PREDICATION AND IMMANENCE: ANAXAGORAS, PLATO, EUDOXUS, AND ARISTOTLE

1. Introduction

A theory of predication invokes immanence, as I shall use the word, if it explains why snow is white by introducing something in snow that accounts for its being white.

Aristotle's theory of predication in the *Categories* is partly immanentist: it explains what we may call accidental predications (Aristotle does not use this terminology in the *Categories*) in terms of immanence. A stick is white because white, or, better, whiteness, is in the stick, but Socrates is a man not because of anything in him. In the *Categories*, nothing explains the latter predication: Socrates just is a man. Elsewhere, with the apparatus of matter in place,[1] it is the fact that Socrates is a composite of a form or essence and matter that makes him a man: then there is something that is in him that accounts for his being a man, and the theory is more thoroughly immanentist.

In the *Categories*, Aristotle says (2. 1a24–25): "By 'in a subject' I mean what, belonging in something not as a part, [is] incapable of being separately from that in which it is" (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν). My object here is to shed some indirect light on this passage. It has aroused considerable controversy;[2] what I have to say does not bear directly on that controversy. The only point touching the controversy that is relevant is this: these lines do not define the 'in' of immanence. To do that, they would have to distinguish being in a subject from being said of a subject; but it is equally true of something that is said of a subject that it is not a part of that subject and is incapable of existing separately from that of which it is said.[3] As Aristotle later tells us (5. 2b5–6b):[4] "So without there being primary substances [it would be] impossible for any of the other [things] to be: for all the others are either said of these

as subjects or in these as subjects" (μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων τούτων λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν).

My suggestion is the following. The comment in 1a24–25 is a disclaimer. It responds to an immanentist theory of predication under discussion in the Academy, according to which the something immanent in snow that makes it white is a physical ingredient. This theory was an idea of Eudoxus'. Aristotle was sympathetic to the position, and his own sounded a lot like it. But his was not that position, and so it was important to distance himself from it.

The idea that snow is white because white or whiteness is a constituent of snow has one obvious drawback: it cannot be generalized to cover all the predicates that attach to things. It will not cover the predicates that are not physical ones: we can hardly say that Socrates is ironic because he has irony-stuff in him.[5] Nor will it cover all the physical predicates: we cannot say that Socrates is a small man because he has some smallness-stuff and some man-stuff mixed in with the rest of his properties.

There are really two different types of counterexample to this theory: we cannot say that Socrates is small or ironic because he has some small or ironical stuff in him, because 'small' and 'ironic' do not characterize types of stuff at all; we cannot say he is a man because he has some man-stuff in him, because a man is what he *is*, not something in him. Pursuit of this distinction would head us in the direction of distinguishing *categories* of predicate. I shall not here pursue it; I shall lump all the counterexamples under one head and call the resulting objection the *Drawback*.

I shall initially not pay much attention to the Drawback; it comes in for more detailed treatment at the hands of Plato, and this is discussed in the last section of this study. Until then, we can think of Eudoxianism as a partial theory, intended to explain certain physical predications and elsewhere silent. There will be a few times when we shall have to take note of its incompleteness along the way.

Here is a disclaimer of my own. According to a scholarly tradition still current,[6] when Aristotle arrived and enrolled as a freshman at the Academy, Plato was off in Sicily trying to make a philosopher out of a king and had left Eudoxus in charge. That tradition rests on a single late text, already known to contain inaccuracies, which has been emended, on the basis of a Latin translation, to *make* it say this, and the result of the emendation does not clearly say this anyway.[7] It could, for all anyone knows, be right; perhaps it would even be pretty, given what I am suggesting.[8] But we cannot trust it, and anyway it would make no difference: Eudoxus, at some point or other in the relevant period, hung around the Academy and, apparently, made some contribution relevant to our understanding of what was going on.[9]

To get in on the ground floor of immanentism, we must go back to Anaxagoras. We shall find Aristotle bracketing Anaxagoras and Eudoxus, and

Aristotle's objections against Anaxagoras will be essential background for understanding his objections against Eudoxus, so this is not merely a Sunday excursion.

2. ANAXAGORAS

Anaxagoras does not clearly have a name for what Aristotle would call his *principles* (ἀρχαί; e.g., *Physics* A 1. 184a11, 16, etc.), *underlying bodies* (see σῶμα τὸ ὑποκείμενον, *Physics* A 4. 187a13), or *elements* (στοιχεῖα; e.g., *De caelo* Γ 3. 302a32). He speaks of 'all things' (πάντα χρήματα or just πάντα; e.g., 59B1, DK ii 32.11, 12f.). Aristotle calls them, or some of them, *homoeomers* (ὁμοιομερῆ 187a25, 302a31–32), where a *homoeomer* is something of which any part is of the same type as the whole, as he defines it elsewhere (*De generatione et corruptione* A 1. 314a20), specifically commenting on Anaxagoras' view.[10] But I can neither translate nor pronounce 'homoeomer', and, besides, the term probably does not go back to Anaxagoras.[11] In *De caelo* Γ 3. 302a31–b2 Aristotle suggests, and in *in De caelo* (Heiberg 1893) 603.17–19 Simplicius says, that Anaxagoras called them *seeds* (σπέρματα); this word in fact occurs in Anaxagoras fr. 4, and I think what Aristotle suggests and Simplicius states is the truth. But this is controversial,[12] and the controversy is not of much relevance here. So let us just speak of 'ingredients'.

Anaxagoras' views about these ingredients and the mixtures they compose were relevant to the concerns of Plato's Academy,[13] for Anaxagoras accounts for the truth of "snow is white" by making white present in snow as a part of it; he even says that snow 'partakes of' white.[14] But, in addition, the white cannot be separated from the snow.

Aristotle interprets this as an immanentist theory of predication. He thereby interprets Anaxagoras in terms that were unavailable to Anaxagoras. There is no more wrong with that than there is with our stating the views of Anaxagoras in English rather than Greek: it does not mean that Aristotle's interpretation is incorrect.[15] You might take the present section as an effort, not to understand Anaxagoras, but to understand how Aristotle understood Anaxagoras; this is all we really need to get at the positions we are ultimately after, those of Eudoxus and Aristotle, anyway. That way it does not matter as much as it might whether Aristotle has read Anaxagoras rightly. In fact, I think Aristotle's interpretation is correct, and I should suppose that the burden of proof is on anyone who would deny that it is. But I do not insist on this.

Anaxagoras says, in 59B6 (DK 35.13–20, from Simplicius *in Physica* 164.26–165.1):

> And since the portions of the great and the small are equal in plurality, so also all [things] would be in[16] everything; and they cannot be separately,[17] but all things

partake of a portion of everything. Since there cannot be a least, it is not possible [for anything] to be separated,[17] or to come-to-be by itself, but just as in the beginning also now all things are together. In all things there are present[16] many things, equal in plurality in the greater and in the smaller of the things being disjoined.[18].

καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραί εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου
καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ πλῆθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ἐν παντὶ
15 πάντα· οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς
μοῖραν μετέχει. ὅτε τοὐλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν
δύναιτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ'
ὅπωσπερ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ
πολλὰ ἔνεστι καὶ τῶν ἀποκρινομένων ἴσα πλῆθος ἐν
20 τοῖς μείζοσί τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι.

In 59B8 (DK ii 36.14–16, from Simplicius *in Physica* 176.29 with 175.12–14), he says: "The things in the one cosmos are not separated,[17] not cut off from each other with an ax, neither the hot from the cold nor the cold from the hot" (οὐ κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ κόσμῳ οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ).

In B12 (at DK ii 39.2–4 = Simplicius *in Physica* 157.1–2), he says: "But nothing is totally disjoined[18] and disconnected[19] from anything else except mind" (παντάπασι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου πλὴν νοῦ).

"Just as in the beginning also now all things are together": he thinks there once was a Cosmic Soup[20] in which everything was mixed. In that Cosmic Soup, "when all [things] were together, nothing was manifest" (B1, 32.12–13 = Simplicius *in Physica* 155.28: καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲν ἔνδηλον ἦν); specifically, "no color was manifest" (B4, 34.17–18 = Simplicius *in Physica* 156.4–5, 34.21–22: οὐδὲ χροιὴ ἔνδηλος ἦν οὐδεμία). But we want him to tell us why snow is white. So we can pass up the Soup course, except for one point.

The ingredients that were all together in the Cosmic Soup and still are all together are "unlimited in plurality" (ἄπειρα . . . πλῆθος B1, 34.11 = Simplicius *in Physica* 155.27); Aristotle says that Anaxagoras made the ἀρχαί unlimitedly many (*Metaphysics* A 3. 984a11–13; *Physics* A 4. 187a25, 26–27, Γ 3. 203a19–20, etc.).[21] So there is no end (or beginning, or middle) to the list of features covered by Anaxagoras' theory of predication; as Aristotle will tell us, the accidents of a thing are unlimited (ἄπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίη, *Physics* B 5. 196b28–29). Even so, it is only a partial theory. For the Cosmic Soup, which had all the ingredients in it, had no horses or men or turnips.[22]

Here we first encounter the Drawback mentioned at the outset. And,

because Anaxagoras' position is a response to Parmenides' denial of the possibility of anything's coming-to-be, the problem is acute, for that denial is completely general.

But this is the norm for the fifth-century cosmologists: Empedocles and the atomists also respond only partially to Parmenides' challenge. So, for the present, let us ignore the Drawback.

"Since there cannot be a least, it is not possible [for anything] to be separated, or to come-to-be by itself": if there were atoms of white or cold, one could imagine detaching one. He thinks there are not: there is no least quantity of any ingredient. But this does not show the impossibility of isolating some pure white or pure cold; it merely denies one of the conditions under which that would be possible.[23] Anaxagoras' argument for the inseparability of white must be sought elsewhere.

"All" things are "in everything"; "all things partake of a portion of everything": snow has white in it, along with everything else; everything else has snow, and white, and everything else in it. This, the "Principle of Universal Mixture,"[24] is the proximate explanation for the inseparability of Anaxagoras' ingredients: there is no getting the white out of the snow because then there would be white that had nothing else in it and snow that had no white in it.

So the question is, Why does Anaxagoras accept Universal Mixture? Or rather, why does Aristotle think Anaxagoras accepted it?[25]

After commenting, in *Physics* A 4, that Anaxagoras employs unlimitedly many principles, Aristotle gives an explanation (187a26-b2):

> Anaxagoras seems to have thought them unlimited in that way because of his taking the opinion common to the physicists to be true, that nothing comes-to-be
> a30 out of what is not (for because of this they[26] say 'all things were together', and 'the coming-to-be of any sort of thing consists in being altered',[27] while the others[28] [make it] combination and disconnection[19]); and again, from the fact that the contraries come-to-be from each other; therefore they were present in[29] [it before]; for if everything that comes-to-be necessarily comes-to-be either from things that are or things that are not, and of these [alternatives], that it comes-to-be from things that are not is impossible (for about this all those
> a35 concerned with nature thought the same), they thought that the remaining [alternative] followed of necessity, and it comes-to-be from things that are and are
> **187b** present in[29] [it before], but imperceptible to us because of the smallness of their bulks. Which is why they[26] say that everything is mixed into everything, because they see everything coming-to-be from everything.

ἔοικε δὲ Ἀναξα-
γόρας ἄπειρα οὕτως οἰηθῆναι διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν τὴν κοι-
νὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς οὐ γινομένου οὐδέ-
νος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος (διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὕτω λέγουσιν, ἦν ὁμοῦ
a30 [τὰ] πάντα, καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοιόνδε καθέστηκεν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι,
οἱ δὲ σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν)· ἔτι δ' ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀλ-
λήλων τἀναντία· ἐνυπῆρχεν ἄρα· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν μὲν τὸ γι-

νόμενον ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐξ ὄντων ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης
a35 ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως), τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν, ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίνεσθαι, διὰ μικρότητα δὲ τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ
187b ἀναισθήτων ἡμῖν. διό φασι πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμῖχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἑώρων γινόμενον.

Aristotle's presentation of the argument is not orderly, but it is clear. The overarching premise is the one 'common to the physicists', which Aristotle formulates twice in this passage (a28–29, 33–34):

(1) Nothing can come-to-be from what it is not already.[30]

Aristotle elsewhere (*Physics* Γ 4. 203a28–29) puts Anaxagoras' view as "τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου γίνεται σώματος"; this might be translated 'what comes-to-be comes-to-be from the sort of body [it is]';[31] it is another version of (1).

In our text, Aristotle adds to (1) (187b1–2):

(2) Everything comes-to-be from everything,

or perhaps, referring again to Aristotle's account elsewhere (203a24):

(2*) Anything comes-to-be from anything,

no doubt, as Simplicius explains, "even if not immediately, still, in due course" (εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀμέσως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τάξιν, *in Physica* 460.13). Aristotle concludes:

(3) Everything (or anything) already is everything (or anything).

But nothing *seems* as if it were everything: there is a difference between being something and manifestly being something, between being something and both being and seeming to be something. Aristotle next says (*Physics* A 4. 187b2–7):

but [they say things] show up and are named differently from each other on the basis of that which most exceeds in plurality in the mixture of the unlimited things;
b5 for [they say] there is no whole purely white or black or flesh or bone, but whatever each thing has most of, that the nature of the thing is taken to be.

φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλισθ' ὑπερέχοντος διὰ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων· εἰλικρινῶς μὲν
b5 γὰρ ὅλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ σάρκα ἢ ὀστοῦν οὐκ εἶναι, ὅτου δὲ πλεῖστον ἕκαστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος.

Here he is accurately representing Anaxagoras; in 59B12 (at DK ii 39.6–7 = Simplicius *in Physica* (157.4) we read: "but whatever [things] there is most of in [anything], these [things] each one thing is and was" (ἀλλ' ὅτων πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν). This principle[32] needs a bit of commentary:[33] snow is white because white predominates in the mixture that is snow, but that does not mean every feature apart from white is blanked out, for snow is also cold. It must be that, in the mixture that is snow, white predominates over black, and cold over hot.

At this rate, the features the theory is to account for must come in contrary pairs: for a feature to predominate, it must have something to predominate over.[34] It is not obvious how this could be made to apply to some of the features most popularly associated with Anaxagoras' doctrine: flesh, bone, hair, bread, and so on (see, for these examples, *De caelo* Γ 3. 302a32–b1, *De generatione animalium* A 18. 723a10–11, Simplicius *in Physica* 460.15–17 = DK ii 18.14–16, 'Aëtius' i.3.5 at DK ii 18.34–36). But if the scholiast on Gregory of Nazianzus is not lying,[35] Anaxagoras said (59B10, DK ii 37.6–7):

"For how could hair come-to-be from not hair and flesh from not flesh?" (πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὴ τρίχος γένοιτο θρὶξ καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ μή σαρκός;). And then he was in possession of a cheap device for manufacturing contraries ad lib.

3. PLATO

Plato had some things to say about forms. And some of the things he said sound immanentist.[36]

3.1. Immanentist Language in the Early Dialogues

There is a group of immanentist passages in the early dialogues. They sometimes have been taken as showing that Plato once held an immanentist theory of forms.[37] They do not show that. In these early passages, Plato is arguing about matters other than metaphysics (namely, ethics or something like ethics)[38] and drawing such distinctions as he thinks he needs to make points about these. His arguments require no backing by any metaphysical system, whether immanentist or separatist.[39]

For example, in the initial conversation in the *Hippias Major*, the word καλόν and its cognates are used with great freedom. It occurs to Socrates to ask Hippias what he thinks it means, or, if you prefer, what the beautiful is. He sets up this question by first asking Hippias whether he thinks there is such a thing as the beautiful (287c4, c6–8, d1–2). This does not require anyone to reflect on the ontological status of the beautiful: it simply nails down the topic for discussion.[40]

But philosophers sometimes do fall to reflecting about ontology. They ask, What is the status of meanings, or essences, or universals, or intentions, or forms, or ideas, or the general, or whatever? Are such things to be identified with, or distinguished from, any of the ordinary things we encounter here on the ground? And so on. And when they do, their starting point for understanding is likely to be just such conversations as the one between Socrates and Hippias, or those we are about to notice. The question takes the form: What precisely is the *status* of this thing whose existence Socrates and Hippias are agreeing on? And, when Socrates and one or another of his interlocutors agree that it is because courage, say, is in someone that that person is courageous, what weight is to be attached to the word *in*? This is the sort of question Plato must at some point have asked himself: How seriously should I take Socrates', or my own, language in places like these?

The occurrences of ἐν in *Laches* 191e5, e6, e10, 192a2, a3, a5, a9, b6, b7 are sometimes cited.[41] We cannot count all of these: at 191e5, e6, 192b6, b7 what courage, cowardice and quickness are *in* are not the people or even the actions that are courageous, cowardly, or quick, but the circumstances and conditions in which people do courageous, cowardly, or quick things. Still, in 192a1–6 Socrates says:

> But I mean it like this: just as if I were to ask what is quickness, which we happen on in running, in zither-playing, in speaking, in learning, and in many other things, and we possess something of it worth mentioning in the actions of our hands, legs, mouth, voice, or understanding.

> Ἀλλ' ὧδε λέγω, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τάχος ἠρώτων τί ποτ'
> ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρέχειν τυγχάνει ὂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ
> κιθαρίζειν καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν καὶ ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν καὶ ἐν
> ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, καὶ σχεδόν τι αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα, οὗ καὶ πέρι
> 5 ἄξιον λέγειν, ἢ ἐν ταῖς τῶν χειρῶν πράξεσιν ἢ σκελῶν ἢ
> στόματός τε καὶ φωνῆς ἢ διανοίας.

And a little later we get talk of 'partaking of' courage and wisdom (μετέχειν, 193e3, 197e2).[42]

At *Euthyphro* 5d1, the pious is the same *in* every action; in 5d3 things are said to *have* a single ἰδέα in as much as they are impious.

When he wrote the *Hippias Major*, Plato[43] seems to have been stuck on the word προσγίγνεσθαι[44], 'to become added to'; at 289d2–4 he refers to what he wants defined as "the beautiful itself, by which all other [things] are adorned and show themselves as beautiful when that form becomes added to them" (αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος), and the use of this verb in this connection is picked up by Hippias (d8, e5) and reverted to by Socrates (290b7, 292d1). Put up against talk of adding flesh to flesh by eating (*Phaedo*

96d1, d3; cf. *Timaeus* 82b4, *Laws* vii 789a5), this sounds immanentist and even Anaxagorean.

In *Charmides* 157a Socrates discusses an alleged Thracian treatment of the soul with beautiful words; at 157a5–7 he says: "From such words self-control comes-to-be in our souls, which, when it has come-to-be-in and is-present-to [them], [makes] it easy to provide health for the head and the rest of the body" (ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης ῥᾴδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι πορίζειν).

In 158b5–6, he says to Charmides, by way of raising a question: "If self-control is already present-to you and you are adequately self-controlled" (εἰ μέν σοι ἤδη πάρεστιν . . . σωφροσύνη καὶ εἶ σώφρων ἱκανῶς . . .). And when he raises it it has the form (158c2–4): "so do you yourself say that you already adequately partake of self-control . . . ? (αὐτὸς οὖν . . . καὶ φῂς ἱκανῶς ἤδη σωφροσύνης μετέχειν . . . ;)[45] And there is more immanentist language to come: self-control is something to be possessed (κέκτησαι 158d8), something that is present-to (παρεῖναι 158e7, 160d7, 161a9, 175e2) or present-in (ἐνεῖναι 159a1, a2, a9) someone.

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates gives a more general formulation involving the expression 'presence-to' (497e1–3): "don't you call good men good by the presence-to [them] of goods, just as you call those beautiful whom beauty is present-to?" (τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;). This is echoed at 498d2–3, and the formula is recast in terms of 'coming-to-be-present-in' (παραγίγνεσθαι, ἐγγίγνεσθαι) in 506de. No one wishes to see in this any heavy ontology.[46] But suppose we lean on it anyway. It is an odd formulation; in fact, it incorporates two formulations: one, generalized, would be that things are F when F's are present-to them, and the other, generalized, would be that things are F when F-ness is present-to them. As far as I can tell, this point is completely irrelevant to understanding the *Gorgias*.

But the formulation is one about which Plato was reflective, even before he was asking expressly metaphysical questions.

In the *Euthydemus*, it is parodied:[47] Socrates is trying to say that there are beautiful things (cf. καλὸν πρᾶγμα 300e3) that are not the same as the beautiful (301a1–4); "but," he says, "there is some beauty present-to each of them" (301a4: πάρεστιν μέντοι ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν κάλλος τι).[48] This is ambiguous between the two formulations we found in the *Gorgias*, because 'some beauty' has the same idiomatic range in Greek as it does in English. In any case, Dionysodorus skewers him with this (301a5–6): "So if an ox became present-to you, you would be an ox, and because I am present-to you, you are Dionysodorus?" ('Εὰν οὖν . . . παραγένηταί σοι βοῦς, βοῦς εἶ, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγώ σοι πάρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ;) to which Socrates responds 'don't even say it!' No doubt drawing a philosophical moral from

slapstick shows failure to grasp the genre, but surely what Socrates should say to Dionysodorus is that not just any and every sort of 'presence-to' makes for character. That would raise the question of when it is that something's presence makes a difference (301a8–9).

That, slapstick or no, is precisely Dionysodorus' next question (301a8–9): "But in what way, he [*sc.* Dionysodorus] said, when one [thing] is present-to another, could the one be other?" (ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ παραγενομένου τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἂν εἴη;). This is tricky. Socrates has said that the beautiful is other than the many beautiful things he has seen, although there is some beauty present-to each of them. Dionysodorus construes this as tantamount to saying that the beautiful is present to those beautiful things; and Socrates registers no objection to this reading. There is no great difficulty so far. But just what is Dionysodorus asking? There are two possibilities. (1) The beautiful, by Socrates' admissions (as construed by Dionysodorus) makes something different from it, and not already beautiful, beautiful: it makes it different from what it was. How, in general, can that be?[49] (2) Dionysodorus is using 'other' as a predicate variable: how can one thing, the F, by being present to another, make that other thing F?[50] Either way, he is asking a generalized version of the preceding question: when does the presence of the F make something F?

Socrates does not say, there (where he goes on to duck the question by perpetrating some fallacies of his own) or anywhere else. But at *Lysis* 217c3–e4 we find this:

> For I say that, for some things, where what is present-to them is such-and-such,
> 5 they themselves are such-and-such; for others, not. Just as if someone plastered something with some color, I suppose what was plastered on would be present-to what was plastered [with it].
>
> Very much so.
>
> Then is that which is plastered also therefore at that time of such a color as that which is-on [it]?
>
> d I don't understand, he said.
>
> But [it's] as follows, I said. If someone plastered your hair, which is yellow, with lead,[51] would it then *be* white, or *seem* white?
>
> It would seem white, he said.
>
> And whiteness would be present-to it.
>
> Yes.
>
> 5 But nevertheless it wouldn't yet *be* any more white, but while whiteness is present-to it it is neither at all white nor black.
>
> True.
>
> But when, my friend, old age brings on it this same color, then it has come-
> e to-be such as what is present-to [it]: white, by the presence-to [it] of white.
>
> How else?
>
> This, then, I am asking now: whether, where something is present-to a thing, that which has it will be such as that which is present-to [it]; or [is it that] if it is

present-to [it] in a certain way, it will be, and if not, not?
Rather the latter, he said.

217c

λέγω γὰρ ὅτι ἔνια μέν, οἷον ἂν ᾖ
τὸ παρόν, τοιαῦτά ἐστι καὶ αὐτά, ἔνια δὲ οὔ. ὥσπερ εἰ
5 ἐθέλοι τις χρώματί τῳ ὁτιοῦν [τι] ἀλεῖψαι, πάρεστίν που
τῷ ἀλειφθέντι τὸ ἐπαλειφθέν.—Πάνυ γε.—Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ
ἔστιν τότε τοιοῦτον τὴν χρόαν τὸ ἀλειφθέν, οἷον τὸ ἐπόν;
d —Οὐ μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς.—Ἀλλ' ὧδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἴ τίς
σου ξανθὰς οὔσας τὰς τρίχας ψιμυθίῳ ἀλείψειεν, πότερον
τότε λευκαὶ εἶεν ἢ φαίνοιντ' ἄν;—Φαίνοιντ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς.—
Καὶ μὴν παρείη γ' ἂν αὐταῖς λευκότης.—Ναί.—Ἀλλ' ὅμως
5 οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἂν εἶεν λευκαί πω, ἀλλὰ παρούσης λευκό-
τητος οὔτε τι λευκαὶ οὔτε μέλαιναί εἰσιν.—Ἀληθῆ.—Ἀλλ'
ὅταν δή, ὦ φίλε, τὸ γῆρας αὐταῖς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο χρῶμα ἐπα-
γάγῃ, τότε ἐγένοντο οἱόνπερ τὸ παρόν, λευκοῦ παρουσίᾳ
e λευκαί.—Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ νῦν δή, εἰ ᾧ
ἄν τι παρῇ, τοιοῦτον ἔσται τὸ ἔχον οἷον τὸ παρόν· ἢ ἐὰν
μὲν κατά τινα τρόπον παρῇ, ἔσται, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὔ;—Οὕτω
μᾶλλον, ἔφη.

This is certainly fledgling metaphysics, and if it ever flew, it might be Eudoxianism.[52] It would account for the fact that something, which I shall call the host entity, is (say) white by the presence in it of an intermediary which is also white.

In the *Lysis*, it is not worked out.[53] In the case of white, there is no candidate named for the intermediary entity: it cannot be old age, which is the only thing mentioned (d7) as explaining why the hair is white, since, as Socrates states it (c3–4, 6–7, d8–e1), the intermediary itself possesses the imported property, and old age is not white. If the intermediary were something like a pigment, like the white lead mentioned, that, in old age, was present-to the hair in a special way, as Socrates says, and not just plastered on to the outside, and if this special presence-to were a matter of the pigment's being physically a part of the hair itself, the whole thing might be Eudoxianism.

But it would be an error to charge Plato with Eudoxianism or with any other metaphysical theory here. The passage is a part of an attempt to characterize the paradigm situation in which x is *friendly toward* or *loves* y as follows: "y is good, and there is present in x something that is bad, but x is not thereby himself bad" (see 217e–218a). For example, there are people who have (οἱ ἔχοντες 218a6) ignorance, which is bad, but are not yet witless or stupid, and so their possession of ignorance has not yet rendered them bad. These, according to the line Socrates is trying out, are the lovers of wisdom. So he distinguishes cases in which something F (something bad, or white) by

its presence in something else makes that something else also F, from cases in which it does not. There is no hint that the notion of 'presence-in,' which has to cover physical presence as well as whatever the relationship is between my ignorance and me, is embedded in any general account of why things are what they are.[54]

Socrates once (*Charmides* 161a4) quotes[55] and once (*Laches* 201b2–3) alludes to *Odyssey* xvii 347: "Modesty is not [a] good [thing] to be-present-to a man in need" (αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι). We do not want to put Homer on the list of immanentists.[56] In the *Lysis*, we have very little better reason for putting Plato on that list. But we shall encounter the relation of presence-to again. And then it will be metaphysics.

3.2. The Phaedo

Immanentist language is not abandoned when Socrates has been launched into the orbit of the Theory of Forms: there are many passages in dialogues from the period of high theory to consider. Here I confine myself to the *Phaedo*. In that dialogue, Plato speaks the language of immanence. Mostly the language is metaphorical, but occasionally it can be taken literally, as we shall see.

Sometimes a rather elaborate theory involving immanence is ascribed to Plato in this dialogue. Toward the end (102d7 and ff.), Socrates uses the phrase 'the tallness in us'; so it is thought that he has in his universe not only forms and ordinary things (or, better: forms, ordinary things, and souls) but also 'form-copies,'[57] 'immanent characters,'[58] or 'immanent forms';[59] indeed, to some, the passage is explicit about these.[60] I think there are no such animals as 'immanent characters' or 'form-copies.' What immanence there is is of an entirely different kind.

3.2.1. The Safe Theory. A little earlier Socrates had been discussing theories that explain the truth of true predications. He has his own. It requires, first (100b5–7): "hypothesizing that there is a beautiful itself by itself and a good and a tall and all the others" (ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα). Socrates asks Cebes to grant that there are such things (b7: εἶναι ταῦτα).

This existential admission is no longer innocent: we have already had (in 74a–c) the generalized argument (generalized from one in *Hippias Major* 287e–289d) that puts the forms on a different level from ordinary things.

Next (100c4–6): "It seems to me that, if there is anything else beautiful except the beautiful-itself, it is not beautiful because of any other one [thing] than because it partakes of that beautiful" (φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ). In fact, he cannot understand other causes

(100c9–10): if somebody says that anything is beautiful because of its color or shape, he gets confused (c10–d3); he says (100d3–8):

> but simply, artlessly, and perhaps foolishly I hold on to this, that nothing else
> d5 makes it beautiful other than the presence of that beautiful to [things] or its communion [with them] or however and in whatever way it becomes added to [them];[61] for I don't make any further claims about that, but [I do claim] that [it is] by the beautiful that all beautiful [things are] beautiful.

> τοῦτο δὲ ἁπλῶς καὶ
> ἀτεχνῶς καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι
> d5 ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε
> κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι
> τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ
> [γίγνεται] καλά.

This theory tells us that:

(1) There are the F-itself, the G-itself, etc.

(2) If anything is F besides the F itself, it is F because it partakes of the F itself.[62]

(3) It is not by anything other than the F itself that anything is F.[63]

But also, there is something about which the theory is explicitly silent: the relationship between the F itself and the things that are F because of it. Socrates mentions as possibilities 'presence-to,' 'communion,' and treats 'becoming added to'[64] as a general label for the relation; on the next page he uses various idioms of 'participation' (μετέχειν, μετάσχεσις, μεταλαμβάνειν 100c5, 101c3, c4, c5, c6, 102b2). All of these are immanentist formulations, and only the second (used in this connection for the first time here) is new to us. But he is emphatic that he is committed to nothing whatever. He most often talks of participation: but this is now only a place holder. The nature of the relation is up for grabs, as Aristotle tells us it was.[65]

So we have no right to take Socrates' immanentist language seriously:[66] it is at best metaphorical, and he is telling us that he is not sure what it is metaphorical for. And in the *Symposium* Diotima denies immanence and speaks of participation in the same sentence; she says of the beautiful itself that it will not appear to its contemplator as anything bodily (211a6–7)

> b nor as being somewhere in something else, e.g., in an animal, in the earth, in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by itself with itself, always being singular in form, while all the other beautiful [things] are partakers of that [beautiful] in such a way that, while the others are coming-to-be and passing-away, that [beautiful] in no
> 5 way comes-to-be any larger or smaller or undergoes anything (211a8–b5).[67]

οὐδέ που ὂν ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινι, οἷον ἐν ζώῳ ἢ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ
b ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μεθ' αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ
ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ
τοιοῦτον, οἷον γιγνομένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων
μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ
5 πάσχειν μηδέν.

At 102b1–2, Phaedo reminds us of what has been so far agreed on: that "each of the forms is something, and the other things by participating in them get named after these themselves" (102b1–2: εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν). The next words are (102b3–6):

> Then if, he said, you say these things like that, won't it be that, whenever you say that Simmias is taller than Socrates, but shorter than Phaedo, you are saying that then both are in Simmias, both tallness and shortness?

Εἰ δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις,
ἆρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῇς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος
δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ
μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα?

Here we first run into a form 'in' Simmias. Suppose there were immanent forms or form-copies here. Socrates' question would be this: "Consider, Cebes, the sentence 'Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo' Our theory tells us that for this we must have, to begin with, Socrates, Simmias, and Phaedo; then tallness and shortness themselves; and, third, another tallness and another shortness that are in Simmias, that mediate between the forms and Simmias. Not so?"

And Cebes, a sharp customer, would have replied, "But, O Socrates, where did this third group come from? You spoke only of ourselves and of forms; you said you knew nothing about the relationship between forms and their mundane participants. When did you learn of these go-betweens?"

That is not Socrates' question. The theory has given us only one tallness: tallness itself. And here he says it is 'in' Simmias, where earlier he had said it was 'present-to' him. There is no new theory in that: Socrates would be as noncommittal about this locution as he was about the preceding ones.

He continues with 'in' in 102d5 and following. It is this passage that the advocates of immanent forms rely on most. Socrates says (102d5–103a2):

102d

5 I'm saying [this] for this reason, that I want it to seem to you just as it does to me. For it seems to me that not only tallness itself is never willing to be at the same time both tall and short, but also tallness[68] in us never admits the short and is not willing to be exceeded, but one or the other of two [things comes about]:
e either it flees and withdraws when its contrary, the short, approaches, or when

that [contrary] comes toward it it perishes; but it is not willing, abiding and accepting shortness, to be other than just what it was. Just so I, having accepted
5 and abided shortness, while still also being just what I am, this same [person], am short; but that, while being tall, hasn't submitted to being short; and in the same way the short in us is not willing ever to come-to-be or to be tall, nor [is] any other of the contraries, while being what it was, [willing] to come-to-be and
103 to be the contrary, but it either goes away or perishes in this undergoing.

102d
5 Λέγω δὴ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ' ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ
e προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρόν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος
5 ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα ὂν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὂν ὅπερ ἦν, ἅμα τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε
103 καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.

There has been no mention of immanent forms in the build-up to this. Tallness, Socrates tells us, cannot be both tall and short. This is familiar ground: it was part of the underpinning for the argument of 74a–c that showed us that the forms were radically distinct from mundane things. But he now adds that the situation has not changed when we turn from consideration of tallness just by itself (αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος 102d6), which cannot admit the short (τὸ σμικρόν 102e1), to tallness as it turns up in us: here, too, it cannot admit the short (102d5–103a2). And again, we are not getting any new theory. There are tallness and Simmias, and tallness when it is in Simmias still would not be short.

But 102d9–e2 and 103a1–2 speak of tallness in us going away or *perishing* at the approach of the short, and surely there can be no question of a form perishing: so, some think,[69] we must have a new entity, one that can perish.

But Socrates is speaking abstractly here: these are the two logical possibilities. One of them is irrelevant when we are talking about forms. But it will *not* be irrelevant when the theory is expanded later: it will be at the center of our attention when we turn to proving the immortality of the soul, and Socrates plants the option here for later use.

In fact, as the dialogue continues, it becomes clear not only that Socrates has failed to introduce immanent forms and has no need for them, but that he has no room for them.

Consider Socrates' reply to the anonymous interlocutor who thinks Socrates is now saying 'just the opposite'[70] of something he had said earlier (103a5–10). Socrates draws a distinction (103b2–c2):

103b

For then it was being said that the contrary *thing*[71] comes-to-be from the contrary *thing*, but now, that the contrary itself[72] can't come-to-be contrary to itself,
5 neither that in us nor that in nature. For then, my friend, we were speaking about the things that have the contraries, derivatively naming them after those, but now [we are speaking] about those things themselves [from] which, when they are in [them], the things named get their derived names; and these themselves,
c we are saying, will never admit each other's coming-to-be.

b2 τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ
5 ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόντων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζό-
c μενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἄν ποτέ φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι.

When he says that the F can't be non-F, "neither that in us nor that in nature" (b5), he is not speaking of *two* things, the F in us, the form-copy, immanent form, or character, and the F in the sky, the Form, the F itself, for he goes on (b7–8), "now we are speaking about the things themselves which, *when they are in*" things here below, account for predications about them.

There are no immanent forms here. But, for immanence, that is not the end of the story.

3.2.2. The Extended Theory. In 103cd, Socrates asks us to concede the existence of the hot and the cold and distinguish them from fire and snow, respectively. He then tells us that, despite the difference between fire and the hot, fire is in one respect like the hot: at the approach of heat's opposite, it must withdraw or perish (103d5–e1).

He thinks that there are many cases like this, in which (e2–6) "not only is the form itself entitled to the same name for all time, but also something else that is not that, but always, whenever it is, has the shape of that" (μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεί, ὅταν περ ᾖ; cf. 104c7–9).

He gives four sets of examples. First, we have fire and snow, which always carry hot and cold with them. Second, there are the numbers 1, 3, 5, and so on, which always carry the form of the odd, and the numbers 2, 4, 6, and so on, which always carry the form of the even (103e5–104b5, 104c1–3,

d5–e6, e8–105a1, 105a5–b1; see also the somewhat curious cases in 105b1–3). Third, very much in passing, Socrates mentions fever (πυρετός), which imports disease into a body (105c2–4). And last there will be the soul, which always carries with it the form of life (105c9 ff.).

Here, by contrast with the safe theory, perishing is not just an abstract possibility but a live option: not for the numbers, but for fire, snow, fever, and perhaps even for the soul. Socrates' project is going to be to show that it is not, in fact, an option for the soul.

He determines or defines (ὁρισώμεθα 104c11, ὁρίσασθαι e7, ὁρίζῃ 105a2) these things as ones "which force whatever they occupy[73] to have not only its own [i.e., the occupier's][74] idea, but also always [the idea] of some contrary" (104d1–3: ἃ ὅτι ἂν κατάσχῃ μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὑτοῦ ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου [αὐτῷ] ἀεί τινος).[75] For example, what the idea of three occupies it forces to become odd (104d5–7); what fire occupies it forces to become hot; what the soul occupies it forces to be alive.

But that means, says Socrates (105b5–8), that there's another safe answer besides the one that says something is F because it bears some unspecified relation to the form for F, namely (105b8-c6):

> For if you ask me what it is that, when it comes-to-be in a body, that body is hot, I
> c shall not state to you that safe but unlearned reply, that it is heat, but one more
> clever, based on what's just been said, that it is fire; nor, if you ask what it is that,
> when it comes-to-be in a body, that body will be sick, should I say that it is
> 5 sickness, but fever; nor, [if you ask] what it is that, when it comes-to-be in a
> number, the number is odd, should I say oddness, but unit, and other things
> similarly.

> εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με
> ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν
> c ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν
> θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ
> ἂν ἔρῃ ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι
> ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί
> 5 ἐγγένηται περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ'
> ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως.

The mechanism is this: there are certain intermediate entities, that always have one of a pair of opposite properties. These intermediates, when they come to be present in something, carry their properties with them, and their presence explains why the host entity in which they are present has those properties.

This is the theory suggested by the *Lysis*, having come out of its closet as unabashed immanentist metaphysics.

It is not that forms are immanent in things: the intermediates are, and the intermediates need not be forms.

The earlier safe explanation for x's being F was that x bears an unknown relation, 'participation,' to the form for F. Now we are to say instead, sometimes, that x has in it y, and y partakes of the form F. The entities imported by the intermediates are, and are referred to as, forms (103e5 [quoted earlier], 104b9, d9–10).

In some cases, so are the intermediates: three, five, and so on are called forms (104d5–6). But no such thing is said about snow and fire.[76] And the soul is treated as a non-form throughout the *Phaedo* (see esp. 79de).[77] The present argument is simple: the soul is an intermediate which imports the form life and so cannot admit the opposite, death; so it is deathless; so it is imperishable. Nothing here demands that the soul be a form.[78]

Consider the examples once more.

1. The presence of fire in something explains why it is hot. On the face of it, the host entity and the intermediate are both physical.

2. The presence of three or five in some number explains why it is odd. Neither host nor intermediate is physical; the intermediate is a form.

3. The presence of fever in a body explains why it is sick. The host entity is unambiguously physical; the intermediate is not unambiguously anything. It sounds to me slightly odd, in this dialogue, to say it is a form, but that does not count for much.

4. The presence of soul in a body explains why that body is alive. Here the host entity is physical, the intermediate not, but still, not a form.

In the first case, we are close to Eudoxianism. We are not all the way there: what the intermediates import are still forms that are radically distinct from the intermediate entities and the host entities.

3.2.3. The *Parmenides* and the Academy. Suppose you were a working member of the Academy, and what you were working on was the question what to do with the theory of forms in the face of objections that focus on the relation between forms and ordinary things. You would reconsider the ways in which that relationship had been explained. And in the course of that reconsideration, you would run into some passages that sound in one way or another Eudoxian or at least immanentist. And you might well ask, Can the troublesome relationship be explained by taking this 'immanentist' way of speaking seriously?

My suggestion is that both Eudoxus and Aristotle did just that, that Eudoxus came up with one version and Aristotle with another, that Aristotle did not think Eudoxus was right, and that this is what he is saying in 1a24–25.

The 'objections that focus on the relation between forms and ordinary things,' or, at any rate, some of them, are canvassed in Plato's *Parmenides*. But we need not assume any particular chronological relationship between the promulgation of the *Parmenides* and that of Eudoxus' immanentism,[79] for there is no reason to suppose that the objections were news when the *Par-*

menides was 'published': it is not as if the members of the Academy communicated with each other by publishing position papers.[80]

Then the *Parmenides* could perfectly well be recording objections current in the Academy. If it is, Eudoxus' proposal could either have preceded the writing of the *Parmenides* or followed it. Either way, there are passages in the *Parmenides* that have a bearing on that proposal. Let us consider three.

Parmenides 130e–131e objects that participation in a form requires either the whole form or a part of it to be in each of its participants, and that each alternative leads to absurdity: if the whole form is in each participant, it is going to be separate from itself; if only a part of it is, then the form is divisible (and there are additional absurdities). It is worth noting that Plato took this argument seriously enough to echo it in the *Philebus* (15b).[81] It constitutes a problem for any view that construes the relation between a form and its participants as involving the immanence of the form or some part of it in those participants: any view that says this stick is white because there is in it a form, or part of a form. And so it constitutes a problem for Eudoxus' view. If Eudoxus had already made his suggestion, Plato could not have written this passage without thinking of Eudoxus.[82] If Eudoxus' suggestion came later, he could not have made it without supposing he had a way around this objection.[83] But there is nothing so far to tell us how to choose.

We shall encounter this objection again later, in Alexander's list of objections against Eudoxus, and that will require a reconsideration of this point. For now, let us stay within the *Parmenides*.

Socrates' admissions in the *Parmenides* actually commit him to the denial of immanence. As he propounds his theory of forms in 128e–130a, the claim that each form is 'itself by itself' (αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό) is built into it (128e6–129a1, 129d7–8; cf. 130b8).[84] In 133c3–6, we encounter the following exchange:

> Socrates, I think that you and anyone else who posits that there is some substance of each [thing] itself by itself would agree, first, that none of them can be in us.[85] [Yes], for how could it still be itself by itself? said Socrates.
>
> ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτήν τινα καθ' αὑτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογῆσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν.
> Πῶς γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

There is some friction between this and the immanentist trend of 130–131; it is as well to remember that Socrates is in some logical trouble in this dialogue, precisely over the question of the relationship between forms and their participants.[86]

Eudoxus' suggestion is that forms are literally *in* their participants. The text at 133c obviously bears on that: Parmenides is arguing that, if you retain the Platonic thesis that forms are 'themselves by themselves,' then the sugges-

tion will not do. But, once more, there is nothing here to show whether the suggestion is one Eudoxus had already made or had yet to make.

Finally, in the dialectic of the second part of the *Parmenides*, in the course of an argument to the effect that the One is equal to itself and to the Others, we encounter (149d–150d) a curious (but this does not distinguish it from many others in this part of the *Parmenides*) subargument[87] purporting to show that the One cannot be larger or smaller than the Others, nor they than it. It runs as follows. If the One were small, the form (see εἴδη, 149e9) smallness would be in it, and if it were in it, it would be in either a part of it or the whole of it. But if it were in the whole of it, it would be either equal to the One or larger than the One. But smallness cannot be either equal or large, so if it is in the One, it must be in a part of the One. But then it cannot be in the whole of that part, or we are back where we started. Parmenides concludes that it cannot be in anything (150b5–6): he expects us to fill in the regress toward which the argument was headed. His conclusion is that nothing is small except smallness (150b6–7), and a parallel argument purports to show that nothing is large except largeness itself (150bc).[88]

The upshot here is quite general: if there were anything to this argument, it would show that we can never explain why anything is small by appealing to the physical presence in it of something that is small. This pattern of explanation is indeed that of Eudoxianism, so the argument would tell against that. And it is certainly true that 'small' is one of the predicates that illustrates our initial Drawback: the idea that something is small because it literally has in it something small is weird. Perhaps Eudoxus would be particularly vulnerable here:[89] he is responsible for a theory of magnitudes and their comparative sizes that finds expression in Euclid, *Elements* v[90] (see esp. def. 5).[91]

But Parmenides' argument is another story: it does not bring out what is weird about the idea that small things are so because they have something small in them. A defender of that idea could easily reply that what is present in the One making it small is something that is equal in size relative to the One, but small relative to something else. This leads to further questions, and we should end up very far afield if we tried to deal with them now. For present purposes, we have enough to see that the argument does not plainly tell against anyone, and that includes Eudoxus. So, as far as this argument goes, Eudoxus might either have been its target, or have been inspired by its very weakness to defend the cause of immanentism.

Immanentism is plainly an option under consideration in the *Parmenides*. But whether Eudoxus had already espoused it or had yet to when Plato wrote the *Parmenides* is not at all clear. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the phrase "when Plato wrote the *Parmenides*" nails down a date specific enough to lend meaning to the question: he might have written it over some time.[92] And, as we shall see, it is also not clear what we mean when we speak of Eudoxus 'espousing' this position. If, as will appear possible if not likely, it