ONE

INTRODUCTION:
WHITENESS AFTER EMPIRE

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In a sentence: the past half century or so has been the first time since the dawn of modernity, since the rise of capitalism and the knitting together of the globe in one unified “system,” that white supremacy has been called seriously into question on a world-historical scale.

—Howard Winant, “White Racial Projects”

To apply the colour white to white people is to ascribe a visible property to a group that thrives also on invisibility.

—Richard Dyer, White

The Negro is not. Any more than the white man.

—Frantz Fanon, Black Skin White Masks

THE PERSISTENCE OF WHITENESS

Whiteness is not, yet we continue for many reasons to act as though it is. It would seem a simple enough assumption that the end of colonialism ushers in the end of whiteness, or at least of its unrivaled ascendancy. Yet the cultural residues of whiteness linger in the postcolonial world as an ideal, often latently, sometimes not. Although the state of being demonstrably
white remains, as Richard Dyer deftly puts it, “a passport to privilege” (Dyer 1997, 44), and despite the obvious role that the visibility of whiteness—what Satya Mohanty calls the “white man as spectacle” (315)—has played in the colonial context, whiteness itself remains a largely unexamined category. Despite the efforts of scholars such as Henry Louis Gates and Kwame Appiah to portray race generally as a kind of malignant fiction, and calls from Dyer, Ross Chambers, and others to bring greater scrutiny to bear on whiteness as a tacit norm, whiteness in the postcolonial moment continues to retain much of its status and desirability, if not its overt colonial-era power. Although the two groups approach race from different, and arguably incompatible, directions—the former wishing to do away with race as a category entirely, the latter to render whiteness visible as one racial category among others—they nevertheless share the aims of critiquing the privilege and power associated with whiteness, and exposing the ways in which whiteness has historically used its normative power to suppress and marginalize its others. Howard Winant, whose eloquent state-of-the-discipline statement begins this chapter, dates the move to critique white hegemony on a global scale to the period “since World War II, and particularly since the 1960s” during which “the world has undergone a profound shift in the global logic of race or . . . racial formation” (Winant 2001, 99), the most significant challenge to global white supremacy since Columbus. But even this globalized challenge, Winant admits, “could not dislodge, but only somewhat weaken, that ferocious tradition of white supremacist world rule” (99). However passionate Fanon’s declarations to the contrary, it seems that rumors of whiteness’s demise have been greatly exaggerated.

Fanon is emphatic in his desire to be seen (and assumedly, read) as “a man, nothing but a man” (Fanon [1952] 1967, 113); yet the impossibility of such a raceless rapprochement with the white colonial Other recurs throughout Black Skin White Masks. The famous statement in the epigraph, which would apparently disavow both whiteness and its racial other, is framed on the one hand by Fanon’s reference to himself as “the man of color” and on the other by an imperative that both whites and blacks “turn their backs on the inhuman voices which were those of their respective ancestors” (231). The apparent ambivalence of Fanon’s vacillation between the negation and affirmation of race exemplifies a dialectic of race consciousness that has lingered within postcolonial studies into the present moment: on the one hand the humanist impulse to, as Fanon himself puts it, “discover and to love man, wherever he may be” (231) and on the other the drive toward reparations, equity, payback—what elsewhere in Black Skin White Masks Fanon calls the former slave’s desire to “make himself recognized” (217) through conflict specifically with the erstwhile white master. In this context, then, it is not merely freedom that the black slave wants, but more specifically a freedom-from its subjection to white colonial power—a psychological and ontological freedom that mere national independence does not necessarily bring.
Homi Bhabha recognizes this “sense of division” and “uncertain dark” in Fanon’s writings, and in Black Skin White Masks specifically, as the mark of a “transgressive, transitional truth” (Bhabha 1994, 40). Fanon’s foundational postcolonial manifesto proves to be transitional for the same reason that it is so transgressive: the articulation of a particular moment in the dialectic of erstwhile masters and former slaves that exposes both the continuing privilege of whiteness and the hollow sham of the promise of true integration. Bhabha carries over this reading of Fanon into his own theorizations of race and ethnicity, most pointedly in his definition of colonial mimicry as “the desire for . . . the subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. . . . almost the same but not white” (Bhabha 86–89).

With the notable exception of Bhabha and a few others, however, postcolonial studies has generally shied away from explicit discussions of race such as those found in Fanon and Bhabha. Curiously, even those texts that address Fanon’s and/or Bhabha’s writings seldom focus on race. This apparent avoidance of race may stem from the poststructuralist sensibility of much postcolonial writing, with its accompanying aversion to any seemingly oppositional logic and affinity for linguistic and literary, as opposed to sociological, critique. Conversely, the undertheorization of colonial whiteness may be the product of a simple conflation; that is, whiteness in this context may be so closely associated with colonial domination that no further distinction seems necessary or desirable. (Such analyses overlook, of course, the key role of nonwhite colonial elites in consolidating and maintaining colonial and neocolonial power.) Whatever the reason, postcolonial studies has to date produced relatively little scholarship exploring the relations between race and power, and specifically between whiteness and the consolidation and maintenance of colonial power. Perhaps the most pointed example of this curious “race-blindness” in postcolonial studies appears in Routledge’s The Post-colonial Studies Reader, arguably the single most comprehensive and widely read survey in the field; in a nearly five hundred-page anthology featuring excerpts from more than eighty texts, the word race emerges in only five essays for a total of eight appearances, one in conjunction with ethnicity (which merits its own dozen mentions in the volume).7

In the United States, however, whiteness studies has emerged within the last ten years as a field that does address relations between race and power within an American studies setting. Very little of this work, however, has focused on the United States in a specifically colonial or postcolonial context, having opted instead for a broader approach to race and ethnicity. Arguably the founding text of American whiteness studies, Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark focuses on the ways in which white cultural discourses reduce representations of blackness to the level of function, as tropes employed in the construction of white identity. Richard Dyer’s White refines and develops this iconographic approach to whiteness, and has emerged as an ur-text that has generated much commentary and discussion as well as subsequent studies;
certainly it is, with the possible exception of Morrison’s text, the most widely cited book-length study in the field. Neither text, however, features any sustained discussion of colonial and/or postcolonial contexts, with the exception of Dyer’s very fine chapter on the BBC television serial The Jewel in the Crown.8

The influence of these canonical texts upon subsequent scholarship has tended on the one hand toward a critical approach that focuses on representation and iconographies of whiteness, in both literary and visual contexts. On the other hand, the ascendance of Dyer’s and Morrison’s writings has meant that relatively little scholarship has moved beyond representations of whiteness in Anglo-American culture to the more salient question of how the representational power of whiteness has historically operated in the service of colonial and neocolonial regimes, and has specifically served such regimes in the domination of their nonwhite others.

It is precisely these missing elements in postcolonial and whiteness studies, respectively, that the present volume seeks to address. This collection of essays examines the interrelations between whiteness and the history of European colonialism, as well as the status of whiteness in the contemporary postcolonial world. Together the essays present a range of critical and theoretical responses to two fundamental questions. First: What happens to whiteness after empire? What transformations, for example, does the nation’s self-image undergo when former colonial subjects return to London or Paris as citizens of the erstwhile “Mother Country”? How do those cultural processes resemble—and how do they diverge from—those experienced by whites of the former oppressing class in South Africa who remain behind in the post-apartheid state, to live and work alongside the newly empowered black majority? How does class impact the ability of white populations to receive their new fellow citizens and subjects?9 What happens to whiteness, in other words, after it loses its colonial privileges?

The volume’s second central question is perhaps more poignant and difficult: To what extent do white cultural norms or imperatives remain embedded in the postcolonial or postindependence state as part—acknowledged or not—of the colonial legacy? Here we may think of any number of colonial-era discourses and practices, from the adoption of the erstwhile mother tongue (whether English, Spanish, French, or some other) as the new national language, to the persistence of color-based socioeconomic caste structures in former colonies such as Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. These examples and many others point to the stubborn persistence of whiteness as a cultural norm in many of the postcolonial world’s official and unofficial cultural practices. Further, what emerges in the relation between former colonizers and colonized, now fellow citizens in a postindependence state, is their common dependence upon—and complicity with—the ideology of whiteness, or more specifically of white (hence Western) superiority. Each must now face the unpleasant truth of their own complicity in telling, and believing in, the
cultural lie of colonial whiteness. Such a bitter epiphany, I would argue, is indispensable for the future health of the postindependence state in particular and the postcolonial world as a whole. Such a facing-down of colonial ghosts is crucial to the task of constructing an integrated postcolonial subject.

Whiteness thus represents not only the contents of the colonial unconscious, but the very agent of its own repression: it is that which would simultaneously recast everything else in its own image and banish the scene of the recasting into an originary myth. Thus does the colonizing process displace or "bleach" the precolonial past and replace it with its own cultural imperatives. Each of the volume's contributors will approach and examine some aspect of these two central questions: on the one hand, whiteness's radically altered status in the postcolonial world, and on the other its lingering (if not always acknowledged) influence. While there is a great deal of scholarship in postcolonial and whiteness studies individually, relatively little addresses the particular intersections of race and power that help fuel colonialism at every stage. Further, there is currently no book-length text that focuses on this very fertile ground for scholarly study; it is indeed remarkable that none of the best-known postcolonial scholars have attempted such a work. One important task for the present volume, then, is to make a thorough assessment of this undertheorized convergence of postcoloniality and whiteness as an important and burgeoning field of study.

It is telling that whiteness studies has concentrated its efforts mostly on the United States, with a few exceptions (most notably Dyer's work), making it seem something of an opposite number to postcolonialism. While the latter has recently come under criticism precisely for its collective myopia regarding U.S. involvement in historical colonialisms and the neocolonial relationship it maintains today with many of its minority populations, whiteness studies has for the most part declined to explore its various and significant points of convergence with the postcolonial. Given the growth of whiteness studies in the past decade, and the proliferation of published studies examining whiteness across a remarkable range of cultural contexts, it is both significant and curious that European colonial whiteness—arguably whiteness at its apex, in its most ascendant and global powerful form—has not loomed large in these analyses. One may rightly wonder whether, to introduce a variation on a concept I have introduced elsewhere, whiteness and its lingering, if somewhat latent, hegemonic influence over much of the world does not occupy some as-yet-unexamined corner of the "colonial unconscious": a continuing malaise that many postcolonial whites (and non-whites) intuit but few are willing to address.

A converse but equally instructive absence arises in postcolonial studies: although so much postcolonial criticism and theory thematizes its counterhegemonic writings in terms of the marginalized racial, ethnic, and cultural identities of the colonized, relatively little space has been devoted to the dominant colonial cultures as racial and ethnic imperatives—and
specifically to whiteness itself as a cultural imperative functioning in the service of empire. The signifier whiteness, then, functions in this sense as the marker or index of the traces of colonial legacies that yet lie latent (but not dormant) in the postcolonial world’s own “colonial unconscious,” which it owes to itself to uncover and interrogate. I suspect that much of postcolonial studies’ inability to address whiteness as a subject position stems from the race-based meta-opposition that grounds much of its thinking: white as colonizing, colonial/nonwhite as colonized, postcolonial. 12

Such a founding principle, left unexamined, can and does fuel much of the misguided critical polemic over what or who is or is not authentically postcolonial. That European colonialism was a white, implicitly and explicitly racist undertaking should by now be beyond argument. What is just as obvious, yet too often overlooked, is that whiteness continues to play a role in the postcolonial world, that there are white subjects, cultural groups, who think of themselves as postcolonial. The point is that there remains in the early twenty-first century a postcolonial whiteness struggling to come into being, or rather a number of post-empire, post-mastery whitenesses attempting to examine themselves in relation to histories of oppression and hegemony of their others in order to learn the difficult, never-mastered skill that Heidegger used to call Mitsein: Being-with. It is this learning of a postcolonial Mitsein, this being-with others after the fact of domination, abuse, and outright murder of them, that constitutes the ground of the most important negotiation between erstwhile colonizers and colonized that postcolonial studies can offer. One philosophy for the white subject wishing to escape from the necessity of referring to a “universal” privileged white—that is, how to distinguish the new antiracist white subject from its erstwhile racist “self”—is to work through the relation to nonwhiteness phenomenologically, as an intersubjective relation. Thus my own recourse here and in my previous work13 to the Heideggerian Mitsein, a “being-with” that undoes white solipsism and escapes the ontological dead end of colonialism by changing the script of the Hegelian Lordship-Bondage relation, or at least its outcome.

It is in the interest of helping foster precisely this spirit of intersubjectivity and mutual recognition between postcolonial whiteness and its others—once slaves and colonial subjects, now peers and fellow citizens—that I have assembled the present volume. In uncovering hegemonic whiteness not only in its historical colonial forms but in its contemporary neo- and postcolonial traces, I and the other contributors to this book hope to contribute not to an undoing or annihilation of whiteness, as some would have it,14 which in any case would be as impossible as any other such project of cultural “purification” (as our century of failed ethnic cleansings and “final solutions” has amply taught us), but the inscription of a new script or narrative of whiteness: a post-mastery whiteness that would be empowered to enter into this relation of Mitsein with its others in an barely glimpsed, emergent postcolonial world.
If postcolonialism can be said to represent any single principle or embrace any single critical project, it would be a critique of the West’s historical domination of its others, the corresponding assumption of its cultural superiority over those others, and especially the discourses that enable both. This definition is undeniably broad and allows for all kinds of divergences among methods, ideologies, even competing literary and critical canons. Yet for all the irregularities and inconsistencies that often surface among any gathering of texts under the heading postcolonial, the category itself emerges from a particular institutional history: namely, the grouping of writers and writings in English departments under the term “Commonwealth” (Mukherjee 1996, 5–6). As I have pointed out elsewhere, aside from the continuation of England as a conceptual center in such a curriculum, such a framework also willy-nilly maintains the oppositional structure of the old colonialism: England as center/metropolis, the “Commonwealth” as margin or province always read in the context (if not the shadow) of the erstwhile mother country. But we must distinguish here among the various approaches and methodologies—among postcolonialisms, as it were—currently existing somewhat incongruously under the heading postcolonial. There has been no shortage of critics who find the term too overdetermined, too ubiquitous to be useful; Aijaz Ahmad, to cite my favorite example, considers “postcolonialism” a term that “designates far too many things, all at once” (Ahmad 1995, 9). The term postcolonial paradoxically suffers from the very flexibility that has rendered it useful in such a variety of historical and cultural contexts. The very overdetermination of the term, in other words, its very inflation as a signifier, comes as a quite mimetic consequence of its efficacy; it fits so many contexts, I would argue, precisely because there are so few places on the globe where European colonialism did not leave its mark. Nevertheless, for present purposes it would be useful to have a roadmap of the various theoretical “camps” that make up this unwieldy field of study, in order to better indicate the particular forms of postcolonial scholarship I am interested in engaging here.

Several postcolonial scholars have attempted within the last few years to “speak for” the field to the extent of naming its referent; or put another way, postcolonial studies has now itself enough of a history for a number of scholars to attempt to write something resembling a poetics of the field, its primary texts, practices, and methods. It is instructive of the difficulty of this task, however, that the two most prominent such attempts—from eminent postcolonialists Gayatri Spivak and Robert Young—approach it from almost diametrically opposed directions. Spivak’s epic Critique of Postcolonial Reason is explicitly indebted and clearly committed to a typically (for Spivak) eclectic poststructuralist approach to postcolonialism, yet its chapter headings examine the field in the broadest possible terms: “Philosophy,” “Literature,”
“History,” “Culture.” Spivak’s Critique constitutes an attempt to engage these established, broadly defined disciplines while defending the continued efficacy of deconstruction in the service of postcolonial goals, aims, and concerns. On the other hand, Young’s more recent Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction aims to do precisely what its subtitle suggests: offer a more conventional, linear exposition of postcolonialism as an epistemologically discreet category unto itself, with a specific history, ideology, and so on. The only exceptions to this approach appear in the book’s final section on theoretical formation, which displays a certain eclecticism even as it attempts to define an overarching theoretical matrix for postcolonial theory, and in the more personal preface and epilogue that frame the volume.

But it is not only methodology that distinguishes these two texts, but the very object of their disparate analyses. Young’s historicist approach unambiguously defines postcolonialism as the culmination of a third world Marxism born of anticolonial struggle, and thus focuses its attention on explicitly revolutionary figures such as Fanon, Che Guevara, and Mao Zedong. Conversely, Spivak’s tireless (and exhausting) deconstruction of postcolonialism and the field’s customary understanding of itself never settles for such a comprehensive or straightforward formulation (indeed the book’s subtitle, “Toward a History of the Vanishing Present,” provides an early hint as to its approach), favoring instead a close analysis of a handful of key texts. Also, in marked contrast to Young’s predilection for third world anticolonials Spivak opts to interrogate the continental philosophical canon—Kant, Hegel, Marx, whom she reads not as ancestors or founders of postcolonialism but as “remote discursive precursors”—as well as a diverse group of literary texts running from Bronte and Jean Rhys to Baudelaire and Kipling to J. M. Coetzee. Even Spivak’s historical analysis (in a chapter entitled, somewhat misleadingly, “History”) resists the kind of historicized account that Young’s book seems to strive for; the chapter seems more preoccupied with placing postcolonial India within a larger global context than with offering any broader history of postcolonial thought itself as an object, as Young’s text is at pains to do.

Although the two volumes cannot avoid mentioning some of the same names (most notably Marx, Foucault, and Derrida), they take divergent approaches to these apparently shared interests. Although space will not allow an exhaustive study of these interests and their presentation in the Young and Spivak, we can briefly examine each text’s presentation of Derrida and deconstruction. Aside from a doggedly poststructuralist approach within the main text, Spivak’s appendix “The Setting to Work of Deconstruction” concludes the book with a concise genealogy of deconstruction as a critical practice with special attention to the “ethical turn” in Derrida, or what Spivak calls “affirmative deconstruction,” whose originary movement Spivak traces back to 1968 and “The Ends of Man” (Spivak 425–26). This brief appendix or ghost limb to Spivak’s text seems to function as a defense of the
ethical efficacy and “responsible action” (428) of deconstruction in the act of its “setting to work” (427, 431). Conversely, Young’s study treats Derrida very much as a historical subject and even as an acquaintance of the author; parts of it seem written to Derrida himself, and refer to him in the second person. The chapter subtitled “Derrida in Algeria,” in fact, focuses squarely on Derrida’s personal history as an Algerian-born Jew, a fact that Spivak’s more text-centered analysis refers to only fleetingly and only at the end of her appendix, as if an afterthought.20 Although both texts seek to demonstrate poststructuralism’s relevance for anticolonial struggle, Young’s chapter makes it a particular point to portray poststructuralism itself as “one echo of the violence of Algeria playing itself out in an insurrection against the calm philosophical and political certainties of the metropolis” (Young 2001, 412), thus historicizing the entire enterprise of deconstruction by positing the founder’s personal subalterity and “experience” of anticolonial struggle as its very precondition—not a particularly Derridean critical move, and certainly not one that the deconstructivist Spivak would be likely to make herself.21

The point here is to demonstrate how even texts that seek to represent some sort of conclusive or overarching picture of postcolonialism as a discrete field of study cannot be reconciled to a single set of critical practices or assumptions, or even a canon of readings. If two of postcolonialism’s leading critics can’t even agree on a canon of key texts in their respective poetics of the field, then any critical enterprise calling itself “postcolonial whiteness studies” would be well advised to remain wary of the dangers inherent to relying on general references to “the postcolonial” or assumptions about its contents, or of glossing over the very heterogeneous nature of what has always been a contentious field of study. One common result of such overgeneralizations has been a tendency to cast postcolonialism in terms of an anglocentric model, which maintains and even reinforces England’s place at the center of the post-empire on which the sun apparently never sets. As I have argued elsewhere at some length, one of postcolonial studies’ ongoing flaws has been a prevalent notion of the field that congratulates itself on its “cultural diversity” while its arguably most widely read critical anthology continues to define its object of study as “those literatures written in English in formerly colonized societies” (Ashcroft 1995, 1). A study of postcolonial whiteness that accepts this definition of postcolonialism would itself be guilty of uncritically privileging whitenesses that speak English, and even of reinforcing the grim fact of English as the world’s preeminent white language.22

Even the more commendable efforts toward an encapsulating theory or poetics of the postcolonial, culminating in Young’s and Spivak’s recent efforts, have had to contend with three areas of significant theoretical difficulty: questions of epistemology, agency, and hybridity and hegemony. I have discussed these issues in some detail elsewhere under slightly different headings;23 here I will limit myself to a brief summary of each general problem. Each of these objections, as we will see, carries over to different degrees and in varying
forms into whiteness studies, and thus any commingling of whiteness and postcoloniality will need to maintain an awareness of them.

The objections to the term *postcolonial* as constituting a discrete epistemological category do not only center on questions of semantics and historicity (when this “*post-*” is supposed to begin, what distinguishes it from its root word “*colonial,*” and so on). More importantly, epistemological critiques of the postcolonial focus on the larger question of the field’s self-definition and its apparent inability to produce its referent as a stable object for its study. What such critiques, most famously Ella Shohat’s, emphasize is what they see as an unresolved tension between an abstracted philosophical distinction and a more temporally concrete historical one. Postcolonialism seeks to encompass a generalized condition of colonization and its aftermath yet also wants to engage in specific but disparate historical and cultural contexts, from the Algerian War of Independence to the Cuban Revolution to cultural practices such as Indian *sati*; even Bhabha’s most rarefied theoretical interventions attempt such engagements, albeit in ways that critics such as Shohat would still consider problematic.

Critiques of the status of agency in postcolonial studies, or rather of some postcolonial critics’ formulation of the subaltern and its possibilities for agency, take a more pointedly ideological form. The most virulent of these critiques have accused postcolonialism broadly (too broadly, given the diversity of the actual field) of producing a discourse that privileges cultural and linguistic differences over the concrete historical and economic conditions of colonization and its aftermath, thus ignoring what Benita Parry calls “the voice of the native” in her struggles against oppression and reducing actual anticolonial struggles to a theoretical *techne,* or what Parry dismisses as mere “devices circumventing and interrogating colonial authority” (Parry 1987, 43). Parry and others assert that such critical practices actually work against the agency of subaltern groups and the emergence of their “voice,” and further Western hegemony, by privileging the discourses of third world elite academics such as Bhabha and Spivak and their specious “representation” of the subaltern. It is characteristic of the epistemological paradoxes I have just described as immanent to postcolonialism that the very inclusion of critiques such as Parry’s and Kwame Appiah’s in so many discussions of the postcolonial actually undermine their railings against what E. San Juan Jr. calls “postcolonial doctrine” (San Juan 1998, 6), or at least co-opts them by demonstrating both the significance of the subject to have attracted such a range of critical studies and its flexibility in accommodating them—in short, of the diversity of argument and critical method that can and does exist under the banner of “postcolonial studies.”

Finally, the critique of “hybridity” as a privileged, even celebrated concept within postcolonial studies has argued that such approaches diminish the field’s efficacy as an oppositional anticolonial discourse. Such critiques argue that the emphasis on hybridity, syncretism, and ambivalence in
postcolonial studies constitutes an implicit rejection of oppositional narratives of resistance and liberation, most prominently third world Marxism, and an embrace of the concepts and language of poststructuralism and postmodernism. (Of course, this critique is also part of the larger polemic over the political efficacy of deconstruction that appears in Spivak and to a lesser extent Young.) Of course this objection does not equally apply to all postcolonial discourses; Bhabha’s deconstructivist approach is more susceptible to this kind of critique than the more apparently politically committed stance of, say, Edward Said. Nevertheless, what is at stake in this critique is whether the questions that a certain type of postcolonial theory has raised—about difference and hybridity, about both colonizing and colonized subject positions in relation to hegemonic colonial discourses of power and their various neocolonial manifestations—contribute to anticolonial struggle or distract from it. According to this type of general objection, the writing of theory does not necessarily constitute an adequate form of “resistance” (a point that Bhabha pointedly denies in “The Commitment to Theory”). Consequently, this privileging of theoretical difference over “actual” resistance and struggle belies postcolonial studies’ own shortcomings as an anti-colonial praxis.

Notwithstanding the flaws that these general critiques have exposed within postcolonialism, the turn toward what we now recognize as postcolonial studies has sought to break the literary, cultural, and ideological hegemony that white English and other European literatures have historically maintained over their nonwhite and near-white others. Taking its cue from poststructuralist theories, much postcolonial scholarship seeks to undo the binary thinking of “colonizer/colonized” and other such essentialized oppositional categories—including the concept of “race” itself—and expose the ways they function to perpetuate the cultural dominance of the West and the marginality of its colonized and once-colonized others. Further, as I have argued elsewhere, in the most general sense postcolonial studies seeks to both interrogate the colonial discourses of the past and provide analyses or articulations of the diasporic, migratory condition that is perhaps the most salient characteristic of the postcolonial world. Even given the theoretical difficulties that critiques of the postcolonial have indicated, postcolonial studies even in its present form remains a body of work that strives to move beyond the limitations of an economic or historicist approach to encompass issues of class, gender, race, ethnicity, language, and geographical location—in short, all of the tangible and intangible factors that constitute the shaping and maintenance of nations and peoples. Marxist critiques tend to miss the crucial point that domination is not only about economic subjugation but also penetrates the minds and bodies of the oppressed, a point that both San Juan’s book and, in whiteness studies, David Roediger’s class-centered critique fail to grasp.

Further, postcolonialism doesn’t neatly or without violence fit any dialectical model of humanist progress; it is thus inaccurate to treat the field as
a form of idealism, because it is possible only in the most general terms to identify the multitudinous discourses existing under the banner of the “postcolonial” as a single, easily summarized ideal or essential horizon of expectations. To dismiss the postcolonial as another failed “end of either history or ideology,” as San Juan does (San Juan 14), or reduce it to a grouping of underdeveloped “national allegories” that lag behind “first-world cultural development,” as Fredric Jameson so notoriously does (Jameson 1986, 65, 69) is to forget that postcolonial studies draws much of its strength from the critique, largely learned from poststructuralist thought, of precisely such categories of social and cultural development. The most compelling writings in whiteness studies, from Dyer’s White to Frankenberg’s writings to Wray and Newitz’s White Trash volume, exemplify this resistance to totalized notions of race and ethnicity and tendency toward what Michel Foucault has called “an autonomous, non-centralized kind of theoretical production,” a critical orientation largely derived from the same theoretical precursors that inform much postcolonial criticism.

Finally it is worth pointing out, if only in brief, that the by-now familiar criticism of theoretical interventions informed by structuralist and poststructuralist approaches—which have been somewhat pejoratively called “constructionist” approaches—does not form an automatic or necessary opposition with criticisms that claim a more overt historical or activist engagement. Deconstructivist approaches to postcolonialism, or to whiteness, do not automatically or necessarily represent an evasion of the world in their analyses of colonial discourses, although the danger of a sort of solipsism is always present. The choice is not, as Robyn Wiegman’s recent critique of whiteness studies would have it, between agency and constructivism. Although Wiegman sees what she calls “an emphasis on agency that situates a theoretically humanist subject at the center of social constructionist analysis” as a “contradictory” effect of current approaches to whiteness studies (Wiegman 1999, 135), I see no necessary contradiction in theorizing a subject that is aware of its own constructedness in terms of constitutive discursive influences yet wishes to project itself as a human agent in what is, after all, a human struggle played out on the level not only of state and collectivity but also (and especially) of individuals. Thus, it is not necessarily or automatically a contradiction in terms to argue for the social constructedness of whiteness as a colonial imperative while positing a subject—who is after all, the concrete focus of such imperatives—as a human agent who must contend with and strive to overthrow them. Such a subject and agent necessarily acts out of a sense of historical and cultural specificity, and both postcolonial and whiteness studies are unavoidably historiographic enterprises to the extent that they are concerned with hegemonic discourses and their effects on subjects.

To the extent that postcolonial critiques, however well intentioned, eliminate race as an object of inquiry, they neglect a crucial dimension of the
colonial ideology. One does not make whiteness as a malignant colonial ideology go away by simply showing how it deconstructs itself, any more than one can do away with the concept of the subject itself by such maneuverings. One can and should, however, strive to show both how whiteness does not essentially, irrevocably come with the kinds of privileges that it now enjoys, and how the privileges of being white have always come at the expense of those who are not. The point is not to undo or “abolish” or destroy whiteness, as the “race traitor” school of whiteness studies argues, since this sort of ethnic self-cleansing (literal or otherwise) is neither desirable nor possible.32 John Brown, a favorite “race traitor” example, never renounced his whiteness, symbolically or otherwise. Neither has Breyten Breytenbach, the self-identifying “Albino Terrorist” who has written so eloquently about his years in prison for fighting against the Apartheid regime in South Africa.33 There is no need to resort to the self-sacrificing, self-destructing white male rebel as a trope of the new postcolonial whiteness, a paradoxically self-serving figure who would allow whites to retain their central status as “emancipators” (à la Lawrence of Arabia, dancing across the train tops) and thus their power and privilege.

On the other hand, one effective way to administer the desired privilegeectomy to the white subject is to show how its position within the colonial society is neither uniformly dominant nor stable, but contingent upon a performance of white power. The reflection on this point offered by George Orwell, as a ruminative colonist in “Shooting an Elephant,” is instructive: “A sahib has got to act like a sahib. . . . He wears a mask, and his face grows to fit it” (Orwell [1936] 1970, 269). Here Orwell reveals the fictiveness of white dominance precisely as a performance, an act that must constantly be kept up (here again is Mohanty’s “white man as spectacle”), as Orwell’s colonial policeman is compelled to murder the elephant in question for no other reason than to make a show of white decisiveness and authority in front of the natives (271). Once the authority and superiority of whiteness reveals itself to be a fiction, the revoking of its privileges cannot be far behind.

The postcolonial critique of whiteness cannot end with the defrocking of the latter, however, for the simple reason that whiteness remains as part of the postcolonial world. White settlers in the United States, Australia, South Africa, Canada, and other areas not only did not disappear or leave upon the establishment of these nations, but were in each instance instrumental to their founding. Such situations do not fit Fanon’s infamous description of anti-colonial revolutions as “a total, complete, and absolute substitution” (Fanon 1963, 35), because whiteness remains behind in the new postcolonial state, in the form of both actual white subjects (former colonizers turned citizens) and the cultural and ideological apparatuses that continue to reflect the values of the colonial regime—a national language or religion, educational system, government infrastructure, and so on. The postcolonial critique of whiteness must thus move beyond narrow
anticolonialism or reverse racism to ask whether a new relation to whiteness is possible after empire—to construct, in effect, a whiteness without privilege, while still acknowledging the lingering traces of white normativity that remains more or less latent in the postcolonial world as an irreducible part of the colonial legacy.

WHITENESS AND AMERICAN STUDIES

Whiteness studies in the American studies context begins precisely with this premise of exposing or undoing whiteness as a tacitly privileged subject position. This movement toward rendering whiteness both visible and subject to critique—that is, to challenge both its invisibility and its (unspoken) claims to an essential superiority—characterizes what Mike Hill calls the "first wave" of white critique" (Hill 1997, 2). This whiteness made ethnic or "strange,"34 a whiteness thus rendered "examinable," as Chambers might put it, marks the success of this first wave of whiteness studies at forcing a moment of reckoning upon its once-invisible object. If the movement that Toni Morrison has described as “a serious intellectual effort to see what racial ideology does to the mind, imagination, and behavior of masters” (Morrison 1992, 12) has succeeded in bringing unprecedented attention to the lingering presence of white privilege, it has also made it necessary to up the critical ante. If whiteness has been made to see itself—or more accurately, to see itself as others see it, have seen it—it has now reached a moment of crisis. No longer able to portray itself as either benign or "normal" (in the sense of constituting a norm), whiteness must now reckon with its own history of aggression and hegemony.

Hill’s introduction to his edited collection on whiteness focuses on the new whiteness as a “terror,” and invokes the Oklahoma City bombings among other examples to illustrate the ways in which late twentieth-century whiteness has tried to distance itself from its more extreme articulations.35 Hill sees this emergence of a “terrifyingly ordinary” whiteness—that is, the tension between the extremity of white supremacist actions and the paradoxical recourse to a sort of populist ordinaries (or in other words, the claim to whiteness as the claim to normalcy, and vice versa) as characteristic of a “second wave” of whiteness studies (3). Yet to grasp the full extent of the impact that the first wave of whiteness scholars has made, it is necessary to move beyond individual acts of white terrorism (Hill also discusses the bombing at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta) to a more broadly ontological analysis. What will happen to normative whiteness now that it has begun to gauge the horrors it has perpetrated on its others, and begins to terrorize even itself? This is a moment of reckoning whose full impact has been postponed by the nearly incomprehensible horror of 9/11. Now whiteness has a new, nonwhite threat to rally itself against, and thus the question of its own implication in and responsibility for helping to create the global political

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introduction: whiteness after empire

conditions that brought the attack about is deferred, as is the question of why the United States has enemies in the first place. Although the 9/11 attacks were not directly about race, and American whiteness not the target—had it been so the terrorists would surely not have chosen New York, arguably the United States’ most multicultural city—certainly the rise in violence directed at Arab Americans, as well as much of our public policy, especially that of racial profiling, would indicate that both the American government and a significant portion of its population do see the attack and subsequent conflict in racial terms.36

The effect of this shift in focus, from the white terrorists within to the Arab ones without (and within) has the effect, I think, of deferring white America’s inevitable moment(s) of reckoning with itself and its historically wronged others. By rallying around the flag and defending “freedom,” whites in America can indulge in the temporary distraction allowed by a specious patriotic “color-blindness”; anyone introducing the least divisive issue, including questions about race, into the post-9/11 public arena is accused of being unpatriotic or worse.37 Whiteness thus attempts to generate its own difference by projection or sleight-of-hand—the matter of why America was singled out for such an attack is both deferred and made different, and the specter of white terror, both at home and abroad, temporarily fades. Yet now that the critique of whiteness has rendered it visible, and thus subject to critique, the question of “What now?”—what we might call the question of the question of whiteness—is irrevocable.

If then, as Gregory Jay asserts, whiteness studies is the “ghost haunting multiculturalism and critical race studies” (Jay 2002, 1), it has also brought Euro-American whiteness to what we might provisionally call a crisis of recognition. For perhaps the first time since its invention some few hundred years ago,38 whiteness finds itself to some extent caught in the other’s gaze; it has come to be aware of itself as a race-object among other race-objects, or at least as an entity that can be and is apprehended that way by the other’s gaze. This new and uncomfortable condition—what, borrowing from Sartre, we might call a “whiteness for-itself”—also begins to form an uneasy state of being-with (Mitsein) as it learns to be looked at by its others. This Mitsein, which is half of Martin Heidegger’s famous distinction in Being and Time between Being-with and Dasein-with (Mitsein und Mitdasein), emphasizes both the interdependence of subjectivities and the indispensability of this intersubjective relation for being. Heidegger’s division of “Being-in-the-world” into three distinct moments, the third of which, “being,” is the being-with, makes clear that the fundamental characteristic of being is precisely its being with others.39 This dependence upon the other for the subject’s being makes this relation both fluid and radically contingent. For if what constitutes whiteness is in fact a transcendental relation to its others—if, to put it in another context, as Morrison claims, it is possible “to discover, through a closer look at literary ‘blackness,’ the nature—even the cause—of literary

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‘whiteness’” (9)—then clearly the truly intersubjective encounter with the Other must constitute a moment of reckoning and of accountability. As Vron Ware explains in her analysis of post-empire England, “The postwar migration of workers and their families from the former colonies involved a reckoning with ideas about “race” and history and culture derived from the past” (Ware 2001, 208). Certainly such moments as Ware describes are in the end always partial and localized. The question of whiteness itself, whiteness qua whiteness, is never the immediate issue, thus rendering all such moments, whether billed as rapprochement, Truth and Reconciliation, War Crimes Tribunals, etc., part of the series of tuchés— in Lacanian terms, one in the string of missed encounters with the Real that nevertheless keep the subject locked into a dialectic of desire and demand with the Other. Nevertheless, as Sartre observes in his writings on the Heideggerian Mitsein,

The Other is the ex-centric limit which contributes to the constitution of my being. He [sic] is the test of my being inasmuch as he throws me outside of myself toward structures which at once both escape me and define me; it is this test which originally reveals the Other to me. (Sartre [1947] 1956, 244-45)

Learning to see a whiteness that, in Sartrean terms, is suddenly externalized and thrown “outside of itself” toward others who would both “escape and define” it—or in other words rendering whiteness visible (and thus strange) and subject to critique—is only the first step, as Hill correctly sees. The real action is not in bringing whiteness to reckoning, but in what happens next. And what happens to whiteness next, especially in the postcolonial moment, is what this book is all about.

POSTCOLONIAL WHITENESS

In my previous work I have outlined certain categories or conditions under which such a postcolonial critique of whiteness might proceed: the concept of whiteness respectively as cultural aesthetic, ontological relation, and cultural history. For present purposes, however, it may be more useful to address specific points of convergence between postcolonial and whiteness studies. Given that neither of these fields of study can be glossed in any meaningful way as a stable or homogeneous entity, we can still identify certain problems or questions that various forms of these disciplines hold in common. For the purposes of the present study, we may identify at least four such points of convergence: (1) the concept of whiteness as a cultural hegemon, (2) the history of the spread of hegemonic whiteness through colonialism, (3) a broadening of the comparative focus of the debate on whiteness
beyond a strictly U.S. model, and (4) a growing awareness within postcolonial studies of the United States itself as an imperial power.

Although what Wiegman calls “the use of class as the transfer point between looking white and believing you are white” (135) is not universally applicable, as she argues in her critique of class-based whiteness studies, it is undoubtedly an effective point of departure for deconstructing white cultural imperatives—especially as they manifest in nonwhite bourgeois communities, of which there are no shortage in the postcolonial world: Cuban Americans, Indian Brahmins, Afro-Jamaican bourgeoisie—the list goes on.42 What these and other such groups share is an investment in whiteness to some degree or other as an indispensable component of their own upward mobility within their respective societies, which each group retains as part of its own particular legacy of colonialism. This is arguably the most apparent point of convergence, and perhaps the most poignant, between whiteness and postcolonial studies: the example of nonwhites not “looking white” but nevertheless “believing [they] are white,” claiming superiority by virtue of their relative whiteness and establishing economic and cultural hegemony over other less-privileged groups on racial grounds.

Thus, to cite just one example from personal experience, the Cuban American professor who some years ago at my dissertation defense objected to my reading Cuban literature and culture in opposition to “the West,” arguing that Latin Americans were as “Western” as any North American. Antonio Gramsci has pointed out in a different context that while terms such as “East” and “West” are “arbitrary and conventional, that is historical constructions,” the terms have nevertheless “finished up indicating specific relations between different cultural complexes” (Gramsci 447). The crystallization of “East” and “West” as terms in a fixed opposition of essences comes for Gramsci out of “the point of view of the European cultured classes, who, as a result of their world-wide hegemony have caused them to be accepted everywhere” (447). So while my former professor’s argument may be geographically true, it strikes me today as a bit ingenuous: Being “Western” in this context has less to do with where one sits on the map than with one’s relation to a colonial history in which “Western-ness” is bound up with both colonial dominance and whiteness.

Over the last two decades, however, under the assault of postcolonial and more recently whiteness studies, this concept of whiteness as a cultural hegemon has found itself increasingly subject to interrogation. The idea of whiteness as a cultural aesthetic norm combines with the idea of whiteness as a desirable and even necessary trait for colonized subjects who wish to achieve class mobility and financial success in a colonized (or formerly colonized) society. This tandem of whiteness as both aesthetically desirable and pragmatically necessary begins to be exposed as a product of the so-called civilizing mission of colonialism. The effect of the colonial sham on the individual level is a subject who simultaneously identifies with the white
ideal and is radically alienated from it; this is the essence of Bhabha’s formulation of the colonial subject who is “almost but not quite . . . almost but not white” (Bhabha 89). The collective result in the colonial context is a hegemonic cultural inscription that would systematically suppress and marginalize the cultural values of the colonized population. Under this scenario, assimilation to the colonizer’s cultural world becomes essential for any colonized subject who hopes for any social or material advancement. As I point out elsewhere, to gain access in this scenario to the social, economic, and political power of the colonial or neocolonial state requires that the colonized subject suppress his or her own cultural practices and beliefs and learn to live “like a white man.” As Fanon, Bhabha, and others have pointed out, however, even those subjects who most successfully internalize the white ideal, no matter how skilled the mimicry or complete the performance, can never attain their goal. It is Fanon who best describes the existential double bind of the colonized subject of color: “[T]he educated Negro suddenly discovers that he is rejected by a civilization which he has none the less assimilated” (Black 93). Once the white lie of assimilation becomes clear, there is no reason for whiteness’s others to continue the sham.

From its beginnings in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the spread of hegemonic whiteness through colonialism has not necessarily meant that all whites enjoyed the same privileges by simple virtue of race identification. Whiteness certainly produces differently classed subjects, as “White Trash” whiteness scholars such as Matt Wray and Annalee Newitz have persuasively demonstrated. However, this focus on economically disempowered and/or culturally marginalized whitenesses within domestic contexts, generating what Wiegman aptly calls “minoritized white subjects,” by its attention to particularized white subjects elides the extent to which whiteness as a concept remains wedded to cultural imperatives that have historically been complicit in the oppression, colonization, and outright genocide of nonwhite peoples the world over.

Certainly the contributors to this volume would recognize along with Wray and Newitz that whiteness is not a monolithic construct and does not hold the same level of power and prestige in all its embodiments. Individual white subjects are no doubt “internally differentiated,” allowing for the fact that some groups of whites “also experience deprivation, stigmatization, and subjugation”, one very fruitful topic for a postcolonial approach to whiteness has been precisely the Irish, whom the English regard as “uncivilized” and therefore “not white,” a rationale the latter employed to justify more than two centuries of colonization (three, if you count Northern Ireland). But the example of colonized or otherwise oppressed whites in whatever context does not change the historical ascendancy of a certain kind of whiteness—let’s call it a bourgeois imperial whiteness. And certainly this dominant form of whiteness did and does come with all sorts of privilege and has had all manner of atrocities committed in its name. Not for nothing does
bell hooks associate whiteness with violence and terror, nor does a prominent group of whiteness scholars collectively classify whiteness as “THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN COLONIALISM.” As this volume tries to demonstrate, the best way for a specifically postcolonial approach to whiteness to demonstrate its heterogeneity is to examine whitenesses “marginalized” by virtue of geography and/or relative cultural distance from dominant colonial histories. Or as Ruth Frankenberg puts it, the rise of global whiteness “is linked to imperial and colonial expansion, simultaneous with the making of (white dominant) nation states” (Frankenberg 1997, 8). Thus the emphasis in the pietes to follow on whitenesses across a variety of geographic and cultural contexts, few of which can be categorized as mainstream Anglo-American whiteness (and even this categorization can be deceiving, as Roberts’s chapter on Princess Diana amply illustrates).

Through such a transnational approach to whiteness across a range of geographic and cultural incarnations, the concept of whiteness itself as a form of hegemony historically linked to colonialism clashes in the postcolonial moment with new, competing narratives of national histories, most of which aim to reinscribe all that colonial historical narratives had suppressed in the name of “education” (think Macauley’s Minute here) or “management” or “maintaining order”—categories that, at least in the colonial context, share many intentions and effects in common. In the postcolonial or post-independence moment, such repressed histories tend to surface with a vengeance in the form of embarrassing, painful events from the nation’s colonial history to be confronted and worked through. More than merely pointing out such moments in the history of colonial whiteness, the new nation’s job is one of remembrance and of mourning, of repentance (or defiance) and forgiveness (or punishment). This process in fact constitutes an examination, if not a construction and a founding, of the new nation’s collective conscience: The salient questions are not just about what has happened, but about what to do about it and how to move on as a nation. How smoothly the process of what in South Africa is known officially as “Truth and Reconciliation” moves forward will largely determine the fate of the nation and its citizens, white or not.

Beyond the status of whiteness within a single nation’s borders, however, this volume argues for a broadening of the comparative focus of the debate on whiteness beyond a strictly U.S. model—that is, beyond a United States-centered model that allows American studies to duck postcolonial issues and lets the United States off the hook for its own imperialist history and current colonial practices and toward an awareness of what Vron Ware and Les Back call “the transnational relationships within the cultures of racism and... the histories of specific local and national arenas in which racial power is forged” (Ware, Vron, and Back 2002, 13–14). Likewise, the Editorial Collective that compiled The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness promisingly asks “how whiteness circulates as an axis of power and identity around...
the world” (Brander Rasmussen 2001, 3), thus implicitly bringing whiteness out of American studies and potentially into the postcolonial realm. Nothing else in their book explicitly pursues this task, however; even Ware’s essay in the same volume, despite its opening claim that “whiteness needs to be understood as an interconnected global system, having different inflections and implications depending on where and when it has been produced” (Ware 2001, 185), is more about domestic English race and class issues than how the current situation grows out of a history of colonialism and slavery. Thus, even texts that gesture toward such a transnational approach to whiteness studies in their introductions, such as The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness and Ware and Back’s Out of Whiteness, invariably revert to a domestic Anglo-American focus for the remainder of the book, treating the occasional foray into English domestic issues as “international.” Such an examination of the relations between whiteness, national identity, and individual subjects, which until now has remained a mostly missed opportunity, is precisely what the present volume seeks to perform or at least initiate.

WRITINGS ON RACE AND EMPIRE

I have not organized the chapters in this volume under any particular headings or subdivisions, although I have grouped together essays that explore similar areas or take similar approaches. Generally then, the first four essays all address whiteness in the postcolonial moment as an ideal or norm that its others either aspire to or resist. The essays in this section explore whiteness as the cultural imperative masquerading as an aesthetic ideal, and examine the ways in which postcolonial whiteness manages to retain much of the privilege and prestige it held at the height of colonialism. This notion of whiteness as an explicit and implicit cultural ideal—of beauty, desirability, virtue, purity—lingers in the postcolonial world in surprising ways, and presents a formidable obstacle for both subjects of color and whites who find themselves marginalized in some other way (by nationality, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, etc.), who either strive for an unattainable ideal (Bhabha’s “almost but not quite. . . .”) or must learn to assert their own cultural difference in the face of the universalized white norm.

Diane Roberts’s “The Body of the Princess” examines the legacy of Princess Diana and what she represented as the most visible symbol of a white England greatly diminished from its erstwhile role as the preeminent colonial power and clinging to what little remains of its Victorian-era glory. John Hawley’s, Anikó Imre’s, and Gerry Turcotte’s chapters each approach this lingering mystique of whiteness from the perspective of various marginalized white and nonwhite groups. Hawley’s “Lavender Ain’t White” explores the relation of black and Latino drag-queen cultures to the glamorous whiteness of “the (white) soap operas” to which they aspire, and examines the extent to which normative feminine whiteness retains a significant
introduction: whiteness after empire

influence over the queens’ aspirations and desires. Anikó Imre’s “Whiteness in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe” focuses on Hungarian Gypsy (Romani) culture in its struggle for self-assertion in the face of a hegemonic Euro-whiteness that has historically sought to dominate and even destroy it. Gerry Turcotte’s “Vampiric Decolonization” continues with an exploration of another localized, hybrid discourse: Mudrooroo’s appropriation of the Gothic vampire novel as a postcolonial narrative that critiques “the way Indigenous identity, mythology, spirituality and values have been fed on by European invaders” and “suggest[s] how Indigenous writers might conceivably bite back.”

The middle three chapters, taken as a whole, explore the vagaries of postcolonial whiteness in its sociological, psychological, and ontological dimensions, and the ways in which the demise of colonialism has served to destabilize not only white supremacy on the collective level but the very notion of what it means to “be white” as an individual. The crisis of whiteness arguably begins at precisely the point at which the colonized subject of color can see through it. Once the hollow sham of maintaining the old tired hegemonic relations in the name of a specious “assimilation” becomes clear, whiteness must begin to surrender its position of mastery and move toward an intersubjective relation of recognition (Anerkennen) between subjects. Obviously this does not mean that all of the inequalities of the old system disappear in one fell swoop. Colonial cultural norms worked their way into the colonized mind over the course of a long, patient, systematic process, and there is no reason to believe that Fanon’s “total, complete, and absolute substitution” (Fanon 1963, 35) ever occurs as suddenly or as thoroughly as his formulation of an anticolonial “tabula rasa which characterizes at the outset all decolonization” (35) would initially appear. But it is on the level of individuals, of daily interactions on the streets and in the towns of the formerly colonized nation, in the workplaces, in restaurants and bars, where the former colony begins the transformation to the postcolonial nation. The chapters by Melissa Steyn, Cheryl Herr, and myself each address this crisis of the postcolonial white subject, as well as the compensating mechanisms by which whiteness manages to reassess and reinvent itself in forms that continue to assert its privilege and prestige.

Steyn’s ‘White Talk’ demonstrates how white South Africans now living under black majority rule, in need of new strategies to help shore up their identities and guard their privilege as whites, are drawing on the resources available to them through the prestige and power still inherent in less discredited forms of Western whiteness, which allow them to maintain a measure of hegemony in post-apartheid South Africa by virtue of their association with them. The next two chapters, Herr’s “The Color of Schizophrenia” and my own “The Gaze of the White Wolf,” explore different mental health discourses in their respective efforts to uncover how white cultural imperatives penetrate into the health sciences on both collective and individual levels—that is, in the form of both universalizing diagnostic tendencies and
hegemony in the analyst-patient relation. Herr’s chapter calls for a multidisciplinary approach to postcolonial mental illness that is attuned to both cultural difference and the ways in which colonial racialization have historically contributed to higher rates of psychoses in both Ireland and the Caribbean. My own chapter focuses on Freud’s landmark case study of “The Wolfman” to argue for psychoanalysis as a discourse that retains the capacity of remaining open to the endless calculation of cultural difference, while also remaining vigilant to its own history of complicity with normative male European whiteness.

The volume’s final three chapters explore the ways in which the constructions of reality inherent in discourses of colonial history function to authorize and maintain whiteness as the norm, while disguising their own constructedness behind what Ashcroft et al. call the myth of “a value free, ‘scientific’ view of the past” (355). In this context, history as a discipline emerges as a crucial tool for the domination of the colonized, but also one that postcolonial writings have employed strategically. Postcolonial studies has sought not simply to reject or reverse the narratives known collectively as “colonial history,” but to explore the conditions of its narrativization, of its construction in response to the political and rhetorical exigencies of colonialism. With this task in mind, each of the last three chapters seeks to engage its chosen colonial history as narrative—that is, not as a transparent continuum of events that are simply recorded, but as a discourse and a rhetoric that has functioned in the service of colonial whiteness and must now be revised and rewritten by its others.

Frances Singh’s “Motley’s the Only Wear” locates a literary prototype of the new and globally aware postcolonial whiteness in the most unlikely of historical places: Conrad’s “Harlequin” from Heart of Darkness, the white Russian sailor whom Marlow describes as a “fabulous... insoluble problem” (Conrad 54) and whose multilingual, multinational qualities make him a much-overlooked model of an ex-centric whiteness that could eschew mastery and learn to live intersubjectively with its others. Christopher Kelen’s “Hymns for and from White Australia” offers a study of Australia’s foundational white mythology as reflected in the ambiguities and anxieties of its national anthems: the official “Advance Australia Fair” and the un-official “Waltzing Matilda.” In “The Times of Whiteness,” Ryan Trimm tracks whiteness in Caryl Phillips’s Cambridge as the signifier of a normalizing, authorizing discourse operating in a sort of temporal schism, a constant deferral of reference through which whiteness establishes itself as an originary nonidentity that positions all other identities as raced, thus rendering whiteness both invisible and atemporal, or “out of time.”

THE FUTURE OF WHITENESS

In the conclusion of White, Dyer warns of the danger of white subjects distancing themselves, not only temporally but representationally and politi-
cally, from both neo-Nazi and other white supremacist groups of the present moment and colonial histories and other past forms of “extreme” whiteness (of which, as we have seen, Hitler’s is only the most famous example). This distancing mechanism allows whiteness to continue to see itself as “non-particularity, the space of ordinariness” (Dyer 223), a collective willed blindness essential to both the maintenance of white cultural hegemony and the avoidance of accountability. In the more crass, blatant forms of this phenomenon by which “normal” everyday whites comfort themselves by this psychic distancing mechanism, we may witness Jerry Springer’s and other daytime talk shows in which foul-mouthed, hostile white supremacist groups are pitted against self-righteous studio audiences. On a more subtle, dissimulating level, however, are self-congratulatory films such as Schindler’s List in which we see a noble white man combat the evils of “extreme” whiteness. Thus, everyday whiteness can distance itself from its most virulent manifestations while maintaining its cultural privileges.

Such a distancing also allows for what Dyer calls the “exquisite agony” (206) of white liberal guilt, which likewise seeks to appease and appeal to the other’s capacity for orderly dissent while surrendering little of its own entrenched privilege. White liberal guilt at its most performative has the additional effect of diverting attention from the facts of white racism and oppression to how badly the Enlightened White Liberal feels about it. Ultimately exercises such as Les Back’s self-loathing ruminations after a series of interviews with a white supremacist leader, which he describes as a “reflexive interpretive reading of whiteness” (Ware and Back 45), serve as more self-portrayals of the earnest white ethnographer trying his Levinasian best to dialogue with the other. The fact that Back winds up hating himself for allowing the white supremacists to get too chummy with him—the fact that he feels so guilty about it all—does more to illustrate the dangers of white liberal guilt than all of the book’s earlier questions about whether whites should study whiteness, and unwittingly serves as a strong argument against such self-representation. I concur wholeheartedly with Back’s later assessment that “if the interrogation of whiteness is to possess ethical integrity, it must accept this ambivalence” (57). Self-reflexive moments are not offensive in themselves, as long as the critic doesn’t languish there—self-flagellation, which we all know is ultimately self-serving, should not be the point. Such white guilt has been both the enabling condition of postcolonial studies and its worst enemy. Or put another way: White guilt has been the prevalent condition blocking postcolonial studies from any careful examination of precisely how whiteness has managed all the damage it has inflicted on its others and what other forms a postcolonial whiteness might take.

Thus, postcolonial studies must be able and willing to respond to certain foreseeable problems or risks in turning its focus to the analysis of colonial whiteness. The emergence of postcolonial whiteness as an object of study means that those of us who undertake it must vigilantly guard against those who view it as an opportunity to (1) construct an apologist narrative

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for whiteness, either in terms of a revisionist history or a distancing from what we now know whiteness to have been; (2) reinstate whiteness as a landmark or standard of reference in cultural or literary studies; and perhaps most insidiously, (3) settle for elaborate expressions of guilt as a substitute for or excuse from the most minute and rigorous analysis of what exactly whiteness has been and continues to be today. As Dyer points out, white guilt can paradoxically function as a validation of white liberal superiority as a more sensitized, and thus morally refined, whiteness: “We may lacerate ourselves with admission of our guilt, but that bears witness to the fineness of a moral spirit that can feel such guilt—the display of our guilt is our calvary” (11).

The turn to postcolonial whiteness thus presents itself as an opportunity to dislocate it, to shift the focus from uncritical representations of subaltern others to an emphasis on the conditions of white colonial production of such representations of both others and itself, and the extent to which it has historically done so in the name of extending and maintaining colonial power. As Winant explains, the task before us is to

think, finally, of what it means to acknowledge that the half-millennium of domination of the globe by Europe and its U.S. inheritors is the historical context in which racial concepts of human difference have attained their present, and still relatively unchallenged, foundational status. (Winant 107–108)

The chapters in this volume not only “think” this acknowledgment, but embrace it as the necessary precondition to any critique of whiteness, postcolonial or not. The point of such an “acknowledgment” would thus be to disrupt the production of the text of whiteness precisely by asking the questions that it has eluded for so long. The task of a postcolonial critique of whiteness must finally be, as Anthony O’Brien suggests, “to ask new questions of old histories,” thus allowing us to “move on from solipsism and myths of centrality” (O’Brien 55) that have maintained whiteness in its position as the invisible, omnipotent arbiter of world culture for far too long.

NOTES

2. See Dyer, especially 1–4, and Chambers.
3. In this context, the recent arguments in the United States by conservative thinkers for a more “race-blind” society must be viewed with suspicion, as a cynical attempt to deploy the language of equality as a ruse to return whiteness to its place as unacknowledged, invisible norm. For a recent and widely read example of this sort of argument, see D’Souza.
4. This is a conflict that Fanon’s later writings pointedly resolve in favor of the latter tendency. See for example Fanon, Wretched.
5. For examples of others who do take on the issue of race within colonial and/or postcolonial contexts, see Trinh 1991; Hall; and Davies 1995.

6. Fanon certainly does not overlook this dimension of colonial relations, nor does his work neglect the relations of what he variously calls the “national middle class” and “national bourgeoisie” with the colonizing regime and its legacy on the one hand and the national working classes on the other. Indeed, in Fanon’s view the national bourgeoisie welcomes independence from the colonial regime as an opportunity to effect “the transfer into native hands of those unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period” (Wretched, 152). See also Fanon, Wretched, 149–54 and 175–76.

7. See Ashcroft 1995, 518, 524.


9. For some very good sociological analyses of this downsized, even defensive working-class whiteness in postcolonial England, Ware, “Perfidious” and Out, 33–59, 99–110, and 196–226.

10. For some pointed critiques of postcolonial studies for its failure to address U.S. “internal colonization” of Native Americans and inner-city Latinos and African Americans, as well the United States’ role in the spread of global capitalism as a form of economic and cultural imperialism, see San Juan; Chun; Cherniavsky. See also Trías Monge for a study of the United States’ continued “protection” of Puerto Rico and other such properties.


12. One admirable exception to this tendency in postcolonial studies is Ashcroft et al.’s Post-colonial Reader. Both the editors’ introduction to the section entitled “Ethnicity and Indigeneity” and the contributors’ essays they include in it generally eschew the binary oppositions of race and colonial power that I am critiquing here. See Ashcroft, 213–45.


15. For a lengthier discussion on this point that I pursue elsewhere, see López, Posts, 121.


18. See Young Postcolonialism, 2001, especially 15–69, in which Young argues for a neat division between “periods” leading up to the present postcolonial moment.


20. For Spivak, “Derrida’s own position as a Franco-Maghrebian” does not necessarily lead one away from deconstruction as an efficacious critical activity, nor does Derrida’s own discussion of “his early years in Algeria.” Spivak does not elaborate on or further discuss these remarks, which appear in the book’s final paragraph. See Spivak, 431.

21. Young actually goes farther along this line of thought in a previous book, in which he seeks to place poststructuralism’s originary beginnings as “not May 1968 but rather the Algerian War of Independence.” See Young 1990, 1.

22. See López, Posts, 40, 219n.


24. For a particularly thorough and widely read critique of just this type, see Shohat.
25. Excerpts from both Parry’s and Appiah’s attacks on postcolonialism appear in Ashcroft et al.’s *The Post-colonial Studies Reader*, the best-known such anthology, and have been anthologized in a number of other such readers. Both of these texts thus paradoxically enter the realm of “postcolonial studies” even as they would disavow their own status as “postcolonial” writings and attack the field itself. See Ashcroft, 36–44 and 119–24 respectively.

26. For examples of Said’s more strident political writings, see Said, *After and Question*. 

27. See Bhabha, 19–39.


29. All of the essays in this collection share with Roediger, as do I, the “desire to produce an antiracist white (or postwhite) subject, one whose political commitments can be disaffiliated from the deployments of white supremacy.” I part company with Roediger’s notion of a class solidarity that transcends race and ethnic identity, however, because it represents a throwback to outdated theorizations of the transcendental Marxist proletariat subject, a model that has historically ignored differences of gender, race, and ethnicity to its own eventual chagrin. Such a class-constituted postwhite subject does indeed fall prey to the dangers Wiegman sees of “reconfirm[ing] a universalist narcissistic white logic” that ultimately serves only to reinvent whiteness as antiracist while allowing it to keep (and shore up) its privilege and power. See Roediger, 8–13; Wiegman, 123. For a concise but theoretically indispensable account of Marxism’s difficulties in maintaining the fantasy of the transcendental proletariat subject, see Laclau, especially 47–91.

30. See Foucault 1980, 81.

31. This tension between human agency and social constructedness—or put another way, between the subject and the social environment that calls or interpellates it—is at least as old as the Platonic dialogues. For present purposes we need only go back as far as Marx’s famous claim that “social being” determines consciousness, and Engels’s more nuanced qualification of this point in a letter to Joseph Bloch, to see the ambivalence that has historically existed between these competing but not irreconcilable terms. See Marx, 11–12 and Engels, 760–62 respectively.

32. I emphatically disagree with Wiegman’s claim that “[t]he abolition of whiteness reclaims the democratic possibility of human society.” On the contrary, the “abolition” or ethnic cleansing, literal or otherwise, of whiteness or anything else perpetuates the oppositional logic of hegemony by simply reversing it. The task of undoing whiteness from within must necessarily challenge postcolonial whites across the spectrum of nationalities and subject positions to “disinvest” themselves from their own whiteness and enter more fully into a relation of postcolonial Mitsein with their others. For postcolonial whites this means the end of seeing this disinvestment as a unilateral move, a self-congratulatory gesture that allows whites, as Annalee Newitz puts it, “to critique themselves before anyone else does.” White self-flagellation is not the point here; an honest reckoning in good faith, and a willingness on all sides to work through painful histories (and presents) and move on, is. See Wiegman, 143; Newitz, 149.

33. Breytenbach’s memoir tells of his “undercover” work against the apartheid regime, his capture and interrogation, imprisonment, and eventual release. See Breytenbach.

34. Dyer’s word—specifically, in the introduction to *White* he describes his own goal as “the project of ‘making whiteness strange.’” See Dyer, 4.
35. See Hill.
36. A U.S. Dept. of Justice memo written shortly after 9/11 alerts law enforce-
ment agencies to the Department’s concern over the growing number of incidents of
violence against Arab Americans and anyone else who looks “like a terrorist”—that
is, anyone with remotely Middle Eastern features. At the same time, CNN reports
that Arab Americans can expect to be targets of racial profiling at airports and other
public places in the United States. See Daniels; “Arab.”
37. As an example from my hometown, take the three Miami-Dade
firefighters—all three African American—who allegedly refused to ride in a fire truck
that had a U.S. flag draped over it. Given the atmosphere of post-9/11 media hype
and controversy, it should perhaps not be surprising that the Miami-Dade Fire Dept.
placed the three men on “administrative leave,” or that they have become the targets
of a barrage of harsh, even threatening e-mails. Yet it is remarkable how
quickly white America turns on its citizens of color when they refuse to toe the (color) line
during a national crisis. See Olkon; White.
38. For more on the construction of the white race as a kind of political
fiction and how it comes to be constituted out of a scattering of national identities,
see Allen; Roediger; Ignatiev.
40. For more on the tuché generally and how Lacan himself applies the term,
41. See López, Posts, 93–96.
42. For more thorough discussion of each of these communities, see López,
“Patria”; Figuera; and Cliff respectively.
43. See López, Posts, 94–95.
44. See Wray and Newitz, 1–12.
45. See Birgit Rasmussen, 8.
47. See hooks, 165–79 and Birgit Rasmussen, 13.
48. For the text of Macaulay’s infamous “Minute on Indian Education,” see
Macaulay.
49. For a useful book-length discussion of how colonial education functions in
the service of establishing and maintaining colonial power (in this case English), see
Viswanathan.
50. See Sun Juan; Chun; Cherniavsky; and Trífas Monge.
51. See Ware, “Perfidious” and Out; Brander Rasmussen et al.
52. Dyer is specifically talking about white women in the cited passage; but
certainly that shoe fits men just as well, imagery aside. For the full discussion of Dyer’s
analysis of the representation of white women in association with the “demise” of
colonialism, see Dyer, 184–206.
53. For the full text of Back’s article, see Ware, Out, 33–59.

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