1 *Regarding Nature: A conceptual introduction*

How should we regard nature? Until recently, this question was decisively answered by the practices of industrial society. Under the enchantment of the Enlightenment story of progress from darkness to light, from ignorance to knowledge, and from scarcity to abundance, we understood ourselves as steadily advancing toward a better future. A sign of this progress, as well as one of its causes, was the ever-increasing domination of nature through science and technology. Thus, it seemed, we could regard nature as just formless substance to be molded into whatever shape we desired. Recently, however, an uneasiness has entered into our understanding of our relations with nature and "progress" no longer seems assured.

How *should* we regard nature? The question poses two intimately connected issues—how we should *think* about nature and how we should *act* within nature. Both thought and action affect the kinds of environments we construct, which in turn influence who we are, how we think, and what we do. When nature is viewed from the perspective of a market economy, it appears to be a collection of "resources" having the potential to be transformed into commodities. Within capitalistic economies, nature can be privately owned, while socialistic economies see nature as being owned by the whole society. Viewed through the lens of science, nature appears as instances of general laws, a perspective which invites and enables the transformation of nature. These and other presumptions frame the ways we collectively understand and deal with nature. They need to be unearthed and opened to critical reflection and revision.

But what is nature? The question requires clarification because the concept of nature is not only rich and heterogeneous, but also pivotal to quite diverse topics. For example, nature can be contrasted to the supernatural or to the immoral, as in "unnatural acts." It can be opposed to the artificial or other products of human activity, as in "natural" foods or

"natural" beauty. This list, far from exhaustive, suggests the diversity of the concept of nature and shows the need for a preliminary specification of its meaning.

For the purpose of examining the relations between humanity and nature, two central meanings of 'nature' need to be distinguished. One meaning of nature is "all that is," at least on earth. In this sense, the primary relation between humanity and nature is that of part to whole because humans clearly are a part of "all that is." Within this understanding of nature, we are not outside of, nor exempt from, the natural processes which result in solar systems, cities, and forests. All human actions, even thinking itself, are natural processes. Values and ideas, as well as canyons and sunsets, are parts of nature. This concept of nature makes all events natural. It is descriptive and inclusive. Nothing, save perhaps the supernatural, is outside of nature.

Another meaning of 'nature' rests on a distinction between humanity and the rest of nature. This concept takes humanity as existing at some distance from nature and presumes a dualism between humanity and nature. 'Nature' is distinguished from 'humanity' as an "other." This concept of nature is common within many environmental discussions. Some, for example, claim that "nature knows best," suggesting that human intervention in natural systems is likely to be destructive to those systems.[1] In a similar vein, criticism or endorsement of the attempt to "dominate" nature presumes some separation between humanity and nature. Thus, the assumption that humans are separate from nature gets built into many environmental discussions from the start.

Each of these concepts of nature have their difficulties. The inclusive meaning of nature suggests a disinterested and nonevaluative perspective on existence. Conceived this way, the concept of nature precludes contrast to the "unnatural" because all that exists is natural Beauty, as well as its destruction, war as well as peace, hate and love, all become natural. This understanding of nature is implicit in many scientific approaches to the world and life, both human and nonhuman These inquiries assume that the various particular realities investigated exemplify less apparent but unchanging regularities described by "natural laws." Applied to nonhuman nature, the resulting sciences and technologies have enabled an astounding capacity for the directed change of the course of events.

However, when this perspective is totalized to include human life, deep concerns arise. Is human life just a part of nature? Is it best understood as exemplifying "laws of nature"? If such laws do apply to *all* human activity, then they must also apply to those who search for the laws which govern human behavior. If so, the search for such laws would not really be a matter of judgment and rational inquiry; rather, it would be a nonrational process of obedience to the laws of behavior. The realization of this project in the human domain is the nightmare of an orderly and totally managed society.[2] The very concept of "good" as a normative ideal regulating human choices must then be seen as a delusion. Under this conception of nature, all experiences of weighing evidence, considering alternatives, posing questions of moral or rational choice, as well as the freedom to make such choices would be deceptions and have no effective connection to reality.

The totalization of this deterministic approach to humanity yields conclusions that cannot be adopted by rational humans simply because, within this view, there are no rational humans. In this account of humanity, all beliefs are causally determined, rather than reasonably, or unreasonably, adopted. Accepting this approach requires embracing the claim that the ordinary lived experiences of reflection, choice, evaluation, and decision are illusions. Yet these experiences are fundamental to life-as-lived and can only be reasonably rejected on the basis of very strongly grounded evidence. The absence of success in scientific projects to control human behavior indicates that there is not yet, at least, sufficient evidence to accept this radical revisioning of human experience. The only possibility of there being sufficient evidence is the actual construction of a totally controlled society, within which the very experience of freedom and choice might be eliminated.

These problems, arising from the self-reference implicit in the totalization of this approach, can only be avoided by denying that laws of behavior apply to all human life. If this is understood as implying a duality among humans, it is both intellectually indefensible and morally repugnant. There is no reason to suppose that all humans, except social scientists or "scientific managers," are subject to inexorable laws of human behavior. Any proposal from those who would unreasonably exempt themselves from such behavioral laws in order to design a society for the "others" seems both self-serving and morally noxious.

Acknowledging some sort of duality within human life seems necessary. Clearly, much of human life—such as digestion—is governed by processes aptly described by laws of nature. If we grant a categorical distinction between such processes and the experiences of reflection, choice, evaluation, and decision, and if we allow for the efficacy of these experiences in the course of human affairs, we can avoid these difficulties. But such an understanding lacks comprehensiveness because the duality within humans remains unexplained. Considerations such as these lead back to the dualistic concept of nature which presumes some fundamental distinction between humans and the rest of nature.[3]

The dualistic concept of nature has its own difficulties. Historically, humans could comfortably understand themselves as both within and outside of nature. The Judeo-Christian tradition provides a metaphysical framework wherein humanity stands at the apex of a hierarchy in nature. This hierarchy also extended beyond nature to the divine. Humans, having souls, could be understood as both the best of nature and as outside of nature, partaking of the divine The Cartesian tradition also provides humanity with a dual self-understanding, granting human bodies the status of natural objects, while reserving a different dimension of existence for human minds. But these self-understandings can no longer claim general credibility. The ascendence of science over religion effectively undercuts most dualistic understandings of humanity. If science is taken as the correct mode of understanding, then it becomes obvious that humanity is part and product of natural processes. Of course humans are part of nature. Where and what else could we be?

Although any dualism between humanity and the rest of nature seems arbitrary, it cannot be easily relinquished. The inclusive concept of nature does not seem to give adequate grounding for an understanding of life as each person experiences it. We find ourselves, at least as adults, "at a distance" from all else—both other humans and other kinds of existence. We are fundamentally *interested* in our worlds, seeking food, and much else, on the basis of needs and desires. We are each the center of our own life. This interested orientation distances each of us from all else and precedes any descriptive orientation Any descriptive orientation presumes interest and engagement and proceeds within that context.

This primary context of an interested and engaged orientation requires the dualistic sense of nature, where 'nature' is understood on the basis of a distinction between humanity and the rest of nature. This concept of nature provides the conceptual space to understand the experiences of appraisal and choice. Just as we are surely within nature, we are also, just as surely, a distinct sort of creature, not to be simply identified with "all that is." We act on nature and transform it, creating artifacts—manufactured things and whole environments. We often experience ourselves as separate and apart from nature, confronting it as alien, fearing and striving to "humanize" nature. This understanding of humanity as different from nature makes clear the interested and engaged relation between humanity and the rest of nature.

There is, then, something fundamental about the dualistic concept of nature. To deny it would seem to require a denial of an essential element of the experience of being human. But there is also something fundamental about the inclusive sense of nature as "all that is." It seems clear that we are of a piece with nature, not standing outside it. The story which science tells us about the origins of our universe and the evolution of life on earth provides the most compelling understanding we have of our place within nature. And that story clearly locates us *within* nature. Thus, my provisional conclusion is that both concepts of nature must be retained.[4] Each concept of nature resists simple reduction to the other. Both can claim a certain primacy, and neither can happily subsume the other. The value of having two perspectives is that they make possible binocular perception, allowing a depth of vision not possible with only one perspective. Henceforth, I shall keep these two senses of 'nature' distinct by qualifying the dualistic use through reference to "the rest of nature" or "nonhuman nature" when the context does not make clear which sense is intended.

One fundamental way in which we differ from much of the rest of nature is that we live within a cognitive world and act on the basis of our ideas.[5] Our sensory experience is a product of interactions between our sensory organs and the stimulations they undergo. These stimulations are encoded by the sensory organs and processed by our neural system. This processing is influenced by biological, linguistic, and cultural factors, as well as by personal idiosyncrasies.

What we view as the world is actually our representation in our experience of the world. For daily living, it is certainly functional that we are unaware of the chasm between our experience of the world and the world, since constant awareness of this gap would leave us plagued by confusion. Nevertheless, it is sometimes important to recognize that our understandings of the world are only mappings, and we can make mistakes in the way we understand nature, including ourselves. One of the convictions which underlies this book is that our current mappings of nature are leading us astray.

Thus, the question, "How should we regard nature?" in part asks, "How should we map nature?" What patterns of ideas should we use to understand ourselves and our relations with the rest of nature? The question involves the problematic assumption that we can choose how to think about nature. This strains the idea of choice. Typically, we make choices only *after* we have adopted some cognitive mapping. Usually we have already conceptualized our situation when we contemplate choices. For example, when I wonder what I shall choose to eat, I have already cast the world into the edible and the nonedible. The choice of cognitive patterns requires recognizing that our worlds *are* cognitive mappings and also envisioning alternatives, both of which can be difficult. We can only choose how we will regard nature after becoming aware of the usually unquestioned assumptions which undergird ordinary thought and normal social practice. The "choice" ultimately involves the construction of culture. The question, then, is what sort of culture should we try to create, for it is only within cultural forms that the rest of nature appears to us. The question, "How should we regard nature?" ultimately asks what cultural forms we should create to map nature and thus our place within it. As a practical matter, calling into question the "normal" ways of regarding nature can only be effective when the established patterns have led to difficulty. They have.

Ideologies of Nature

The metaphor of mapping for understanding humanity's relations with the rest of nature obscures the active aspect of our relations with the rest of

nature. Different sorts of maps make possible different agendas for action, and various sorts of actions require different types of maps. A topographical map of fine detail tempts and indicates ways of walking to the top of a mountain or planning a canoe trip down an unknown river. A map of interstate highways invites a rapid motor trip to distant places, while a tax map assigns responsibility for tracts of land to people who can be summoned to financially support the state. Maps of nature thus suggest programs of action, and as we use those maps, we may change the territory. Therefore, the metaphor of maps of nature needs to be supplemented with an understanding of the agendas for action implicit in the various mappings. I shall use the phrase "ideology of nature" to include both the images or maps of nonhuman nature that we create and the agendas for action implicit within such mappings.

The term "ideology" is contested.[6] It was coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796 with the intention of naming a new "science" of ideas. Adopted by Marx, the term came to have a pejorative meaning. Marx's central claim about the theories that he views as ideological is that they cause that which is historically contingent and changeable to appear as necessary and immutable conditions of human existence. Thus, an idea that correctly identifies some important aspect of alterable historical reality can become a source of mystification if it is seen as identifying some necessary fact about human existence. This sort of mystification inhibits efforts toward change, because it seems fruitless or worse to attempt to change that which is necessary.

"Human nature" is a concept particularly susceptible to ideological use. The extrapolation of "human nature" from the typical behaviors of people within a culture is apt to be deceiving because there is a tendency to confuse behaviors that are typical within a particular society with "human nature." What appears to be human nature, within a particular culture, reflects both human nature *and* the habitual behaviors induced by that culture. Separating the two types of regularities is difficult. Evidence that is easily available to people within industrial, capitalistic societies indicates that all humans are "naturally" self-centered, greedy, and only out for themselves. This is, after all, how our culture trains us to behave, and it does correctly state a widespread behavioral pattern within capitalistic

societies. But the claim that this is actually "human nature" is ideological, because it mistakes what is historically contingent for some form of transcultural necessity.

Ideologies of nature are similar to ideological theses about human nature. Both typically mistake a conditioned reality for some transcultural "truth." Built upon this fundamental mistake, these ideas are then used to effect massive transformations of natural systems. Ironically, these transformations can then provide validation for the ideologies that guided them. "If it works, it must be true." Opening conceptual space for critical reflection on this interchange between humanity and nature is the intention underlying the concept of "ideologies of nature."

The pages that follow are an examination of various ideologies which frame our views of the rest of nature. Ideologies of nature are clusters of convictions about the structure of nonhuman nature, its significance, and its value. They are composed of two essential elements—images or mappings of nature and agendas for action. Images of nature are cognitive frameworks within which nonhuman nature makes its appearance. They are explicit or implicit claims about what nonhuman nature is and how it is composed. Thus, an image of nature involves, for example, beliefs, perhaps unconscious, about nature—whether it is sacred or profane, infused with purpose or devoid of meaning, composed of discrete parts or organically interrelated, as well as a host of other assumptions. Agendas for action are intimately connected to images of nature, as images permit, invite, oblige, and prohibit various actions regarding nature. Conversely, agendas for action require various kinds of mappings, and actions change territories, confirming old images or requiring new ones.

Ideologies of nature are often only implicit in various social practices. Experimentation on animals or the paving of a meadow for parking places may not be done with any clearly developed theory about animals or natural habitats. Nevertheless, such practices tacitly presuppose answers to questions about the value of animals or ecosystems, and such values involve understandings of what animals and ecosystems are.

It can be difficult to unearth the ideologies of nature implicit in social practices for several reasons. Since interactions with the rest of nature are often based on habits of thought and action formed in the socialization

process—rather than being based on careful reflection—the relations between those habits and their underlying ideologies may be rather loose. Thus, several differing ideologies may provide a conceptual basis for a single social practice. Some social practices are, in this sense, "overdetermined." In such a situation, revealing the inadequacy of one ideology may not create change but simply lead to the invocation of another ideology.

A related difficulty is that reflection on ideologies of nature often involves making precise what is only implicit. Much of our thinking and acting regarding nature is ambivalent and inconsistent. This is not surprising given the unconscious dimensions of most ideologies of nature. Trying to make precise that which is merely implied and indeterminate runs the hazard that the result—a more precisely formulated ideology—is not one which the participants in such a practice would, upon reflection, accept. This can make it difficult to confirm that the imputed ideology is indeed operative. Nevertheless, even unacceptable ideologies concerning nature can bring to the fore the necessity for justifying our current ways of treating nature.

In this way, trying to make implied ideologies precise may stimulate reflection on how we *should* regard nature. When the underlying rationales for social practices are brought to light, those rationales may not withstand scrutiny, creating a cognitive dissonance which stimulates change. Of course, such dissonance may only lead to another justificatory ideology rather than changes in practice, but then the process of reflection can start again. While this, in turn, might kindle changes in the way we treat the rest of nature, there is no certainty that reflection has the power to transform practice.

Ideologies of nature are intimately connected to ideologies of society. Relations taken as normal in one domain easily become operative metaphors in the other. If nature is cast in Darwinian language as "red in tooth and claw," then it may seem "natural" to think that society should be an arena in which the strong dominate the weak. If a relationship of domination between man and woman is deemed "natural," then so too is the attempt by men to master nature. The interaction between social ideologies and nature ideologies also has a material basis. Any society involves patterns of interaction with the rest of nature and thus presumes some ideolo-

gy of nature. These patterns of interaction, if moderately successful in guiding the production of material life, provide people with what they desire. This in turn supports the social and political ideologies that legitimate the existing social order. Social domination and the domination of the rest of nature are intimate companions.

If ideologies can provide both implicit and explicit answers to a set of related questions, then the more general category of "traditions" refers to the clusters of associated questions themselves. Within the tradition of political philosophy, there are a number of competing ideologies. The various conceptions of the "good state"—for example, democratic capitalistic, democratic-socialistic, fascistic, anarchistic—give rise to specific ideologies. But the very set of questions itself constitutes an intellectual tradition. The tradition of social and political philosophy consists of various answers to questions about the legitimacy and proper role of political power, the best ways to select leaders, the nature of human freedom, and other issues concerning how human society should be organized. Few explicit ideologies of nature exist within the social and political tradition, although the social practices endorsed by the various ideologies constitute implicit ideologies of nature. Indeed, as I shall argue, the way we constitute our social and economic systems is one of the most fundamental determinants of how we interact with the rest of nature.

The nature tradition, as I shall refer to it, is another set of questions centering around the issue of how humans should interact with the rest of nature. Around 10,000 years ago, with the rise of agriculture and the domestication of animals, nature became a focus for alteration instead of adaptation. It was only with this new attitude toward nature that the concept of wilderness, denoting that which is not under human dominion, could arise. As Roderick Nash points out, civilization creates wilderness. Nash relates a conversation with a contemporary Malaysian hunter-gatherer who simply could not understand Nash's questions about "wilderness." Finally, Nash asked him how he would say, "I am lost in the jungle." The hunter's puzzled response was that he did not get lost in the jungle. The question was as nonsensical to him as the expression, "I am lost in my apartment," would be to a city dweller.[7] Hunting and gathering societies have no need for a concept of wilderness.

The advent of agriculture radically transformed the relation of humanity to the rest of nature. As Max Oelschlaeger notes, "The agriculturalist necessarily defines 'fields' (areas cleared of natural vegetation), 'weeds' (undesirable plants intruding upon fields), and 'crops' (desirable plants suited to human purposes). In contrast, the hunter-gatherer lives on what is conceptually the 'fruit of the earth' fields, weeds, and crops simply do not exist."[8] With agriculture, nature becomes something to be fenced and planted, altered in accord with desire, rather than dwelt within.

A few hundred years ago, with the collapse of the medieval world and the rise of industrialism, the rest of nature became an object of domination instead of mere alteration. The ever-increasing intensity of human domination eventually gave rise to countermovements aimed at the conservation or preservation of aspects of nonhuman nature. Recently, the project of dominating nature has generated a vigorous environmental movement which has questioned many dimensions of our relations with nonhuman nature. There has now been a sufficient history of concern for nature to warrant distinguishing a nature tradition within human thought. The nature tradition encompasses nineteenth-century thinkers such as Emerson and Thoreau, as well as twentieth-century thinkers like John Muir, Aldo Leopold, and Rachel Carson. It also includes the large numbers of contemporary environmentalists and social movements, such as deep ecology, ecological feminism, and social ecology. Within this nature tradition, a number of divergent ideologies of nature exist.

One of my intentions in this book is to build bridges between the social and the nature traditions. Historically, these two traditions have not communicated well with each other, ignoring or giving woefully weak answers to the central concerns of the other. While the social tradition has attended to the problem of human society and human liberation, it has often ignored or assumed the worst answers to the questions of central importance for the nature tradition. In fact, the social tradition has largely failed to recognize nonhuman nature as anything other than an arena for human domination.

The nature tradition has concentrated on the conservation, preservation, or liberation of nonhuman nature, ignoring questions of central concern to the social tradition, often appearing indifferent to the problems of

poverty and other forms of human oppression. Consequently, it has often failed to connect its concerns with those who have an interest in changing the dominant social order. One thesis of this book is that these two traditions—or at least particular ideologies within each tradition—can be enriched through cross-fertilization.

One example of this cross-fertilization is the way some ideologies in the nature tradition could be enhanced by drawing upon one of the ideologies within the social tradition. Within Marxism, in order for any theory of human emancipation to be considered adequate, it must identify the agents who will carry out the necessary changes. This is one notable contribution of Marx and Engels in their critique of utopian socialism. The "requirement of agency," as I shall call it, directs attention to the need for any theory of emancipation to develop its analysis to the point of discerning the dynamics of the changes which can result in liberation.[9] Any nature ideology that is interested in effectively changing our current mode of relating to nature—and most are—could deepen its analysis and enhance its prospects for success by trying to identify the human agency that can bring about the desired changes. With an identification of such agents, practical efforts aimed at change could be more effectively determined and evaluated.

Ideologies within the nature tradition often have an inadequate understanding of the causes of destructive social relations with the rest of nature. Ideologies within this tradition often argue against the dominant ideology of nature and offer some alternative without discussing the social basis for that ideology. Consequently, proposals for changing the ways in which we relate to nature often amount to little more than utopian "oughts," paying no attention to the question of who, in a particular society, is likely to try to create a society that is harmoniously reconciled with the rest of nature. The nature tradition, so I shall argue, can be enriched by recognizing the problem of agency and striving to incorporate the requirement of agency into its analysis of the human situation.

The economic systems that we construct and live within are, I suggest, the primary immediate causes of the relations between society and the rest of nature. The compulsion to earn a living within organized societies compels most people to do what they do. Because economic systems are of

central importance, the second and third chapters examine the ideologies of nature implicit within capitalism and socialism. These two socioeconomic systems are profoundly linked to the need for continually expanding material production. For somewhat different reasons, neither can easily choose to evolve toward an ecologically sustainable economy. The fourth chapter is an exposition of the ideology of "expansionary industrialism," which is the phrase I shall use to name the ideology of nature that undergirds both capitalism and socialism. Expansionary industrialism embodies a faith in technology and a technocratic organization of society, as well as an apparently insatiable consumerism. The fifth chapter is a consideration of the idea of control that is implicit in industrialism. I argue that industrialism and its project of dominating nature is problematic at its very foundation because the very possibility of control rests on a mistaken mapping of the human situation. It involves a sort of tunnel vision that is no longer tenable. The belief in the possibility of control, despite its impossibility, functions to legitimate bureaucratic managers and technocracy in general.

The sixth chapter is an analysis of the ideology of nature implicit in science. Science objectifies nature as a result of its methodological orientation toward purposive action. Although this orientation is essential for human action, it is typically totalized into an image of nature that makes all other ideologies seem absurd and unreasonable. It thus tacitly legitimizes the ideology of nature that is implicit in industrialism. It is the totalization of the scientific objectification of nature that requires critique.

In the seventh chapter, I discuss two environmental responses to industrialism that I call "reactive environmentalism" and "ecological environmentalism." Reactive environmentalism is a defensive reaction to the obvious excesses of industrialism, conceiving the environmental crisis as a series of "problems" to be corrected. Reactive environmentalism images nature in a piecemeal fashion and generates such concepts as assimilation capacity, which tries to determine the maximal amount of pollution that can be placed in an ecosystem without creating systemic collapse—and thus the "loss" of a natural "dump." Ecological environmentalism develops an ecological ideology of nature that provides reasons why economic expansion cannot continue indefinitely. Ecological environmentalism maps nature as a relatively tightly integrated system. Focusing on the connectedness of

nature, it spawns slogans such as "everything must go somewhere," "and then what," and "nature knows best." This ideology shifts the burden of proof to those who advocate human intervention in natural systems. It provides an ecological basis for a critique of the status quo. One exponent of such an ideology, who leans toward the political right, is Garrett Hardin; an exponent on the political left is Barry Commoner.

In the eighth chapter, I begin to discuss the nature tradition and try to develop an ideology of nature which draws upon, but goes beyond, the science of ecology. This ideology of nature assumes that humans are part of nature and supports the idea of nonanthropocentric relations with the rest of nature. Some philosophers who are concerned with environmental ethics have developed strong critiques of any human-centered ethics, leading to the rejection of anthropocentrism—the idea that only humans have moral standing. The ninth chapter considers the difficulty of grounding any environmental ethic within contemporary ethical discourse and argues for the importance of social change. I argue that deep ecology offers an important foundation for an environmental perspective that accepts the project of social change. Deep ecology rejects anthropocentrism and proposes an eight-point platform that could be the basis for unity among all who seek to create a society that embodies respect for all of nature. Deep ecology seeks a transformation of people and society, advocating the joys of an expanded sense of identification with nature. In the tenth chapter, I consider the contributions that deep ecology can make to a radical environmental movement that understands industrialism as the root cause of ecological crisis. Despite significant differences, there is ground for a fundamental unity among radical environmentalists. Creating such unity may be a way for radical environmentalism to be effective in challenging and changing industrialism.

Since the focus of this book's analysis is on industrialism and its ideologies of nature, with the intention of fostering a greater unity among radical environmentalists, I shall pay relatively little attention to the problems of the Third World. There are several reasons for this. I think that the extent and depth of the ecological problems that all peoples of the world face have their roots in industrialism. Industrialism, I argue, is the core problem, and it is from within industrial societies that adequate solutions

must arise. Further, industrial peoples cannot responsibly preach to less industrialized societies while continuing to consume the lion's share of global resources. Such a posture is morally dubious and likely to be of little effect.

Focusing on industrialism does not underestimate the severity of the problems of the Third World, which are intense and will almost certainly get worse before they improve. The projected growth of Third World populations, as well as current structures of debt and the power of international financial institutions and transnational corporations, guarantees desperate situations for the poor of our earth for some time to come. On the other hand, depending on how the ecological systems unravel, the relative independence of the poor from industrialism may work to their benefit. They are far less dependent than industrial societies on uninterrupted flows of energy and resources. It is hard to predict how the future might change.

Finding alternatives to industrialism within industrialism is likely to be the most important long-term project for the well-being of both industrial and Third World peoples. Much thinking about "development" and "underdevelopment" is dominated by an indefensible linear model which sees industrialism as an end point in a desirable process of change Against this view, two points need to be made. First, it isn't happening. Most peoples of the Third World are falling behind those of the industrial world The promise of development is not being kept, and the industrialized countries use the lesser industrialized countries as sources of cheap labor, cheap resources, and waste sites. Further, the promise cannot be kept To bring all the people of the world up to the consumption levels of industrial peoples would require truly massive increases in energy use and manufacturing output. This would foreclose any chance, slim as it may already be, of coping well with problems such as global warming.[10]

What the Third World needs most right now is a clear understanding of why industrialism is the wrong path to follow and why, as an end point, industrialism is not the best kind of society. Showing this clearly is one of the tasks of radical environmentalism and success in this will facilitate the creation of better societies for people all over the world.