Introduction

In his influential text of 1936, “The Origin of Geometry,” Edmund Husserl began to articulate the transcendental background of *Wissenschaftstheorie* by denying that objectivity could be reduced to the epistemic capacity for repetition of self-evident truths.\(^1\) Although this statement may at first appear to be paradoxical, granted not only many of his commentators, but equally the axioms of his own position, he immediately added: “It does arise, however—in a preliminary stage—in understandable fashion as soon as we take into consideration the function of empathy and fellow mankind as a community of empathy and language” (OG 360). The typical complexity of Husserl’s position is as evident here as it is elsewhere. Following Bolzano, Husserl had been committed throughout to truth as a system of determinate repeatables. From Brentano he had learned the significance of intentional inexistence not only as a distinguishing mark of the mental, but as an epistemic source of evidence, of “judgment with insight.” As his correspondence with Frege makes evident, Husserl had joined Frege in rebelling against the attempts of intuitionists or conventionalists to reduce the symbolic matrices of geometry to syntactic play, that is, to what he had condemned from the outset as mere Spielbedeutung.\(^2\)

That the “Origin” added the criterion of empathy to the features of *objektivität* may, nonetheless, even from the distance of time, seem strange. None of the above thinkers had, after all, joined him in this. Husserl’s extension of the concept of objectivity, however, was neither new in his thought in 1936 nor new to the phenomenological “movement” in general, as it came to be called. On the one hand, the problem of empathy extends before Husserl not only to his idealist predecessors (for example, Fichte and Hegel), but beyond them to the reception of treatises on the passions in philosophical modernity (for example, in Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Adam Smith, and Rousseau). On the other hand, the problem of empathy had equally formed a critical part of the itinerary of phenomenology. This can be witnessed in the great treatises on this topic, such as the writings of Scheler, Stein, Husserl’s fifth Cartesian Meditation\(^3\) (all bearing in turn the effect of Lipps), as well as, in a quite different genre, in the writings of Levinas, Lacan, or even...
Lyotard and Habermas. But this was perhaps the point. As Husserl well knew, at stake at the center of his foundational claims were a number of traditional metaphysical operators as paradoxical as the set paradoxes he had attempted to solve in Russell’s aftermath. Thus, it would be no accident that the fifth Meditation would center on the problem of apperception by means of the category of analogy, nor that in the “Origin” itself the community of empathy and language would be immediately glossed as a community of “reciprocal linguistic understanding,” nor finally that this “differential” itself would be glossed as an exchange between the determinate and the indeterminate, sign and symbol, the univocal and the equivocal. Such, after all, would be the remnant of abstract or propositional objectivity, as the Formal and Transcendental Logic had already realized in ultimately criticizing the misguided presupposition of truth in itself. Now, as the latter declared, all truth would be involved in “relativities” and, as “The Origin of Geometry” stated, everywhere the problems are historical (OG 368).

In one sense, all this seemed new, granted Husserl’s earlier arguments on behalf of what he once termed the “mighty forces of objectified strict science” that were levied against the claims concerning decadence common to historicism. And yet, at the same time, these developments only made explicit the analysis of a certain history that had accompanied phenomenology from the outset. In the “Origin,” as in other writings of this period, the effect of this history would be referred to by Husserl in terms of the constant, indeed unavoidable, “danger” attending the reciprocal linguistic understanding that underlies the “community of communication,” namely, that the origins of evidence in the “living truth” revealed in intentional analyses might succumb to a certain forgetfulness (FTL 279).

It would take perhaps a Heidegger to see the conflict between formalists, logicians, and phenomenologists as a conflict between the ancients and the moderns, specifically between Aristotle and Hobbes. It was all of that and more. Surely this was true of the problems of empathy or sympathy, where at stake were not only links to Kant’s account of pure feeling in the third Critique, but a whole archive that could be traced back, for example, to the Augustinian ordo amoris or beyond to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. It perhaps was even more straightforwardly true of the philosophy of mind and epistemology at stake in phenomenology. Husserl (like Heidegger after him) had begun by attempting to deepen Brentano’s retrieval of neo-Thomist and Aristotelian accounts of intentionality and the evidence of “daily life” upon which they relied. They realized and indeed tacitly affirmed the intransigence of their differences with respect to the ancients (FTL 199). Indeed,
Husserl and Heidegger were in agreement, at least in this respect, that these
differences now involved a failure in memory, a failure in the retrieval of ori-
gins, a certain forgetfulness regarding authentic beginnings. In addition,
they agreed that, as a consequence of this failure, communities were in prin-
ciple—to use Husserl’s term—dangerous.

Now one will say that in the sphere that interests us here—that of sci-
ence, of thinking directed toward the attainment of truths and the
avoidance of falsehood—one is obviously greatly concerned from the
start to put a stop to the free play of associative constructives. In view
of the unavoidable sedimentation of mental products in the form of lin-
guistic acquisition, which can be taken over by anyone else, such con-
structions remain a constant danger. (OG 362)

For Husserl, the preeminent danger in question was the danger of passiv-
ity, the unconscious entanglement of free association, a domain the Formal
and Transcendental Logic had described as an “anonymous” one of unful-
filled “symbolic rhythmics” (FTL 369–70). Notwithstanding his reliance
upon the fecundity of passive synthesis for extending the foundations of stat-
ic intentional analysis, Husserl turned steadfastly against the problem of
passivity, against, to use Fichte’s staunchly non-Aristotelian terms, a certain
vis inertia of habit.9 At stake, to use Husserl’s terms, was a history in which
“[g]reater and greater segments of this life lapse into a kind of talking and
reading that is dominated purely by association” (OG 362). And, despite all
his commitments to historicity and tradition, Heidegger was equally trou-
bled by this same failure in his critique of the inauthenticity of the everyday.
Indeed both were even “Nietzschean,” to the extent that they both claimed
that the foundations of science required a critique of the traditions of the
everyday. As Nietzsche had put it, “we philosophers need to be spared one
thing above all: everything to do with ‘today’ [Das Heute].”9 If tradition was a
source or origin, “tradition” was equally, both Husserl and Heidegger
agreed, a source of illusion.

The position was Hobbesian twice over perhaps, consistent with what
Husserl had recognized as Hobbes’s generalization (and subjectivization) of
Galileo’s revolution.10 In the first place, the protocols of the position articu-
lated tradition as being haunted by the failure of false authority. Second,
they articulated the domain of the political not only as a domain of “living
truth” and its arete, but equally as a domain regulated by the economics of
stray desire and its danger, and, in the extreme, by the possibilities of death.
But, against Hobbes, the copula could not be reduced to calculability. For
Husserl, and it should be recalled that it was equally his argument against Frege, such reductions were “onesided,” that is, lacking an account of the adjudicative acts that underlie intentional contents. Moreover, the point was not that the position was simply abstract, but that, in the extreme, such onesidedness was falsifying. In his later works Husserl becomes more extreme in his characterization of such reductions, their omissions, and their exclusions; indeed, he claims in “The Vienna Lecture” of 1935 that “a one-sided rationality can certainly become an evil.” But this perhaps indicates as well the status of Husserl’s modernism. As Leo Strauss put it, Hobbes was always concerned with the extreme case.

Perhaps at no time would Husserl become closer to those like Horkheimer and Adorno in their critique of instrumental rationality and what Husserl called elsewhere the “unquestioned tradition” of Technisierung. But we should also recall what instigates this danger for Husserl in the text of the “Origin” itself: precisely that point at which the science of infinite tasks constituting philosophy de jure collides with philosophical claims de facto (OG 291), that is, the distinction between the regulative, the underdetermined task of historical judgment, and the ideal of objectivity that regulates such judgment. Even Foucault would affirm the result: the claim to ideology and objectivity need not conflict—nor, as he also would point out, would increasing rigor or the return to origins dissipate the role of ideology. But, of course, that just is the problem of judgment, especially granted Husserl’s immediate claim that “no line of knowledge, no single truth may be absolutized and isolated” (OG 291).

To add that “the community of communication” would require the community of empathy as a condition of objectivität is not only to raise the problem of its permanence (its iterability or documentability), it is also to recognize that the community of rational agents is likewise a community of passions, with both its constitutions and its “dangers” implicitly linking knowledge to power. This recognition reappears in Husserl’s call for vigilance of conscience over against submission to unconscious effect that gives rise to the possibility of fulfillment and to the hope that we might be able “to transform the logical chains of centuries” into a “lasting traditionalization” (OG 367). Still, if Bolzano’s account of truths-in-themselves had required a certain intentional modification to grasp the phenomenological iterability that underlay scientific identity (Husserl had worried about their mythic status from the beginning), the famous analyses of empathy by Theodor Lipps, founded on the concept of inner imitation and self-projection, would need to be similarly altered and perhaps even detached from the notion of mimesis.
and self-projection. The task of overcoming the limitations of the latter had been begun quite early by Max Scheler and Edith Stein, both of whom had noted the egoistic distortions of modern philosophy in its formulations. Their analyses also provided theoretical links with Aristotle, particularly in the notions of understanding *[synesis]* and sympathetic judgment *[syngnome]*. It is not accidental, then, that the problem of community and nature would reemerge in this guise, as the later books of the *Ideen* would initially reveal, but as would equally be demonstrated by the continuing presence of the genre of *Naturrecht* in its discourses. Moreover, that phenomenology had concerned itself from the outset with these problems is evident as early as Reinach’s contributions to the first volume of Husserl’s phenomenological *Jahrbuch* in 1913.

At the same time, however, granted the history (not to speak of the histri-onics) that accompanied this development, it would be naive—indeed perhaps ideological—to claim that such retrievals might occur forthwith and without regard to the history that governs both the concept of community and the concept of nature. Here too the problems are not only historical, but often enough Hobbesian as well. If phenomenological narratives were originally (or often enough) Aristotelian in inspiration, they inevitably ran into a Hobbesian challenge, as is shown implicitly in Husserl’s criticism of modern philosophy. This also is made explicit in Heidegger’s criticism of the *commercum* of *Das Man* and the demand for a hermeneutics of empathy that would not only overcome the abstractness of previous theoretical formulations, but also articulate “the unsociability [Das Unumganglichkeit] of the dominant modes of Being-with” in which empathy is first constituted. These no doubt complicated his own “dangerous” attempts “to gain the mastery over the everyday.” The various analyses of the Other that took place in Heidegger’s wake—epistemically, ontologically, and ethically—and that accompanied the descent of phenomenology (surely troubled by Husserl’s and Heidegger’s shortfalls here) only truncated the obvious concerning this failure of traditions and the historical embeddedness of their own analyses.

The problem perhaps had already received its protocols from Hobbes’s own transformation of the “vain and fabulous” tradition, a transformation that was poised between certainty and the threat of oblivion. As Hobbes put it, recalling both the ancient “virtue” of friendship and the principle of charity: “The affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits on strangers is not to be called charity, but either contract, whereby they seek to purchase friendship, or fear, which maketh them purchase peace.” The problems affecting community would be infinitely complicated by this
analysis, estranged in the distinction between theory and object, self and other, power and knowledge. Hegel also would affirm the breach between nature and institution that it entailed. Although (like the initial phenomenological glosses on the pure feeling of empathy) Hegel affirmed the Romantic’s retrievals—that is, he could affirm that “everything begins with the heart”—it is equally true too, he claimed, that “feeling and heart is not the form by which anything is legitimated as religious, moral, true, just, etc.”

To raise the issue of contract is indeed to raise the question of legitimation and the problem of the law itself. It is to raise again the distinction between ‘positive’ law and ‘natural’ law, the issue of constitutions both political and transcendental—and to do so throughout a domain that, qua theoretical, remains struck with the vagaries of theory, that is, undetermined. It is just here, of course, that the problem of interpretation emerges, complicating both the explication of experience and the language of theory. Indeed, as Spinoza recognized in raising the problem of interpretation, the models for such laws were not only political, but theological and scientific, a matter analogical through and through. Or, as Hobbes himself put it, “All Laws, written and unwritten, have need of interpretation”—and this is especially true of the natural law that has “the greater need of able Interpreters.” Insofar as neither Hobbes nor Spinoza had simply acceded to the Nietzschean “new infinity of interpretation,” both had encountered its problem. The recognition of the undetermined condition at stake, that the Babel of language has become theoretical, underwrote both the Hobbesian preoccupation with certainty as well as the Hobbesian investment in sovereignty. Surely Hobbes’s theoretical concern with the problem of translation is of a piece with his search for certainty in the polis, a concern already confronted with the disruption of the natural language of theory and practice, and the problem of recognition and the transfers, both theoretical and political, it entailed. Indeed, in one sense, still hopeful for an eidetic resolution, Scheler had not argued otherwise insofar as he claimed of moral theory that its concern with criteria for evaluation was already a sign of a certain decadence: “its origin is always connected with processes of disintegration in an existing ethos.”

The same rupture attends not only the problem of ethos, but the problem of community operative in all “phenomenological” discourses associated with it: the problem of tradition and lifeworld, the inherited and the invented, the given and the constituted, nature and culture. And if Husserl’s turn to empathy as a condition of objectivity seems from a particular vantage
point surprising, the final account of empathy—perhaps even from his own standpoint—becomes startling. First, Husserl's commitments to the significance of temporality surely becomes tensed within his historical turn. Empathy, as Experience and Judgment puts it, thus becomes the opening of "intersubjectively common time"—still providing thereby a commonality of one and the same objective world. But, additionally, the latter, taken in the most comprehensive sense, becomes understood as "our earth," articulating a "matrix" from which the philosophemes of origin, naissance, and the lived world would ultimately achieve a certain founding determination.

Gadamer had claimed in his own account of the post-Kantian archive of hermeneutics that neither empathy nor sympathy could be reduced to a condition of knowledge; yet neither could either of them be reduced to simple emotion. This was indicative of the complex interplay constitutive of traditionality in general (TM 233). In this way, tradition should be seen as a "multifariousness of voices" (TM 284). What was important here was not simply an internal relation of intentional "transfer," to use Hobbes's term, but an "I and Thou" relation, that is, a matter of dialogue. And here the point concerned not cognitive iterability or agreement, but interpretability. Gadamer, however, like Foucault, would not deny the epistemological project. Instead he would demand its extension: "objectivity" would be the working out and application of such possibilities through dialogue (TM 267).

Still, the implications of the latter remain perhaps inevitably unclear. It is just this problem that haunts the move from the bonds of nature, constitution, and cognitive agreement to interpretability. The complicated remainder such a move imparts regarding judgment and legitimation once again underscores the underdeterminability that divides claims de facto and claims de jure. Gadamer glossed dialogue as an event that summons its participants "to come with one to 'judgment'" (TM 261n). Thus the account remained evidential, if always articulated through a historical context, still "ordered to the object, a mensuratio ad rem" (TM 261). Moreover, Gadamer had distinguished what he had called his own "revival" of hermeneutics and its account of rationality of traditions from commitment to the past simpliciter, that is, from "traditionalism." Even simple reiteration would require legitimation. Here again there is no perspective (and doubtless no tradition) "in itself."

Yet the complicated remainder these developments impart with respect to problems once readily invested in the problem of empathy (and the dangers accompanying it) are apparent, bequeathing a domain divided between
action and passion, self and other, the individual and the universal, experience and judgment. In one sense, this division is the division of judgment [Urteilung] itself, as Hegel had learned from Hölderlin. Bolzano would stop the logical progression of his own Wissenschaftslehre to criticize explicitly this division, its complication, and its threat. But as Hölderlin’s original rendering claimed, what is also at stake in the equivocality of signification—to use Husserl’s terms, its ‘symbolic rhythmics’—is the question of its reduction and the possibility of a certain counter-rhythm or caesura, that is, a content irreducible to presentation. Here the phenomenological quest for adequacy and cognitive agreement, an event in which “everyone is equal to everyone else” (FTL 226), encounters its limit in the problem of difference, alterity, and incommensurability. Indeed, as Jean Hyppolite once put it, in a text that explicated the Logic of Hegel, judgment here becomes “the precarious abode of understanding which oscillates between the subjective and the objective, the empirical and the transcendental, the judgment of perception and the judgment of experience.” And, it should be added, consciousness and the unconscious, as Hegel already had seen. Hyppolite’s text is one that many saw as a parcours to the issues of “poststructuralism.” Thought would remain, as Foucault would put it, a “perilous” act whose “identity” is always articulated through difference, thus divided between self and other, sign and symbol, conscious and unconscious—and ultimately between those who possess community (communitas) and those who do not. It is at this point that phenomenological experience and its account of the community of rational agents encounters its Hobbesian ancestry in its midst, confronting there the agonistics of reason and power and the rupture of traditions anew. This would result in a complex legacy for phenomenology, the narratives and the evidence it invokes, and the communities from which it sought assurance and sought in turn to sustain.

If none of this simply dissolves the evidence that the phenomenologist seeks to interrogate or the judgments that result from this interrogation—indeed, if it still must be claimed that there are instances in which it would be irrational to judge otherwise and that we are morally obligated at times to so judge—then likewise it is true that justification and obligation equally confront both the complexity of their limits, the summons of their responsibility, and the heterogeneous interface between interpretation and community. Indeed, in many ways, as has been seen, the problem of this interface has accompanied the itinerary of phenomenology itself—one that doubtless bears thinking and rethinking.
It is just to this task of thinking and rethinking to which our authors in this volume turn. In the first part of the volume, entitled “Origin, Insight, and Explication,” John Brough begins this task by offering a careful and interesting examination of Husserl’s inquiry into the experience of time-consciousness. Focusing on Husserl’s responses to two common but opposed conceptions of time-consciousness, namely, that one can never perceive the present and that one can only perceive what is present, Brough provides the reader with an opportunity to perceive the richness of the notions of presence and absence as they appear in Husserl’s thought. Husserl’s understanding of the experiences of retention and recollection also are discussed, as well as his notion of the absolute flow of consciousness.

The chapter written by Dieter Lohmar provides an opportunity for the reader to see how Husserl’s consideration of the concept of the Life-world contributed to his critique of idealizations. Drawing upon a broad array of his works, Lohmar examines the different ways in which Husserl attempted to determine the basic and shared experience that grounds or makes meaningful the idealizations that we invoke. In addition to providing insight into the problem of idealizations in general, this chapter also explores what the implications might be of the “seeping in” of scientific concepts and perspectives into our everyday Life-world.

The question of the origin of Being and Time is the focus of the chapter by Theodore Kisiel. Going back beyond the opening pages of that work, and further back than the Introduction to the Aristotle book of 1922, Kisiel directs us to the Kriegsnotsemester of 1919. In this semester, Heidegger explored the possibility of a radicalized phenomenology and laid the groundwork for his future inquiries into the experience of Being. Combining an analysis of the major themes of that semester with an inquiry into the hints that appeared in Heidegger’s habilitation work of 1915, Kisiel provides a far-reaching and thought-provoking chapter in which the multiple directions in which Heidegger’s paths of thinking would take him become clearer.

The last chapter in this part is cast in terms of an inquiry into the cleverness that is required to do phenomenology. Here, Dominique Janicaud seeks to explore what he identifies as phenomenology’s “unavoidable tension between method and project.” He clearly identifies the dilemma inherent in the need for method, namely, that establishing rules or procedures might render phenomenology ultimately reductivist and formal, while not establishing rules might leave phenomenology so vague and flexible that it ceases to be a coherent discipline. To solve this dilemma, Janicaud suggests that phenome-
nology should establish its own notion of rigor, one that is coupled with a particular openness to phenomena. This openness is characterized as a type of aesthetic sense. Taken together, this openness and this sense of rigor should render phenomenology “too clever to be science, not clever enough to be art.”

The second part of this volume moves from exploring the broader questions of origins and interpretation that undergird these investigations and turns to consider more directly the implications of an inquiry into the boundaries of the individual and the state. To this end, Anthony Steinbock’s chapter explores the possibility of creating a nonfounded, yet transcendental, theory of intersubjectivity. After sketching out some of the difficulties inherent in Husserl’s Cartesian, and hence foundational, account of intersubjectivity, Steinbock proceeds to discuss three variant phenomenological methods: the static, the genetic, and the generative methods. The generative method, with its concentration on cultural, historical, and normative phenomena, appears to be most fruitful for this project. An examination of the notions of homeworld and alienworld within the context of this method leads Steinbock to suggest that phenomenology and the phenomenologist have a dual responsibility to be “ethically ‘critical’ of the home and ethically ‘responsible’ towards the alien.”

The chapter by H. Peter Steeves begins by investigating how Husserl’s explication of the experiences of apperception and pairing enable one not only to recognize the Other, but also to recognize multiple Others, that is, to recognize one’s own community. Steeves acknowledges the criticism that Husserl’s theory can be said to lead to a version of relativism in which intercultural understanding is impossible. In order to respond to this criticism, Steeves builds upon the analyses explored earlier to show not only that it is possible to understand various cultures, but also that one necessarily participates in a transcendent community, a community that is itself greater than the sum of its elements. In his closing section, Steeves provides some provocative suggestions for further reflection on the implications of the existence of this transcendent community.

David Kolb’s chapter explores the differing views of Heidegger and Hegel with regard to the nature and structure of the state and its role in shaping the circulation of goods and identities within it. He contrasts Hegel’s perspective—in which fixed anchors of meaning and substantiality such as the agricultural class and the craft corporation develop and hence limit circulation so that there is space for the rational exercise of political freedom—with Heidegger’s notion of das Gestell, in which there is a depthless circulation of identities and goods that may nevertheless be mediated by one’s own fini-
tude. In addition, Kolb examines the possible criteria that each thinker (and his or her successors) has available for making a critical judgment between the forms that civil society may take.

In the next chapter, Shaun Gallagher focuses on Habermas’s critique of Hegel’s political philosophy. Gallagher first shows how Hegel’s theory indicates that the particular historical reality of a nation and of its citizens limits the universality of a state. This results in a nationalism that is based upon trust and a lack of critique; a possible consequence of this nationalism is the emergence of totalitarianism. He then explores Habermas’s attempt to develop a theory of postconventional patriotism that is less trusting and that includes an element of vigorous critique and a commitment to universal, consistent values that are not shaped by the realities of a particular nation, but by a commitment to internationalism and consensus. After exposing some of the limitations in Habermas’s theory, Gallagher proposes that these limitations can be overcome by a retrieval of the concept of phronesis that mediates the ambiguity between the universal and the particular.

James Hart’s essay completes this part. In it he challenges the reader to reflect upon what it means to live as an authentic member of a political community. Drawing upon a wide array of resources, including the writings of Husserl, Thoreau, Arendt, and Dewey, Hart moves the reader beyond mere theoretical reflection to a consideration of the implications of our current practical, everyday actions. By means of an examination of the limitations of representational democracy and the commitments that we implicitly make when we pay taxes, Hart focuses our attention upon the ethical responsibility that we bear for the immoral military actions undertaken by our nation.

The third part of this volume includes three chapters that focus upon Gadamer’s experience of truth in tradition. Holly L. Wilson begins this threefold exploration by taking up the question of Gadamer’s conservatism. After summarizing how several thinkers have responded to the charge that Gadamer’s commitment to tradition makes his work irreducibly conservative, and the weaknesses that she sees in these defenses, Wilson proposes a new strategy by which this charge might be answered. This strategy builds upon what she identifies as Gadamer’s conception of the multifariousness of traditions, a perspective that is not committed to a view of tradition as a monolithic or unitary phenomenon. Wilson’s proposal is supplemented by an analysis of Gadamer’s view of language and its relationship to the Socratic and Hegelian notions of dialectic and the Christian understanding of the power of the spoken Word.
The chapter by James Risser invites the reader to reflect upon the presence of truth in the hermeneutic experience. He presents an overview of Gadamer’s analysis of the beautiful and the concept of mimesis and examines the relationship between both a copy and an image of a picture and the original picture itself. An image, Risser suggests, becomes an event of self-presentation or shining forth of what is beautiful. Proceeding from the analysis of the beautiful, Risser goes on to propose that there is an imaging of truth, an image-play in language and conversation, that is akin to a performance. Invoking the concept of “thick images” in which we become entangled, Risser suggests that this performance does not refer back to something that is more true or more real, that is, it does not represent something that must be dis-entangled. Rather, this performance is itself a site in which truth comes to fullness in the act of saying what is meant.

Lawrence Schmidt provides the final discussion of the notion of hermeneutic truth in this section. He suggests that a key concept that has not been explored fully is Gadamer’s notion of the Einleuchtende, that is, the enlightening. By examining how this concept is both similar to and different from Aristotle’s notion of phronesis and Husserl’s notion of evidence, Schmidt is led to characterize the experience of enlightening as one in which there is a shining forth of the probable truth of the thing itself. This shining forth, which can overtake one without warning, provides the ground for the judgment that distinguishes between more and less legitimate prejudices that one might have regarding what one encounters. Using the concept of enlightening to ground the notion of hermeneutic truth, Schmidt suggests some responses to several contemporary critics of Gadamer, including Rorty, Bernstein, and Caputo.

The last part in this volume includes a number of papers that explore the issue of how justice arises within a community and the question of how a community itself is defined. The first chapter is written by James Hatley. It explores the responses made by Levinas and Arendt to what is characterized as Hegel’s conception of impersonal historical judgment. In order to clarify the notion of heterogenous judgment, which is offered as a response to Hegel and which is said to form the foundation of justice, Hatley investigates Levinas’s notion of ethical judgment. Ethical judgment, grounded in an experience of an other who cannot be reduced to one’s own plans and purposes, results ultimately in an acknowledgment of one’s responsibility to the other and an offering of one’s apology. Hatley then contrasts this Levinasian notion of apology with Arendt’s conception of conscience, a critical perspective that one directs toward one’s own thinking. By illuminating the tensions
and areas of agreement that exist between these two thinkers in their shared project, Hatley enables the reader to reflect profitably on the question of the ground and limitations of ethical and political judgment.

Steven Hendley's chapter inquires into the implications of the loss of both a notion of universal emancipation and, hence, a stable and justifiable notion of one's self and of one's community. Drawing upon the work of Lyotard, Hendley suggests that two possible responses to this loss, the first, to adopt a "secondary narcissism" and to use it as a foundation for justifying one’s own behavior and for judging the behavior of others; and the second, to determine what it means to be a community within the particular, shared context in which we find ourselves, should be rejected. In order to develop an alternative response, Hendley explores Lyotard's insight that questions concerning the "we" and the context in which the "we" emerges are always problematic and remain open to discussion by competing genres of discourse. It is suggested that a shared commitment to renewed and continued questioning concerning the nature of the "we" may be the only form of consensus or dissensus that can endure and enable a community to be.

The chapter by John Protevi examines the relationship of force, law, and justice in Derrida's thought. Protevi begins with an overview of Derrida's debt to and dialogue with Hegel and his analysis of force in nature. He then examines Derrida's contention that the general text itself is a site in which there is a play and an overflow of both force and signification. Finally, concentrating on Derrida's essay "Force of Law," Protevi considers how an interplay of forces concurrently grounds and threatens to rupture political and legal institutions, both in terms of their ability to dispense justice and in terms of our understanding of their meaning.

Max Pensky's essay takes up the question of the relationship between remembrance and justice. Weaving together a reflection on Derrida's image of the haunting, ghostlike trace of memory (which whispers of violence and responsibility) with an account of Habermas's objection to the instrumentalization of memory (which enables the actions of the past to become mere history), Pensky explores the strengths and the weaknesses in the thought of both of these philosophers. More important, in so doing, Pensky bids the reader to engage in the struggle to comprehend the impossible possibility of the event of justice arising in the shadow of the Holocaust.

The chapter by Steven Vogel explores two elements of an antinomy of Western Marxism and the implications that this antinomy has for thinking about the environment. The first element, discussed by Lukács, suggests that the solution to our social crisis requires a recognition that nature and
the surrounding world are socially constructed and, in addition, an acknowledgment of our responsibility for its condition. The other element, discussed by Adorno, suggests that such "identity-thinking" must be replaced by a recognition of the radical otherness of all that lies beyond one's thought. Vogel bridges this antinomy by suggesting that the reality of our practice, that is, our always already being involved with our surrounding world despite its otherness, provides a ground for a respectful recognition of our responsibilities for and to a nature and world that is other, yet not totally independent.

Ute Guzzoni's essay provides the final chapter for this volume. Her essay commences by asking whether and in what way, in our current age, nature can present itself as an appropriate theme for philosophical inquiry. By reflecting on a portion of a poem by Rilke, and drawing on the insights of both Heidegger and Adorno, among others, Guzzoni leads the reader to consider what type of thinking is appropriate for thinking about nature. She suggests that philosophy must take up finite thinking, that is, thinking grounded in our experience of the world, sensual thinking, aesthetic thinking, indeed, thinking that is fundamentally Gelassenheit, as its proper mode. This thinking can be directed not only toward nature as it has been conceived classically, but also toward that "second nature" that appears to be particularly problematic and challenging. This second nature includes those technological processes and artifacts that, although made by human hands, have slipped from our grasp and control. Guzzoni challenges us to consider whether finite thinking, directed toward those features of our technological world that elude us and appear as emancipated, might empower us to enter into a fruitful relationship of free mutuality with these elements.

In closing, it should be noted that the papers collected in this volume derive from the annual conferences held at Villanova University and the University of Memphis. The local coordinators for these meetings were Walter Brogan and John Doody of Villanova University and Robert Bernasconi, Len Lawler, and Tom Neen of the University of Memphis. The members of the Executive Committee for these meetings were John D. Caputo, Drucilla Cornell, Arleen B. Dallery, Lenore Langsdorf, Dennis Schmidt, and Stephen H. Watson. Our thanks are offered to all of these people who helped to make those meetings successful and who thereby helped this volume to be produced.
NOTES


4. Husserl’s treatment of the paradoxes of set theory remains unpublished at this time.

5. Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978). Henceforth all references to this text will use the abbreviation FTL.


7. This history, as Scheler noted, had been undertaken quite early by Dietrich von Hildebrand. See his “Die Idee der Sittlichen Handlung,” Jahrbuch für philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, vol. III. See also Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 262. Moreover, much of Gadamer’s Truth and Method is devoted to its further elaboration. See Truth and Method, second revised edition, trans. Joel Weinheinheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroads, 1989). Henceforth all references to this text will use the abbreviation TM.


12. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 196ff. On Strauss’s view of phenomenology, and especially of Husserl and Heidegger, see “Philosophy as Rigorous Science and


16. See Adolf Reinach, “Über die apriorischen Grundlagen des buergerlichen Rechts,” *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, vol. I (1913). Husserl provided a synopsis of this work and characterized it as both a masterpiece and a classic in the history of the philosophy of law in his 1918 “Adolf Reinach: In Memoriam” (trans. Frederick Elliston and Theodore Plantinga in *Husserl’s Shorter Works*, ed. Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981]). Reinach is credited with demonstrating that in this domain there are “a priori truths in exactly the same sense in which primitive arithmetical or logical axioms are a priori” (p. 355)—a claim that will become more complex as writings in this volume will attest.


21. That Husserl recognized the link between the problem of interpretation and the problem of intersubjectivity, that moreover both were complicated problems of the ‘empathy’ at stake in the appeal of the “Origin of
Geometry” to the latter as a sufficient condition of objectivity, is evident from fragments collected on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserlianana volumes thirteen and fourteen (for example, Beilage LXVI of the latter). See Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, vol. II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).


27. TM 281. Gadamer’s texts actually manifest a great amount of ambiguity on these matters. Immediately before distancing himself from a revival of tradition, and against the Enlightenment, he apparently endorsed Romanticism at least this much: “The real force of morals, for example, is based on tradition. They are freely taken over but by no means created by a free insight or grounded on reasons” (TM 280).


32. The text in question derives from Hegel’s *Faith and Knowledge*, where, commenting upon Kant’s accounts of judgment, Hegel already had raised the problem of the copula as an identity in opposition to difference, and an identity that exceeds consciousness. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, trans. Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977), 72. This same text and Hyppolite’s commentary upon it would return in both Foucault’s and Derrida’s works, and reappears again in recent attempts to account for the heterogeneity of judgment.