Chapter 1

Theoretical Approaches to Conflict and Order in International Politics

Since the late 1970s, students of international relations have been caught up in the debate between the realist/neorealist schools, on the one hand, and the neoliberal-institutional approach on the other. To some extent the roots of this debate can be traced back to the traditional contest between political idealism and realism, or between the role of norms and power in state behavior. The debate in the last quarter of the twentieth century has concentrated on the tension between the postures of anarchy and order, conflict and stability, in world politics. What is the dominant principle in international relations? Is it the anarchical nature of the international system predominant in many parts of the world, resulting, as the neorealists contend, in cycles of conflict and an ongoing search for security? Or is international institutionalism, currently prevailing in the more developed parts of the globe, the wave of the future, as the nonrealists assert? Can institutionalism common in international economics replace the security dilemma in international politics?

The maxims of realism now face a challenge from another direction. Along with the growing order in relations between states, we are also witnessing the emergence of ethnic conflict on a global scale. A large share of contemporary violence and disintegration in the world stems from ethnic conflicts both intrastate, such as within Northern Ireland and Canada, or with an interstate link, as in the ethnic confrontations in Afghanistan, Cyprus, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and the Kurds, and former Yugoslavia. The shift of conflict from the interstate realm to the intrastate domain calls for some amendment in realist contentions, while also challenging the institutionalist precepts.
Thus, the task of explaining change from anarchy to order in international relations must also include an ethnic theory.3

The core of our study focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict as reflected in twenty-six international crises over the 1947-2000 period. Our study explores the relative merits of realism and institutionalism in explaining international phenomena and remains open to evidence supporting each. A priori we admit to a predilection for the realist school because of the subject matter; the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict are more compatible with power politics. Similarly, by adopting international crisis as our conceptual framework and as the basis for our empirical research, we are obviously choosing a conflict-oriented approach. We do hope to explain, however, the appearance of international order and some institutionalism in a conflict-ridden region. Our realist disposition will be modulated, as previously noted, by an appreciation for the worldwide phenomenon of ethnic conflict, which has dogged the Arab-Israeli conflict since its inception. This study thus supplements classical international politics theory with its attention to both institutional and ethnic elements.4

In pursuing the interstate dimension we integrate concepts from both the realist and institutional schools of international relations. From the realist school we draw concepts of international interactions such as conflict, international crisis, balance of power, and deterrence. From the institutional school we derive cooperative concepts such as rules, regulations, and regimes. When we turn to the ethnic dimension we use terms such as ethnonational aspirations, civil wars, and interethnic crises. In our application of these approaches we also intend to probe their validity. By taking such a comprehensive perspective, this inquiry will not only provide a better understanding of the Middle East conflict but will also produce theoretical insights useful for the study of other conflicts.

This study examines change in the Arab-Israeli conflict as reflected by the dynamics of international crises. Three questions arise in this context: Was there change in the attributes of international crises over time? If yes, in which dimensions and directions did change take place? Why did changes in conflict occur? In order to answer these questions we pursue five goals:

1. to devise an index for detecting change in crisis;
2. to identify the main trends and areas of change in crisis;
3. to link these changes in crisis with trends in the conflict;
4. to evaluate whether changes in crisis dynamics reflect upon trends in conflict; and
5. to explain changes in conflict with international relations theories.

In this chapter, we start with a review of the main paradigmatic approaches and theories debated in the discipline. We suggest a set of conditions taken from the theoretical literature that explain change from conflict and confrontation to some form of accommodation and collaboration. Next, we offer a theoretical
framework for the analysis of crisis magnitude designed to measure change from anarchy to some institutionalism. In doing so we apply concepts and data from Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld’s International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project. We conclude our theoretical presentation by highlighting main concepts in ethnonational theory and its application to world politics. Special emphasis is devoted to the spillover of ethnic elements in interstate conflicts or vice versa. The conclusion of this chapter will extend our theoretical framework for the analysis of crisis magnitude to the ethnic domain.

**ANARCHY AND ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS**

The puzzle of anarchy and order is inherent in world politics; the mixture of disorder and organization preceded the inception of the international system and accompanied its evolution. The coexistence of violent and amicable relations among political units has always been in the background of theory building in international politics. Anarchy and order as core foci of inquiry of international politics came to prominence following the establishment of an international system of states, and crystalized with the evolution of a global system that simultaneously includes nation-states, regional groupings of states, and international organizations devised to preserve world order. The coexistence of immense violent conflict, actual and potential, alongside evidence of intensive cooperation demands scholarly inquiry as to the dominating principle of international relations.

Current international relations theory comprises four approaches regarding the role of international institutions in maintaining order: neorealists who perceive order as directly linked to structure; realists who see some role for institutions in promoting order; neoliberals who allow an independent role for institutions; and constructivists who totally reject structure and view cooperation as growing out of a reformed process of international relations. In the following pages we address some concerns of all four perspectives.

The neorealists provide an explanation of international behavior primarily at the international or world politics level. As Kenneth Waltz put it when responding to John Vasquez’s attack on the realist paradigm, “Old realists see causes as running directly from states to the outcomes . . . New realists see states forming a structure by their interactions and then being strongly affected by the structure their interactions have formed.” Neorealists see the structure of the international system, as defined to a large extent by the distribution of power, as solely responsible for international order. In their eyes international regimes and international institutions play no role in promoting order at the international level.

Neorealists have difficulty with the concept of institutions because of their distinction between anarchy, which is the organizing principle in the international system, and hierarchy, which is the dominant principle in the domestic
system. Their frame of reference makes it difficult to adopt concepts such as international regimes and institutions. As Helen Milner pointed out, anarchy implies not only the lack of order but also the lack of government. Hence, international politics, from a neorealist perspective, may not sustain domestic concepts of order. By its very nature international politics constitutes the opposite model of domestic politics. Classical realists, however, have fewer inhibitions toward international institutions and differ here from their successors.

When neorealists accept the existence of institutions in international politics, they do so in a particular way. When John Grieco, a realist, asserts that the most critical deficiency of structural realism is to explain the “tendency of states to undertake their cooperation through institutionalized arrangements,” the neorealists’ response would be that institutions reflect the realities of power of international politics. In John Mearsheimer’s words, “[F]or realists, . . . institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system. In short, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war.” At the same time that the neorealists “may disagree on the nature, extent, and causes of that order,” they must concede that world politics is not just a permanent struggle for power. It does exhibit some order.

Neorealists and classical realists differ on the role of institutions or, alternatively, international regimes, but are not very far apart in their definitions. Mearsheimer defines institutions as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior.” Krasner, writing a decade earlier, defines an international regime as a setting in which international actors accept “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Jervis describes security regimes as “principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.” Noticeably, Mearsheimer, who is the closest among the three to neorealism and to Waltz, does not include norms in his definition.

Indeed, most of the respondents to Vasquez’s attack on the realist paradigm asserted that we must not cluster all realists together. Despite the high regard for power in old realism, classical realists, as already pointed out above, did not totally disregard the role of institutions. One example is Kaplan, who wrote his pioneering study on international systems at the time when political realism dominated the discipline of international relations. Krasner made a very definite distinction between the two realist approaches: “Waltz’s conception of the balance of power, in which states are driven by systemic pressures to repetitive balancing behavior, is not a regime; Kaplan’s conception, in which equilibrium requires commitment to rules that constrain immediate, short-term power maximization . . . is a regime.”

While realists, or as Krasner defined them “modified stucturalists,” perceive some role for regimes or institutions depending on the world in which
they operate,19 neoliberals, or those influenced by the Grotius tradition, go one step farther than the moderate realists and see regimes as independent variables influencing international order and cooperation.20

The international order in Europe during the last decade of the twentieth century serves as a case that supports the neoliberal approach. Grieco, on the basis of the European Community’s (EC) renaissance in the wake of the Cold War, admits that realists must contend with the survival of international institutions despite structural changes.21 The continuation of international institutions in Europe after the disintegration of the Soviet Union supported the neoliberal contention that international regimes and institutions survived a shift in the distribution of power, and eventually generate their own rationale and sustenance. Mearsheimer, who represents the doctrinaire neorealist approach, indeed expected European institutionalism to collapse following the end of the Cold War.22

Naturally, the neoliberal explanation for the survival of international institutions following the Cold War is that institutions have their own rationale of existence and independently support international order. Accordingly, if institutions serve the interests of the actors of the system they will persist even following structural changes. But the European case is limited in proving the neoliberal argument since it is possible to argue that the institutions did not fulfill any function in the transformation of the Cold War. The constitution of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) accompanied the decline of the Cold War rather than contributed to its demise.

While neorealists have trouble explaining Europe in the wake of the Cold War, neoliberals have their own difficulties. Indeed, the main problem for nonrealists is that the phenomenon of institutionalism so far has either been confined to a geographic area, such as Western Europe, or employed globally in functional areas such as international economics. A more rigorous test for the relevance of institutions in contributing to international order would come from an area experiencing some structural change and the inauguration of some institutionalism, but where violence is still a vivid option and hence the states’ main concern is not international economy but security. The identification of a case study of intense conflict followed by some cooperation advances the study of the role of international institutions in promoting cooperation. In the Middle East the states’ main concern is not international economy but security. It will be our task to detect whether the Arab-Israeli conflict serves as an empirical case that fulfills the requirements for advanced theoretical testing of realist and nonrealist claims. Does this rivalry exhibit the genesis of international institution building that fosters regional international order, and if so why?

The European phenomenon suggests the rationale that once institutions are in place, they create a new reality and are not easily abolished. This brings us to the impact of the praxis of cooperation via international institutions on the emergence of a new approach to international politics. Did the experience of the Western European states within the framework of international institu-
tions mollify mutual fears of one another and increase confidence and interest among them in the benefits of cooperation? Alexander Wendt suggests that "four decades of cooperation may have transformed a positive interdependence of outcomes into a collective 'European identity' in terms of which states increasingly define their 'self' interest."23

Wendt’s approach to institutionalism is influenced by constructivist theory, which grew out of critical theory. Constructivism focuses on the process of identity and interest formation, arguing that this was the most crucial factor in determining anarchy and international order. Unlike neoliberals, critical theorists, as represented by Wendt, state clearly that structure has no role in international politics “and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure. . . . Structure has no existence or casual powers apart from process. . . . Anarchy is what states make of it.”24 Such an argument would be difficult for realists to accept in light of the practice of international politics. Nevertheless, the role of process in explaining order in the midst of anarchy should not be disregarded, particularly in areas such as the Middle East where the norm has been violence and the discourse of cooperation is only slowly being inaugurated.

COLLABORATION IN CONFLICT:
TOWARD A THEORY OF CHANGE

Four schools have been identified in explaining international order. In accordance with the above analysis regarding the role of structure versus institutions in maintaining international order we present them as: neorealists, realists, neoliberals, and constructivists. Against this background of perspectives, we turn now to our main question—how to explain change from anarchy to international order?

As a departure point we pinpoint Krasner’s theory of change: “When regimes are first created there is a high degree of congruity between power distribution and regime characteristics.” But with time, he argued, since “power distributions are more dynamic [than regime characteristics]—they are constantly changing . . . thus, regimes and power distributions are not likely to change at the same rate.” With time, if the incongruity between the two realms becomes too severe, “there is likely to be revolutionary change as those with the greatest power capabilities move to change underlying principles and norms.”26 Krasner departed from neorealism in that he also accepted that regimes once created assume lives of their own and influence international behavior and the creation of national interests. Arthur Stein articulates what could be considered a contribution to a realist-based theory of change affirming that interests determine regimes and that the distribution of power is one of the affecting factors. Distinguishing between “those who make a direct link between structure and regimes” (neorealists) and those who presume that interests intervene between
structure and regimes, he asserts that shifts in patterns of interests would cause regime change. Krasner provides an additional distinction between change of regimes and change within regimes. “Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes,” while, “changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself.”

While these theorists rejuvenated realism, a profound look into classical realism would discover that it offers a variety of elements that today appear to belong to competing approaches. Almost two-thirds of Morgenthau’s much celebrated *Politics among Nations* is dedicated to norms, principles, and international institutions and organizations that influence and limit the procession of violence in international politics. Henry Kissinger’s analysis of the emergence of the nineteenth-century institutional system similarly included both structure and institutions as pillars of international order.

Kissinger, a classical realist, articulated a theory of international order that included a composite of structure, international norms, and process in the promotion of change. In *A World Restored*, which deals with the emergence of the Concert System in Europe, Kissinger presents two main elements for the establishment of a stable international order in an environment of constant conflict: an equilibrium of forces and legitimizing principles. “The security of a domestic order resides in the preponderance power of authority, that of an international order in the balance of forces, and in its expression, the equilibrium. But . . . it is constructed in the name of a legitimizing principle.” The third element that coincides with stability is diplomacy, defined by Kissinger as “the adjustment of differences through negotiation . . . possible only in ‘legitimate’ international orders.” The last part of the sentence points to the subordination of practice to structure and a normative environment. Significantly, the practice of peace for almost a century caused the leaders of Europe to forget “that states could die, that upheavals could be irretrievable, that fear could become the means of social cohesion.”

*A World Restored* makes it clear that the stable system Kissinger was talking about was not the same as Karl Deutsch’s concept of a war-free security community: “A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope. Wars may occur, but they will be fought in the name of the existing structure.” The stable world (the Concert System) that Kissinger identified in the nineteenth century, could today be defined as a “security regime,” namely, an international system managed by principles, rules, and norms accepted by all actors in the system regarding restraint on states’ behavior. Despite the discrepancy between international order and war, evidence indicates that other cases of institutional behavior within areas of incessant conflict do exist. U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, as delineated by Michael Mandelbaum, represented a “managed balance of power,” a system comparable to the Concert System, a configuration that contained characteristics of institutionalism. Charles Lipson defined even the East-West rivalry as a security regime. Jervis saw a security regime in the Concert of Europe system, in which the great
powers did not maximize individual power positions and took each others’ interests into account, despite the struggle for power.\textsuperscript{35} In the words of Jervis, “Of course the Concert did not banish conflict. But it did regulate it.”\textsuperscript{36} The balance of power system, as long as we define a balance of power system by Kaplan’s parameters, such as the one that existed during the ancien regime or during the Concert, would still fall within the regime category, even though exhibiting some conflict.\textsuperscript{37}

On the basis of the above theories and case studies we devised a set of conditions that would explain change from a “revolutionary system,” to use Kissinger’s terminology, to a more stable one that accepts some minimum international order. Learning from the experiences of Europe during the last two centuries, we see the relevance of institutions alongside structure in establishing international order. Hence, we try to bridge the gaps among differing elements from the various institutional approaches, with an inclination toward realism as the perspective most appropriate in areas such as the Middle East. Realism as we see it does not ignore the impact of international institutions and diplomacy on international order.

We start from the premise that in a system of sovereign states, the distribution of power is the basic structure for providing security to actors whose main concern is to survive.\textsuperscript{38} The emergence of a \textit{balance of power} is thus our first condition for security in a self-help system. A framework of security is one in which a revisionist actor cannot achieve unilateral goals without drawing retaliation exceeding its potential gains. In the absence of deterrence, revisionists may attack other system members for opportunistic reasons\textsuperscript{39}. In regional systems, such as the Middle East, and especially within the Arab-Israeli context, the distribution of power is complex since the number of actors is always shifting. It is further complicated by an extraregional great power balance.\textsuperscript{40}

The emergence of a balance of power by itself is not sufficient, it must be accepted by the members of the system. Hence, the acceptance of the balance of power or, in other words, \textit{legitimacy} is our second condition for change to a more stable system. States in a conflict situation face security dilemmas and hence they cannot permit relative gains by their potential rivals. Even liberals would agree that in a conflict-ridden system, when the actors’ achievements are not necessarily at the expense of their competitors, they nevertheless cannot limit the scope of their interests to common gains.\textsuperscript{41} In a world where states have huge incentives to take advantage of one another and no restraints to prohibit aggressive behavior, a state that ignores a rival’s gains may create a power gap that could lead to an existential threat. According to the classical security dilemma, gains in one actor’s security may pose existential threats to its rivals.\textsuperscript{42} Hegemonic powers that seek absolute security thus constitute obstacles to stability. Acceptance of the balance of power is therefore linked to the acceptance of relative security, or to use Kissinger’s words, “The foundation of a stable order is the relative security—and therefore the relative insecurity—of its members.”\textsuperscript{43} At various times in the Middle East, Egypt, Iraq, or Syria aspired to
achieve hegemony, as most Arab states suspect of Israel as well. The removal of such ambitions is an integral part of the emergence of stability.

Legitimacy, according to Kissinger, necessitates the advent of common norms. Intense conflicts such as those of the European system during the Napoleonic wars, Europe under Hitler’s reign, the Cold War during its early years, or the Arab-Israeli conflict at different times, constitute cases in which a balance of forces existed without the recognized legitimacy of some of the system’s members. As a result these periods were ridden with continuous crises and wars. Without the abandonment of radical goals, which present an existential threat, there can be no chance for international institutions to have a lasting impact on international relations. However, acceptance of the right to exist among parties to the conflict can come prior to the actual termination of conflict. Mutual acceptance, even if on a limited basis, constitutes a more advanced stage and as such a second condition for the emergence of collaboration in a system still experiencing persistent conflict.

How can parties to a conflict accept a balance of power when they do not share any common norms, even after an equilibrium of forces has been established? Why should antagonist states abandon total mutual denial and adopt compromise interactions reflective of a regime? Adversaries may have to espouse rules to coordinate their interaction, as Arthur Stein points out, not because of shared values but because of a shared stake in averting a certain course of action. Process calculation, in addition to structure, affects behavior. Theorists call the acceptance of certain rules by actors lacking common norms in order to prevent an undesirable outcome “common aversions.” As Stein states, “Anarchy in the international arena does not entail continual chaos.”

The common enemy of the great powers in the post–Congress of Vienna system was social revolution; despite the rivalry that persisted between actors such as Russia and Britain, they adopted rules and procedures that regulated their competition.

Acceptance of the balance of power can be seen as the adoption of rules and norms of behavior within a conflict system, as Krasner interprets Kaplan’s balance of power system theory. Paradoxically, but in accordance with the logic of common aversions, these rules and norms would be induced by a boost in the cost of war, our third condition for change. When the potential damage of war drastically exceeds any potential gain from war, states will strive to create security arrangements that diminish the chances of war. This is essentially the rationale of deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence. On the modern battlefield, even conventional warfare may be so destructive as to make war unattractive, although there is no equal to a nuclear deterrent. A major inducement to the acceptance of a regime to regulate conflict systems is its members’ fear that crises will get out of control.

Mistrust is a basic impediment to the transformation from anarchy to a regime, even under conditions of common aversions or legitimacy. For instance, the rationale for the two strategic doctrines “preventive” and “preemptive”
strikes assumes a complete lack of trust. The threat of such escalations provides
the parties to the conflict with additional incentives to accept some rules and
norms of behavior. Aversion to sudden changes in the balance of power is cru-
cial especially in an international system in which the competing sides possess
advanced military technologies. Both the ability of several states to form an
alliance against one other actor, or one actor’s breakthrough in the military
domain that shatters the balance of power, can provoke a preventive war. The
advantages of a first strike can also induce a preemptive attack. The negative
alternative to a regime is often an intensive arms race that may ultimately esca-
late into war.48

In a self-help system the fear of such escalation in light of mistrust, or
“defection,” in the language of game theory, necessitates transparency and a
mechanism for detection of alterations in the status quo. Regulatory practices
guarding against cheating are often spelled out in international agreements. This
kind of institutionalism is the fourth condition for the formation of internation-
al order in a conflict system. Measures designed to lead to the reduction of
uncertainty on both sides with regard to unilateral strategic-military moves are
known as Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM).49 These meas-
ures cannot be established in a total conflict situation where there is not even
the rationale of “common aversions.” Similarly, their utility is modest when a
full-fledged international security community has been established. It makes
sense that this concept was first used in the context of the CSCE in Helsinki in
1976, when the East and the West agreed to adopt measures that would reduce
the potential for a surprise attack. The form of CSBM in a subsystem such as
the Middle East may differ from the European experience. Extraregional pow-
ers or superpowers could fulfill a prominent role in supporting the CSBM. The
great powers may be useful in regulating the arms race and in providing reas-
surance to the parties in conflict, and thus reduce a rationale for prevention or
preemption in order to maintain their security.50

Do we recognize an institutionalized international order when we see one?
The answer is not clear. The conditions described above would be conducive to
the transition from an anarchic international order to an institutional one, but
in order to recognize a regime we must evaluate two patterns of interaction as
indicated in the literature; one where order is administered purely via deter-
rence—and one in which order is maintained through the establishment of a
regime. A system cannot be said to have achieved a regime if political actors are
dissuaded from aggression simply because the potential gain of their act would
be outweighed by the potential cost inflicted by other actors, even if this rela-
tionship is regulated by rules. The rationale of deterrence requires disproportion
between the potential gain and retaliation in favor of the latter, and the need to
demonstrate determination in order to gain credibility. A basic requirement for
the formation of a security regime is “that major actors prefer the status quo—
with the possibility of modification by uncoerced changes—to the world of
possible gains and possible losses that they expect to flow from the individual-
istic pursuit of security policies.” In a deterrence relationship, security is not accomplished via a cooperative effort, it is an absolutely individualistic endeavor. An institutionalized international order could thus be defined as the abandonment of protecting the status quo via unilateral measurements to a collaborative effort.

This distinction between a deterrence relationship and a security regime does not always exist in the real world of international politics. They are two ideal types of relations, which form a scale ranging from total anarchy on the one hand to a security community on the other. In reality a deterrence posture and a security regime are not always mutually exclusive: stable deterrence may provide an incentive for sustaining a security regime. Our examination of stability in conflict systems looks for a process of change from one disposition to another.

To describe and analyze a course of change and to detect nuances that come to characterize the dynamics of conflict over time, we adopt the concept of an international crisis and develop an operational index designed to measure changes in the magnitude of international crises.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

So far we have demarcated the boundaries of a conflict in both the realist and nonrealist viewpoints, and addressed the conditions for change from severe confrontation to gradual conflict regulation. Still missing is a unifying concept that embraces both structure and process and reflects the transition from stability to instability and back. We regard crisis as a concept that encompasses change from anarchy to order and vice versa.

The literature on international crisis is vast. It includes both theoretical studies and empirical research. Perhaps most salient among them is the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, which integrates theory and in-depth historical analysis of conflict, crisis, and war. The project explores 412 international crises that incorporate 895 foreign policy crises worldwide from 1918 to 1994. Its analysis focuses on crisis attributes, the participating state actors and their characteristics, the regional and international system(s) in which a crisis occurs, and the role of third parties, namely, major powers and international organizations, in crisis management. This study draws upon the core concepts developed by ICB as well as on the Middle East section of its data-set for the 1947–1994 period.

According to Brecher and Ben-Yehuda an international crisis denotes: 1) an increase in intensity of disruptive interactions among system actors; and 2) incipient change within the structure of an international system, more precisely, in one or more structural attributes—power distribution, actors/regimes, rules, and alliance configuration.
A central assumption of crisis theory is the existence of a link between the crisis and an “incipient change within the structure of an international system.” The evolution of a crisis can be conceived, as Brecher has done, as a process that will influence the structure of an international system, or, as postulated here, as an indicator of change. Like Brecher, we also look for structural changes that explain variations in crisis behavior. At the same time we focus on behavior in crisis that reflects change from anarchy to some degree of regime formation.

Our framework goes beyond Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s ICB project. While we narrow the empirical focus to the analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we expand its theoretical framework. Whereas the ICB’s point of departure was the realist paradigm with international crisis as its core concept, we apply concepts from the neorealist-institutional schools, thus surveying not only power relationships but also the application of rules and regulations during the termination stage of crises and relate them to trends in conflict.

An international crisis among states is a critical stage in the transition from stability to the use of force in world politics. It is assumed that the reduction of such occurrences, or modifications in the mode of crisis behavior, would reflect both change in the pattern of relations among the involved actors as well as the introduction of rules and regulations. An international crisis can deteriorate to war but can also backslide to stability. Hence, we have chosen state behavior in international crises as an indicator of a potential transition from an anarchical to a more stable order. The duration of the crisis is the period in which the dynamics of transition from normal relations range to violent interactions and back are excessively at work. On the basis of the above we assume that an international crisis—a microcosm of international politics and condensed change—will be an effective vehicle through which to evaluate the transition from a relationship of total conflict to a more regulated rivalry and, further, to some cooperation in a protracted conflict.

All of the preceding inferences about the meaning of international crises in world politics depend upon a crucial assumption about how these observed events relate to unobserved processes. To be more precise, international crises are events that summon to mind images such as John F. Kennedy announcing the quarantine of Cuba (in essence, a blockade) to the world on television in October 1962 or troops moving around on trains throughout Europe in the summer of 1914. These things can be seen or at least imagined by the reader of a historical text. Thus, crises are part of human history and, in principle, can be measured in some way or another. The key point, then, is this one: a crisis is the observed manifestation, in a series of events, of some underlying and unobserved conflict. The conflict can be imagined, but it cannot be viewed on television, photographed, or experienced in any other sensory manner. Instead, conflict—the latent variable within this study—is understood to ebb and flow on the basis of its most intense and comprehensive visible referent: internation-
al crisis.59 Thus, any number of variables that focus on the frequency and intensity (with the latter defined more specifically by the concept of magnitude throughout the remainder of the study) of crises as events may be developed in order to assess, on the basis of a time series, the direction in which some underlying conflict is moving.

We chose the ICB project as the empirical basis for our study because we require an objective data-set to provide us with a descriptive analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The ICB, being a worldwide project, is as immune as possible to regional or state centric biases. Also attractive was its macro orientation, specifically its focus on international crisis within a protracted conflict, rather than on a foreign policy crisis. This allowed us to maintain an overall perspective in which the dangers of subjective analysis were relatively remote. For example, the definition of threat in a foreign policy crisis may vary from one state to another, depending on the perceptions of the decision makers. By contrast, in an international crisis gravity is evaluated from an overall-objective perspective, taking into account, the stakes over which the different adversaries contend and identifying the most salient threat in that particular confrontation.60

However, we depart from the ICB project in two major aspects: first, ICB focuses mainly on crisis while for us the study of crisis is a means for the study of conflict as a core subject matter in international politics. Accordingly, while ICB models analyze change within a single crisis, we identify and explain change in a series of crises that take place within a protracted conflict. Second, while ICB dissects a crisis and describes its stages of onset, escalation, and de-escalation, we take the crisis as an integral whole, identify its overall magnitude, and compare the magnitude of different crises over time. Variation in levels of crisis magnitude, indicating trends in conflict, is our research objective in this section of the study.

REALMS OF CRISIS AND THE CRISIS MAGNITUDE INDEX (CMI)

The concept of crisis magnitude and its operational tool—the CMI—are designed to characterize changes that occur in interstate behavior during international crises. Crisis magnitude focuses on the entire crisis, embodying the extent of disruption that takes place during the crisis period and identifying three specific domains in which disruption occurs. Based upon the ICB definition of an international crisis presented above, crisis magnitude is a composite of three realms: context, process, and outcome. These realms describe the attributes of change in both the dynamic and static elements of crisis. The first and last realms—context and outcome—are the relatively static attributes, which characterize the slowly changing elements of disruption during a crisis, whereas the second realm—process—is the dynamic domain where more rapid transformation takes place.
Integrating these realms of crisis, we developed an index of crisis magnitude designed to measure the extent of change in crisis attributes. The CMI is composed of six indicators emanating from the above three distinct realms that serve as our basis for the illumination of change in crisis evolution and of the patterns of conflict escalation or de-escalation.

The first realm—CONTEXT—encompasses three attributes: (1) gravity of threat to values; (2) number of crisis actors defining the extent of distortion in behavioral regularities due to the conflicting issues between actors; and (3) the level of superpower involvement, indicating the severity of the crisis from a global perspective, as well as the potential for conflict escalation or regulation. In essence, this realm accounts for the structure of the regional system in which the crisis occurs and the threats that emanate from the distribution of forces and the objectives of the participating actors. But context also transcends structure since it also includes forms of institutionalism represented by superpower participation, which places constraints on the use of power in regional crises.

The first indicator—gravity of threat—is composed of seven categories: existence; grave damage; internal stability/political regime; territorial integrity; economic; influence; limited military damage.61

Gravity of the value threatened serves as an indicator of an actor’s motivation for involvement in the crisis. States engage in conflict, crisis, and war in order to promote their foreign policy goals. Gravity encompasses both the interests at stake and the distribution of capabilities among the adversaries. Our postulate is that the higher the gravity of threats, the greater the magnitude of the crisis and the lower the prospects of conflict regulation following crisis termination. Compare, for example, threats to Israel in the 1947–1948 Arab-Israeli war and the 1973 war: In the first case, the threat was to Israel’s very existence and accordingly crisis magnitude was high and intense conflict ensued. The threat during the October War was of grave damage to the Jewish state and its civilians, indicating some decline in magnitude.

The indicators of crisis magnitude, together with their values, expected levels of crisis magnitude and propositions linking each indicator to overall magnitude are presented in Table 1.1 which follows.

The next context indicator, number of crisis actors under threat, ranges from six, the highest number of actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict (involving Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria), to the lowest possible—one.62 Number of crisis actors serves as an indicator of magnitude since the number of rivals in a dispute affects the distribution of power, state actor interests, issues at stake, as well as the extent of disruptive interaction among the competing parties. Hence, the larger the number of actors the greater the disturbance in the conflict system and, therefore, the smaller the prospects of conflict de-escalation. In the number of crisis actors we include both regional and global actors. Some crises involve only regional adversaries while others also include major powers and superpowers from the global system.
### Table 1.1
The CMI—Realms, Indicators, Values and Postulates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Realm</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Postulate</th>
<th>CMI Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Gravity of Threat</td>
<td>Limited military damage</td>
<td>Low threat - limited disturbance</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>High threat - substantial disturbance</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grave damage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Existence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Actors</td>
<td>Single actor</td>
<td>Few crisis actors - limited disturbance</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Four actors</td>
<td>Many crisis actors - substantial disturbance</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Five actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Six actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superpower Involvement</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No/low superpower involvement - limited disturbance</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-military</td>
<td>Semi-military/military superpower involvement - substantial disturbance</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Crisis Management Technique</td>
<td>Negotiation/ mediation nonmilitary pressure</td>
<td>Non-military/ nonviolent behavior - limited disturbance</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nonviolent military multiple including violence</td>
<td>Military nonviolent/ violent behavior - substantial disturbance</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No/low violence - limited disturbance</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minor clashes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serious clashes</td>
<td>High violence/war - substantial disturbance</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full-scale war</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Termination</td>
<td>Formal agreement</td>
<td>Accommodative outcome - limited disturbance</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-formal agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tactit understanding</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unilateral act</td>
<td>Non-accommodative outcome - substantial disturbance</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Imposed agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Faded/other- non-accommodative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Within protracted conflicts one must differentiate between two major groups: global conflicts, where the superpowers are the core adversaries, and regional conflicts in which the superpowers may be involved but are not the primary actors. In the first category—global confrontations—such as in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. and USSR activity is part of the process realm detailed below, since both states are the major participants in the confrontation and it is disagreement over their core values and goals that triggers the crisis. By contrast, in regional crises, as in the 1973 war, the principal clash of issues is among local rivals although the superpowers may have exacerbating or moderating effects on regional processes. Superpower activity in regional cases creates constraints for client states, forming a contextual realm for local adversaries. The Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East belongs to the second category—that of regional conflicts—and we therefore consider superpower activity in our study as part of context, reflecting the link between the global and regional dynamics.

The third indicator, superpower involvement, ranges from military, semi-military, economic, or political to no involvement at all. Superpower involvement serves as an indicator of magnitude since the extent of third party involvement leaves its trace on crisis dynamics. In evaluating the impact of external powers in an ongoing dispute we must distinguish between diplomatic and military involvement. Even though both represent the capabilities of the great powers, the latter is much closer to power politics, while diplomatic involvement carries the potential for accommodation and interstate institution building. We may assume that the higher the diplomatic involvement, the greater the chances of conflict regulation. By contrast, the higher the military involvement, the greater the likelihood of conflict escalation. On the whole, high levels in context indicators, namely grave threats to basic values, many crisis actors, and intensive superpower military rivalry, point to high crisis magnitude and vice versa.

The second realm—PROCESS—includes two behavioral attributes of the crisis: (1) type of management technique used by the actors in order to cope with the crisis and (2) level of violence throughout the event.

The first process indicator, Crisis Management Technique (CMT), differentiates among crises processed by means of violence, a mixture of violence and diplomacy, demonstration of force, and negotiations. CMT functions as an indicator of magnitude since it encompasses a wide range of interactions ranging from diplomacy to violence and the combination of both as means of bargaining in international interactions. As such, it defines boundaries of behavior among rivals and signals the transition points between “zero-sum” violent confrontations and negotiations representing mixed motive situations. Accordingly, CMT has an impact on conflict termination. Violence alone signals escalation, while negotiations reveal moderation and a trend toward reconciliation. When viewed together, both diplomacy and violence measure the extent of distortion during the crisis. The outbreak of hostilities, with no other management tech-
nique, represent the violent side of high crisis magnitude, and “coercive diplomacy,” to use Shelling’s term, whereas nonviolent measures coupled with negotiation techniques denote low magnitude. Management of a crisis via negotiations also signals the introduction of institutional procedures into the relationship.

The next process indicator, level of interstate violence, explores the range of hostilities that occur during an international crisis. This indicator is divided into four subcategories: war, serious clashes, minor clashes, and no violence. Level of violence is a core aspect of international crisis escalation. The initial transformation from non-crisis to crisis situation is triggered by an increase in hostility and a rise in the prospects of violence. Moreover, international crises vary in levels of violence, some being intermediate changes from the normal relations range—such as insurgency actions and retaliations (e.g., 1953 Qibya, or 1968 Beirut airport), while others consist of a major shift in existing patterns—such as interstate wars (e.g., 1947–1948 war, 1956 Sinai campaign, 1967 Six Day War, 1973 October War). On the whole, we propose that the level of violence reflects the severity of the conflict; the harsher the violence, the smaller the chances for resolution of the conflict. At the same time, we are aware that in severe cases only major confrontations induce attempts at conflict resolution. We refer to this phenomenon as the “violence-accommodation” relationship.

The third and last realm—OUTCOME—focuses on the winding down of crises: the content of crisis outcomes and the form they take. Crisis termination serves as the sixth indicator of crisis magnitude because the dynamics within protracted conflicts are shaped by the way each crisis ends. More specifically, a distinction is made between crises terminated by dictate—imposed or unilateral endings—and those concluded by compromise embodied in semiformal or formal agreements. Crises falling within the first group reflect failure to overcome via mutual agreement the disturbance that caused the crisis. The potential for institutional arrangement is dim with this type of termination. Events in which crisis is terminated by compromise reflect a higher potential for reduced rivalry. A crisis that ends in compromise epitomizes the wishes of the parties to conclude the conflict and their readiness to accept common rules of behavior. Our study anticipates that the conclusion will have an impact on future conflict dynamics. High magnitude exists in cases resolved by an imposed agreement, by a unilateral act or in cases that fade over time, since the conflicting stakes in these cases are not resolved among the crisis actors. By contrast, in a crisis terminated by tacit, semiformal, or formal agreement, crisis magnitude is low, reflecting the reduction of crisis-generated tensions among participants.

Since we do not want to introduce a priori assumptions regarding the relative importance of each indicator in the overall score of crisis magnitude, we assigned equal weight in the composite index to the indicators in all three realms. The overall CMI score was derived from the following formula: SUM of all indicators per case (with High = 1) + SUM of all indicators per case (with Low = 0). The possible range of overall magnitude is 0 to 6. The index serves
our purpose of setting forth a defined set of indicators that enable us to compare crises in the Arab-Israeli protracted conflict over time. In the future it may lead to further comparisons of crises in other geographic areas or in diverse periods. The subdivision of all six indicators into the three realms of context, process, and outcome provides us with another means with which to compare change in crisis magnitude and conflict evolution. A comprehensive analysis of these crises and changes in crisis magnitude over time will be presented in chapters 2–4.

The CMI is a counterpart of an earlier Index of Severity formulated by the ICB project. Both indexes attempt to characterize international crisis and to highlight the extent of disruption/change manifested in the crisis events. As such, both indexes relate to a time frame from the onset of the crisis to its outcome. However, the CMI identifies three realms and assigns equal weight to all indicators. By contrast, the ICB severity index specifies a deductively derived weight for each indicator. The indicators that appear in both indexes are number of actors, superpower involvement, and violence. The severity index indicators of geostrategic salience, heterogeneity, and issues are replaced in the CMI with gravity of threat, crisis management technique, and termination. The rationale behind this approach is that while the three variables that were dropped are valuable for a project that compares interregional behavior, they are superfluous for a comparative analysis within the same region.

In summary, the CMI is built on key definitions of an international crisis that involves a change in the intensity of disruptive interaction and a challenge to the structure of the regional/international system. The assumption is that a reduction in threat, number of crisis actors, involvement of the superpowers, the role of violence in crisis management, the scope of violence and frequency of hostile interaction reflect changes in the magnitude of the crisis. The persistence of such a trend over time would indicate an elementary change in conflict dynamics.

Our assessment of conflict transformation is also based on an appraisal of crisis frequency over time affecting change in conflict dynamics. The rationale for measuring frequency of crises is that the higher the frequency, the greater the turbulence of conflict. It follows that the reoccurrence of crisis points to a profound dissension among the parties, and a decline in the reiteration of crisis must represent some basic changes in the judgments of the parties to the conflict regarding their interests. Conflict abatement is affected not only by the substance of crisis but also by the intensity of crisis occurrences within the conflict. The decline in the appearance of crisis indicates acceptance of some restraints on conflict procession. Moreover, we hold that a decline in the occurrence of interstate crisis indicates state awareness that hostile escalation may bring the parties to war without reciprocal gains from such violence.

One way to appraise frequency would be to divide the number of crises over the years and then distinguish between periods. But distribution of crises is not spread out evenly, that is, in several years more than one crisis erupted. We
therefore gauge the evolution of the conflict according to years free from crises, years of middle-range crises (where violence was absent or only used in a limited form), and years of major crises (where the threshold of war was crossed, or at least massive military interaction took place). We consider a year in which more than one crisis took place according to the more severe crisis of that year. Similarly, if a crisis carried over from one year into a large part of the next, we also consider the second year as a year of crisis.

Having presented the concept of crisis magnitude, as well as the CMI—a tool designed to measure continuation and change in crisis attributes—we turn now to the ethnic elements in international crises. While recognizing the prominent role of the interstate dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict we must also consider the centrality of the non-state level of interaction. We therefore supplement traditional crisis analysis with an ethnic dimension in order to improve our understanding of crisis magnitude and conflict dynamics.

ETHNICITY AND CHANGE IN A PROTRACTED CONFLICT

Despite attempts to search for similarities, some conflicts have their own character and rules of the game. Our point of departure is that not all regions are alike in terms of violence; some international systems prohibit violence, while others permit it. Since the Arab-Israeli conflict belongs to the protracted conflicts category, we must take into account characteristics specific to this type of dispute, including the propensity to resort to interstate and sub-state violence. Edward Azar probed the theoretical attributes of protracted conflicts and introduced the term Normal Relations Range (NRR). Within this framework he demonstrated how certain conflicts can be sustained for a long time following rules and procedures considered unbearable or system threatening in other systems. Such systems exhibit explicit or implicit rules of the game. They are unique in that an unusual cooperative event among some parties to the conflict will cause others to resist collaboration in favor of a return to some form of conflict within the borders of the NRR. Change is thus a deviation from, or an alternation of, an existing pattern of interaction in the direction of a new NRR, or a new equilibrium.

Azar, Jureidini, and MacLaurin added an important insight to the explanation of protracted conflicts—the ethnic dimension. They attributed the persistence of most conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, to a mixture of communal and interstate disputes. Based on their typology distinguishing conflict as either “interstate,” “inter-communal,” or “mixed,” they concluded that it was especially the ethnic dimension of the conflict that prohibited a solution. It was also the ethnic dimension, they argued, that kept a certain NRR. At the same time, the Arab-Israeli experience suggests that the interstate component (including that of the great powers) also kept the ethnic dimension from disappearing. Azar thus introduced two ideas into the scholarly analysis of ethnic
conflict: the linkage between the interstate and ethnic domains, and the pro-
longing effect of the ethnic element on the conflict.

On the relationship between the ethnic and the interstate domains Sandler
proposed the concept of “compound conflict,” which defines the Arab-Israeli
conflict as "a structure composed of two bordering domains of violence, inter-
state and inter-communal." Afflicted by both spheres since its inception, the
Arab-Israeli conflict has become the prototype of a compound dispute, espe-
cially following the 1973 war and the increased salience of the ethnic dimen-
sion.

Academic attention to the ethnic dimension of international conflict was
scarce when the expectations of the modern state were high, but the literature
on the ethnic variable has grown enormously in the last three decades. In
contrast to the earlier state centric model of international relations, students of
world politics in recent years have included the intrastate scene and ethnic con-
flict in their terms of reference; appreciation for the ethnic factor in interna-
tional relations has markedly increased.

Ted Robert Gurr’s “Minority at Risk Project,” a worldwide comprehen-
sive empirical study of some fifty ethno-political conflicts is a key example of
the rising relevance of ethnic conflicts. Gurr and Barbara Harff distinguish
between two main kinds of ethnic groups and minorities in world politics: col-
lectives that demand representation within the state they inhabit, and separatists
who demand autonomy from the state that rules over them. The ethnic
minorities in America represent the first type whose conflicts, according to
Gurr and Harff, are less severe and rarely spill over from the internal to the inter-
national domain. The Yugoslav civil war illustrates the second type, and demon-
strates the severe international implications of this kind of ethnic conflict.

Minorities and national peoples are among the politicized communal
groups Gurr defines in his comprehensive analysis of ethnicity and conflict
dynamics. He defines ethno-national groups as: "relatively large regionally con-
centrated peoples who historically were autonomous and who actively seek to
improve their status in the modern state system." Among the ethnic groups
Gurr identifies as ethno-nationalists are the Palestinians, the core ethnic group
investigated in this study.

Gurr’s main conclusions reflect the increasing salience of ethnic elements
in politics and their impact on conflict: (1) Ethnic fragmentation had been gen-
erated already in the mid 1960s, much earlier than the end of the Cold War,
when international relations theorists began to regard it as an important field of
research; (2) The main issue characterizing current ethno-political conflicts is
power contention among communal groups; (3) Unless associated with a fight
for independence, struggles for indigenous rights are subsiding in world poli-
tics. In short, most ethnic conflicts, even if disguised as ideological or religious
campaigns, are ultimately directed at achieving independence.

These conclusions are in accord with Anthony Smith’s observations that
contemporary ethnic revival is related to nationalism. Walker Connor had
already noticed in the early 1970s the rise of what he called “ethno-nationalism.” Smith based his work on ethnic nationalism upon an observed cultural community, namely, one whose members believe that they deserve to be and can become a nation-state. But while Connor focused attention toward domestic pluralism in the constitution of the nation state, Smith pointed toward the international aspects of ethnic revival. Principles such as self-determination, cultural identity, and national sovereignty are the legitimate basis for an ethnic community’s demand for a nation-state.\(^79\) When these aspirations are translated into secessionism or irredentism, linkage with the international system forms.\(^80\) In the Arab-Israeli context, for instance, the current struggle is over Palestinian secession, but the potential threat of a Palestinian state for both Israel and Jordan is that of Palestinian irredentism.\(^81\)

Our book focuses on conflict dynamics. Although Azar’s thesis regarding the impact of the ethnic component on prolonging conflicts implies continuity and our work encompasses change, we have in common a sensitivity to the intersection of interstate and ethnic conflicts. We ask, why in one period is the interstate domain predominant, and under other conditions does the ethnic element become salient? Even if we know why certain conflicts endure, we still need to explain why ethnic animosity situated in the international context of conflict persists, mounts, or declines. In other words, within the framework of compound conflicts, we are concerned with the impact of ethnicity on the regulation or stabilization of protracted conflicts. Moreover, the endurance and intensity of protracted conflicts do not always concur. A major task of this study is to distinguish between the endurance of the conflict in terms of time and changes in intensity of the conflict, especially as the interstate and ethnic levels are concerned.

Not all the work in the area of internal wars supports Azar’s thesis on the endurance of civil wars. Roy Licklider’s comprehensive study of civil wars concludes that the patterns of identity-based civil wars are not different from those political/economic wars and “identity wars do not last longer” than non-identity wars. Where identity civil wars differ is in termination. Licklider’s data support Robert Wagner’s hypothesis that “negotiated settlements of civil wars are more likely to break down than settlements based on military victories.”\(^82\) This finding, that a resolution based on power relationships supports stability in ethno-national conflicts goes against the very essence of institutionalism and regime formation. The latter assume that in the interstate realm negotiated settlements indicate stability, while dictates usually break down and continued struggle prevails. In realist terms, this insight would imply that preponderance is more conducive to international stability than a balance of power.\(^83\)

William Zartman, a collaborator in Licklider’s research enterprise, raises another germane insight along the lines of both Gurr’s findings and Smith’s contention: “A likely outcome of internal wars is de facto secession, where each side has effective, unchallenged control of a territory and population.”\(^84\) This observation is further supported by other studies that assert that separation of
groups is the key to ending ethnic civil wars.\textsuperscript{85} Partition in effect transforms the interethnic conflict into an international one. Power-sharing arrangements, though to a lesser degree, can also be associated with separation.\textsuperscript{86} The preference for partition over other solutions by students of interethnic conflict corresponds with the preference for decisive outcomes. More subdued ethnonational conflicts in which leaders failed to reach decisive conclusions such as partition would support Azar's findings of endurance and protractedness. But not all partitions imply an end to the conflict, as the Indo-Pakistani experience has demonstrated time and again.

Against this background our study is of relevance. First, we will examine whether Azar's thesis on endurance indeed holds in the Arab-Israeli case. Did the Palestinian factor prolong the conflict in the Middle East? Second, we explore whether these links between the interstate and the ethnic realms of conflict affect the transition of the Arab-Israeli conflict from pure confrontation to some form of institutionalism. Of interest are the bearings of international arrangements on ethnonational conflict, and vice versa. Accordingly we explore the impact of conflict resolution or regulation at the interstate level on the ethnonational conflict, that is, the impact of behavioral patterns and balance of power at the interstate level on conflict regulation at the ethnonational level.

In our analysis of the interstate and ethnic components of a protracted conflict, we use the ICB data-set in which both settings of conflict exist. The concept of crisis magnitude and its operational counterpart—the CMI—are useful and appropriate for measuring patterns of escalation or cooperation in both interstate and ethnic-state type international crises, defined below.\textsuperscript{87} Approaching the Arab-Israeli conflict from a compound perspective, namely an ethno-national as well as an interstate one, produces a more accurate picture of overall change in the conflict. The Arab-Israeli conflict provides an empirical basis for testing international relations theories. Our findings will thus be relevant to analysts examining the transformation of a protracted-compound conflict from anarchy to some international order elsewhere in the world.\textsuperscript{88}

In their original work, Brecher and Wilkenfeld, the authors of the ICB project, were state centric in their orientation. They fused the ethnic dimension into the statist framework or excluded from the project cases, where the ethnic dimension was predominant and did not seem to have a direct interstate axis of interaction (such as the 1987 Palestinian uprising known as the Intifada). Nevertheless, in their comprehensive book \textit{A Study of Crisis} Brecher and Wilkenfeld ascertain that “35\% of all international crises from the end of World War I through 1994 had an ethno political dimension.”\textsuperscript{89} Recognizing the salience of the ethnic element in conflict, crisis, and war, they investigated at length the relationship between ethnic and state behavior in crisis.\textsuperscript{90} In doing so, ICB distinguishes between two ethnicity variables: “ethnic related” and “ethnic driven”. The first, ethnic related, describes a crisis as ethnic if ethnicity was a factor in the behavior of one or more adversaries in an interstate crises. Ethnic
driven focuses on ethnicity as a preeminent causal factor, affecting the behavior of states and the configuration of the international crisis. The ethnic related variable, championed by David Carment, corrects the earlier deficiency by incorporating a broad range of ethnic phenomena into the study of crisis. But one should not automatically assume a causal relationship between the existence of some ethnic attributes and the outbreak of interstate confrontations. Brecher and Wilkenfeld introduce the ethnic-driven variable in order to supplement their earlier state centric viewpoint, distinguishing between domestic ethnic elements that have some effects on interstate relations, and ethnic factors that are preeminent throughout an interstate rivalry.

Brecher and Wilkenfeld also accept the common distinction between two types of ethnic conflict: secessionist and irredentist, but choose to combine them “into a single measure of interstate ethnic conflict.” By contrast, Carment maintains the distinction between the two, and he also suggests a typology of ethnic cases and anticipates that the effects of ethnicity will be most pronounced in irredentist cases.

The ICB’s approach suits our purpose, since in the Arab-Israeli conflict it is difficult to differentiate between the two types of ethnic conflict. The tension between the Palestinian demands for an independent state to replace the state of Israel and more recent proposals for a two state solution demonstrates that it would be simplistic to classify the Middle Eastern dispute either as solely a secessionist or an irredentist conflict. Similarly, we do not find the differentiation between ethnicity related and ethnicity driven typology useful for our analysis since almost every crisis in the Arab-Israeli conflict identified by the ICB project was to some extent related to the Palestinian problem and hence can be categorized as ethnic related.

On the whole, ICB’s approach to ethnicity as a contextual attribute of international crisis behavior does not fully overcome the realist barriers. Its analysis of ethnic elements is based on states’ concerns, namely on national interests that unfold into interstate confrontations, and on the military-security issues that develop as a consequence of ethnic unrest. Since ethnic minorities can operate within a state or at times increase tensions between states, ethnicity is a constraint characterizing interstate conflicts and affecting international crises. ICB does not consider ethnic groups as major independent actors, thereby overlooking their role in crisis and their impact on crisis escalation and de-escalation.

Recognizing that ethnic groups constitute meaningful political actors, we move away from the discussion on whether ethnicity is a minor or salient element in escalating interstate confrontation and outline a threefold classification of crises in world politics: (1) Interstate crises are events involving at least two states in which the ethnic factor does not play any role in the international crisis. For instance, the 1973 war fits this category of cases in the Arab-Israeli conflict. (2) Ethnic-state crises are incidents in which an ethnic Non-State Actor (NSA) is preeminent in either triggering a crisis between or among states,
defining the issues at stake, or participating in its procession. For example, the 1982 Lebanon war, in which three states—Syria, Lebanon, and Israel—participated and where the PLO played a central role in the onset as well as during the crisis and its termination, falls in this category. (3) Interethnic crises are hostile encounters between or among ethnic groups within one polity that do not involve an interstate confrontation. The three waves of ethnic rivalry between the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine in the pre-1948 period are typical examples of this group.

These three types of crises will serve as our departure point for a comparison of crisis attributes and trends in conflict dynamics over time. Hence we have organized this book according to these three categories of crisis. Chapters 2–4 analyze international crises focusing on the interstate domain while ethnic-state and interethnic crises are the topics of chapter 5 and part of chapter 6. We are interested in three perspectives. First, we describe the distinct profiles of interstate, ethnic-state, and interethnic crises, specifically looking for differences in their core crisis attributes. Second, we address the question of the relative salience of each type of crisis over time, indicated by the frequency of crisis occurrence. Third, we probe the linkage, if any, between the trends of crisis in the interstate and ethnic domains. We ask: does the decline or rise of crisis in one domain influence similar occurrences in the other, and vice versa.

The first query—a comparison among the three types of crisis—is conducted along the six CMI indicators, namely: gravity of threat, number of actors, the role of the superpowers, CMT, the level of violence, and termination. The aggregate testimony of these indicators provides us with significant insights regarding the disposition of the conflict. Evidence as to the frequency of each mode of conflict facilitates a significant insight into both interstate and the ethnic-state type crises. While measurements help us understand the relationship between the two modes of conflict, the findings here cannot be exclusively quantitative. Because of the dearth of ethnic variables in the ICB project, a qualitative perspective is imperative. The qualitative mode of analysis is also indispensable to the third question, regarding the relationship between the interstate and the ethnic-state dimensions of conflict.

In conclusion, our theoretical framework for the analysis of crisis magnitude and conflict dynamics is based on a core contention: the realist paradigm of international politics must be complemented by both institutional and ethnic dimensions. In our search for transformation within the Arab-Israeli conflict, we stipulate that international crises should reflect trends of change, if indeed they exist, and that they will relate to all three approaches. Within this framework we probe the links between low/high levels of international crisis magnitude, the evolution of institutions in the interstate domain, and the evolution of an ethnic dimension. We postulate that the higher the magnitude of crisis, the more intense the conflict; conversely, the lower the magnitude of crisis, the greater the extent of regime/institutions building. Hence, a persistent decline in magnitude of crisis indicates the metamorphosis of the conflict from
extreme hostility to inceptive cooperation. A special variant of international conflict are protracted-compound conflicts that contain ethnic elements. The double capacity of an international crisis—to reflect both the ethnic and interstate dimensions of conflict—serves as an integral part of this book. We demonstrate that the interstate and the ethnic domains interact with each other and influence the institutions that regulate international interaction among the political units.

Crisis frequency, changes in crisis magnitude—reflected through variations in the realms of context, process, and outcome—and the linkage between statist and ethnic elements, describe the overall state of conflict. The statist outlook prevails when we concentrate on context in chapter 2, on process and outcome in chapter 3, and on overall magnitude in chapter 4. The analysis of crisis magnitude identifies trends and turning points. A shift in outlook in chapters 5 and 6 puts the ethnic domain at the core of our analysis, in search of a better understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole. Chapter 7 integrates the interstate and ethnic aspects and suggests new directions for additional research.