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Introduction

We would never guess from reading George Herbert Mead that emotion plays a significant role in the social psychology of the person or in social life.[1] Mead effectively banished affect to the biological substratum of human consciousness, restricting its role in social psychology to the emotional overtones of impulses in the incipient stage of the act. For Mead, 'mind', and by implication, 'self' and 'society', are essentially cognitive phenomena grounded in social behavior.

Indeed, Mead and the symbolic interactionist tradition he inspired in sociological social psychology have been widely admonished for their neglect of emotion (Gerth and Mills 1964; Meltzer 1972; Collins 1986), although there have been exceptions to or qualifications of this criticism (see Baldwin 1985, Denzin 1985, 223; Scheff 1983, 334; Stryker 1981, 28; Stryker and Statham 1985, 354–5).[2] Whatever the relative merits of these divergent interpretations of Mead, a reawakened interest in emotion in the sociology of the late 1970s and early 1980s sent symbolic interactionists scrambling to pin down Mead's position on the role of emotions in social life (Denzin 1985; Franks 1985; Scheff 1985b). If a social theory of emotions could be found in Mead, symbolic interactionists could expand their theoretical scope to encompass affect without publicly renouncing his cognitivist legacy.

While the neglect of emotion is a widely acknowledged criticism of Mead, the reason why he ignored affect is not generally well known. Mead's cognitive conceptualizations of mind, self, and society grew out of his attempt to develop a social psychology that was immune to the dangers of solipsism, one that could deal with mind and consciousness without disintegrating into a theory of general psychology.[3] To realize his ambition, Mead searched for a universal, objective principle that transcends the subjectivity of individual consciousness. He found this principle in the significant symbols that constitute a society's language. Through the social psychology he established on the bedrock of language, Mead hoped to escape "the trail of the epistemological serpent" (Mead 1924–5/1964, 268) that bedeviled the attempts of his contemporaries to construct a genuine *social* psychology.[4]

What made language universal and objective for Mead is the *symmetry of response* that significant symbols allegedly evoke in people sharing the same

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language. For example, shouting "fire!" in a crowded theatre creates the behavioral disposition to flee in both the person announcing the danger and those hearing it. At the same time, significant symbols create similar objects of consciousness in symbol users and recipients. These social cognitions are the basis of human intersubjectivity.

Now, to the extent that what individuals say in social interaction is understandable to both themselves and to others, social objectivity exists. The individual transcends mere subjective experience when, through communication, he or she finds that others experience the same world (Morris 1934, xxviii–xxix). The intersubjectivity created by language makes Mead's provocative theory of mind as a social process and a product conceptually possible. It also provides a conceptual basis for the mutual orientation and coordination that is the essence of the *social act* (Mead 1934, 7n.), the unit of analysis in his social psychology.

Unfortunately, Mead viewed the intersubjectivity created by language as strictly cognitive in nature, making it difficult for later symbolic interactionists to develop a social psychology of emotions within his conceptual framework. Despite his occasional flirtation with emotions, he maintained that the natural function of language is the arousal of the same cognitions in self and others, rather than the elicitation of common affective response. While acknowledging the capacity of language to evoke emotions, he insisted that emotional communication does not necessarily evoke the symmetry of response that is the essence of cognitive communication. For example, one person's expression of anger might instigate fear, rather than anger, in another person. Therefore, to grant emotions the conceptual status of social phenomena would seriously weaken his attempt to build a social psychology upon the universal and objective foundation of language. As a result, Mead assigned affect a peripheral role in his social psychology.

Despite this shortcoming, Mead's theory that language is the basis for a social psychology of mind, self, and society remains his greatest contribution. It seems strange, then, that symbolic interactionists traditionally have paid lip service to the role of language in social psychology—exceptions to this generalization, including Denzin's (1972) study of names and pronouns in childhood socialization and his later work (1987) on semiotics and symbolic interactionism, notwithstanding. It remained for the ethnomethodologists, as Collins (1986) observes, to open up the field of sociolinguistics. However, like Mead's treatment of language, theirs has been too cognitive to be of much utility in the development of a social psychology of emotions.

Paradoxically, considering Mead's denial of the social significance of affective communication, symbolic interactionists began to appreciate the importance of language only when they seriously turned their attention to emotions in the late 1970s. Among their contributions to the social psychology of emotions, they identified the role that culturally influenced cognitive labels play in identifying present emotional experiences and evoking memories of past ones (Shott 1979). Gordon

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(1981, 583) articulated this notion at a conceptual level, pointing out that naming a sentiment "reifies [it] in the learner's understanding . . . [making] an otherwise transient impulse or gesture socially significant and memorable." However, despite the widespread recognition by interactionists and other theorists in recent years that language plays an important role in eliciting emotional experience, virtually nothing has been done to operationalize this understanding and derive its empirical consequences.

For example, symbolic interactionists have failed to generalize the affective significance of language beyond its obvious function of providing a "vocabulary of emotions" (Gordon 1981). Surely, the affective significance of language applies to all linguistic stimuli, not just those identifying and designating emotional experience. The word, "mother," for example, is not merely a kinship designation in a cognitive sense, but also, and perhaps more significantly, a social identity evoking feelings of warmth, goodness, and quiet determination. In contrast, the word, "bully," elicits feelings of negative affective tone and greater liveliness. Similarly, words designating interpersonal acts and social settings convey affective overtones. Consider the feelings generated by "assault" as compared to "hug"; "cemetery," as compared to "party." In short, the names with which we designate all kinds of social stimuli evoke affective associations such that language functions as a linguistic warehouse, so to speak, for storing affective meaning. By this account, affect is more pervasive in social life than the experience of specific emotions, and symbolic interaction involves the processing not only of cognitive information about objects and events, but also, and perhaps even more fundamentally, their affective associations.

There is, then, a need for an interactionist social psychology that deals explicitly and more extensively than in the past with the affective component of language and its role in social interaction. As Collins (1986, 1349) stated emphatically, "the time is ripening for a theoretical upheaval . . . as we have to come to grips with the grounding of language not only in cognitive aspects of social interaction but in what may turn out to be its emotional interactional substrate."

Besides failing to operationalize symbolic interactionism in terms of language, interactionists have generally ignored Mead's other great contribution to social psychology—his conceptualization of mind as a process of cybernetic feedback and control and, by implication, human behavior as "constructed in a succession of self-correcting adjustments" (Shibutani 1968, 331). For Mead, the physiological capacity for reflexiveness that "is the essential condition . . . for the development of mind" (1934, 134) means that "the thing we are going to do is playing back on what we are doing now" (1934, 71). Although the concept of cybernetic control articulated in modern systems theory (Buckley 1967, 1968) and perceptual control systems theory (Powers 1973) was clearly anticipated by Mead and by Dewey (1896), it is strangely absent in the work of symbolic interactionists who laid claim to Mead's intellectual legacy.[5]

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Moreover, the concept of control has found no place at all in interactionist treatments of emotion (cf. Heise 1979, 36–7). Instead, interactionists have generally dealt with emotions as dependent variables—culturally influenced cognitive constructions and expressions of ephemeral affective states—and have paid notably less attention to the consequences of emotions in social life (cf. Stryker 1987). This one-sided emphasis on the "primacy of cognition" in emotional experience is simply not conducive to cybernetic thinking (Scheff 1985a).

What is needed, therefore, along with a greater application of Mead's emphasis on language, is an interactionist social psychology that incorporates and operationalizes his conceptualization of mind as a process of cybernetic feedback and control and behavior as an anticipatory, self-adjustive process.

These preliminary considerations bring us to the theory that is the focus of this book.

Affect Control Theory

Affect control theory (Heise 1979; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) proposes that people construct social events to confirm the affective meaning of their situated identities and those of other actors; and when events occur that strain these sentiments, people initiate restorative actions and cognitive revisions to bring affectively disturbing events back into line with established sentiments. The formalization of the theory comprises a set of elegant mathematical models representing the interpretation and construction of social action (Heise 1979, 1988, 1992), along with a powerful interactive microcomputer program, INTERACT, for simulating these processes (Heise 1978; Heise and Lewis 1988a).

Although a contribution to the social psychology of emotions, per se, was not anticipated in the early statements of the theory (Heise 1978, 1979), it soon became evident that affect control theory could make substantial contributions to this emerging field. This was quickly verified through the collection of data on the affective meaning of emotion terms and the refinement and expansion of the original theory to accommodate emotions (Averett 1981; Averett and Heise 1988; Smith-Lovin 1990). More recently, the theory has brought under its purview the external expression of emotion and its role in the dynamics of labeling and attribution processes (Heise 1989a).

Much effort has been expended in the last decade on the theoretical development and empirical refinement of affect control theory and identifying its connections with other theories in social psychology (Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988). Nonetheless, the theory has yet to be formally codified in deductive form, nor have its linkages with other social psychological theories been systematically detailed and brought together in a single publication. Moreover, the metatheoretical assumptions of the theory have never been carefully examined.

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This book is devoted to a formal exposition of affect control theory, an examination of its fundamental assumptions, and a systematic comparison of the theory with other theories in social psychology. In particular, this book, as its title suggests, focuses on the symbolic interactionist tradition in sociological social psychology inspired by the seminal work of George Herbert Mead (1934). While the affinity of affect control theory with symbolic interactionism has been acknowledged (Heise 1979; Stryker 1981, n.49; Stryker and Statham 1985, 356–7), the structural resemblance of the two theories has never been closely examined, nor has the relation of affect control theory to Mead's original social psychology been explored.

In this regard, affect control theory addresses the shortcomings of Mead and symbolic interactionism identified in the introduction to this chapter. While much of this book is devoted to evidencing this claim, an anticipatory sketch is in order here. First, congruent with Mead's emphasis on language as the basis for a social psychology that is irreducible to principles of general psychology, affect control theory conceptualizes and operationalizes social interaction in terms of its symbolic representation in language—the semantics of interactional components, such as identities and interpersonal acts, and their combination in syntactically ordered events. At the same time, by rejecting Mead's rather gratuitous assumptions about the affective significance of language, affect control theory expands the scope of his theory so that it can serve as the basis for a social psychology of emotion. Specifically, affect control theory embraces Mead's premise that language creates shared objects of consciousness, but supposes, in turn, that all social cognitions evoke affective associations. It is at the level of the affective associations evoked by cognitions that affect control theory is formulated.

Second, in contrast to the efforts of symbolic interactionists in the last fifteen years to extend Mead's social psychology beyond cognition, affect control theory does not consider affect to be coextensive with those specific, intense, and ephemeral affective states we call *emotions*. Instead, it views affect as a more general and pervasive component of human consciousness that subsumes the emotions as a special case.

Third, because the principle of control is a defining feature of the theory, affect control theory maintains Mead's model of mind as a socially engendered, internal linguistic process of cybernetic feedback and control, and his conceptualization of social interaction as a process of mutually adjusted response. However, the theory applies the principle of control to affective, rather than cognitive, processing.

Because affect control theory is framed and operationalized in terms of language and linguistic theory, it is essential that I state in the first chapter of this book what the theory assumes about language and what it does not.[6] A discussion of two closely interrelated points should accomplish this. The first concerns nonverbal

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and other kinds of language systems; the second, the relation between language and culture.

Language systems are, of course, not all verbal in form. Human language, broadly conceived, also includes such nonverbal forms as intonation or inflection, tone, and volume of speech; gestures; and body language.

> A social world in which people communicate with one another only through language would be colorless and flat—like a place where people could exchange only typed messages with others they could not see. It is what we "say" to one another by physical appearance, expressions, gestures, tone of voice, and the way we arrange ourselves in space that add rich dimensions to human social life. We not only send "linguistic [verbal] messages" to one another but we also exchange information about our internal states (what "mood" we are in), about our relationships to one another (are we hostile or friendly?), and about the way our linguistic messages or acts are to be interpreted (are we joking, serious, playing, or fighting?). Such nonlinguistic communication is the very fabric of social life. (Keesing 1976, 166).

Nonverbal communication systems not only augment and complement verbal linguistic ones, they may parallel them (Hall 1966). Because they have their own grammars, syntaxes, and other rules of meaning and organization, they may even equate to verbal language systems, as might be the case with verdant grammars of social behavior (Gregory 1985). However, compared to verbal linguistic systems, we know relatively little about the structure of such systems. Bateson's (1972) analysis suggests that our relative lack of knowledge about nonverbal language may stem from the fact that what it codes and communicates—the operations ("algorithms") and subject matter (relationships between self and others and between self and environment)—lie in the realm of the unconscious, inaccessible and defying description in verbal terms: "It is not only that the conscious mind has poor access to this material, but also the fact that when such access is achieved, e.g., in dreams, art, poetry . . . and the like, there is still a formidable problem of translation" (1972, 139).

While formalized in verbal linguistic terms, it must be emphasized that affect control theory recognizes the importance of nonverbal forms of communication in social interaction. The theory employs verbal language because it shares with Mead the assumption that it is the primary symbolic system through which social cognitions are represented, accessed, processed, and communicated (see Proposition 2, next chapter); because verbal linguistic systems have been well investigated; and because verbal language is amenable to quantitative, attitudinal measurement on universal dimensions of response employing the semantic differential (see Proposition 4, next chapter). At the same time, there is nothing inherent in the theory that would proscribe the application of affect control principles

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to other kinds of symbolic systems, or to attitudinal data collected with nonverbal instruments such as the *projective differential scale,* a nonverbal projective imaging measure paralleling and revealing at least the evaluation and potency dimensions of the semantic differential (see Raynolds, Sakamoto, and Raynolds 1986).

In fact, affect control theory invokes the operation of nonverbal forms of communication in its modeling of reidentification processes, where it presumes that the external expression of emotion influences the labeling and trait attribution of social interactants (see Propositions 20 and 24 next chapter). Finally, if the semantic differential captures the affective overtones of cognitions, as Osgood (1969) contends, semantic differential responses to verbal stimuli may reflect the relationships of "the heart or . . . unconscious" (Bateson 1972, 139) coded in nonverbal linguistic systems (primary process in Freudian terms). Indeed, the predictive power of affect control theory may very well stem from this possible connection between verbal and nonverbal linguistic systems.

The classic statement of the influence of language upon culture can be found in what has become known as the "Whorfian" or "Sapir-Whorfian hypothesis"—essentially, the idea that through language, people break up their culture for purposes of communication. Words are categories of reality, and their grammatical organization, an organization of reality. By implication, "language is not merely part of the culture, but . . . also a reflection of the total culture . . . a reflection, more importantly perhaps, of the organization of that total culture" (Bohannan 1963, 42).

Widely misunderstood and misapplied, the Safir-Whorfian hypothesis is best understood as an expression and partial explanation of cultural uniqueness and diversity. Transformational linguistics and the search for linguistic and cultural universals has for some time rendered the Sapir-Whorfian hypothesis outdated and intellectually unfashionable (see Keesing 1976, 159–163).

In any case, affect control theorists, like anthropologists and sociologists concerned with culture, recognize that language and culture are not coextensive. That is, while language is part of culture, and while the principles of organization underlying language may parallel the principles of organization found in culture, language is not equal to culture by any stretch of the imagination. Therefore, while affect control theory purports to deal with culture, it makes no pretense that it is definitive of culture. The theory measures and models the influence upon psychological processing and social interaction of cultural sentiments embedded in language—no more, no less.

Plan of this Book

The rest of this chapter reviews the rediscovery of emotion by psychologists and sociologists in the late 1970s and argues that if the study of emotion is to develop into a unified field of inquiry, social psychology must adopt a conceptual

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framework that transcends the parochialism of its parent disciplines. These discussions provide a context for evaluating the contributions of affect control theory to an integrative social psychology and to the social psychology of emotion.

The next two chapters are devoted exclusively to affect control theory. Chapter 2 presents a concise propositional statement of the theory, from its metatheoretical assumptions about language, cognition, and affect to the basic premises of affect control theory proper and their application to event recognition, event construction, emotions, and reidentification processes. Chapter 3 expounds the fundamental assumptions the theory makes about cognition, affect, and human motivation. A discussion of the primacy of cognition versus affect debate in psychological social psychology provides the context for discussing the relation between cognition and affect as viewed by affect control theory. A discussion of human motivation, from instinct to incentive theories, sets the stage for introducing the affect control theory of motivation based upon language, identification, and control.

Revisiting the thesis with which this introductory chapter began, Chapter 4 details how Mead's social behavioristic theory of language, the foundation upon which he built his social psychology, led him to conceptualize 'mind,' 'self,' and 'society' as exclusively cognitive phenomena. Drawing a point by point comparison with Mead, this chapter shows how affect control theory retains the essential features of his social psychology, while vitalizing its affectively and motivationally lifeless constructs.

Chapters 5 and 6 apply affect control theory to the analysis of social interaction. Chapter 5 establishes the affinity of affect control theory with identity theory, an application of the general symbolic interactionist framework to role analysis (McCall and Simmons 1966/1978; Stryker 1968, 1980, 1981). The chapter includes detailed comparisons between affect control theory and Burke's model of role-identity processes (Burke 1980; Burke and Tully 1977) and situated identity theory (Alexander and Wiley 1981).

Against this theoretical background, Chapter 6 presents affect control theory simulations of social interaction in both institutionalized and novel settings, the respective foci of the *structure* and *process* schools of symbolic interactionism which grew out of one-sided exaggerations of Mead's ideas (Meltzer and Petras 1972). The chapter concludes with a discussion of how roles are learned and later accessed in memory, comparing the account of these processes provided by affect control theory to the social learning model of Heiss (1981) and the associative addressing model of Wallace (1983).

Chapter 7 presents the affect control theory of emotions. The chapter begins with a discussion of the positivist versus constructionist debate in the social psychology of emotions. Following the introduction of the emotions model of the theory, simulations illustrate the manifold ways in which emotions function in social interaction. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how affect control the-

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ory helps to reconcile the positivist and constructionist positions by integrating important features from both sides of this conceptual and theoretical divide.

Chapter 8 addresses the reidentification processes set in motion when events fail to confirm the situated identities of interactants. Part I of this chapter opens with a discussion of the synthesis of attribution theory and symbolic interactionism achieved by Stryker and Gottlieb (1981) that makes it conceptually possible for affect control theory to incorporate both trait attribution and labeling processes within a single reidentification model. The established reidentification model of the theory is described and illustrated with simulations of labeling and attribution processes. Part I concludes by showing how affect control theory contributes to the further integration of attribution theory and symbolic interactionism. Part II deals with the revised reidentification model which, by incorporating the effect of emotion displays upon reidentification outcomes, connects attribution and labeling theory with the social psychology of emotions. The revised model is described and illustrated with a systematic analysis.

The final chapter of this book discusses connections between affect control theory and social psychological theories that lie outside the symbolic interactionist tradition. It evaluates the theory as sociological explanation and as integrative social psychology, and presents a critical assessment of the theory, along with a prospectus for future research and application.

The examples of affect control theory predictions that appear in this book are based on models and cultural data from a large–scale Canadian replication (MacKinnon 1985, 1988) of the U.S. study conducted by Heise and associates (Smith–Lovin and Heise 1988). In this regard, cross–cultural comparisons are drawn in a number of places throughout the book.

The Rediscovery of Affect

Affect registers our reactions to objects and events around us and our successes and failures in dealing with them; it accompanies our anticipation of future events and our memory of past ones; and it marks the establishment and dissolution of our most intimate and intense social relationships. Affect is the dynamic principle of human motivation, mobilizing action in the search for functional or gratifying experiences and the avoidance of dysfunctional or displeasing ones. Affect is also an important basis of human intersubjectivity: people infer how others are thinking and feeling by observing their emotional reactions to events, and control the revelation of their own thoughts and feelings by monitoring their external expression.

In view of the potency and pervasiveness of affect in everyday psychological experience and social life, why have psychologists and sociologists neglected its study for almost fifty years? There had been a serious concern with emotion around the turn of the century in the theoretical work of psychologists like James

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(1890), Dewey (1894, 1895), and McDougall (1908), and sociologists like Cooley (1902/1956 and Durkheim (1912/1954). There was significant empirical work as well, which reached its peak around 1930 (Scheff 1984a). During the next four or five decades, however, the study of affect fell into a state of somnolence, interrupted only occasionally by isolated attempts to reawaken interest in the area (Gerth and Mills 1964; Tomkins 1962; Shibutani 1961).

The moribund state into which the study of emotion slipped during this period was part of a more general neglect of the subjective life of the person by psychologists and sociologists alike. In psychology, the study of both cognition and emotion was eclipsed by behaviorism. Adopting the "from Missouri" attitude of a misplaced emphasis on observable data, the study of the subjective component of human behavior was sacrificed upon the alter of a supposed objective science. In sociology, the paradigmatic hegemony of functionalism and other macro sociological theories from the late 1940s to the early 1960s neglected the construct of the individual person in favor of more abstract concepts like 'role', 'status', and 'social system' (Dahrendorf 1958; Freidrichs 1970; Lockwood, 1956; Wrong 1961). When the individual was finally brought back into the picture, sociologists turned in large numbers to theories that imported the behavioristic perspective from psychology—*exchange theory* (Homans 1958, 1961, 1964) and *social behaviorism* (Burgess and Bushell 1969). The impact of behaviorism upon sociological social psychology was so extensive, in fact, that Friedrichs (1974) contemplated whether eventually it would become the prevailing paradigm in sociology.

The rehabilitation of the subjective as a proper object of scientific inquiry occurred in psychology through cognitive, rather than affective, theory and research. Cognition might have been considered a more scientifically respectable topic of research than affect, which often is conceptualized as a departure from rationality, as in psychodynamic personality theory and neoclassical economics (Etzioni 1988). As the respectability of the subjective became firmly reestablished with the ascendancy of the cognitive paradigm in the psychology of the 1970s (Roseman 1984; Shaver 1984), the intellectual climate was ripe for the rediscovery of emotion. If the 1970s belonged to cognition, it was clear by the early 1980s that "the next decade or so belongs to affect" (Tomkins 1981, 314). By the mid-1980s, the subsequent explosion in theory and research was such that the editor of an entire volume of the 1984 *Review of Personality and Social Psychology* devoted to emotions could boast that "emotion is back, and with a vengeance" (Shaver 1984, 7).

In sociology, an interest in the subjective experience of the individual was kept alive during the heyday of macro theory, and against the later threat of behaviorism, by interpretive sociologies like action theory, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and phenomenological sociology. These micro theories share an emphasis on cognition and a concomitant neglect of affect. Eventually, however, a growing dissatisfaction with these cognitively biased theories set the stage

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for the rediscovery of emotion in sociology (Collins 1986). At the same time, the handful of sociologists who had become interested in emotion discovered a niche that could accommodate their efforts. This was made available by the failure of psychologists to seriously attend to the role of social interaction in the production of emotions. Capitalizing upon this neglect, Kemper's groundbreaking book, *A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions,* began with the observation that "there are many theories of emotion, but none is sociological . . . an effort to explain emotions as a product of social interaction is long overdue" (1978, 1).

Kemper's book was followed in short order by a striking number of sociological contributions to the study of emotion. Shott (1979) laid the groundwork for a symbolic interactionist theory of emotion by extending Mead's conceptualization of cognitive role-taking to "empathic role-taking," and by showing how emotions enter into socialization and social control processes. Hochschild (1975, 1979, 1983) analyzed the "emotion work" people engage in because of cultural norms ("feeling rules") governing emotions and their expression. Collins (1975, 1981) showed how Durkheimian social solidarity is built up from the everyday, shared affective experiences he terms "interactional ritual chains." Scheff (1979, 1984b) developed a theory of "emotional catharsis" based upon psychoanalytic theory. And, Denzin (1980, 1984, 1985), combining elements of symbolic interactionism and phenomenological thought, proposed a theory of emotions as "lived experiences" that has the self as referent and that locates people in the world of social interaction. Closer to home, Heise (1978) published a modest introduction to affect control theory, followed by a major theoretical statement in 1979. While these works were not all inspired by the same theoretical traditions, they had in common an emphasis on social interaction as the wellspring of emotion.

By the early 1980s, interest and output by sociologists had developed to the point that comprehensive review articles were required to take account of the progress to date, to assess the degree to which the extant sociological literature contained latent or inchoate theories of emotion, and to delineate the issues and controversies that had already begun to crystallize in the field (Gordon 1981; Scheff 1983). By the middle of the decade, Collins (1986) was able to describe the study of emotions as one of the most important developments in the sociology of the 1980s. And, by the end of the decade, a separate section on emotions had been firmly established in the American Sociological Association.

However, the study of emotion in psychology and in sociology grew side by side in the late 1970s and early 1980s with minimum communication and exchange of theoretical orientations and research accomplishments. Their independent development reflected differences in their substantive concerns—one dealing with emotion in terms of its relation to cognition, motivation, and individual behavior; the other, in terms of its relation to social structure, culture, and social interaction.

This divergence has proved unfortunate because the issues considered important by each discipline have not been of exclusive interest and relevance. For

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example, constructionist theories in sociology stress the role of cognitive interpretation in emotional experience, albeit they have done little with this idea; and cognitive theories in psychology emphasize the importance of the situation of social interaction, although they did not move beyond exhortation until the mid-1980s (de Rivera 1984; Kelley 1984). For these reasons, I have reviewed the study of emotion in psychology and sociology as separate developments, categorizing works as falling in one area or the other solely on the basis of the discipline affiliation of their authors.

However, there has been a growing convergence of interest and orientation in recent years, enhanced by the publication of sociologists' work in psychology journals and handbooks and of psychologists' writings in sociology outlets. As might be expected, this has taken place largely in the area of social psychology.

The Social Psychology of Emotion

Like the study of emotions itself, social psychology developed independently in psychology and sociology (House 1977; Stryker 1977; Rosenberg and Turner 1981; Jackson 1988). Psychological social psychologists have been more likely to study the effects of experimentally manipulated social factors on individual attitudes and behavior; sociological social psychologists, the effects of naturally occurring patterns of social and cultural structure on social attitudes and interaction. The psychological approach has paid much greater attention to the study of *intra*individual processes, like cognition and motivation, than to the social factors presumed to affect them. The sociological approach has attended to *inter*individual processes like social interaction, the establishment of intersubjective beliefs and attitudes, and the situation of social interaction within which these processes occur.

In a classic definition, Gordon Allport (1968) defined social psychology as "an attempt to understand and explain how the thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others." Allport's definition of social psychology is one-sided, however, because it ignores the reciprocal effects of individual personality and behavior on social and cultural structure. Moreover, because it fails to acknowledge the inherently social nature of individual personality, it renders social psychology a simple extension of general psychology. Despite these shortcomings, Allport's definition identified a promising point of rapprochement between the two social psychologies—the effect of the situation of social interaction on the individual's thoughts, feelings, and behavior.

Employing this theoretical commonality as a criterion, the study of emotion in psychology until recently has not constituted a social psychology of emotions at all. In fact, from the turn of the century to the 1980s, the psychology of emotion had largely employed a physiological perspective (see Kemper 1978; Roseman 1984). This includes the classic work of James (1884, 1890), Lange (1885), and Cannon (1929), as well as more recent efforts that continue to emphasize the phys-

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iological determinants and concomitants of emotional experience. The role of cognition in emotional experience was not introduced into the picture until the 1960s (Arnold 1960; Schachter and Singer 1962; Schacter 1964), and the role of interpersonal relations much later still (de Rivera 1984; Kelley 1984). Yet, the growing interest in the 1980s in "close relationships, the crucible in which powerful emotions are formed" led Shaver to "wager . . . that the emerging psychology of emotion will necessarily be a *social* psychology" (1984, 7, 10).

In contrast to its treatment in psychology, the study of emotion in sociology has been a social psychology from the outset. For example, Kemper based his pioneering analysis on the premise that "most human emotions result from outcomes of interaction in social relationships" (1978, vii). And, as observed above, symbolic interactionists and those of other theoretical persuasions who contributed to the development of a sociology of emotions share an emphasis on the dynamics of social interaction as the genesis of emotions.

However, if social psychology is to serve as the arena for the study of emotion as a unified field of inquiry, the intersection between its psychological and sociological variants must become much more expansive and profound than a common concern with social interaction. While building upon this point of consensus, the field must develop an autonomous and distinctive conceptual framework that transcends the restrictions of its parent disciplines. A recent historical analysis of social psychology by Jackson (1988) suggests that, indeed, this has been gradually taking place.

According to Jackson, a unified conceptual framework became more or less crystallized in the social psychology of the 1980s, promising to integrate the field not only across disciplines, but within psychology itself where the history of social psychology has been a particularly stormy one. The new "integrative orientation" delineated by Jackson comprises the following components: (1) a movement towards employing the social act rather than the individual as the unit of analysis;[7] (2) a growing appreciation of the person as an active, reflexive, and social organism; (3) an expanding psychological modality that includes cognition, emotion, motivation, and behavior as inextricably interrelated components; (4) the conceptualization of self as a process of constructing and confirming situated identities in social acts, a mutual process of self-presentation and impression management; (5) a conceptualization of reference processes as interactive (reciprocal), reflexive (involving internal as well as external significant others), and situated (situationally specific to social acts); (6) a conceptualization of normative processes as an attempt by participants in a social act "to coordinate action by taking each others' meanings into account in constructing their behavior" (1988, 125); and (7) a conceptualization of social behavior as occurring within unitary bounded periods of time, beginning with the construction of situated identities for mutual acceptance and confirmation and terminating with a discontinuity of the social process, often accompanied by a change in spatial location. An important metatheoretical impli-

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cation of this integrative orientation, meaning thus becomes a social construction, rather than the personal cognitive property of individual actors.

A social psychology embracing this integrative orientation will attend to both the intraindividual and interindividual aspects of emotional experience. The sociologically trained social psychologist will not hesitate to trespass upon the territory preempted by psychologists, nor will the psychologically trained researcher balk at violating the turf previously staked out by sociologists. An integrated social psychology of emotion will approach affect as inextricably bound up with the cognitive, motivational, and behavioral components of the psychological modality of the person. It will deal with emotions as outcomes of social acts that have implications for the situated identities of participants, as governed by socially situated reference and normative processes, and as sustaining the social life of the person and the group. To a large extent, the production of such a social psychology is the aspiration of this book.

I will revisit this integrative orientation in the final chapter of this book, where I assess affect control theory in terms of its potential contributions to an integrated social psychology and to the study of emotion as a unified field of inquiry.

Summary

I began the *tour d'horizon* of this book by discussing the reason for Mead's reluctance to grant emotion an important role in his social psychology. I then argued that symbolic interactionism must pay greater attention to Mead's emphasis on language and control, while extending his cognitive social psychology to include the affective life of the person. Following a concise summary of the rediscovery of affect in the psychology and sociology of the late 1970s and early 1980s, I suggested that the social psychology of emotion as a unified field of inquiry is predicated upon the development of an integrated social psychology, one that rises above the conceptual limitations of its parent disciplines. In this regard, I introduced a recently proposed integrative orientation in social psychology and briefly considered its implications for the social psychology of emotion.

The following two chapters introduce affect control theory and examine its assumptions about cognition, affect, and human motivation.

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