

## Introduction

In the summer of 1977, Menachem Begin, Israel's newly elected prime minister, asked visiting overseas Jewish leaders to support a massive effort to end slum conditions among Israeli Jews. During the next two years, his government established Project Renewal, a comprehensive community renewal and development program—a hybrid resembling the American Urban Renewal, Model Cities, and War on Poverty programs. It called for the improvement of the urban infrastructure (streets, sewage system); the elimination of remaining transit camps (Ma'abarot) set up in the 1950s; the rehabilitation of existing housing; the construction of education, community, and health facilities; and, the expansion of social welfare, health, education and job training services.<sup>1</sup>

Heading the program was the deputy prime minister, Professor Yigal Yadin, an internationally recognized archeologist and former chief of staff of the Israeli army. Seeing himself as an Israeli Charles DeGaulle determined to change the Israeli political system, Yadin had only recently entered politics as the leader of the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) party. Although Yadin's party did well in the 1977 elections (see appendix), Menachem Begin managed to form a government without the DMC. Instead of remaining in the opposition, Yadin compromised his position on political reform, joined the Begin government, and sought to make his mark by rectifying social inequality. As deputy prime minister and head of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Affairs, he took charge of a comprehensive Project Renewal program involving several ministries, the Jewish Agency and overseas Jewish communities, municipal governments, and neighborhood residents. Limited to pre-1967 Israel, participating renewal communities included entire towns (usually the newer, more peripheral development towns) and neighborhoods in the older, larger, and centrally located cities. By 1984, the program encompassed eighty-four neighborhoods. With few exceptions, it excluded Israeli Arab neighborhoods and towns.

Yadin's renewal program proposed unprecedented changes in the Israeli public policy system, in which all powerful ministries dictated policies to dependent and weak municipalities in a system devoid of meaningful citizen participation. It called for the active participation of neighborhood residents in a municipal-initiated planning process that was binding on ministry Project Renewal activities. Project Renewal also broke with the traditional method of diaspora fund raising for Israel. Overseas Jewish communities had always contributed to a general, nonrestricted fund for Israel, now each overseas Jewish community was asked to earmark contributions both for the program and for a particular Israeli renewal neighborhood with which it was "twinned."<sup>2</sup> Moreover, its direct involvement in the renewal of its adopted Israeli neighborhood extended to other activities including limited participation in the planning process (see Gottlieb and Schreter 1986, p. 2).

When Yadin left his post in the summer of 1981, Project Renewal rather than the existing public policy system, had changed dramatically. Yadin had not been effective. In place of a single comprehensive, coordinated, and integrated effort, several ministries and the Jewish Agency operated competing specialized renewal programs, many of which limited the input and meaningful participation of municipal authorities, neighborhood residents, and overseas twins. The Ministry of Housing dominated the government's renewal activities. On the local level, mayors and, to a lesser degree, overseas Jewish communities assumed a far more powerful role than intended.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, resident participation fell far short of intent and expectations. Finally, although the program should have provided additional funds for renewal, ministries and local governments often used renewal funds to replace existing operating budgets.

The Israeli political system provides a partial but important explanation for how the implementation process significantly altered the original program and policy.<sup>4</sup> This book describes how the political system contributed to Yadin's failure as government coordinator, the dominant renewal role of the Ministry of Housing, the independent Jewish Agency and social ministry Project Renewal efforts, the influential endeavors of mayors on the local level, the poor results of citizen participation, and the viable involvement for many overseas Jewish communities. It also evaluates the impact of Project Renewal on the Israeli political system: Did it bring about political change?

The focus of analysis is on what Ashford (1978) refers to as Israel's *political constitution*: "a set of political institutions without which the state in its present form could not persist," or the characteristic way Israel conducts its business of policy implementation (pp. 81, 82, 86).<sup>5</sup>

"The basic hypothesis of policy analysis of politics would be that the state will not undertake those policies which tend to impair or threaten its constitutional foundations" (*ibid.* p. 82).<sup>6</sup> Therefore, Israel's political constitution or the major characteristics of the Israeli political system should strongly influence the implementation of Project Renewal; it is unlikely that the program would introduce significant political change.

Several characteristics of Israel's political constitution exerted a major influence over the implementation of Project Renewal. First, and most important, coalitions consisting of several independent oligarchical parties have always characterized the Israeli governmental system.<sup>7</sup> Because no party has ever won an absolute majority in national elections, the party with the largest number of elected representatives is traditionally charged with establishing a coalition government. It does so by forming partnerships with one or several smaller, and often ideologically very disparate, parties. To come to terms, the coalition partners agree on mutually acceptable principles and policies and divide up ministries, with the most important taken by the major party. Although committed to serving the national interest, party leaders can also use "their" ministries to benefit party interests, provided they do not violate the coalition agreement. This system fosters, therefore, considerable independence among the parties that make up the coalition.<sup>8</sup> Thus, horizontal fragmentation with its lack of unity and central authority, characterizes the Israeli governmental system.<sup>9</sup>

What Benjamin Akzin and Yehezkel Dror concluded in 1966 remains true for the Israeli political system today: "It is a basic, though unwritten, rule of the coalition agreement that a department allocated to a given political party should be conducted more or less as the minister and his party wish without much interference by the cabinet" (1966, p. 10). This "federation of ministries whose coordinating mechanisms are extremely weak" limits the collective authority of the government and the prime minister over individual ministers and ministries (Kalchheim 1988, p. 41).<sup>10</sup> This system enacted, organized, and implemented Project Renewal on the national level.<sup>11</sup>

This factor clearly limits the ability of any program, including Project Renewal, to foster coordination and cooperation among several ministries controlled by different parties; opposition by one or more hampers implementation.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, it would be unlikely for the major coalition party to support wholeheartedly an interministerial program headed by a minister of a minority party in the coalition with whom it must compete in the next election. Program or policy success could prove very costly at the polls. In contrast, policy implementation can be effective provided the coalition parties are in agreement, the policy area

lies exclusively within one ministry or ministries controlled by a single party, and sufficient resources exist to fund implementation.

Second, partially as a consequence of coalition governments, politicians have dominated the ministries. From the beginning of the state, Israel has lacked a tradition of a neutral professional civil service. Since the early 1950s, however, there has been a gradual professionalization of the administrative staffs and the growth of a modern professional bureaucracy that requires the views of experts and not just politicians (see Eisenstadt 1967, p. 302). This common core of professionals has the potential to foster inter- and intraministerial cooperation and agreement in much the way professionals bridge different levels of American government (Peterson, Rabe, and Wong 1986, pp. 152-162). Nevertheless the dominant political element continues to check and limit the influence of the professionals.

The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the Israeli system resembles that described by Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981) as *image one*, in which politicians make policy and bureaucrats implement it.<sup>13</sup> This assumes a "degree of hierarchy of authority, of simplicity of decision and of effective political supremacy which now seems unrealistic" (p. 6). In practice, of course, the Israeli bureaucracy performs more than a technical function and does influence policy making.<sup>14</sup> A great deal of discretion exists in any system—much more than *image one* would permit. In practice, the politicians, both elected and appointed (political executives as distinct from super-grade civil servants [Aberbach and Rockman 1977, p. 25]) dominate the civil service.<sup>15</sup> Party leaders are in a position to appoint many key bureaucrats, including the directors general of ministries and heads of Jewish Agency departments.<sup>16</sup> This suggests that, in the case of Project Renewal, ministry and agency professionals on the highest level are likely to be sensitive to party considerations.

Third, the delegation of certain state functions to the autonomous Jewish Agency has contributed to fragmentation of national government and prevents unity of governmental action in the public sector. Established in 1929 under international public law under the provisions of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, the Jewish Agency served as the World Zionist Organization's (WZO) "instrument for the upbuilding of the Jewish national home and the struggle for statehood in Palestine proper" (Elazar and Dortort 1985, p. 7). During the British Mandate, the Jewish Agency served as an unofficial government—a regime without sovereignty—for most of the Jews of the Yishuv and as the liaison with the Mandate authorities (King et al. 1987, p. 10; Arian 1985, pp. 21-30).<sup>17</sup> Its chairman, David Ben-Gurion, became

Israel's first prime minister. With the establishment of the state of Israel, the agency chose not to disband. Ever since it has sought to perform functions within Israel to justify its continued existence. In 1952, for example, the Israeli government signed a legal agreement (Law of Status) with the World Zionist Organization, giving the agency primary responsibility for the care of new immigrants, rural (agricultural) development, and certain educational functions. Until 1971 the WZO and Israeli political parties controlled the agency. A reorganization at that time gave the non-Zionist diaspora community and fund raising leadership equal representation with the WZO in all agency institutions.<sup>18</sup> The agency also expanded its involvement in Israeli education, social welfare, housing management, and immigrant absorption. Although strongly influenced by the government's coalition parties, the agency has retained considerable independence through its control over the funds raised by the two major overseas fund raising organizations: the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) in the United States and the Keren Hayesod elsewhere.

Its desire to survive and the need to justify its continued existence strongly influences its actions. Therefore, the agency fought for a separate, independent and visible role or program in Project Renewal and refused to give up or share its control of overseas renewal funds.

Fourth, Israel's formally highly centralized hierarchical intergovernmental system also exhibits a degree of vertical fragmentation that delegates authority from the national to the municipal levels of government.<sup>19</sup> Over the years, municipalities have performed various roles and functions in administering ministry programs within their jurisdictions. This gave local authorities influence over what the ministries did in areas under their control.

Bargaining, rather than hierarchical decision making, often characterizes the interaction between the municipalities and local interests and the respective ministry responsible for the various national services (Elazar 1977, p. 49; Smith 1982, p. 7; Torgovnik 1988, p. 93).<sup>20</sup> This is especially true when the municipality is given a role in the provision of the ministry's services, as is the case in welfare and education (Lazin 1982).<sup>21</sup> The overlap of functions—the ministry making policy and the municipality implementing it—is not, however, a relationship between equals. "From a power perspective, local governments are indeed subordinate to governmental and party centers" (Elazar 1988b, p. 3). The advantage is usually with the ministry.

Also, the standing of municipalities varies, with some having more influence than others on the ministries and their policies. In general, ministry influence and dominance is inversely proportional to the

socioeconomic and political standing of the particular municipality. As a rule, the more powerful have been those communities, mostly in central Israel, whose residents are veteran settlers of European origin and their offspring, and the weaker are those communities on the periphery whose residents are more recent Jewish immigrants from Arab countries. Party, government, and personal ties and style of the mayor also significantly influence the standing of a particular municipality within the intergovernmental system (see Arian 1985, p. 241). Thus, in the same way that American federalism influences the implementation of American grant-in-aid programs, so Israel's local governments, at least the more powerful ones, can influence how Project Renewal is implemented within their jurisdictions (see Lazin 1987).

Fifth, despite the near absence of ethnic parties, ethnicity has always been a factor in Israeli politics and public policy. Every government since 1948 has used the distribution of public resources to win the votes of various immigrant groups (Abramson 1989, pp. 546ff).

Jews of European origin (Ashkenazim) and their descendants dominated the leadership of the Zionist movement and led and controlled the building of the political, social, economic, military, and cultural institutions of the Yishuv and later of Israel. In 1948, for example, they made up 85 percent of the Jewish population of the new state (Grose 1985, p. 27). The Jews from Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East (Sephardim or Oriental), on the other hand, have been underrepresented. A relatively small Sephardi community living in the Holy Land for generations initially remained outside the Zionist movement while other Oriental Jews, small in number, participated (see Eisenstadt 1967, pp. 50ff; Smooha 1978, pp. 58ff). Also outside the Zionist framework were the ultra-orthodox Jews of European origin. Postindependence mass immigration has altered the ethnic makeup of Israel; by the late 1960s Oriental Jews and their offspring had become the most numerous Jewish group in the state. They failed, however, to achieve economic and political power commensurate with their numbers.<sup>22</sup>

Oriental Jews made their first inroads into Israeli politics via municipal government. By the late 1960s they won most mayorships and local council seats. The perception of the dominant Mapai party as the symbol of a state that robbed them of their dignity and made them second-class citizens led many Oriental Jews to run for local office as independents.<sup>23</sup> Many joined the Herut party of Menachem Begin, which welcomed them into a much smaller party with virtually no infrastructure in development areas (Grose 1985, pp. 25-26).<sup>24</sup> Since 1969 more and more Oriental Israelis have voted for the Likud, and their children do so to an even greater extent.<sup>25</sup>

Clearly the ethnic factor influenced Project Renewal's enactment and implementation. In 1977 a majority of Oriental Jews voted for Likud, which contributed to Begin's victory. In recognition of their support, Begin sponsored Project Renewal, a massive slum clearance program designed to benefit this constituency.

Of less concern to Israeli governments and parties has been the Arab minority (see Smootha 1978, pp. 84ff, 95, 134, 145, 197). No Israeli government has sought to achieve their total integration or equal standing in society. Less use is made of public resources to win their votes, and there is still less ideological pressure for their equal standing in Israeli society. The integration issue is also complicated by the desire by Arab Israelis to "preserve their corporate identity" (Elazar 1977, p. 52).<sup>26</sup> The continuing state of war between Israel and most of her Arab neighbors as well as the failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also make it difficult for the Israeli political system to achieve greater equality for its Arab citizens. Accordingly, it should be of no surprise if Project Renewal did not initially involve Arab Israeli neighborhoods and or towns.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to the preceding five political variables, the condition of the Israeli economy significantly influenced the implementation of Project Renewal. Successful implementation required adequate financial resources from the government of Israel and diaspora Jewish communities. The general state of the economy, the rate of inflation, the fund raising ability of diaspora communities, the number of new immigrants, and relations with neighboring Arab countries influence the availability of resources as well as the desire to fund the particular program.<sup>28</sup> The Lebanese War of June 1982 significantly altered Israel's economic situation as well as the status of Project Renewal as a funding priority for the government, the Jewish Agency and diaspora Jewry.

### A Policy Implementation Study

This book examines the implementation of Project Renewal to better understand the relationship between politics and public policy. The study also contributes to a clarification of *policy implementation*.<sup>29</sup>

The approach used here to study the implementation of Project Renewal is essentially a *top-down* or policy analysis perspective, guided by many of the concerns of the bottom-up approach.<sup>30</sup> The objective is to provide "a clear factual account of the implementation experience [while recognizing] different points of view [held] by the various participants in the implementation experience" (Yin 1982, p. 63). This approach facilitates the study of the implementation of a particular pol-

icy within an "implementation structure" involving many different public and private agencies on all levels of the intergovernmental system, including the neighborhood.<sup>31</sup> The choice of a top-down perspective reflects the author's belief in the importance of the initial program and his interest in the political effectiveness of the administrative organizations and procedures it established.

The study departs, however, in several ways from the top-down approach and in particular from the model proposed by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). They accepted a distinction between policy formation, the enactment and funding of a policy or program, and its implementation. For them implementation begins where policy stops; it is a process of putting policy (or programs) into effect: "a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them. . . . Implementation, then, is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results" (pp. xiv-xv). They are concerned, therefore, mainly with coordination and managing various elements to achieve desired ends.<sup>32</sup>

Whereas implementation for them begins with a set policy and program, the analysis here is also concerned with the policy formation process.<sup>33</sup> It begins with a review of previous governmental efforts at urban renewal and community development in Israel and events leading up to the adoption of Project Renewal. Second, and more important, this study assumes that once officially adopted the program underwent considerable change and modification before formal implementation at the local level. Finally, in accord with the bottom-up method, this study maintains that the implementation process changes and adapts the original policy (see Majone and Wildavsky 1978, p. 109; Larson 1980, pp. 114-117; and Nathan 1982, p. 74). Therefore, the approach here is longitudinal: it is concerned with the origin of the policy, the enactment process of the original program, and subsequent changes during implementation at both the national and local levels until 1985, when the program was substantially altered.

The approach of this study is consistent with Susan Barrett and Colin Fudge's (1981b, p. 4) view that "rather than treating implementation as the transmission of policy into a series of consequented actions, the policy action relationship needs to be regarded as a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends."<sup>34</sup> They suggest, therefore, that one looks at implementation

not solely in terms of putting policy into effect, but also in terms of observing what actually happens or gets done and seeking to



understand how and why. This kind of action perspective takes "what is done" as central, focusses on the behavior or actions of groups and individuals and the determinants of behavior, and seeks to examine the degree to which action relates to policy. . . . [I]mplementation . . . may be regarded as a series of responses: to ideological commitment, to environmental pressures or to pressure from other agencies (groups) seeking to influence or control action. (Barrett and Fudge 1981b, pp. 12-13).

In effect, one studies a sequence of events "triggered off" by a policy decision (*ibid.*).

Finally the analytic approach used here takes an organizational perspective (see Barrett and Fudge 1981b, p. 26; Williams 1982, pp. 7-9.) It does not study individuals per se, but their behavior as members of formal and informal political or administrative organizations. This requires a focus on the relevant organizations and how their members understand and view the program (Yanow 1987, p. 110). Nevertheless, the research revealed important roles played by key actors on both local and national levels that significantly affected the policy implementation process.

The experiences in Project Renewal of Yigal Yadin, the deputy prime minister in charge of Project Renewal, and Eliahu Nawii, mayor of Beer-Sheva, are cases in point. Yadin failed to coordinate the program. Typically, he complained that fellow ministers and senior ministry personnel refused to answer his phone calls. His frustration and inability to direct the program reflected the weak standing of his party in the coalition. In contrast, the failure of Nawii to direct the program in Beer-Sheva reflected more his personal indifference toward most public matters than his position as mayor in the intergovernmental system.

### Methodology

This book is based upon the author's research on Project Renewal at the national level, as well as its operation in six different Israeli municipalities.<sup>35</sup> After reviewing previous Israeli renewal efforts, the longitudinal research design looks at the program from its formal inception in 1977, through its adoption by the government in January 1979, and its subsequent operation until 1984 with the end of the second Begin government.<sup>36</sup>

The six Israeli case studies of Project Renewal include the municipalities of Ashkelon, Beer-Sheva, Beit Shemesh, Herzliya, Ofakim, and Yavneh. Although they are not a representative sample of municipali-

ties in general, or of those involved in Project Renewal in particular, they illustrate a wide spectrum of different types of local governments involved in the program.<sup>37</sup> They represent variations in population size, location, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, the format of the program (whether it encompassed a single neighborhood or the entire municipality), the overseas "twin" community, and the political affiliation of the mayors.<sup>38</sup> Absent are municipalities in the north of the country. They are similar in many ways, however, to the peripheral communities in the southern or Negev region. Whereas the size sample is fairly representative, the three major cities—Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, and Haifa—which are each double if not triple the size of Beer-Sheva the largest city in this sample are also not included.<sup>39</sup>

**Ashkelon** (1984 population: 54,700) is a large development town in the southern coastal area.<sup>40</sup> Its mayor, Eli Dayan, a Moroccan-born, religious, Israeli-educated lawyer, won his first election representing Yadin's Democratic Movement for Change in 1978. He won again in 1983 as the candidate of a newly formed TAMI party committed to improving the lot of Israeli Jews of North African origin. A dynamic and appealing mayor, he overcame Ministry of Housing opposition to include all but two prosperous neighborhoods in the program. He also managed to give all eligible residents, regardless of neighborhood, access to renewal social programs. The powerful and relatively prosperous Jewish community of Great Britain served as Ashkelon's overseas twin.

**Beer-Sheva** (114,300), the largest municipality in the study, is located in the northern Negev. It too is a peripheral, development town, but also the home of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and Soroka hospital. Also, in contrast to other peripheral towns, it has a larger middle-income population and greater ethnic diversity, with many native-born Israelis and Jews of European origin. Over 15,000 Soviet immigrants came to the city in the 1970s. Its mayor, Eliahu Nawii, Iraqi born and Israeli educated, took office in 1963. He was originally a Labor party affiliate who later formally declared himself an independent. Local efforts failed to expand the program beyond the initial two neighborhoods—Gimel and Daled-North. The mayor's indifference toward all governmental activity, including Project Renewal, partially explains this failure and contributed to the relatively active and effective role of some neighborhood residents. One such activist, Rafi Shitrit, became the deputy mayor in 1983. The Jewish communities of Argentina and Frankfurt, Germany, each sponsored a neighborhood. Later Stockholm, Sweden, joined Frankfurt in sponsoring the Daled-North neighborhood.

**Beit Shemesh** (13,600) is a small development town near Tel-Aviv in the foothills below Jerusalem. Its mayor, Yehuda Ben Zev, a member of the Likud party, failed to overcome the Ministry of Housing's refusal to expand physical renewal beyond the single neighborhood. He did succeed, however, in having the social program serve almost the entire municipality. Of all six case studies, Beit Shemesh held the sole direct election of neighborhood residents for the local renewal steering committee. The project was twinned with the Jewish community of Indianapolis, Indiana.

**Herzliya** (66,100) is a moderate-sized veteran city with a large well-to-do population located in the central coastal region north of Tel-Aviv. Its strong and activist mayor, Joseph Nevo, a member of the Labor Party, controlled the program and used it to further his own political interests. Local municipal professionals played important roles, especially in the social program. The program involved two neighborhoods—Neve Israel and Shavit—both of which were twinned with the Jewish community of Boston, Massachusetts, which provided substantial resources and political influence. In Neve Israel, a single resident, acting like an American machine boss, dominated the program. Nevo lost the 1983 mayoral race to Eli Landau of the Likud.

**Ofakim** (13,100) is a typical, small, peripheral, development town in the Negev with a mostly low-income North African Jewish population. Local political interests and politics dominate all municipal services and activities, including Project Renewal. Its National Religious Party (NRP) mayor, Avraham Revivo, a hard-working, acerbic man, shared control of the program with his coalition partners on the municipal council. Local politicians denied neighborhood residents a meaningful role in the program. Revivo lost the election in 1983 to the Labor party candidate. Project Renewal encompassed the entire municipality, although officially the physical renewal excluded two areas of the town. Ofakim had no overseas twin until 1983 when the Jewish Community of the Republic of South Africa adopted it.

**Yavneh** (17,500) located in the center of the country, underwent a transition from a typical development town to a much larger community. It became a city in 1986. Yavneh has a diverse population that includes large numbers of veteran Israelis who recently settled in new neighborhoods of single family homes. Its activist Likud mayor, Meir Shitrit, who had once been the youngest mayor in Israel, became a Knesset member in 1981.<sup>41</sup> He controlled the entire program in his city: "I am the Local Steering Committee." The physical program encompassed one neighborhood, while Project Renewal funded social programs serving the entire population. Later a second neighborhood was

added. Antwerp, Belgium, adopted the first neighborhood. Its support and cooperation with the mayor remained problematic.

The findings of this study are based on three stages of extensive, open-ended, structured interviews designed to determine the actual roles and influence of the major governmental (ministerial), municipal, neighborhood, Jewish Agency, and overseas groups and individuals taking part in the program.<sup>42</sup> The author adjusted the set of prepared questions to a persons's position and expertise in an attempt to determine "perceptions of agency operations and relationships" (Narver and Williams 1982, pp. 149-179). Stage one involved interviews with national-level elected and administrative personnel in government and Jewish Agency offices. With one exception, all persons cooperated. Stage two involved interviews in the six communities with the mayors, project directors, citizen activists, elected officials, heads of municipal agencies, regional staff of the Jewish Agency and ministries, and representatives of the overseas communities. A final stage involved follow-up interviews with key participants on local, regional and national levels of the Project Renewal program.

The turnover of elected and administrative officials during the seven year period caused some problems, although these were not insurmountable. The author was able to interview several persons who had left their positions.

Critics of the open-ended interviewing approach charge that it lacks objectivity, fosters bias and may result in "[t]he field research associate becom[ing] part of the policy process being studied" (Hall and MacManus 1982:104ff). Recognizing the problem, the author and his research staff maintained their status as outsiders. More important, interviews were supplemented with the use of written materials and secondary sources: official documents, reports, participant published reports and correspondence related to Project Renewal in the archives of the Jewish Agency and the Ministries of Interior, Labor and Social Affairs, Housing, and Treasury were reviewed. The author read and consulted with the authors of the various studies commissioned by the International Committee for the Evaluation of Project Renewal, including the two major evaluations by the Technion and the Social Research Unit of the Blaustein Institute for Desert Research at Sdeh Boker, respectively.<sup>43</sup> Analysis followed a pattern in which data collection and analysis overlapped. Many of those involved were given the opportunity to comment on the authors' earlier drafts.

Finally, the reader may ask why one should believe the findings of this book. The study presents an accurate record of the implementation experience and politics of Project Renewal. It provides the different

points of view of the various participants as well as the findings of most major research done on the program.

In contrast to many other studies of Project Renewal, the author of this work has no vested interest in the program or its sponsors. For example, Paul King, Orli Hacoheh, Hillel Frisch, and Dan Elazar, the authors of *Project Renewal in Israel: Urban Revitalization Through Partnership*, wrote their study for an organization, headed by Dan Elazar, having major evaluation contracts with the Jewish Agency for Project Renewal and other programs. The organization's well being is dependent on obtaining future agency and government contracts and consultations. Its public conference on Project Renewal in 1986, became a public relations event in praise of the Ministry of Housing and Jewish Agency, which sponsored and funded the conference. Another interesting case is Charles Hoffman's *Project Renewal: Community and Change in Israel*. The Agency's Project Renewal director at the time, Gideon Witkon, co-authored the book and much of it glorifies Agency renewal efforts and personnel.

The Technion's multivolume study (Samuel Neaman Institute 1985), on the other hand, suffers from a methodology that accepted the formal and official planning process of Project Renewal as real. Despite its valuable information about the program at all levels of government, it frequently missed the informal and unofficial workings of Project Renewal, which often presented a very different picture.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, some of its research methods are questionable. For example, its chapter on budget (Newman 1985, vol. 1, pp. 2-138) is based on counting programs and not on actual monies allocated or spent.<sup>45</sup>