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Post-Coloniality, Corrective Studies, and the (Re)making of History

> If the economic take-off of the West began with the techniques that made possible the accumulation of capital, it might perhaps be said that the methods for administering the accumulation of men [*sic*] made possible a political take-off in relation to the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power, which soon fell into disuse and were superseded by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection.
>
> **—Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (1977)**

> But at the outset one can say that so far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an assumption had been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West. The Orient was viewed as if framed by the classroom, the criminal court, the prison, the illustrated manual. Orientalism, then, is the knowledge of the Orient that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or manual for scrutiny, study, judgment, discipline, or governing.
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> **—Edward Said, *Orientalism* (1979)**

As the rise of the social sciences and the humanities in the West shows, the coupling of social/power relations with representations and meanings is one of the quandaries of scholarly inquiry. Can or should the subjects of historical processes be jointly examined

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with the subjects of social identity? Among critical currents of social research (e.g., Marxism, feminism, postcolonial studies), this difficulty has contributed to the rift between various objects of analytical intervention. On the one hand, there are those who examine the unfolding of socioeconomic conditions. At best, this would include the political and ideological epiphenomenons of these socioeconomic conditions, though most studies only optionally consider such "cultural effects." On the other hand, there are those who examine the varieties of cultural and representational forms. The latter are generally understood in the absence of any but the most cursory or pro forma socioeconomic contextualizations. Stuart Hall has already described the results of this schism in his critical appraisal of Althusser's essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses."

> The two sides of the difficult problem of ideology were fractured in that essay and, ever since, have been assigned different poles. The question of reproduction has been assigned to the marxist (male) pole, and the question of subjectivity has been assigned to the psychoanalytic (feminist) pole. Since then never have the twin met. The latter is constituted as a question about the "insides" of people, about psychoanalysis, subjectivity and sexuality, and is understood to be "about" that. It is in this way and on this site that the link to feminism has been increasingly theorized. The former is "about" social relations, production and the "hard edge" of productive systems, and that is what marxism and the reductive discourses of class are "about." This bifurcation of the theoretical project has had the most disastrous consequences for the unevenness of the subsequent development of the problematic of ideology, not to speak of its damaging political effects.[1]

A primary purpose of this book is to contribute to the bridging between the study of, what Stuart Hall terms, "the 'insides' of people, . . . subjectivity and sexuality" and the study of "social relations, production and the 'hard edge' of productive systems." This marks a shift from referencing the subject matter of history to rethinking the manner in which social subjects are historically produced and referenced; from assuming the content of identity categories to examining the assumptions/truths which conflictively constitute subjects as bound to specific identities; and from exploring the intersecting topics of historical reality and identity formation to mapping the genealogy of historicized identities, that is, to the study of the ways in which subjects live their history.

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Such efforts may perhaps suggest a reversion to psychologism, that is, to reducing social-historical processes to the realm of the individual. The goals of this book are different because here I only examine individuals as social artifacts of historically specific power-knowledge axes: it is political technologies and disciplines that constitute individuals—through complex and disputed processes—as social subjects.[2] Paraphrasing Foucault,[3] my work explores: how historically concrete and conflictive power relations codify individuals; how their own individuality is created by, within, and against these same power relations; how individuals are oppositionally affixed to their own identities; and how these power relations impose on such individuals "the law of truth" that they must acknowledge, re-member, and whose visage they must replicate in order to be re-cognized by other individuals.

Simultaneously, my research critically distances itself from this Foucaultian perspective in that I consider the subaltern subjects of Western colonialism and not a seemingly decentered Western subject. The latter inevitably becomes recentered precisely because it is abstractly theorized within a Crusoe-like universe that only contains the West (and no "natives").[4] My concern here is with how colonized subjects are historically constituted: as presumably unitary but shot through with endless contradictions; as the apparently homogenous target of useful domination fragmented into multiple embodiments; as totally driven to the margins yet as producing the proliferation of the margins and of myriad resistances. I dismiss the perspective that posits certain national-cultural/racial groups as social subjects that are *born* colonized. Drawing critically from the work of Fanon, Memmi, and Mannoni, my interests lie instead in how these groups *become* colonized,[5] in how people manufactured as a subject race are simultaneously understood as *in need of subjection*:[6] therein the principal title of this book.

I will do more than examine the way in which U.S. capital (as a social condition and a relation of power) created the subaltern subjects of the implantation and development of capitalism in Puerto Rico. My analysis will mainly look into how the once-again colonized laboring poor of this island became constructed as the wayward or criminal subjects of the new colonialist law and order through the deployment of socioeconomic, political, and signification systems.

In this sense, I now have concerns similar to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak when she distinguishes between the traditional/Marxist political economies of colonialism in India and the research of the Subaltern Studies group. In her essay "Subaltern Studies:

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Deconstructing Historiography," Spivak characterizes the traditional approach as defining

> [t]he insertion of India into colonialism . . . as a change from semi-feudalism into capitalism. Such a definition theorizes the change within the great narrative of the modes of production and, by uneasy implication, within the narrative of the transition from feudalism to capitalism.[7]

To this paradigm she counterposes the work of the Subaltern Studies group that, instead, focuses on

> revising this general definition and its theorization by proposing at least two things: first, that the moment(s) of change be pluralized and plotted as confrontations rather than as transition . . . and, secondly, that such changes are signalled or marked by a functional change in sign systems.

One prominent example of such transformations is the discursive and politico-practical shift "from crime to insurgency," because "[a] functional change in a sign system is a violent event. Even when it is perceived as 'gradual,' or 'failed,' or yet 'reversing itself,' the change itself can only be operated by the force of a crisis."[8] These are the concepts that have directed my current research, which, in turn, explains the remainder of this book's title.

My focus is on the linkages among colonialism, economic transformation, punitive structures, and discourse production, and how these processes violently constituted and refashioned Puerto Rican society and most of its members during the first half of the twentieth century. Such a direction requires attention to a complementary set of conceptual lenses: those of the ideological representations of material practices and those of the subjectivities that constitute them. This type of study demands a rethinking of the gendered, raced, and class-based "connection between past history and current historical practice"[9] by examining the process through which subjects are recognized as not just subordinate but also in need of policing and, synchronously, in need of policing precisely because they are subordinate subjects. This is why I have recuperated within my work the conceptual frameworks provided by the critique of Orientalism and by other postcolonial perspectives. However, my use of the critique of Orientalism and of postcolonial perspectives compels a few taxonomical and conceptual clarifications.

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What does it mean to critically rethink the subaltern subject of Eurocentric/colonialist paradigms? At first glance, Orientalism references a very different geographical area. However, the concept, as Said has shown, is not just a question of geography, but of colonialist discourse. At issue are the cultural practices and representations that necessarily accompanied and helped make possible a particular collection of colonialist and neocolonialist enterprises that, not accidentally, coincided with the creation of a world capitalist market: the phenomenon otherwise known as the "rise of the West."[10]

The element of the critique of Orientalism re-aligned within this book is, expressly, how the politico-economic structures and dominant knowledges inherent to what Octave Mannoni broadly defined as "colonial situations" (pp. 17–18) constitute a social-geographic space and its subordinate inhabitants. Referenced is any encounter marked by national-cultural/racial hierarchy and inequality. This conceptual point of departure allows for a critique of the era of colonialism (including neocolonialism) that aspires to question the nexus of power and knowledge that made and still makes such colonial situations possible. The intention is to anticipate and further a noncolonialist age by identifying and critiquing, not just the socioeconomic and political roots of colonialism, but also the systems of meaning and ideological representation that ground colonialism—broadly understood. Such is the context in which postcolonial outlooks are pertinent: from Césaire, Fanon, Memmi, and Fernández Retamar to Said, Visvanathan, Spivak, Guha, Nandy, Hall, Bhabha, Trinh, Mudimbe, et al.

Given the sadly pervasive reality of neocolonialism, my use of the term "postcolonial" is very different from a simple allusion to the period after a former colonized people have gained political (though not economic) independence. Given also the widespread tangibility of what Ashis Nandy has called anti-Western oppositions that remain firmly positioned within Western paradigms and structures (formally anticapitalist or not),[11] my use of the term "postcolonial" is equally distinct from what Bill Ashcroft, et al. have defined as "all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day."[12] In my mind, the economic and political effects of neocolonialism are still colonial. A *post*colonial perspective, on the other hand, designates the political, economic, and cultural efforts to uproot and dismantle colonialism altogether—particularly its Western underpinnings.

Likewise, I use the term "colonized" in this study only to denote all those populations and spaces that became the object of national-

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cultural/racial oppression by the West as part of the historically concurrent and overlapping emergence of capitalism, colonialism, and chattel slavery on a world scale five hundred years ago. The colonized subjects were thus produced as part and parcel of the transformation of "Christendom" into "Europe" and of Christian universalism into Eurocentric universalism.[13] It is no accident that the rise of the colonialist culture of capitalism also brought into "common"—that is, Western—usage the term "ethnic": signalling the shift from the Greek *éthnos,* meaning "nation" and "people," to the Catholic-Latin *ethnicus,* referring to "heathen," "pagan," and "savage": hence, the intertwined genesis of modern racism and nationalism. As Trinh Minh-ha has pointed out in *Woman, Native, Other,*

> The perception of the outsider as the one who needs help has taken on the successive forms of the barbarian, the pagan, the infidel, the wild man, the "native," and the underdeveloped. Needless to say, these forms whose meanings helplessly keep on decomposing can only exist in relation to their opposites. . . . Thus the invention of "needs" and of the mission to "help" the needy always blossom together. The Full Man, the Church, the Humanist, the Civilized-Colonist, and the Professional-Anthropologist all have a human face and are close male agnates descending from the same key ancestor.[14]

This study classifies the opposite of the colonized as the "colonizer," meaning: Europeans, their recognized descendants,[15] and the social space thus constituted as dominant within national-cultural/racial hierarchies. Colonialism has constructed *both* these subordinate and hegemonic spaces and their corresponding populations as *colonial* realities:[16] the various "mother countries" (or metropoli) and their respective colonies—overseas and internal, direct and indirect (neocolonies)—Japan being the only exception that confirms this originally Western taxonomical rule. This colonial reality engendered the world that Sartre described in the 1950s as numbering "two thousand million inhabitants: five hundred million men [*sic*], and one thousand five hundred million natives."[17]

Representing History

A theoretical touchstone of many new postcolonial outlooks is the representational character of history. Does a historical process exist outside of the social subjects and power relations that other-

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wise embody, structure, and signify it? Can such a process ever have a material reality that is universal, transcendent, and above dispute? These are controversial questions within materialist conceptual parameters since one tenet of the latter is the empirical veracity of history. I agree with Stuart Hall's explanation, in "Signification, Representation, Ideology," that the reality of events unfolds historically: that is, as social conditions and power relations that, across time, perpetually constitute the individual/group subjects who continually transform these conditions and relations (p. 105). The focus on the representational and narrative character of history does not contend the human capacity to understand events that have already transpired. But, in the very similar way in which concrete reality in the present is conceptually volatilized through meaning—that is, textualized—in order to be understood, this no less concrete past is brought to the present through meaning; it is textualized. To be acknowledged, the past must be made to appear again in the present assuming the form of an imagined reasonable facsimile, a narration, which then replaces this past. Knowledge of the past, then, is doubly representational: the past appears again (re-presents itself) in the present, and this re-apparition can only materialize in the shape of an approximation-in-thought that substitutes the original past (represents it). Such is the textuality of history.[18]

This construction/reconstruction of the past is a necessarily disputed process. The past is the material manifestation in memory (written, sensorial, and/or artifactual) of previous or persistent social conditions and power relations. These conditions and relations originally unfolded as subject positions (individual and collective) that were/are inherently conflictive and hierarchical in terms of race, gender, class, sexuality, nationality, and so on. This explains why struggles arise around the ways in which this past is re-membered. The various ways in which this past is re-presented (literally: made to appear again) in varying degrees have to reflect the analogous or continuing social conflicts and hierarchies that such a past expresses.

This study, then, examines material reality—including history—as an antagonistic and unstable construct mediated by no-less-material and no-less-contested sign systems. Such an approach allows for a different kind of understanding, one that can acknowledge the instability of subject positions and the social forces that cause their constructions. Unlike materialist theoretical frameworks that posit historical reality as any other set of facts that are always already there, waiting for its discovery,[19] this inquiry begins with a different set of assumptions. My purpose is not to assert the

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true story of criminality, U.S. colonization, and economic change in Puerto Rico, nor to provide readers with a privileged access to a stable reality. Rather, this study has more suspicious intentions: scrutinizing the ways in which capitalism, colonialism, and the law—as power relations—are embedded in, as well as work through, such categories as universal truths, privileged accesses, and knowledge. In this sense, I agree with Foucault's suggestion:

> "Truth" is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A "regime of truth."

He immediately adds that "[t]his regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism," finally stating: "[t]he problem is not changing people's consciousness—or what's in their heads—but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth."[20]

To examine ideological representations requires a renewed consideration of language, how it works to simultaneously point out and inscribe. As Carroll Smith-Rosenberg has pointed out

> . . . [I]f we accept the post-structuralist argument that it is language that endows the social with meaning, we must also insist that language, itself, acquires meaning and authority only within specific social and historical settings. While linguistic differences structure society, social differences structure language.[21]

One of the fundamental ways in which social conditions and power relations fashion people as subjects (for example, as laborers, Europeans, men, criminals, etc.) is by way of the individuational effects and functions that these sign systems (language in the broad sense) assign people. As Louis Althusser has observed in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," the myth is that people appear as the sole authors of these discourses.[22] Thus, the meanings through which people are seemingly only defining, acknowledging, and recognizing the history they are making, the social conditions under which they are making it, and the power relations within which they are making it, are, coincidentally and in actuality, the meanings through which these people are defined, acknowledged, and re-cognized as individuals (by themselves and by others). The ideological representations of, for instance, propertied and educated social sectors, women, Caribbean people, homosexuals, etc., summon the very people who believe themselves as the initiators of these identities.

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Yet the sign systems and textual practices through which individual and collective subjects live this history, these social conditions, and these power relations are necessarily inverted, deflected, and displaced. These discourses allude to history, relations, and conditions that are perceived, for example, as the Law, Reason, Human Nature, Historical Destiny, and so on. The history, relations, and conditions thus conceived are different from the history and relations and conditions that actually constitute these individual/collective subjects in the first place—such as capitalism, gender oppression, racism, heterosexism, colonialism, etc. Such textual displacements do not make social conditions and power relations any less material or any less terrible. As Ashis Nandy has noted in the case of History and Christianity as metonymically Western, "None of them is true but all of them are realities" (p. xiv). The formation of social subjects is, then, doubly imagined. On the one hand, the primary dimensions in/through which this takes place are the realm of the mind (thought, language, discourses, meanings, signs, and the like). On the other hand, the social conditions and power relations being referenced are not the ones that are indeed fashioning these individual and collective identities. The very people that make history are circumscribed and unstably fixed by textual forms of representation, as ideological representations become an integral element of the conditions and relations with (and within) which people make history.

Yet this study attempts to break with positivist and metahistorical traditions in general, particularly with the "false consciousness" paradigm: I do not pretend to have uncovered the hidden truth of the colonial mind, of its representations, nor of social unrest in Puerto Rico as revealed to me in the signs left behind by its protagonists. As Diane Mcdonnel has argued, "Without a set of universal truths or a privileged access to reality, nothing can be proven beyond dispute"[23]—and I neither claim such a truth nor have such an access. This study is one other interpretation, an-other account, of events and processes that transpired between 1898 and 1947 in Puerto Rico: in this sense, it is closer to the subtle ambiguity suggested by the Spanish word for "history" (*historia*), alluding not only to the past and its analysis, but also to narrative practices in general (as in "story" or "tale"). As Janet Abu-Lughod has remarked, "[I]n historical reconstruction there is no archimedan point *outside* the system from which to view historical 'reality.'"[24]

My research stems from an effort to triangulate previously unexamined axes/elements in the case of the social-history/historical-sociology of Puerto Rico. This is the way I have tried to read

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these events and the—mostly displaced and furtive—voices of their subaltern participants. However, I know full well that these voices were not "speaking to me" and that my reconstruction of their meanings is not to be confused with whatever meanings these subaltern social practices may have had for their participants and for their detractors—all of those meanings being inaccessible to me (and to any other historical analyst). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak is correct when, in "Can the Subaltern Speak?", she states:

> When we come to the concomitant question of the consciousness of the subaltern, the notion of what the work *cannot* say becomes important. . . . The sender—"the peasant"—is marked only as a pointer to an irretrievable consciousness. As for the receiver, we must ask who is "the real receiver" of an "insurgency"? The historian, transforming "insurgency" into "text of knowledge," is only one "receiver" of any collectively intended social act. With no possibility of nostalgia for that lost origin, the historian must suspend (as far as possible) the clamor of his or her own consciousness (or consciousness-effect, as operated by disciplinary training), so that the elaboration of the insurgency, packaged with an insurgent-consciousness, does not freeze into an "object of investigation," or, worse yet, a model of imitation. "The subject" implied by the texts of insurgency can only serve as a counterpossibility for the narrative sanctions granted to the colonial subject in the dominant groups. The postcolonial intellectuals learn that their privilege is their loss. In this they are a paradigm of the intellectuals. (p. 287, emphasis in the original)

These are odd contradictions: that ideological representations author the subject as the subject struggles to claim ownership and that the history of narratives cannot elude the narrative character of history. Entering such apparent incongruities requires highlighting, in social research, the formation of social subjects, history, socioeconomic conditions, and discourses.

The Moments of Transgression

What it might mean to address the above distinctions was partially suggested more than a decade ago, when Steven Spitzer observed:[25]

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> The relationship between patterns of economic organization and punishment is always indirect at best. It is mediated by a number of different structures, processes, and contradictions that make it impossible to precisely deduce the anatomy of the economic order from a study of punishment or vice versa.[26]

How are the subaltern subjects of the popular illegalities[27] in Puerto Rico positioned with respect to the subaltern subjects of colonialist forms of punishment and the subaltern subjects of the colonial economic order? To what extent are these subaltern subjects one and the same? In this book I do not intend to deduce the forms of punishment by re-examining the types of social change that took place in Puerto Rico. Instead, I am interested in how that important part of the everyday existence of the laboring-poor majorities in the Island—namely, the subjectivity of the popular illegalities—was structured and lived as a mediation between these "patterns of economic organization and punishment."

Because the survival practices of the laboring classes have, historically, cut through the ways that the accumulation of capital is implanted, these survival practices have been frequently constructed as transgressive. Given the forms of social disruption that emerge in each particular historical situation, it becomes necessary to demonstrate why the unique forms adopted by the dispossession process structurally required and specifically included what Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* called the "methods for administering the accumulation of men" (p. 220).

I examine this problem by delineating the contours of such punitive methods in Puerto Rico. Yet the concrete details of colonial criminal justice and of the penal system's development will not be examined in this book. Rather, my analysis concentrates on: (1) the implantation and disruption of the accumulation of capital and (2) the ideological representations that radiated from and were determined by these punitive methods. The persistent autonomy of these survival practices set limits to advancing capitalism's ability to effectively summon and fashion the impoverished majorities in Puerto Rico as a docile potential labor force. In turn, these contrary survival practices were supposed to have been identified, explained, controlled, penetrated, and redirected by the new and changing forms of punishment, particularly by the discourses on criminal justice.[28]

Given the necessarily opaque, displaced, and elusive textual traces left by these popular illegalities, one of the other objectives of this study is to identify the physiognomy of such prohibited subal-

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tern practices by examining the normative direction and substance of both the colonial-capitalist narratives and the law-and-order discourses at this time. Much of this study involved inspecting a large number of the official documents, scholarly essays, and newspaper articles of the day that recorded both the practices and the voices of these disorderly subaltern subjects. My own research into these chronicles and sociographies was carried out with attention to the conflictive way that they structured and logged the subaltern voices. Although coming from another context, Deborah Britzman's advice is, in this sense, still quite pertinent:

> Re-presenting the voices of others means more than recording their words. An interpretive effort is necessary because words always express relationships, span contexts larger than the immediate situation from which they arise, and hold tensions between what is intended and what is signified. . . . The retelling of another's story is always a partial telling, bound not only by one's perspective but also by the exigencies of what can and cannot be told.[29]

Therefore, at this level too, my research is similar to the work of the Subaltern Studies group. In the case of the official record of rural disorder in nineteenth century India, Ranajit Guha has remarked:

> It is of course true that the reports, dispatches, minutes, judgements, laws, letters, etc., in which policemen, soldiers, bureaucrats, landlords, usurers, and others hostile to insurgency register their sentiments, amount to a representation of their will. But these documents do not get their content from that will alone, for the latter is predicated on another will—that of the insurgent.[30]

In "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency," Guha suggests that "a closer look at the [official] text can detect chinks which have allowed 'comment' to worm its way through the plate armour of 'fact.'"[31] Such reports, dispatches, etc. regarding disorder among the colonized do not make much sense except in terms of the disciplinary codes of colonial-capitalist pacification. My own research also reads the imprint of analogous subordinate resistance/survival practices within their, oftentimes, only written record. This is why, according to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography," you "can only read against the

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grain if misfits in the text signal the way. (These are sometimes called 'moments of transgression' or 'critical moments')" (p. 211).

In no way, however, am I advancing a romantic notion of what these often criminalized survival practices were or have been. As Martha Knisely Huggins has advised, "Spitzer's dictum [re: the construction of problem populations] need not imply that criminals are motivated by revolutionary objectives, only that people are labeled deviant when their behavior or personal qualities represent a significant impediment to the maintenance and growth of a system."[32]

In this study, then, I am not denying the very real violence and pain resulting from some of the illegalized subsistence practices and turbulent reactions to the colonialist dispossession process. The perspective adopted in this book, though, is twofold. First, even in these particular cases such intrinsic violence, as well as the very palpable suffering that may and many times does follow in its wake, is nevertheless devoid of any moral or immoral essence. Moral culpability is a socially variable, historically determined, and extremely contested ideological representation. The harshness and the anguish may all be there. What is neither inherently nor ontologically there, however, is the criminal/delinquent identification: this is a changing, socially constructed interpretation of real and contradictory practices, power relations, and social conditions. It is a form of discourse.

Second, because crime and delinquency are historically variable ideological representations of such practices, relations, and conditions, then the conflation of *social* violence[33]—that is, illegal or illegalized violence—with violence *sans phrase* amounts to a major oversight. This maneuver omits or excuses the very real violence and brutality inherently present in many of the legal, systemic, and/or exonerated practices of hegemonic elements: the State, capital, and the propertied and educated classes and individuals in general. Such officially condoned violence is mostly relocated outside of the epistemological and administrative terrain of the criminal justice system altogether. Collapsing the signifiers of violence by reducing all violence primarily to the violent practices of the dispossessed merely reinforces the reconstitution and continuation of the existing codes of legal/punitive regulation. Another element this book examines is precisely the ways that the economic and colonialist dispossession process was furthered by such fusion of violence markers.

These are the principal questions addressed in this study. The order of exposition began in this chapter with a detailed description of the general concepts and theoretical concerns that have directed

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my recent research: knowledge-power relations; the historicity of textuality and the textuality of history; colonialism and punitive discourses; and the links between socioeconomic structures and subjectivity. The second and third chapters are an explanation of the imposed colonial-capitalist structures, their signifying practices, and the sociocultural repercussions of this process in Puerto Rico, from the U.S. invasion of 1898 running through the end of its foundation-building period after the European War of 1914–1919.

Chapters Four and Five examine the contradictory response and resistances of the "native" majorities in the Island to the machineries of dispossession during that first pivotal period; the colonialist institutions and discursive operations that contained and represented the disorders of the colonized are also explored. The remaining primary chapters (six, seven, and eight) deal with the ways that this process of containment and transgression, the text of the popular illegalities versus its official representations, were coupled and at the same time unraveled in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. The closing chapter summarizes the main themes of this book.

Edward Said remarked in *Orientalism* that the corrective study of colonized majorities turned most "native" populations into " . . . something one judges (as in court of law), . . . something one disciplines (as in school or prison), something one illustrates (as in a zoological manual). [Something that] . . . is *contained* and *represented* by dominating frameworks" (p. 40). Whereupon Said asked: "Where do these come from?" In the case of Puerto Rico, this is the question to which we will now turn, regarding the crucial 1898–1921 period.

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