CHAPTER 1

Are Security Regimes Possible?
Historical Cases and Modern Issues

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There are two basic and opposing views about how states should provide security for themselves. According to the dominant realist view, states should arm themselves to deter wars if possible and to fight them if necessary. They should supplement their own strength through military alliances, while recognizing that allies are necessarily impermanent because of shifting state interests. At the other extreme, idealists have argued that recurrent warfare underscores the bankruptcy of traditional diplomacy, which is premised on national self-help. Their grandest aspiration is to transcend balance-of-power politics, based on alliances, and to forge a comprehensive system of peace, based on collective security. Collective security, in this sense, is a universal alliance in which all states pledge to support any prospective victim of aggression. It is an “all for one” system rather than a standard system of counterpoised alliances.¹

Both views, and their polar opposition, are well-known. Indeed, the modern study of international politics began with the articulation of realism by Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, George Kennan, and others in the late 1940s.² They definitively rejected collective security as utopian legalism and supported American rearmament. They wanted to limit the tasks of new international organizations to well-defined common problems such as European reconstruction, rather than the provision of universal security. At the same time, they distanced themselves from the most popular rationale for active American involvement around the
world: rabid anticommunism. They understood that the most ideological form of anticommunism was simply another kind of utopian policy, one with no inherent limits on the global tasks America should perform or the price it should pay.³

The realists' intellectual victory was aided mightily by the tragedies of twentieth-century European history. Woodrow Wilson's effort to abolish the old diplomacy, with its secret treaties and rival alliances, had failed to prevent Fascist expansion in the 1930s, failed to create secure borders for smaller states, and failed to overcome the narrow, self-interested diplomacy of the great powers. Italy's 1935 invasion of Abyssinia was recognized as the last, fatal moment of the League of Nations, not only because its sanctions did not deter Italy's conquest but also because it was clear that other major powers were more interested in Italy's value as a future ally than in its current invasion of Ethiopia or its direct violation of the league's covenant.⁴ The league simply failed in its most basic purpose, just as it had in 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria.⁵ Once again, the old logic of national military power and alliance politics overrode vague Wilsonian hopes for collective security.

If more proof were needed that collective security was an unattainable goal and a dangerous policy, the late 1940s seemed to provide it. Plans for the United Nations, developed at Dumbarton Oaks in the midst of World War II, were less ambitious than Wilson's Fourteen Points.⁶ But they did contain the core idea of collective security, memorialized in the U.N. Charter's Articles 1(1) and 2(5) and institutionalized in the U.N. Security Council.⁷ In practice, however, the United Nations was unable to sustain the wartime alliance between the United States and Soviet Union. Their opposition gradually hardened into the basic bipolar structure of postwar politics. By the time the United Nations actually implemented collective security operations in the Korean peninsula, its actions only reinforced the significance of superpower opposition and military power. Indeed, the United Nations could act collectively in Korea only because the Soviets had foolishly walked out of the Security Council proceedings in protest.

These dominant historical events underlined the Realist view that states should recognize the perils of international anarchy and should therefore equip themselves for deterrence and war. Credible military threats of punishment and denial are central to this approach. What makes these observations more than banal pessi-

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mism is the idea that if each state pursues its own narrowly self-interested strategy, then no nation may succeed in providing security for itself and each may actually become more insecure. Yet none can escape: each state would be in mortal peril if it did nothing while others armed, even if all are worse off by pursuing these narrowly self-interested strategies instead of cooperating to limit armaments. That is the essence of the security dilemma. States are trapped by systemic forces.

The dominance of Realism and the powerful logic of deterrence theory have not prevented others from exploring more cooperative efforts to provide national security—efforts that fall short of utopian collective security but recognize that conflicting national interests are often mixed with other more compatible interests and goals, which can sustain some forms of international cooperation. International politics, then, is not wholly a realm of strife and confrontation, even though military conflicts are a central issue and policy mistakes can be fatal. Rather, states recognize that they often have powerful interests in cooperation and exchange.

Important joint gains are to be captured in many issues: trade, the environment, monetary affairs, arms control, and many other areas. The problem, in other words, is not that such social exchanges are unprofitable. The real problem is that they are often difficult to accomplish because information is poor, deception and cheating are possible, and most important, the basic rights of property and contract (and enforcement mechanisms for those rights) are simply absent at the international level.

This perspective, sometimes called neo-institutional or neoliberal, is grounded in basic Realist assumptions, particularly the anarchical character of international politics and the preeminence of nation-states as actors. But it concludes that the interaction of national interests produces a more complex terrain of cooperation and conflict. One overriding problem, from this perspective, is to understand how nations can create institutions to capture the potential gains from cooperation, while minimizing the real dangers of deception and nonperformance. In the security arena, the basic aim of this approach is to understand how nations can prevent arms races, diminish the risks of surprise attack, and more generally, ameliorate the effects of the security dilemma.

Some research in this vein compares superpower cooperation in different issues and different regions. These studies are valu-
able and suggestive even though they do not directly address larger issues of international relations theory. At the same time, other scholars have been developing middle-range theories about international cooperation between countries that are both partners and adversaries. Much of this work draws on game-theoretic ideas about strategic interaction in mixed-motive games, most recently involving games of incomplete information. But the work typically goes beyond an analysis of strategic interaction among nation-states and asks how they can institutionalize patterns of cooperation, improve information about others' preferences and choices, and protect against risks of defection.

Discussion about these institutional issues builds on earlier work dealing with the formation and maintenance of cooperative regimes in specific issues. Most of the regime literature deals with international economic issues, especially trade but also foreign investment, exchange rates, debt, communications, and other high-technology industries. In addition, there is increasing interest in the application of these regime concepts to issues where cooperation has been much more difficult to achieve, particularly security issues such as nuclear proliferation.

We will turn, then, to the starting point of this neo-institutional literature, the study of regimes, and then explore its extension from international economic issues to national security questions.

THE STUDY OF REGIMES

The study of international regimes is designed primarily to understand how cooperation is articulated and institutionalized in specific issues or regions. It focuses on the ways that states establish rules and procedures to moderate and manage the consequences of anarchy and facilitate more specific cooperative agreements.

Although this approach is obviously different from realism (including both traditional realism and neo-realism), it is also different from earlier approaches to international organization. The study of international organizations had become a kind of intellectual backwater by the 1960s. It was characterized mainly by atheoretical research on the internal operations of specific institutions, generally the United Nations and its affiliated organizations. The vast growth of trade and investment in the North
Atlantic and the management of this rising economic interdependence were simply ignored. Rather, these traditional studies of international institutions continued to look at specific organizations (or suborganizations such as the U.N. Secretariat) and ask (1) how they worked and (2) what were their consequences for international politics. This work did not pose a serious challenge to the dominant realism of the day nor to its increasingly scientific specification.\textsuperscript{14}

Later research on economic interdependence and regimes shifted that focus substantially and, in the process, redefined and revitalized the study of international organizations.\textsuperscript{15} It examined broader patterns of cooperation in key issues and asked (1) what were their basic rules and decision-making procedures and (2) how did particular institutional processes within an issue or area help to constrain state choices and produce regularized, cooperative behavior. Specific institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, were not ignored but rather were embedded in a broader inquiry into the creation and maintenance of international order.

This new approach was in many ways closer to earlier studies of political integration than to traditional studies of international institutions. The literature on integration, like the subsequent literature on regimes, focused on the creation and management of political order beyond the nation-state, underscoring the central importance of economic issues and nonstate actors.

There were important differences between the study of integration and the study of regimes, however. The most important one is that regime analysis dropped the basic causal dynamic of neo-functional integration theory: the idea that technical solutions to shared regional problems could produce their own, self-reinforcing logic of growing supranational institutions and pooled sovereignty.\textsuperscript{16} This focus on technical solutions and their progressive spillover into larger projects of political integration was undermined by events that neo-functionalism could not explain. France simply blocked further integration that did not accord with its own vision of Europe and France's leading place within it.\textsuperscript{17} In 1963, President de Gaulle vetoed Britain's entry into the European Economic Community. Later, he boycotted nearly all EEC meetings and provoked a constitutional crisis over basic differences about how the community should function.\textsuperscript{18} These disputes, which stymied European integration for years, clearly showed
that integration was still a project of nation-states and still, at heart, a matter of high politics.

Neo-functionalist theories of integration could not explain the new political limits on the EEC or the community’s lethargic progress in the 1960s and 1970s. Even so, the study of regional integration had produced an important and useful analytic shift, which was later adopted in studies of regimes. The focus moved away from specific institutional procedures toward the management of common international problems.

The regime literature, like that on integration, assumed that important joint gains were to be captured from managing these problems. One difference is that integration literature maintained a clear regional focus. It concentrated on geographic areas where economic interdependence might be linked to political institutionalization.\(^\text{19}\) The literature on regimes, by contrast, typically focused on the organization of global issues.\(^\text{20}\) Despite this difference, both approaches recognize that many issues are inherently transnational. That is, they spill across national borders and cannot be managed effectively by any single nation-state.\(^\text{21}\) Indeed, the inability of nation-states to manage such issues, and the possibility of capturing joint gains, provides incentives for both regime creation and regional integration.

These basic foci, particularly the emphasis on political cooperation to manage transnational issues, can be found from the very outset in regime studies.\(^\text{22}\) They are linked directly to the search for international rules and convergent expectations as mechanisms for organizing interstate relations in key issues. These concerns are clearly present in Stephen Krasner’s influential definition of regimes: “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”\(^\text{23}\) Case studies of specific regimes have proliferated, showing how anarchy’s effects can be managed and joint gains captured under diverse conditions. There are important common themes here—recurrent functions performed by successful regimes.\(^\text{24}\) By creating an inclusive framework with well-defined norms, regimes
lower the transaction costs of negotiating and implementing specific agreements. By encouraging repeated transactions, they lengthen the “shadow of the future.” Such iteration often creates powerful incentives for states to keep their bargains in order to capture a stream of future gains, thus making some agreements self-enforcing.

Regimes can make agreements more transparent by creating mechanisms and institutions to provide information otherwise unavailable or too costly to acquire. Greater transparency does not make betrayal impossible, but it lowers the gains from cheating and deception. In arms control, where cheating is a very real concern, agreements have aimed at raising transparency. There have been prohibitions against encrypting missile test data, for instance, and agreements to permit on-site inspections and surprise visits to military facilities. The real trick is to increase transparency enough to build confidence in the reliability of agreements but not so much that other military secrets are disclosed or sovereignty challenged.

Transparency is a more subtle problem in economic issues. After all, surprise is more important and potentially much more devastating in military affairs than in economic issues. Economic issues are monitored by different actors as well. Private firms such as exporters have ample incentives to monitor others’ compliance with economic agreements and report violations to their home government. The more usual problem is that others’ noncompliance can be observed, but the reasons for that behavior are murky. This confusion about others’ motives and intentions is important because some excuses for nonperformance may be perfectly acceptable and others completely unacceptable, according to the agreement. For example, we know that it is difficult for foreigners to sell products or services within the Japanese market. But is the problem basically one of nontariff barriers imposed by the Japanese government or private preferences and institutional obstacles created by Japanese firms and consumers? Most government-imposed barriers would violate trade agreements; most private barriers would not.

Finally, regimes can provide or facilitate sanctions for rule violations (although, in my opinion, they do this less well because sanctioning is typically costly and creates serious collective action problems). In any case, they can sanction either by threats of proscription or by retaliatory actions. The sanctions may either be
centralized punishments by formal institutions or, more often, informal and decentralized punishments, principally the exclusion of violators from the future benefits of cooperation among regime participants.

Thus, regimes encourage cooperation by making it rational—by increasing the expected benefits of cooperation and raising the expected costs of noncompliance. If we assume (quite plausibly in many cases) that states are locked into relationships that resemble a Prisoners’ Dilemma, then regimes may work by transforming the original PD payoffs (which encourage defection) into more tractable super-games with incentives for sustained cooperation. In doing so, they perform another crucial function: they stabilize mutual expectations regarding future behavior and adherence to rules (because cooperation is now more profitable than defection and others understand the incentive structure and current behavior of their partners).

Considerable empirical research has been done on these issues. There are parallel and largely comparable studies of all major international economic issues and many more on important social issues such as the environment. These studies deal with

- foreign investment
- exchange rates
- the trading system
- trade in specific sectors as textiles, autos, commodities, and air travel, among others
- natural resources, the environment, and pollution
- oil
- debt
- telecommunications and data flows
- human rights
- international crimes and moral issues, such as piracy, slavery, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, airplane hijacking, and the killing of endangered species (what Ethan Nadelmann calls global prohibition regimes).

These studies typically go beyond specifying rules and norms in specific issues areas. Rather, they aim to understand the incen-
tives and sanctions behind different rules, the logic of bargaining, and the reasons why rules and decision-making procedures develop and change. In an early critical article, Susan Strange argued that the new focus on regimes was too static, dedicated too much to the status quo, and interested too little in change, either normatively or positively. In fact, virtually all regime studies have been deeply concerned with the process, causes, and consequences of international change. Some studies, in fact, are focused almost entirely on the causal mechanisms that underlie changes across regimes. Explanations range from hegemonic decline to surplus production capacity to changes in basic policy ideas and ideology.

As regime studies have proliferated, so has the criticism of this approach. Several accusations are fundamental. First, it is correctly charged that the whole approach is conceptually underdefined and imprecise in specifying key terms, such as rules and norms. In addition, there is epistemological confusion in stressing both convergent expectations (which are intersubjective and cannot be determined objectively) and objective patterns of interstate behavior (rules and procedures) and their causation, which can be investigated through the usual positivist methods. There are also serious limitations to all the general causal mechanisms that have been suggested. In particular, the idea that stable regimes require hegemonic leadership has been subjected to withering criticism on both empirical and theoretical grounds. There are other gaps and problems. The regime approach concentrates on issue and areas, but there is no convincing analysis of how issue-areas are created or linked together. Finally, although we now have dozens of empirical studies of specific regimes, we have no overarching theory about how international politics is fragmented into these distinct regimes, no real explanation of which issues will lack well-formed regimes (or when or why), and no real analysis of how different regimes dovetail with one another to create an overall international system. Taken together, these are serious attacks on the possibilities of creating a true “regime theory.”

There is also another angle of attack. This critique points out that regime studies can never amount to a comprehensive approach to international relations, much less a theory, because the basic features of regimes are simply missing in key security issues. True, a well-specified theory of regimes could predict when and where cooperative regimes would form and where they would
not, but such a theory could still say little about the character of interaction in basic security issues if they are not likely to develop rules and common expectations about behavior.\textsuperscript{47}

This last criticism is important. It underscores the inherent limits of extending the regimes approach even if basic conceptual issues are clarified. Nevertheless, some studies of security regimes have been undertaken, particularly on issues where cooperation has been seriously attempted. Broadly speaking, these studies fall into three areas. One is arms control, where studies deal mainly with nuclear proliferation or superpower arms agreements. There are also studies of particular arms control agreements, but they go beyond the treaty’s negotiation and final text to ask about the character of institutions created to deal with treaty interpretation, dispute resolution, and implementation.\textsuperscript{48} In this sense, treaties are understood as the focal points of international institutions, often informal ones, that are needed to implement and sustain profitable agreements. Second, there are studies of the one time when multiple Great Powers cooperated for an extended period—the Concert of Europe. The question here is whether the diplomatic interactions can be fruitfully understood in terms of common expectations and rule creation, the language of regimes. Finally, the same questions about stable security cooperation have been raised about the Cold War. Although this work is usually not written as explicit “regime studies,” it inquires into the same issues.

In this chapter we will concentrate on the two cases where relatively equal powers created stable forms of cooperation. We will see how regime analysis has been applied and then consider its strengths and limitations.

**THE CONCERT OF EUROPE**

There have been two periods in modern European history when major powers were able to manage their rivalry successfully for prolonged periods. The first—the Concert of Europe during the early nineteenth century—sustained the coalition that had defeated Napoleon and actually incorporated succeeding French governments. More recently, the United States and Soviet Union managed to set fairly clear rules of diplomatic and military conflict, not only avoiding major war but also averting any direct mil-
itary engagement. In that sense, they were not only bitter rivals and adversaries but also partners with some important common understandings.

Renewed interest in the Concert of Europe is understandable. It offers a model of successful postwar planning and peaceful interaction among great powers.\textsuperscript{49} In the aftermath of the Cold War, such a model is bound to attract attention, particularly so because it is a model of a peaceful multipolar world. From the beginning, the concert recognized the basic policy interests of all the great powers, even those of defeated France. Unlike the postwar plans for World War I and World War II, the Peace of Paris avoided any utopian schemes.\textsuperscript{50}

The concert was a very deliberate scheme to create a postwar world order.\textsuperscript{51} International order was thus deliberately constructed and was not simply the by-product of balance-of-power politics. A key part of that order was an ongoing process of diplomatic communication. Indeed, Richard Elrod defines the Concert of Europe as “the great powers meeting together at times of international crisis to maintain peace and to develop European solutions to European problems. Statesmen who had finally recognized the necessity of cooperation in the last coalition against Napoleon continued to believe in the advantages of collaboration to maintain the postwar settlement.”\textsuperscript{52}

The Treaty of Chaumont (March 1814), which established the victorious coalition, also pledged to continue that alliance after Napoleon’s defeat. C. J. Bartlett, writing of British policy in the period, cites this continuity as the treaty’s greatest novelty.\textsuperscript{53} The chief aim—at Chaumont and later at the Congress of Vienna—was to prevent any French attempt to overturn the expected peace settlement. But Castlereagh, representing Britain, was disappointed in his broader hopes that the treaty would formally guarantee peace against all great powers (not merely France), settle all disputed European frontiers, and offer protection to the smaller European powers, especially the German states.\textsuperscript{54} In other words, the concert would never become a true instrument of collective security. Its aims would be more limited, focused exclusively on the interests of Great Powers and directed against the one state that might harbor hegemonic ambitions. The Congress of Vienna, which began even before Napoleon’s final defeat, ratified these basic aims and moved to establish regular, high-level communications among the powers.
These communications were sustained at repeated Europe-wide conferences with very senior representation, from foreign ministers to crowned heads. These meetings did not produce joint action, but they were valuable nonetheless. In particular, they allowed great powers to discuss their disputes regarding smaller countries and contested regions and, as a result, avoid threatening each other when they intervened to protect their interests. That is, they facilitated coordination and policy accommodation—a process that was doubtless encouraged by the fundamentally status quo goals of all the major powers except France.

It is also likely that the concert’s sustained, high-level diplomatic communication delayed the reemergence of traditional alliance politics until mid-century. This achievement came despite potentially important cleavages among the powers, notably a basic difference between Britain and Austria over the concert’s role in suppressing nationalist, democratic movements. Britain, represented by Castlereagh and later Canning, did not see how foreign intervention would contribute to its own security. It simply refused to participate in these antinationalist concert policies. Metternich, who represented an anti-democratic, multinational empire, naturally saw vital stakes in suppressing such social movements. These differences split the great powers and limited their capacity for coherent action, but in spite of all that, the concert did not dissolve into rival alliances.

The absence of direct confrontation between two major powers from the Napoleonic wars until the Crimea (1853–1956) was no small achievement. It was, after all, a turbulent age when nationalist and democratic forces were emerging throughout Europe and challenging the basic principles of multinational empires (Austria, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, which was rapidly unraveling). The social, economic, and political transformations of that period produced all too many sites for potential conflict. In the 1820s and 1830s, for instance, there were social revolts in Naples, Spain, Greece, Poland, and Belgium—all of them threatening to neighboring powers and more distant monarchies. Some Great Powers did intervene, but they did so in ways that did not threaten their peers, partly because they had communicated their intentions well in advance. Likewise, they managed to resolve several major crises (the Belgian Crisis of 1830–1832, the Near Eastern crisis of 1839–1841, the first Schleswig-Holstein crisis of 1850–1852) with little more than diplomatic maneuver-
ing and small-scale military action.\textsuperscript{56} There were somewhat larger conflicts after mid-century. Italian unification produced one war (1859) and German unification three (1864, 1866, 1870).\textsuperscript{57} But after the Franco-Prussian War, the major powers did not fight each other again for nearly half a century, not until World War I. Moreover, from the Napoleonic Wars until World War I, there was no systemic war in Europe, a record that differs markedly from the eighteenth century when multipolar wars were commonplace.\textsuperscript{58}

This stability was not simply the result of the actors' peaceful predispositions. It was, according to Paul Schroeder, the product of three new systemic arrangements:

- a system of intertwined duties and guarantees for Great Powers, including participation in concert decisions and nonintervention in each other's internal affairs;
- a network of smaller states that served as effective buffers and spheres of influence, at once separating the Great Powers and giving them common tasks to manage;
- arrangements that insulated European politics from extra-European disputes over colonies and informal empires.\textsuperscript{59}

Schroeder's careful analysis is not explicitly framed in terms of "security regimes." But in fact he describes a well-articulated regime that combines both formal and informal institutions to produce shared normative understandings, shared rules of behavior, and common expectations about key issues. Schroeder especially underscores the importance and durability of treaty commitments throughout the nineteenth century:

A variety of procedures and devices strengthened this network of treaty guarantees, including a system of diplomacy of conference and some general principles of a European concert. The latter protected the rights, interests, and equal status of the Great Powers above all, but they also committed these powers to the performance of certain duties connected with those rights—respect for treaties, noninterference in other states' internal affairs, willingness to participate in the Concert's decision and actions, and a general observance of legality and restraint in their international action. This system of guarantees for the rights, status, and existence of the Great Powers, though egre-
giously violated and badly strained in the mid-century wars, managed to make something of a comeback and to endure after a fashion till the turn of the century.  

Robert Jervis has analyzed the concert explicitly in regime terms. His findings support the idea that the concert had common understandings, strong norms against efforts to change the status quo by force, and some limited institutionalization. But common understandings and rule adherence are not enough by themselves to define a regime, Jervis argues (quite properly, I think). They could arise from simple deterrence models, which rest solely on states’ power capabilities. So could reciprocity, which often arises outside regimes.

Jervis’s own argument that the concert is best understood as a security regime is really threefold. First, behavior by Great Powers did show regularity, common understandings, and shared norms. Beyond that, they clearly recognized each other’s vital interests, even if they did not always endorse them. Second, states seemed to make policy choices with an eye toward long-term benefits rather than short-term advantages. Their choices indicate that they considered the international political order relatively stable. It was an environment in which reciprocity and self-restraint could flourish because they were profitable, now and into the future. Finally, Jervis argues that, unlike balance-of-power arrangements, the concert did not always reflect the powers’ underlying capabilities. Outcomes were relatively autonomous from the current distribution of power—another reflection of institutionalized rules and restraints.

Why, then, did the concert collapse? Jervis’s answer is that memories of the destructive Napoleonic Wars slowly faded and new, unsocialized leaders came to power in the wake of the 1848 revolutions. He also observes that controlling revolutions, though a broadly shared goal, also produced conflict because Britain and France were more tolerant of domestic liberties than Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Finally, he notes that the concert, despite its informal rules, restraints, and diplomatic meetings, was not very well institutionalized.

In addition to these important observations about the sources of change, I would add two points. First, the effect of the 1848 revolutions went beyond a change of leadership. The real point was that the revolutions all failed and conservative forces quickly
solidified their control over national governments. Such counter-revolution changed the logic of nineteenth international politics in two basic ways. It freed conservative governments from their obsessive concerns with domestic order and allowed them to pursue more ambitious and expansionist international policies without fearing its impact on domestic order. More important, conservatives won their victories in 1848 by presenting themselves as guardians of the nation, as nationalists. This new, ideological basis for governance made it increasingly difficult to reconcile international conflicts, many of which involved contested border regions. The biggest impact was ultimately the creation of a German empire, which not only expanded Prussian power but also eliminated the smaller German states that had served as a defensive buffer in central Europe. Second, even if one acknowledges that the concert ended at mid-century, some of the structural changes reflected in the concert lasted well beyond mid-century. Not only did great powers continue to hold conferences on major issues, they recognized duties, guarantees, and norms such as non-intervention in each other’s affairs. Still, the world of the late nineteenth century was a world of shifting alliances, centered on Bismarck’s Germany, not a world of inclusive security regimes.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

If the world of the nineteenth century concert was unusually stable and peaceful, so was the long postwar confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union. True, there were many tense moments and some close calls during the four decades after World War II, beginning with the Berlin blockade (1948–1949) and culminating with the nuclear showdown over Soviet missiles in Cuba. There were also large-scale regional wars throughout the period, many of them with direct or proxy involvement by Washington or Moscow. Several of these disputes could easily have led to larger wars, risking direct engagement between superpower armed forces. Yet all were successfully managed, through a combination of diplomacy, coercive threats, and limited warfare. In the end, Soviet and American troops never met each other face to face on the field of battle. As Gordon Craig and Alexander George observe: “In retrospect, it appears remarkable that all U.S.-Soviet diplomatic confrontations and war-threatening crises—over Ber-
lin, Korea, the Middle East, and Cuba and in South Asia—have been successfully terminated without any kind of shooting war between American and Soviet military forces. The mutual fear of igniting a fuse that could trigger thermonuclear holocaust is undoubtedly the major factor that accounts for this success.”

The real success of the Soviet-American relationship was not only that it averted a major war, but that it became increasingly stable over time. Writing in the late 1950s, Albert Wohlstetter could speak of a “delicate balance of terror.” Ten years later, the balance of terror had become durable, not delicate. It was stable enough that the nuclear terror receded into the background, even though the United States had half a million soldiers fighting Soviet-backed forces in Southeast Asia. The new, stable balance was founded on secure, second-strike deterrence. Because each side had the assured capacity to retaliate with overwhelming force after any nuclear attack, there was no longer a powerful incentive to launch a preemptive first strike if war threatened. As a result, the danger of nuclear war declined significantly even though Cold War tensions rose and fell dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s.

Other aspects of the superpower relationship were stable as well. There were no directly contested borders in Europe after the second Berlin Crisis in 1958, when Khrushchev demanded the withdrawal of Western troops and the establishment of a “Free City of West Berlin.” This practical division of the continent remained tacit for decades. The United States simply refused to acknowledge any explicit spheres of influence, because that would concede Soviet control of Eastern Europe. But the division was no less fixed or clear-cut because of its informality. The U.S. did not contest it diplomatically, much less militarily. In particular, successive American presidents refused to encourage revolts within the Warsaw Pact and refused to extend aid when revolts did break out in Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

How extensive were such cooperative arrangements in the midst of wider conflict? Did they really constitute shared rules and norms, with convergent expectations among the parties? How were they institutionalized? These questions go to the heart of whether a Soviet-American security regime really existed during the Cold War.

Broadly speaking, there are three views. One is that the United States and the Soviet Union were adversaries who deterred each
other militarily, whose mutual deterrence became more stable over time, but who never produced significant broader understandings or truly shared norms. They were essentially adversaries, not partners, even if they did not go to war. In any case, there is no evidence that a security regime existed because specific political outcomes were closely tied to underlying force distributions. At the other extreme, some have argued that the superpowers developed effective ways of communicating their foreign policies and reconciling their differences, and in the process managed to construct basic "rules of the game" for international politics. These rules—tacit or explicit, formal or informal—are the deliberate product of efforts to avoid common aversions, principally nuclear war. Finally, some scholars argue that some elements of superpower security regimes did exist but that they were limited to specific issues and regions and never became more comprehensive. Craig and George state this last position clearly. They conclude that the two superpowers "learned some fundamental 'rules of prudence' for managing their rivalry and for dealing with occasional confrontations without becoming embroiled in warfare." Learning, adaptation, and appropriate behavior (including both crisis management and crisis avoidance) produced a stable peace despite sharp ideological differences. Still, according to this centrist view, it would have been "unrealistic and infeasible" to expect a "comprehensive U.S.-Soviet security regime, one that covered all aspects of their security relations."

What is at stake here is not just different views about U.S.-Soviet interactions but different views about how international institutions can mediate international politics. These differences bear on the different ways that regimes may be understood. The strongest version is that regimes matter only if they produce outcomes different from those of underlying power capabilities. A less demanding version is that regimes affect outcomes by codifying basic agreements and creating institutional settings that encourage further cooperation by reducing transaction costs and increasing transparency. In any case, underlying power resources do not yield strong "point predictions" (as its proponents acknowledge). Institutions can thus facilitate coordination on some equilibria instead of others, encourage mutually profitable agreements by lowering the risks of cheating and deception, and encourage learning and cooperation that is (and must be) consistent with states’ power and interests.
This less demanding definition of regimes is a fruitful way to understand the nature of Soviet-American security cooperation. Cooperation was extensive despite their deep differences over basic political and economic issues and despite their global contest for power and influence. Security cooperation was grounded in the stable character of the nuclear standoff, which reassured both powers about their essential security interests and made clear how truly interdependent they were at the strategic level.

With stable second-strike capacities in place, the superpowers recognized two kinds of gains from cooperation. One was to increase the stability of nuclear deterrence at the margin: to facilitate greater communication in crises, prevent accidental launches and contain any wider consequences if they occurred, and shape nuclear force structures in ways that discouraged fears of surprise attacks. Joseph Nye has shown that this kind of nuclear cooperation and learning was extensive. Indeed, Nye goes on to argue that “the two countries largely agree[d] upon broad and specific injunctions in a number of subissues within the security relationship, and one can argue that a jointly recognized regime exists in such areas.” Nye cites regimes that constrained short-run self-interest and reshaped ideas of long-run self-interest in several key areas: (1) destructive power in Europe, (2) prevention of nuclear accidents and control of military forces, (3) nuclear proliferation, and (4) arms-race stability (essentially the acceptance of nuclear parity and limits on offense and defense). Still, Nye notes the ambivalence that surrounded other efforts to limit conventional threats or counterforce targeting.

Second, although the superpowers were often rivals in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, they also had mixed motives in many of those areas. As Roger Kanet and Edward Kolodziej have shown, the superpowers frequently worked together to manage regional conflicts. Their joint aims were “to prevent escalation, to staunch or cut losses, or to focus resources and priorities elsewhere.” Alexander George and associates have produced dozens of case studies of cooperation in specific regional security issues, from the Austrian State Treaty to Antarctica, as well as global issues such as arms control. Obviously, such cooperation extended to nuclear proliferation, where both countries had overriding interests in limiting the spread of nuclear technology and delivery systems.
Thus, if regimes are understood as vehicles for learning and coordination, for lowering transaction costs and increasing information flows, and for creating settings where states can mutually restrain their pursuit of short-term gains, then the United States and Soviet Union did forge security regimes during the Cold War. Those regimes were not comprehensive; they did not cover all major issues or regions. Nye rightly calls them an incomplete mosaic. They certainly did not imply the cessation of conflict over basic economic and political issues. Nor do they seem to have produced important outcomes divorced from the superpower military balance (although, as noted earlier, it is usually impossible to predict specific outcomes from those force configurations). What these regimes did do was encourage and institutionalize cooperative outcomes where they were supported by underlying configurations of power and interest.

CONCLUSIONS: THE POSSIBILITIES OF SECURITY REGIMES

The analysis of Soviet-American security cooperation and the Concert of Europe shows that relatively equal powers can sometimes create security regimes. These are more than simply the production of orderly patterns of behavior, which may well be precipitated by deterrence and the balance-of-power politics. Regimes must be more than that if they are to be meaningful features of world politics. They are deliberate efforts to manage international affairs to capture joint gains or prevent common losses. They must be premised on some compatible configuration of preferences, reasonable information about others’ choices and behavior, and some limits on the risks of cooperating. Obviously, there are serious obstacles to the creation of security regimes. If states view politics as a zero-sum struggle, if they actually desire wars of expansion, if they cannot seek joint gains for domestic political reasons, if they fail to recognize their policy choices are interdependent, if they cannot distinguish each other’s offensive and defensive weapons and military deployments, if they are unwilling to reassure other states by permitting adequate verification, then the prospects for security regimes will be poor indeed. Unfortunately, these are recurrent problems in security affairs. They are made more difficult because errors in judgment—including unre-
ciprocated efforts to cooperate—may well be fatal. Therefore, cooperative and conciliatory policies in security issues carry risks that are simply not present in economic issues.  

Yet these obstacles are not always present and, even when some are, states can often find important areas of agreement—zones for some common management even if they are not comprehensive. Their aims are typically to avoid catastrophic losses rather than to capture potential gains. But the long peace after both the Napoleonic Wars and World War II indicates that they are well worth pursuing, while trying hard to dampen the very real risks.

NOTES


3. This limitless role for American foreign policy and its connection to anticommunism is made clear in President Truman’s statement that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” which became known as the Truman Doctrine. It is echoed in President Kennedy’s inaugural speech, where he pledged America would “pay any price, bear any burden” to preserve freedom around the world.” Harry S Truman, “Special Message to Congress on Greece and Turkey,” March 12, 1947, in Papers of the Presidents: Truman, 1947 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 176–80.