CONTEXT AND CONCEPTS

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Seminar XI, which you are studying this year, was the first of Lacan's seminars I participated in and the first I edited. Lacan arrived on the fifteenth of January 1964, at the École normale supérieure, in what was called the Salle Dussane, the theater of the École normale named after a famous French actress of the Comédie française, and said "Ladies and gentlemen, in this series of lectures, which I have been invited to give by the École Pratique des Hautes Études, I shall be talking to you about the fundamentals of psychoanalysis."

It was the very first time I saw him and heard him speak. When he finished his lecture that day he asked the students of the École normale to come and introduce themselves to him. I went with my friends, and he asked our names. He then asked us to write them down with our addresses, and we shook hands. If I remember correctly, I asked him a question about an error in one of his schemas that had been reproduced in a psychology journal, and he responded affirmatively. Two or three times during that year, between January and June 1964, he met with three or four of us privately at the École normale for small question and answer sessions. For instance, when he says on page 149 at the end of chapter 12 in Seminar XI, "Last time, I ended with a formulation which, I later realized, was well received," he was alluding to one of those private meetings where we questioned him about his formulation, "transference is the enactment of the reality of the unconscious."

Ten years later I edited Seminar XI. I did not do it for the public. I really did it for him in response to a challenge. Please excuse me for remi-
niscing. Many of Lacan’s students had asked him if they could edit his seminars by the time I started in 1973, but they always tried to rearrange the stenography or intertwine what he said with their own considerations, and he was never really satisfied. He was always grumbling that it would not do, even when he allowed a few summaries to appear here and there. He had just rejected the complete manuscript of one of his seminars, edited by a former student at the École normale (who had spent a year working on it) when I said to him that it ought to be done step by step. It ought, I said, to be done sentence by sentence, every lecture constituting a chapter, nothing being left out or moved around. Today this seems quite natural, but at the time it had not yet occurred to people that everything Lacan said was worth writing down and studying.

When I said that it ought to be done that way, he gazed at me. You have all, I imagine, read something about the gaze. He gazed at me, which had some weight, and all he said was, “prove it.” Before he said “prove it,” I had no idea that I wanted to do it myself. I discovered it at that very moment. “Prove it” is the formulation of a challenge. I believe he recognized that desire in me, and at the same time, proving it was an invitation to prove myself. Furthermore, he was astute enough to say it in the language of logic, for it was a challenge formulated in that language. Thus he recognized my logical side as well. He took me at my word and asked for a commitment: “don’t just say it, do it.” As a matter of fact, I could prove it only by doing it.

It was also a matter of proving that I could satisfy him, who was so well known for being unsatisfied. I jumped at the challenge, not knowing that I was thereby deciding, as it were, my fate. Not knowing what I was saying, I claimed that it would be finished in one month. I worked night and day for a month and finished in time. I gave him the first draft of twenty chapters from the seminar, which I had converted from the stenography. He read it and was satisfied. Shortly afterwards I began to revise the draft, discussing a few points with him before completing it. He eventually offered to let me do the whole series of his seminars, which I had no idea I wanted to do. As you know, I’m still not through with it, and I am sometimes reproached for not doing it quickly enough.

Again and again, I come back to this seminar, which in some ways is particularly dear to me, but in other ways is not because the commitment I made at that time still weighs upon me. Be that as it may, I come back to this seminar frequently. It was not until the course I gave in 1981–1982, many years after having attended and rewritten Seminar XI, that I was satisfied with my understanding of alienation and separation, which you find in chapters 16 and 17 entitled “The Subject and the Other.” And it was not until my course in 1982–1983 that I was satisfied that I had grasped the
chapters on the drive. In my course, "From the Symptom to Fantasy and Back Again," I tried to reconstruct various parts of Seminar XI. Every year, at one moment or another, I would look at the seminar from a new perspective. I attended it as a student, edited it as a professor, and commented on it publicly as a psychoanalyst. Thus it has been with me during various periods of my life.

This past year I spoke about it in my course, emphasizing the sense in which it is a debate with Freud. Even more than that, a quarrel with Freud is secretly going on in the text. I believe I grasped this aspect better now because we have been having some institutional problems in the École de la Cause freudienne lately; these circumstances have made me see just how embattled Lacan was in 1964 when he gave this seminar. It is not just the seminar of a thinker—Lacan was also a fighting man at the time. He was trying to prove himself, and we see this at the very beginning when he asks, "Am I qualified to [give this seminar]?” He expands on his qualifications, mentioning his having given his seminars for ten years, but then goes on to say, "I consider the problem deferred for the time being."

It is the seminar of someone beginning anew. There is a cut between his ten previous seminars and this one. The ten previous seminars had been given in Sainte-Anne Hospital in a lecture hall that held fifty and later one hundred people. For Seminar XI, he left the psychiatric hospital for a lecture hall at the École normale, 45 rue d’Ulm, right near the Pantheon. His lecture hall there opened directly onto the street, and, whereas for the ten previous years one had to register to get into the psychiatric hospital, with this seminar things were quite different. Anyone from the Latin Quarter could come inside and listen. It was not just fifty or one hundred selected people; the numbers grew to three hundred. Some years later, at the Faculté de Droit near the Pantheon, six hundred people came to listen to him lecture.

But it was not just a matter of changing places; it was also a matter of changing audiences. The previous seminars were given to an audience of clinicians, while this seminar was the first to address the general public—not only clinicians but students, professors, and others in the humanities. There was a specific audience as well: the students of the École normale. When Lacan began by asking whether or not psychoanalysis is a science, he was clearly addressing a few of us who were, at that time, students of Althusser’s. Althusser had suggested that Lacan come to the École normale and they had had some discussions. Lacan was always very attentive to those in his audience who spoke, and thus he did, at least in the beginning, try to relate to us.

The seminar for that year, was announced as “The Names-of-the-Father,” but apart from the first lecture, Lacan decided not to give that
seminar because of institutional problems in the analytic group he was part of at that time. A split had occurred, and under pressure from the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA), some of his old companions decided to forbid him from being a training analyst. I will not mention them. I believe they are all forgotten or unknown. In any case, he decided to cancel his seminar and never give one on the same exact subject again. In the following years he reiterated again and again that he had not given his seminar on the names-of-the-father, and would never give it, because he believed people were not prepared to hear what he had to say, or perhaps because nobody deserved to attend such a seminar. At the beginning of my course in November I proposed, however, that he gave the seminar in a disguised way, and that instead of the names-of-the-father, we have Freud's fundamental concepts. Secretly it was delivered.

Lacan founded his own school in 1964. Previously he had just wanted to be readmitted into the IPA. Let me remind you that Lacan was not thrown out of the IPA. In 1953, he decided with some colleagues to leave the French institute, the Société psychanalytique de Paris, because it was moving in an authoritarian direction he could not accept. They left the French institute and asked that their new group be accredited by the IPA. A similar situation arose in New York, for example, when, following a split, a second group was recognized by the IPA and later even a third one. In many cities in the United States there are two different institutes, both of which are recognized by the IPA. But in 1963, Marie Bonaparte, who was on the central committee and friendly with Anna Freud, Hartmann, and the others, convinced them to send a letter to Lacan saying that they were awfully sorry, but since Lacan had left the French institute, he was no longer a member of the IPA. Lacan and his colleagues were very surprised by this answer. I found this letter in Lacan's archives and published a photo of it. It was signed by Ruth Eissler, the wife of Kurt Eissler, who determined a lot in the history of psychoanalysis. But for ten years after 1953, Lacan and his friends tried to prove that they were worthy of being asked back into the fold. In 1963 they received a definite "no" from the IPA and split from the group. At that point, Lacan, who had never wanted to create his own school, did so, and he called it the École freudienne (Freudian School) to prove he was not a dissident. Despite not being accepted back into the IPA, he had no intention of following Jung's or Adler's path, and remained faithful to Freud. Lacan's École freudienne was founded on the 21st of June, which falls textually between chapters 19 and 20 of Seminar XI.

So that was the context of Lacan's institutional battle. Lacan is very discreet about it in his lectures. It is only in the first chapter that we are given a context for the dispute; in it he asks a fundamental question concerning Freud's responsibility for what had occurred in the IPA. The latter
was created by Freud, and Lacan's opinion is that Freud wanted the IPA as it is today, that Freud himself wanted an institution to preserve his work faithfully, to preserve the letter of his work, even at the risk of condemning analytic experience to a standstill. We have no proof that Sigmund Freud was betrayed by the IPA. We know, for instance, that he desperately tried to have his American students accept non-medical doctors as analysts, and he discussed this in "The Question of Lay Analysis." Freud's correspondence attests to his desperation at having been foiled by his American students who were prepared to split with him rather than accept lay analysts. In that sense we may say that Freud was betrayed and that he gave up because he had no power. Or that he had to choose between what he wanted, i.e. the truth of analytic experience, and the worldwide spread of psychoanalysis. He chose worldwide spread over truth. As he wrote to one of the faithful, "I would rather have an international movement because we may be forced into exile." He had astonishing foresight.

Thus Lacan does not follow the usual approach of saying that Freud was betrayed by the IPA. He says, on the contrary, that the IPA corresponds to something in Freud: a preference for what Lacan calls a formal preservation of his message, rather than the living spirit of psychoanalysis. What is thrown into question in this seminar is the way in which Freud himself organized the cult of the dead father. For instance, when Lacan explains that Freud was oriented in the discovery of the field of the unconscious by his self-analysis, he asks, "And what is his self-analysis, if not the brilliant mapping of the law of desire hanging on the Name-of-the-Father?" (48) This sentence stresses a link between Freud's self-analysis and the Oedipus complex, which is the relationship between the law of desire and the Name-of-the-Father. Do not think that in saying this, Lacan is saying that's all there is to it. He stresses this point in the seminar precisely because he's trying to go beyond the link between the law of desire and the Name-of-the-Father. He stresses the fact that the result of Freud's self-analysis is a limitation in Freud's perspective. Lacan throws the Name-of-the-Father into question, and this questioning of Freud is presented as, "I'm going to talk about the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis."

He announced the title of the seminar as The Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis (you'll find this in the first pages). But, as he immediately presented the four concepts, we in the audience used to refer to the seminar as The Four Fundamental Concepts. Later Lacan accepted this title from his audience.

The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis appears to be a tribute to Freud, since the four concepts are taken directly from his work. Just as Lacan at that time calls his institute the "Freudian School," in his seminar he uses the term "Freudian concepts" just to prove that he is not a
dissident. But within this "tribute" he tries to go beyond Freud. Not a beyond Freud which leaves Freud behind; it is a beyond Freud which is nevertheless in Freud. Lacan is looking for something in Freud's work of which Freud himself was unaware. Something which we may call "estimate," as it is so very intimate that Freud himself was not aware of it. So very intimate that this intimacy is estimate. It is an internal beyond.

Here and there in the text you find elements of a reanalysis of Freud, a questioning of the limitations of Freud's self-analysis. In doing this, Lacan tries to understand his own position as an outcast in the international psychoanalytic movement. He is not fighting in his own name alone, because he believes that his rejection by the IPA is part of something larger. He says, "I am referring to something that I can only call the refusal of the concept." (18) Refusal is perhaps not the best translation. In French it's *le refus du concept* (perhaps "rejection" of the concept is better than "refusal"). It means something along the lines of putting something outside, like repression. He identifies what he presents in the first chapter as an excommunication, and theorizes it as a rejection of the concept. That's why he stresses the Freudian concepts, but at the same time here and there we can hear something other than a celebration of the Freudian concepts. For instance, in the first chapter, when he asks those seemingly rhetorical questions, we may hear something else. "What are the formulations in psychoanalysis concerned with? What motivates and modulates this 'sliding away' (*glissement*) of the object? Are there psychoanalytic concepts that we are now in possession of? How are we to understand the almost religious maintenance of the terms proposed by Freud to structure analytic experience? Was Freud really the first, and did he really remain the only theoretician of this supposed science to have introduced fundamental concepts? Were this so, it would be very unusual in the history of the sciences." (10)

Lacan raises epistemological questions about psychoanalytic concepts, but in doing so he is really asking whether Freud's concepts are to remain the only worthwhile ones in psychoanalysis. It is clear—as is true in the case of Lacan's "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter'"—that in giving a seminar on the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis he is introducing other concepts which, strictly speaking, are not found in Freud's work, and which Lacan considers his own. Whereas, during the first ten years of his seminar Lacan always took up a text of Freud's (the first year it was Freud's technical writings, the third year it was the Schreber case, in *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* it was *Civilization and its Discontents*), this time he does not do so. He takes on Freud as such, and in the following years of his seminar he never again takes up a text of Freud's in the same way. Here and there he discusses a text, but he does not build his whole seminar around one of Freud's articles or books. Instead, every year he builds on one of his own schemas or concepts.
Within these epistemological questions and this celebration of Freud, we thus see not a debasement of Freud, but what might be called a substitution. A kind of rewriting of Freud, a version of Freud that Lacan adopts; but this is done secretly, or at least discreetly, because at the same time he has to prove himself to be Freud’s true heir. This might be referred to as the strategy of the seminar.

In some sense I knew this from the outset. But I was only really able to formulate it clearly this year.

In the limited time we have left, let us consider the four fundamental concepts. First, the unconscious. This Freudian concept has been completely neglected by ego-psychologists to the extent that, to them, the unconscious is not even a fundamental concept. They do not know what to do with the unconscious because they consider Freud’s first topography—unconscious, preconscious, and conscious—to have been completely superseded by the second topography—ego, superego, and id. Hence they discard the first topography altogether.

Lacan revitalizes the Freudian concept of the unconscious, introducing thereby the concept of the subject. Indeed, he introduces the unconscious as a subject, for the subject is not a Freudian concept even if, when Freud says Ich, he is sometimes referring to the subject. When Freud says das Ich, he is often referring to the ego. The subject is a Lacanian concept, a reordering of Freud’s work.

When Lacan takes up the second fundamental concept, repetition, he introduces the connection between $S_1$ and $S_2$, which is the articulation of things. When he presents transference, it is through a combination of the first and second—subject and knowledge—which is the subject supposed to know. And with the concept of drives he introduces jouissance.

What I am suggesting is another reading of Seminar XI. It may be read at two levels. On the one hand, it is a revitalization or celebration of Freud and, on the other, it’s the introduction of a new way of speaking about psychoanalysis, a refoundation of psychoanalysis.

With his four fundamental concepts, it is as if Lacan were presenting the unconscious in four distinct ways. Indeed, there are four distinct representations of analytic experience—four distinct ways of grasping what is going on in an analysis. It is not at all an abstract seminar; it is a seminar that is very close to actual analytic practice.

The seminar poses the question, “What is talking?” How do we grasp the phenomenon of talking in analysis? Lacan privileges the gaps. He chooses to define the unconscious—and it’s only one definition among many—as “impediment, failure, split.” Here he is very close to Freud’s first discovery, a discovery rejected by ego-psychologists who think that Freud did not
know as much as they do. "Impediment, failure, split. In a spoken or written sentence something stumbles. Freud is attracted by these phenomena, and it is there that he seeks the unconscious. There, something other demands to be realized—which appears as intentional, of course, but of a strange temporality. What occurs, what is produced, in this gap, is presented as the discovery. It is in this way that the Freudian exploration first encounters what occurs in the unconscious." (25)

Here Lacan is very close to The Interpretation of Dreams, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, and Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious. At the same time, what he says is very practical. Freudian analysts are attracted to these phenomena and, when they occur, it is easy to say, "that's it." Lacan makes this same point in the preface to the English language edition of Seminar XI that he wrote in 1976: "When the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning (or interpretation), only then is one sure that one is in the unconscious. One knows." (vii) Thus even though he is stressing another point, a gap in meaning, he is also trying to focus on the times one is led to say, "that's it." Lacan presents that moment as precisely the one in ordinary discourse when we would say, "that's not it." In analytic experience something is inverted, and we say, "that's it" when a miss or a failure occurs. That is what Lacan calls the subject. He tries to present the unconscious as something that is both a modality of nothingness and a modality of being. It is a strange kind of being that appears when it ought not to: precisely when a strange intention is being realized. Lacan chose to stress the unconscious as subject, a subject which has no substance, which is a stumbling, since something does not fit but expands to fill desire itself.

In some ways, when Lacan says "subject," it is equivalent to saying "desire"—something which does not fit. But that is not the whole of the Freudian unconscious because the unconscious also appears as repetition. That is what Lacan presents as the network of signifiers. The unconscious is also an articulation of signifiers, and we can see Freud practically producing this field of investigation by noticing in his patients' speech what appears again and again in their dreams and parapraxes. Freud thereby invents his own Rosetta stone, pinpointing his own version of Champollion's cartouche. Just as Freud notices repetitive occurrences, Lacan first stresses the unconscious as a stumbling, but also emphasizes the repetition of the unconscious that always says the same thing.

It is important to stress the unconscious as repetition, because it is completely different from stressing the unconscious as resistance, which is so fundamental in ego-psychology. The thesis that Lacan develops in this book is that the unconscious does not resist so much as it repeats. In some ways, resistance disappears in this text. It does not appear at all as a fundamental concept, or even as a secondary concept. Lacan stresses repetition
instead of resistance, and when he speaks of transference he stresses deception, not resistance. Lacan says:

As you saw with the notion of cross-checking, the function of return, Wiederkehr, is essential. It is not only Wiederkehr in the sense of that which has been repressed—the very constitution of the field of the unconscious is based on Wiederkehr. Freud bases his certainty on that. (47–8)

And he says:

... there is only one method of knowing that one is there, namely, to map the network. And how is a network mapped? One goes back and forth over one's ground, one crosses one's path, one cross-checks it again and again, and in the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams there is no other confirmation of one's Gewissheit, one's certainty, than this—'Speak of chance, gentlemen, if you like. In my experience I have observed nothing arbitrary in this field, for it is cross-checked in such a way that chance is eliminated.' (45)

This is another perspective on the unconscious: the unconscious is not merely a gap, but repetition; and through this cross-checking, a network is constituted.

Let us move on to the unconscious as transference. Transference is one aspect of the unconscious and (I did not discover this until the seventies, à la "The Purloined Letter"), in Seminar XI, transference and repetition are treated as two distinct concepts. That was not a common theory of transference; for a long time Freud himself considered transference to be a modality of repetition, a repetition of primary love for the fundamental object in the patient's infancy. That is, first you love your father, for example, and that is all you want. You have a primary love object, which you supposedly transfer onto the analyst by repeating past relationships. What is fundamental in Lacan's construction is the complete splitting and separation of these two concepts in order to propose a new theory of transference. Lacan says this very precisely: "repetition is something the true nature of which"—i.e., repetition as a network of signifiers—"is always veiled in analysis, because of the identification of repetition with transference in analysts' conceptualization." (54) This was a true breakthrough which Lacan had not arrived at before. In the Écrits you find various attempts to theorize transference in which transference is viewed as a modality of repetition. Here we have a breakthrough which ought to surprise everyone, in that these two concepts are completely distinguished.

Lacan connects transference with psychical reality, for instance, when he defines transference as "the enactment of the reality of the unconscious." But it takes on its true meaning only when you distinguish reality
from the real. So when Lacan says, "transference is the enactment of the reality of the unconscious," he is not saying the enactment of the real of the unconscious; as you will see, that is a fundamental distinction. He shows that the reality of the unconscious is always ambiguous and deceptive, whereas repetition is connected to the real, which does not deceive. When Lacan talks about anxiety in Seminar X, he distinguishes anxiety from all other affects, saying that in analysis and in life, anxiety is the only affect which does not mislead or deceive. He shows how anxiety is connected to what he calls the real. It is a function that one may not grasp, but it does not deceive.

To understand Seminar XI, you have to connect transference with reality as deceptive, and repetition with the real as that which does not mislead. When you present the unconscious as transference, you present it as something which misleads and deceives—a view that is very much present in Freud's work. For instance, when Freud discusses his patients' dreams regarding analysis, he points to his patients' attempts to satisfy something in their analyst by dreaming. If you take the plasticity and mobility of dreams seriously, you have to admit that the unconscious is not truth itself without at the same time being a lie: the analytic concept of truth is connected with lying. That is what Lacan means when he says that truth has a fictional structure, and this is borne out in his lectures on transference here.

Fourth, you have the unconscious as drive. This was always present in Lacan's work, and he develops the point later in *Television*. The subject, at some level, is always happy, is always enjoying himself. As Freud says in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, one way or another, be it through apparent unhappiness or displeasure, the subject obtains satisfaction. Even if we try to go beyond the pleasure principle, this beyond stresses something which is an internal beyond of the pleasure principle. Freud explained this very precisely: when the pleasure principle fails, the reality principle is triggered. Thus while the pleasure principle may fail, the reality principle takes upon itself the task imposed by the pleasure principle. The reality principle takes the place of and carries on the task of the pleasure principle when the latter fails. The reality principle is actually a more cumbersome way of obtaining satisfaction. When you are dreaming and you have a nightmare, you open your eyes and connect with reality because the dream has failed to protect your sleep, which is the fundamental task of dreaming (true, a dream fulfills a wish, but first and foremost it serves to protect sleep). The pleasure principle has failed, and so you open your eyes, as Lacan says, to continue dreaming with your eyes open. That's why Lacan says that reality is fantasy. We receive data through sense perception, but with the exception of this supposed pure data, reality is fantasy. Thus we must distinguish the
reality that is equal to fantasy from what we call the real, which refers to that which is satisfied by the overwhelming and all-powerful pleasure principle: something that does not change, which requires all our dreaming and all our waking, but that is nevertheless pleasure.

Freud draws a distinction between the goal and the aim of the drive. You may or may not have the object of the drive—food, for example, in the case of the oral drive. Nevertheless, as Freud says, the object itself is unimportant. It may be this or that, but what remains the same is what is satisfied in the circuit of the drive. Even if you don’t have the goal, you realize the aim, which is jouissance.

I have presented various ways to schematize these four fundamental concepts. The first concept, the unconscious as subject, is grounded in hysteric because the clinical structure of hysteria presents this privileging of desire. Repetition is better illustrated by obsessive neurosis; that is why Lacan refers to the “Rat Man’s” repetition compulsion. In Seminar XI, you can read the chapters on the unconscious in relation to the Dora case, and the chapters on repetition in relation to the Rat Man case. The chapters on transference refer to the lies of hysteria, whereas the chapters on the drives refer essentially to that part of analytic experience which does not lie. In this trajectory we move from the unconscious to the id—which is why Lacanians unify Freud’s first and second topographies. We go from the unconscious, which refers to the distinction unconscious/preconscious/conscious, to the drives which refer to the id.

What I would like to show you, however, is the homologous structure present in Lacan’s conceptualization of all four of these terms. In some sense, he is really speaking of the same thing in four different ways.

First, he presents the unconscious by what he calls its formations: dreams, parapraxies, etc. In the case of parapraxies, you bungle what you want to say or do. You make a mistake, and that is precisely where the analyst may say, “that’s right.” Therein lies the truth: not in what you wanted to say, but in what you effectively said or did. Thus we have a reversal of values: you missed your goal, but your true aim was achieved. This is what Lacan presents at the end of Seminar XI as the distinction between goal and aim. This structure is already there in Lacan’s presentation of the unconscious, in this strange inversion of values which is the cornerstone of analytic experience.

Repetition. Again and again, something is repeated. (The true translation of the title of Seminar XX, Encore, should be Again or More). What Lacan makes apparent in the section on “The Unconscious and Repetition” in Seminar XI is that you repeat because you have not fulfilled your aim. You have fulfilled something, but it is not what it ought to be. In Encore he
says that you obtain satisfaction, but it is never the satisfaction it ought to be. That is why Lacan developed the notion of the real as that which always comes back to the same place for the subject, but which the subject does not encounter. He takes repetition as the repetition of a failure, not of a success, and this has even given rise to the concept of "failure neurosis."

That is why, for instance, Lacan distinguishes between repetition and other types of behavior. (143) Freud's concept of repetition, Wiederholung, has nothing to do with habit or stereotypical behavior because Freud speaks of Wiederholung in reference to something that is always missed, and that is lacking. Thus we can better understand what Freud meant by his "latency period": you have a primary object with which you repeatedly attempt to establish a relationship. Repetition is always connected to a lost object—it is an attempt to re-find the lost object yet, in so doing, to miss it. And what is that lost object? It is illustrated in analytic theory by the mother as the fundamental primary object which, through the operation of the Name-of-the-Father, is always forbidden and lost. Lacan says that the mother is the fundamental Ding, the thing that is always lost and that repetition tries to recover and yet always misses.

Lacan speaks of the real as always connected with a mistake and an impossible encounter. (53) And where do we meet this real? What we have in the discovery of psychoanalysis is an encounter, an essential encounter, an appointment to which we are always summoned with a real that eludes us. It is an appointment with some thing that is never there at the meeting place. Consider the importance of appointments, meetings, and dates in the realm of love; there can be no love story with the real because you try to make a date, and repeatedly reschedule the date, but something else appears.

This is the encounter with the real that is beyond automaton, the return or insistence of signs. The real is that which lies behind automaton. That is where Lacan introduces repetition. It is not repetition that is important, but what is missed.

Thus you can see that there is a homologous relationship between Lacan's discussion of repetition and his presentation of the unconscious as subject. It is always a question of what is missed, and what in this mistake, lies or appears.

I will present the third point, transference, very briefly as we are running out of time. Here too Lacan introduces the dialectic of goal and aim. He presents transference as the fundamental deception of the unconscious, using the example of the statement, "I am lying." I will not go into all the steps of his presentation, but he shows the patient as someone who says, "I am lying" which, except in logical treatises, means "I am deceiving you." And the analyst may say at that moment, "by telling me that you are
deceiving me, you are telling the truth.” Lacan, in the schema you find in the chapter, “Analysis and Truth,” illustrates once again this reversal of values at the very moment that you say that you are not telling the truth. Even if you lie in your dream, there are ways of interpreting your dream whereby the truth emerges. Thus here again we find the same structure as before.

The fourth concept is the drive. Lacan shows, for example, that eating is not merely a manifestation of the oral drive. The object or goal of the drive is food. But the aim of the drive is jouissance, which may very well be satisfied without any food. Anorexia, for instance, illustrates the full range of the oral drive, for the anorexic eats nothing and derives oral jouissance therefrom which is elevated to the level of being lethal—to the level of the death drive. Anorexia represents the ultimate in oral jouissance.