would be ranked as more desirable than others. These might include specific somatic, motivational, and performance attributes as well as ascriptive qualities such as gender, ethnicity, family origin, and the like. Hierarchical differentiation in the manner just described not only ranks persons, objects, roles, and experiences according to how desirable they are for purposes of affective maximization, but also, in regard to persons and roles, ranks their control of opportunities to obtain affective maximization.

Now, early in history, Hammond reasons, when groups were small, this hierarchically differentiated preference system would have led to very little hardship, in as much as there was scant economic surplus to distribute disproportionately among the stratified population. But with growth in scale and the introduction of technological complexity, increasingly large surpluses were appropriated in such a manner that those at the low end of the hierarchy experienced considerable deprivation. Hammond suggests that in these circumstances a new form of differentiation was likely to, and did, emerge, especially for the benefit of those who were ranked low in the existing preference order. This involved the hierarchical differentiation of time: the future can be designated as the repository of a superior level of affective maximization, either in this life or in a postulated hereafter. Belief systems are now invoked to alleviate the burden of inadequate affective resources in the present. In essence, cognitive management is applied to the mending of emotional distress. (This theme resounds in the work of Hochschild and Thoits, this volume).

Within this framework, Hammond is able to argue against sociobiological propositions concerning inbuilt genetic bases for stratification. Rather, he postulates an initial human condition—the need for affective maximization—and conjectures what forms of social organization might be most likely to emerge to attain the affective goal. The human emotional matrix, then, shapes social organization in order to facilitate the pursuit of affective goals.

Thomas Scheff here approaches the micro-macro issue through shame and pride, which he sees as the linchpins of social control. Following Darwin, McDougall, and Cooley, Scheff proposes that individuals engage in more or less perpetual emotional monitoring of the sentiments of approval or disapproval of self that are presented by others. Individuals not only cognize others’ reactions, but also react emotionally with either pride (for approval) or shame (for disapproval). These emotions operate in somewhat
gyroscopic fashion to guide the individual along a socially prescribed path. Cumulating this effect across the whole society provides a micro-basis for a macro-effect, namely, the general pattern of conformity that prevails in society. Social order is thus constructed by aggregating the total of individual cases of experience of pride and shame.

Scheff poses an important question: If shame and pride are so crucial to the maintenance of social order and so pervasive, why don't we see these emotions manifested more often? Relying mainly on the work of psychologist Helen Block Lewis, who did intensive microanalysis of verbatim psychotherapy protocols, Scheff proposes that indeed both shame and (by implication) pride are present, only they are masked, sometimes even from those who are experiencing these emotions. Lewis argued that shame, specifically, can be disguised and unacknowledged in two forms: "overt, undifferentiated shame," which includes painful feelings, blushing, lowered gaze, low-volume stammering speech, among the major signs; and "bypassed shame," which is marked by covert symptoms, such as obsessive, repetitive thought. Scheff regards both these as so prevalent that they may massively contaminate many situations in which actors experience critical evaluation from others, for example children vis-à-vis parents; students vis-à-vis teachers; even nations vis-à-vis nations.

Norman Denzin, too, takes a macro view in relation to emotion. Focusing on movies and television, he offers a semiotic reading of dramas about alcohol and alcoholism. Denzin discovers an underlying emotional logic in these productions in which cultural and societal definitions of class and gender provide the subtext for the manifest emotions of the characters. As vehicles of culture transmission, film and TV dramas define proper and legitimate emotions and serve to shape individuals’ desires and self-declarations so that they can experience the affects that society deems proper for them.

Steven Gordon explicitly links micro and macro through his employment of the classical social structure and personality paradigm. In that tradition, which also includes culture and personality studies, elements of macro organization or culture were linked across the society-individual gap to personality dispositions (often Freudian in origin), or to concepts such as "national character." Gordon proposes that social structure and culture may differ in how they affect emotions: the former more influential on behavioral and motivational aspects of emotion, while the latter may have greater effect on the quality, intensity, object, and setting of emotion. From the social structure perspective, Gordon poses questions about what specific elements affect emotion; (a) whether it is better to look at structural effects on emotion content, or at abstract elements of emotion; (b) what interme-
mediate structures operate to translate macro structures into micro effects; (c) how structural change in society ultimately leads to change in the emotions that are socially relevant; and (d) about the cultural relativity of emotion paradigms (for example, emotions are considered internal events by most Americans, but social relational nexti in the Southwest Pacific).

Gordon distinguishes between emotion, which he proposes is a response based on inborn, undifferentiated bodily arousal, and sentiment, which he defines as a socially-learned composite of bodily sensations, gestures, and cultural meaning connected with a social relationship, and provided with a cultural label. This definition fosters a perspective on emotions (sentiments) that stresses their social, as opposed to biological, origin. Entailed are such matters as their (a) long-term character (in contrast to the relatively short time span of emotions more closely linked to the biological); (b) the social constraints that structure emotional situations even in the absence of underlying physiological response; and (c) how social fiat overrides the physiological in dictating change in emotion. Gordon proposes three processes by which emotions are transformed into sentiments: Differentiation, which elaborates the raw emotional materials into highly nuanced and complex patterns that are coordinated with social variability; Socialization, which entails the social processes, including rewards and punishments, and modeling, by which culture members learn about emotional experience; and Management, which allows social determination through normative interventions that bring emotions into line with social prescriptions. Conclusively, in regarding the micro-macro link, Gordon focuses attention on the analytic possibilities in both directions—not only how societal structure affects emotions, but also how emotions affect societal structure.

Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods. Can emotions be measured and quantified? Or are emotion phenomena only qualitative? Lynn Smith-Lovin and David Heise answer unequivocally yes to both questions. When approached through their Affect Control Theory, emotions have both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Their model does not “split a difference,” but, rather, formulates the emotions question in a way that embraces both approaches. Smith-Lovin and Heise have calculated the numerical values of certain underlying meanings of common language terms for behaviors, identities, objects, and emotions. Given that a certain situation reflects a certain meaning, they are able to predict the emotions that are likely to be felt in the situation. That is, they predict a set of numerically valued meanings, to which specific, common language emotion terms have been found plausibly to correspond.
Smith-Lovin and Heise base their meaning analysis on the three commonly found dimensions of the Semantic Differential method. These are: (a) evaluation (how good or pleasant something is); (b) potency (how powerful or strong something is); and (c) activity (how aroused or active something is). All the items of a culture—including objects, actions, roles, and emotions—can be rated according to the three dimensions. In essence this produces a profile of the culture in terms of evaluation (E), potency (P), and activity (A). Consensual ratings were obtained from culture members who provided numerical scores for each item and the average ratings of an item on the three dimensions comprise the meaning of the item.

Heise’s and Smith-Lovin’s affect control theory holds broadly that actors behave so as to maintain their fundamental identities. Thus, if a Father Kisses a Child, the action conforms to the culturally sanctioned meaning of the Father identity. However, if a Father Abuses a Child, this does not confirm the Father identity. In such cases of discrepancy between behavior and identity, an emotion will be experienced—which emotion depends on the degree of discrepancy—and is determined in the affect control model by calculating the degree of departure of the untoward act from the normal pattern for the given identity. Degree of departure means how far the away the EPA ratings of the discrepant act are from the EPA ratings of acts that are normal for the given identity. According to the theory, and somewhat counterintuitively, the actor will seek to return to a state of harmony with the fundamental identity at issue, and will tend to choose a subsequent act that will attain the harmony. Failing this, there can be a shift in identity. Therefore, if the abusive Father does not retrieve his fundamental identity through reparative or loving action, he will necessarily rethink his identity (or observers will rethink it) to bring it into conformity with his conduct. In this process, emotion provides a signal that there is a discrepancy to be mended, or an identity to be reformulated. Whether dealing with identities, behaviors, or emotions, the affect control model works through the EPA values of the specific behaviors, identities, and so forth, and produces new values according to what the actor is likely to do. The new values are then translated through the dictionary of EPA profiles of culture items into discrete identities, behaviors, roles, and emotions.

In addition to Smith-Lovin and Heise, the other sociologists of emotion who have collected empirical data (and discuss it here) are Arlie Russell Hochschild, Peggy Thoits, and Candace Clark. Their approach to emotions is mainly qualitative. But some of their work is done with meta-emotional concepts, such as emotion management techniques (see Thoits, this volume) and these lend themselves to quantification, as in Thoits’s frequency counts of different management strategies by gender and other attributes.
Positivism Versus Anti-Positivism. One of the major intellectual debates in
the social sciences today is between positivists and anti-positivists. In gen-
eral, the positivist view is that emotions can be examined as more or less
objective phenomena, determined by certain social structural and interac-
tional conditions. Both the conditions and the emotions are susceptible to
measurement that is often, though not always, quantitative. Positivist in-
vestigators frequently seek covariance patterns between social structures
and interaction patterns, on the one hand, and the emotions that are hy-
pothesized to ensue, on the other. Furthermore, emotion is examined in its
physiological as well as its social, cognitive, and expressive aspects, in order
to pursue a complete theory of emotion.

Per contra, non- or anti-positivists argue against the possibility of
treating emotions as objective, measurable phenomena. Emotions are con-
sidered cognitive constructions that have no reality aside from the mental
processes that allow the individual to perceive situations that normatively
demand certain emotional responses. Positivists and anti-positivists ordi-
narily differ also in their sources of intellectual inspiration. Positivists are
devotees, mainly, of the natural sciences, in which so much progress has
been achieved in the cumulation of knowledge, whereas anti-positivists are
often inspired by philosophy, which does not seek to cumulate knowledge,
but to set forth the conditions under which knowledge can be accumulated,
that is, rules of epistemology.

In this work, the positivist view is represented mainly by Theodore
Kemper, who proposes that social structures give rise to specific emotions—
at least modally—and that a sociology of emotions must also accommodate
the physiological underpinnings of emotions. The idea that social structures
determine specific emotions is based on the notion that we are phyloge-
netic inheritors of a set of primary emotions—fear, anger, joy, and depre-
sion—(Kemper, 1987) that serve evolutionary adaptive needs, and that
there are certain environmental contingencies to which these emotions are
responsive. For humans, the major environmental contingencies in con-
temporary society are social. Therefore the vicissitudes of social relations
determine emotions—unless society intervenes normatively to require a
different outcome. When it does so, it runs the risk of distorting emotional
life—as when it tampers with sexuality, or seeks to repress deprived and
resentful populations, or insists on emotional wholeheartedness when the
heart is still broken (see Thoits, this volume).

According to a very comprehensive body of results from a number of
disciplines, emotional outcomes of interaction can be predicted from a
model that centers on the social dimensions of power and status. Power and
status interactions directly produce emotions. Fundamental to the model is
the idea that actors necessarily interpret their and others' power and status
positions subjectively. Notwithstanding, this usually leads to a consensual judgment. Should this not be the case, further interaction usually makes it clear. The positivist argument here is that regardless of phenomenal differences from culture to culture in what constitutes power and status, and what one judges to be a "good" outcome or a "bad" one, once the judgment is made, the phylogenetically adaptive emotions will ensue when certain power and status outcomes occur in interaction.

Denzin here asserts a vigorous anti-positivist view. He proposes a sociology of emotions project that ignores the conventional science approach, which would be (a) to treat emotion as a variable, (b) undertake cross-cultural studies, (c) develop the history of particular emotions, and (d) examine the association between emotions and standard sociological categories such as social class, gender, ethnicity, and so forth. Denzin's ultimate anti-positivist dictum opposes efforts to build a theory of emotions, whether grand or middle range.

Rather, Denzin would have sociologists of emotions study what he calls "emotionality," which is, for him, the Ding an Sich. This would include how emotion is structured as a lived experience, the forms of emotional feeling and intersubjectivity, violent emotions, temporality and emotions, epiphanies and shattering emotions (which have the effect of bringing about decisive changes in lives) among other questions. While these problems clearly emerge from phenomenology, from which Denzin derives his perspective, other questions he proposes may share some common ground with positivist approaches, for example cultural constraints on emotionality, the relation of emotions to self and biography, and differences in emotionality according to gender—notwithstanding that the research approaches are likely to differ. For example, Denzin endorses using the self as a datum and field of investigation, a highly unlikely resource for positivist investigators.

To be judicious in the debate about positivism is both a desideratum and difficult. The difficulty is that the positions often appear both polar and preemptive, as if there were no middle ground. Indeed, in an important sociological sense, there is none, for to endorse one side of the debate is to sponsor careers that cater to it and snuff out those that do not. Reduced to fundamental terms, it is Weberian-style conflict between competing status groups, each under the banner of a preemptive claim. Readers must either choose sides, or wisely refuse to do so, in order to create a syncretic field of study that incorporates the best of both approaches.

**Political Economy of Emotions.** Another axial difference in contemporary sociology centers on whether a problem is examined apart from its histori-
cal rootedness, or whether the historical context, particularly the mode of production, is analytically central to the problem. This issue is a variation on the positivist-anti-positivist theme, and stems from Marx. Although virtually all sociologists today acknowledge a debt to Marx's analysis of the social relations that underlie and determine the patterns of daily life, and of the importance of social structures of stratification, only some apply Marx's specific analysis of political economy. Political economy in this sense involves the way different groups in society are positioned in relation to the mode of production, how the basic constituents of life—from the earning of a livelihood to the experiences of desire and pleasure—are related to the organization of technical and social elements involved in the production of society's goods and services. Marx's main analysis was of capitalism, hence the political economy approach today mainly locates problems for sociological analysis in that setting.

Denzin treats the problem of emotions as rooted fundamentally in issues of political economy (he describes it as the domain of work), along with those of gender, and class. These structures are historical, in this case "post-modern," and they have "cultural" effects; that is, they provide a set of meanings embodied in cultural productions, such as movies and television, that set forth models of action and emotionality. But these reflect the political economy of postwar, late Capitalist America, whose elements, according to Denzin, include: (a) bureaucratization, which organizes individuals into compartmentalized roles and interaction opportunities; (b) commodification, which translates all human interests, including desire, sexuality, and eroticism, into marketable goods; (c) mass-mediated reality, which removes individuals from direct encounters with the world, but overloads the senses with pseudorealities; and (d) the deconstruction of (that is, concentrating extreme skepticism on) major, sustaining "myths," such as those of the value of science, the prevalence of freedom, and the efficacy of democracy.

Denzin seeks no "theory" of emotions, but rather to understand how emotionality is "lived" in such a world. This approach allows him to examine the cultural productions of our time (here, mainly, films about alcoholism), not in terms of manifest plot, but as strictures about the limits of emotion and reason in the very specific society that gives them life. Viewers' needs and emotional selves are shaped by these films. They learn how to be, and what it means to be, emotional in a particular historical moment of the productive process, in particular sites where particular emotions are endorsed as suitable and desirable. Following Louis Althusser, Denzin argues that the social relations of emotionality in the media are "ideological," not the real relations that prevail, and which must be examined.
Hochschild too works in the arena of political economy. One of her main concepts is emotional labor, which she defines as the emotion work that one must do as part of one's job. Emotion work is brought into play when what one feels is discrepant from the "feeling rules" proposed by society, or self. Emotions must then be managed to bring them into line with feeling rules. Hochschild proposes that this can be done by such methods as surface acting, or by deep acting. In the former, one puts on the expressive visage or body stance of the emotion, in the hope of stimulating the authentic feeling. In deep acting, one resorts to more profound strategies, such as modifying bodily or mental states, designed to evoke an emotion more in line with feeling rules.

Hochschild's analysis of the emotional labor of airline flight attendants provides insight into the way emotions have become a commodity, sold along with one's labor power in capitalist society. She contends that nearly a third of men's work and about half of women's work requires emotional labor. These workers are constrained to adjust their emotions according to the feeling rules set down by their employers, rather than feeling the emotions they would normally feel in the circumstances. Hochschild's main concern here is with the political economy of gender, to which I turn now.

**Gender Analysis.** Possibly the most important development in recent sociology is the emergence of gender as a central analytic category. Although gender has not been absent from empirical studies, where data are often analyzed separately by male and female, the current status of gender is entirely different. Based on feminist analyses of the presuppositions of many theories and theorists, the new consideration of gender stratification takes it to be as important as stratification by economic criteria. The emerging labor force of women workers and women managers of organizations has derailed older notions of superordination androle segregation between the sexes.

In the study of emotions, gender is a particularly significant differentiation. Apart from conventional ignorance that holds women to be more "emotional" than men, there is the fact that male and female hormonal processes differ, hence this may differentiate degree and type of affect. For example, in the domain of aggression—emotional precursor, anger—higher levels of male testosterone, which have been tied to aggression or dominance-seeking—may determine different rates of anger. But social and cultural shaping and repression have affected the ease with which women express anger. In addition, traditional patterns of social organization, which have focused women's attention on caring roles in the family and community, may also affect the threshold of anger in women, and their styles of coping with it (see Thoits, this volume). The task of gender anal-
ysis is to untangle this knot of biological and social components, not only with respect to anger, but all emotions.

Hochschild here analyzes what might be thought of as a gender economy, where men and women act on the basis of their fundamental gender ideologies, which are justifications for the maintenance or change of social relations between the sexes. Focusing on two-job families that also have a young child, Hochschild applies her notion of feeling rules and emotion work to the problems the couples face in the management of the complex fit between work roles and child care, which Hochschild imaginatively refers to as the "second shift."

Gender ideologies among these couples divide into traditional (husband should work, wife mainly stay at home to do child care), egalitarian (both husband and wife should work and share responsibilities equally for child care), and transitional (something in between the first two). When husband and wife have discrepant ideologies, the stage is set for powerful emotions. Hochschild examines the emotional pathways that are used in developing a gender strategy, as she calls it, for change. Wives who desire their husband to be more egalitarian need to muster their indignation so they can distance themselves from their positive feelings for their husband, as they prepare to confront him over the issue of sharing the work of the second shift; or they must deal with the resentment and depression that follow from accommodation to their husband's resistance to change by diminishing their work involvements; or they must shed their embarrassment over the shabby results of their indifferent housekeeping, if that expedient was used to economize on time to allow a full commitment to the job; or they must find ways to cope with or avoid guilt over the resort to cutting back on time spent with the child, when this solution was deemed the necessary one.

Male emotional pathways were particularly marked when they resisted their wife's demand for a more egalitarian arrangement. Often the male gender strategy went to almost ludicrous lengths to reduce the need for wife's contributions to his comfort—any sacrifice to avoid the need to contribute to the work of the second shift.

Thoits employs gender as a fundamental analytic category in her effort to evaluate techniques for emotion management. She finds that in the face of a distressing emotional experience, women and men choose different emotion management strategies. Women tend to seek catharsis experiences and social support, try to see the situation differently, and gain perspective by writing about the distress in diaries, letters, poetry, and the like, while men tend to try thinking through the troubling situation, engaging in hard exercise, or simply accepting their distress. This invites subsequent analysis of techniques of socialization and of social structural differences between

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men and women that might lead to the differences in emotional management strategies. (Denzin, Clark, and Gordon in this volume also examine emotions through a gender lens.)

**Managing Versus Accounting for Emotions.** Indisputably the most popular perspective in the sociology of emotions deals with how emotions are managed. This contrasts with the approach that attempts to account for emotions, for example, Collins, who attributes a common emotional mood to those who engage in interactional rituals together, or emotional energy to those located in order-giving positions in the social structure; or Kemper, who hypothesizes that specific emotions follow from gain or loss of either power or status in social interaction. One reason for the popularity of the management approach is its compatibility with a generally anti–positivist stance, derived in particular, here, from symbolic interactionism. In the version propounded by Blumer (1969), that sociological approach demurs on the possibility of relating variables (such as power and status) to emotions. (We shall meet this position again below in the section on prediction versus description.)

The management approach to emotions is based on the foundations developed and elaborated by Hochschild, Thoits, Gordon, and Clark. First, emotions are socially constructed. This means that emotions are not irrevocable, biologically-guided, natural phenomena that simply happen to people. Rather, they are amenable to social direction, enhancement, and suppression. Second, social construction is mainly accomplished via norms or feeling rules that inform individuals about which emotion is suitable in which situation. A considerable part of emotion socialization in childhood is devoted to specific tuition, to opportunities to observe models, and to incidental learning of emotion norms. These norms apply not only to proper and improper emotions, but also provide behaviors, expressions, and labels for emotions. Third, the social constructionist position asserts that emotions can be managed. This means that when a deviant emotion is experienced, the individual who is cognizant of the norms can take measures to reintegrate his or her emotional experience with the normative requirement. We have already seen in Hochschild’s position that in various occupations, emotion management is one of the principle requirements, since the job itself consists mainly of emotional self-presentation.

Thoits here explains in some detail how management of emotions can be accomplished. First, she postulates that emotion is understandable as a complex consisting of situational cues, physiological reactions, expressive gestures, and an emotion label. These are interlinked in such a manner that changing one of these elements has a potential domino effect on the others. Thoits further postulates two modes of emotion management:
behavioral and cognitive. That is, those who find they are emotionally deviant and want to accommodate to the relevant emotion norms, may work on the four emotion elements either through behavior change or cognitive change.

Behaviorally, one may change situational cues by leaving the situation, or by rearranging it, for example, by getting someone else to leave. One may change one’s physiology by breathing more slowly, or by charging up one’s system through a bout of heavy exercise, or by ingesting drugs. One may change expressive gestures directly, by masking them with the gestures of the proper emotion, or by exaggerating them, or by refusing to be expressive at all. (The final category, involving behavior and the emotion label is null.)

Cognitively, according to Thoits, one can change the situation by reinterpreting it, or by reflecting that it will soon end, or by focusing on either positive or negative characteristics of the other actors in the situation. One can apply cognitive leverage to physiology by monitoring and concentrating on one’s physiological signs, from pulse rate to palmar perspiration. Finally, one can relabel the emotion in the light of other considerations, for example, by tracking how the situation continues to unfold and finding evidence of different intent in one’s interaction partner(s).

Emotion management (of both own and others’ emotions) is also the focus of Clark’s exploration here into the micropolitics of emotion. Clark wishes to explain how people come to know, defend, or extend their “place,” in social relationships. Place is an individual’s composite rank vis-à-vis another on the dimensions of power, status, and distance (or intimacy). It stands for what an individual may claim or assume as a “right” in interaction with others who, in turn, have their place and its rights. Place encompasses etiquette, vocabulary, the proxemics of space, even touch. Those with higher place operate more freely in these modes; those with lower place are more constricted.

According to Clark, although social interaction directly establishes one’s place, one’s place claims are limited by the self-concept, which may dictate more or less place as proper or deserving. But emotions also have a hand, for they operate in a number of ways to determine the place one claims, and the methods by which the claims are made. First, emotion serves a signal function with respect to place, for example, to act in an embarrassing manner directly affects one’s place in the interaction.

Second, emotion is a place-marker, both intrapersonally as well as interpersonally. In the former mode, emotion demarcates one’s place, as in the example of embarrassment, above; or one’s emotions can make one pliant to the sometimes egregious place claims of others, as in cases of victims—an abused spouse, a concentration camp inmate—identifying with
the aggressor. In the interpersonal mode, emotions are often the message of a place claim addressed to others, alter-casting them for certain responses, for example, rage to reduce another’s place, love to induce them to elevate one’s own.

Clark proposes five ways in which emotions can be used as tactical weapons in the micropolitics of claiming or maintaining place. First, expressing negative emotions to another or withholding positive emotions is intended to induce the other’s fear, or shame, hence put the other “one down.” Second, expressing positive emotions to another, or withholding negative emotions, is intended to induce the other’s liking or solidarity sentiments. Third, controlling another’s level of emotional arousal, as for example, making the other lose his or her “cool,” while remaining calm and collected oneself is intended to “displace” the other. Fourth, eliciting the other’s feeling of loyalty and obligation assures that the other will not reduce one’s own place. And last, one can patronize the other, by expressing positive emotions that mark one’s own superiority and the other’s inferiority, as for example, expressing sympathy for a superior, or pointing out the other’s problems. According to Clark, these tactics of emotional micropolitics serve to create and maintain hierarchy in social relations.

Affect Control Theory not only seeks to predict emotions but also is premised on management of emotions. Indeed, Heise and Smith-Lovin can generate predictions about when emotion management is likely to occur, namely, when behavior has led to a transient identity that is at odds with the fundamental identity of the actor. They are also able to predict specific management actions in the given situation. These are not conceived as management in the manner of Thoits, since they apply only in the given situation of identity discrepancy, and are not identifiable as general management techniques.

**Prediction Versus Description.** The beginning of all theory is description. This is necessarily the case, since without an aggregate of coherently presented details, there would be nothing to theorize about. Description promotes the generation of concepts. Linkages between concepts may be observed, even if only tentatively. And theory, as conventionally understood, consists of a set of linked concepts, that is, statements of how concepts are related to each other, for example, unjustified loss of status produces anger. For those who affirm the value of predictive theory, there is no alternative but to start with description.

The debate here is whether description can be set aside at some point and more formal operations can be undertaken, such as creating theoretical propositions and testing hypotheses. Here the paths among various approaches to the sociology of emotions diverge sharply. Although the issue partakes somewhat of the positivist-anti-positivist polarity (e.g., Denzin
favors only description), most positivist-oriented investigators recognize the importance of description. Smith-Lovin, whose work with Affect Control Theory (ACT), represents a relatively high level of positivist application, is nonetheless eager for descriptive studies by which to augment the domain that is susceptible to ACT analysis. Similarly, Thoits, whose approach to emotions is quantitative as well as qualitative, here presents the details of a number of descriptive studies that evoke important questions for her. Through relatively simple inquiries about emotional deviance directed to male and female respondents, she is able to address questions about gender that it would be hard to develop without the descriptive data. She can see immediately whether there are gender differences in the amount and type of emotional deviance and in strategies to cope with it. The descriptive percentages then can lead to theoretical surmises as to why the genders differ in these matters. At some point this leads to a test of predictive hypotheses.

Gordon, Hochschild, and Clark also shun the predictive approach in favor of description. To some extent this is due to their sense that insufficient data exist for the formulation of theoretical propositions. But their approaches, which owe something to Symbolic Interactionism, also derive from it the premise that we cannot know in advance how individuals will construct their lines of action, therefore, to seek predictive theory is inherently problematic. If, in addition, one considers cross-cultural and historical variations, as Gordon does, a predictive theory is unlikely.

Per contra, Kemper proposes that at the proper level of abstraction prediction is not only possible, but can lead to a cumulative science of emotions. Following the argument of Willer and Webster (1970), Kemper chooses power and status as universal dimensions of interaction at the level of “theoretical constructs” that can lead to prediction across a broad span of social conditions. Therefore, regardless of the particular setting or culture, Kemper predicts that arbitrary deprivation of status leads to anger. Culture may “play” with this, and attempt to convert it into something else, and indeed may manage to do so, but this is after the fact, namely, after anger has been initiated. (Here Hochschild would say that her “interactive” model is better able to explain the ensuing management of emotion. Indeed, although Hochschild’s model embraces the frequently evolving nature of emotional experience, it does not contradict the original proposition concerning the initial instigation of anger in the relational condition of status loss.)

Collins, too, offers a predictive theory in that in his formulation the structural relations between order-givers and order-takers are seen to result in certain emotions. These cumulate or dissipate emotional energy in a manner that leads to a chain of relatively successful or unsuccessful future interactions.
While Hammond’s evolutionary theory would seem to offer few opportunities for prediction in the time-bound present, in fact, it generates numerous predictions about current relationships among social structure, emotion, and the physiological substrate of emotion.

**Biosocial Versus Social Construction.** The final issue separating different approaches in the sociology of emotions to be considered here entails the role of biological and physiological influences. Related also to the positivist-anti-positivist debate, this issue reaches deep into the origins of sociology as a discipline. In *The Division of Labor in Society*, Durkheim (1933), pitted sociological analysis firmly against biological explanations of human conduct. Indeed, to establish sociology as a viable scientific discipline it was vital that biology not preempt the social. In *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim (1938) erected another barrier against biological intrusion by affirming that “social facts must be explained only by other social facts.” Since then, biological initiatives have languished in sociology. Nor have biological approaches fared any better under the banner of sociobiology, a theoretical position that cavalierly preempts sociological explanation by locating the origins of a great deal of social organization in the genes. This argument has been thoroughly rejected by sociologists. (Readers can find the arguments pertinent here in Caplan, 1978.)

In the sociology of emotions, the confrontation of the biological and the social is both more focused and more heated than in most other sociological subfields. Virtually every sociologist of emotions acknowledges a physiological substrate to emotions. The debate turns on how important it is. Gordon denies its significance for the sociology of emotions, affirming rather that the sociologically interesting emotions—he calls these sentiments—are socially constructed derivatives of raw emotional arousal. Therefore, if anger is raw emotion, social mechanisms create sentiments of annoyance, rage, bitterness, and jealousy. According to Gordon, it takes social construction and emotional culture to make these variants possible.

Hochschild prefers an “interactive” approach, in which physiological reactions are a part of the emotion complex, but subject to a significant degree of social management. Indeed, for Hochschild as for Thoits, one strategy for managing emotional deviance is to activate or suppress bodily arousal.

In the controversy over the role of the physiological, sociologists of emotions have paid particular attention to the work of Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer (1962). These psychologists purportedly found that emotions could be rendered theoretically in a two-factor model: cognition of a situation in conjunction with undifferentiated physiological arousal. The supposed fact of undifferentiated arousal allowed some sociologists of emo-
tions to conclude that the physiological substrate was therefore unimportant. Recent experimental findings as well as analyses of the results of work based on the Schachter and Singer paradigm have cast considerable doubt on their view (for review of the arguments see Kemper, 1981; 1987; and Gordon, this volume). Hence, the way may be open to a judicious reexamination of the links between sociological and physiological processes in the formation of emotion.

Kemper has argued most strongly for such a link, based on a body of psychophysiological data that fosters the integration of the two quite distant levels of analysis. He argues that a complete theory of emotion must ultimately deal with the fact that emotion is biologically rooted, and regardless of the degree of social conversion, construction, or management, the interface between the two must be illuminated.

**CONCLUSION**

It should be apparent from this review of metatheoretical issues in the sociology of emotions that the field is extremely broad, and accessible from virtually any sociological persuasion. (See table 1.1 for a synoptic view of the several metatheoretical issues reviewed here and the location of each of the contributors to this volume with respect to them.) It can be argued that the reproduction of some of the major conflicts and controversies of the sociological macrocosm in the subdisciplinary microcosm of the sociology of emotions is a warrant not of fracture, but of opportunity. The diver-

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sity of approaches all devoted to a discrete phenomenon augurs well for the attainment of knowledge in sufficient breadth and depth to potentiate a remarkable synthesis. Although some staunch defenders of their paradigms may reject any concourse with other paradigms, the future is usually wiser than the past in being able to see precisely those channels of integration between different approaches that too fervent practitioners could not see earlier.

Different eras in scientific and intellectual work also have at their core a different ethos. The present period is one of deconstruction, in which no paradigm is credible as more worthy than another. This breeds isolation and a fortress mentality among different theoretical persuasions. In the mode of Weber's (1958) analysis of the consequences of Calvinist anxiety in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, we may say that the deconstructive demiurge has fastened a paralyzing anxiety on all approaches. To ward off the concern that one's own paradigm may be worthless, one demeans the others. To maintain confidence in one's own perspective, one resists linkages with others that do not pass ideological muster. Some of the most careful description of these competitions between competing scientific perspectives can be found in the volume on “grid” and “group” by Douglas (1982).

But Zeitgeists do change and, perhaps, with the approaching millennium—a symbolic occasion of some moment even in an ultra-rational age—there may be a turn toward synthesis, a classical period of reassessment and integration of diverse knowledge. These periods of intellectual assimilation seem to follow periods of upheaval and heterodoxy, whether in the political or intellectual domain, whether in art or science. In this sense, there can be no permanent revolution. Having achieved their proximate goals, the revolution must subside. Weber (1947) gave us this idea in his notion of the routinization of charisma.

We may look forward to such routinization in the sociology of emotions, but not yet. First the battles may intensify, but we must trust that as new cohorts of students and scholars enter this field, in their understandable efforts to establish their own intellectual identity they will abandon the stale confrontations of their seniors and mentors. From their vantage point they will know much more than we do now, and those now *doing* the sociology of emotions should be inspired by this.

**References**


