CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION:
TRIBALISM AND POLITICAL DUALISM

In *The Descent of Man* Charles Darwin wrote:

There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members, who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection. (Darwin 166)¹

In 1989, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini exemplified the tribalist ethic Darwin described when he asked Muslims to sacrifice their own lives, if necessary, to execute the author of the blasphemous *Satanic Verses*, an enemy of Islam. The Iranian religious leader was immediately censured by the international community. He was criticized for condemning Salman Rushdie to death, ridiculed for thinking that the death sentence might protect the Islamic community from the invasion of Western ideas, and declared “an outlaw and enemy of all humankind” (Appignanesi and Maitland 152).

Although the ayatollah’s actions commanded attention in Europe and the United States as a gross violation of the rights of a human being, his value system is not peculiar to Islamic fundamentalism. Societies at war everywhere have demanded of their citizens the same willingness “to sacrifice themselves for the common good” in the conviction that triumph over their enemies serves their best interests and that they are on the side of truth and justice. In 1991, President George Bush, having compared Iraq’s President Saddam
Hussein to Hitler, asked that American troops in the Arabian Peninsula "selflessly confront evil for the sake of good" on behalf of "the community of nations" (Bush, "State" 258–61). By casting the conflict as one between good and evil, President Bush unified the country against Iraq and generated in the American people the same set of social priorities that Darwin associated with tribal competition: patriotism, obedience of authority, and fidelity.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines the term *patriotism* as "love of or zealous devotion to one's country." Although in peacetime love of country may be expressed in different ways, only in the context of a perceived threat from abroad does patriotism command serious attention; then it is commonly appreciated as the willingness to die on the battlefield and celebrated for its value to the whole citizenry. The poems collected in such anthologies as *Patriotism in Poetry and Prose* (1864), *Poems of American Patriotism* (1898), *American Patriotic Prose and Verse* (1917), and *The Patriotic Anthology* (1941) are mostly war poems, which honor the heroism of the nation's soldiers. The poems in turn inspire patriotic emotions in their readers, building group solidarity and allegiance.

The relationship of patriotism to warfare should be of interest to us because successful military competition, in the transition of human organization from tribal bands to a global society, may be of decreasing long-term advantage to the American people. Martyrdom, because it indicates total commitment to the group's defense, stands as an ideal in a world in which the well-being of a group is thought to depend upon its successful military competition, its ability to annihilate its enemies. In a world in which the well-being of the group is obviously dependent upon the well-being of the other constituents of the larger society, such "hard-core altruism," as Harvard's neo-Darwinian sociobiologist E. O. Wilson calls the willingness to sacrifice oneself for one's kin, may be seen as "the enemy of civilization" (E. O. Wilson 155–57).

Ethnocentrism, or "the irrationally exaggerated allegiance of individuals to their kin and fellow tribesmen," says Wilson, is "the force behind most warlike policies" (E. O. Wilson 111). The tribalist tendency of a group to assume that its customs, practices, and beliefs are the only correct ones produces "political dualism"—the understanding of the world as divided between "us" and "them"—which is conducive to warfare against groups with different cus-
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tombs, practices, and beliefs. Political dualism belongs to the model of competition, in which relationships among unlike groups are expected to be antagonistic, more competitive than cooperative. Unlike groups vie for dominance within a nation, and unlike nations vie for dominance in the world; what matters is dominance. The willingness to go to war for the group, the willingness to die for it, is the measure of devotion to it. Suppression of the enemy is the means to achieve peace.

The new transnational systems of communication, transportation, trade, and finance and the transnational environmentalist movement are forcing upon many people the acknowledgment that interdependence makes cooperation advantageous to all the global society's constituents. Although globalization is producing alliances among the world's powerful nation-states, multinational corporations, and military forces that may be considered another imperialist world order, it is also inspiring among some people the philosophy of "political holism": an appreciation of human society as a continuously evolving global system of ethnically and ideologically diverse, interdependent individuals and groups, whose interests are more likely to be advanced by cooperation than by hostile competition. Political holism is born of "soft-core altruism," the willingness to cooperate with unrelated individuals for future benefit (E. O. Wilson 155–56), and so it is opposite tribalism. Political holists, concerned for the well-being of the whole, regard the oppression of one component by another as dangerous to the political stability of the global system.

While providing incentives for negotiation and cooperation, globalization, paradoxically, intensifies tribalism because it threatens the identity and autonomy of individual cultures and nations. Tribalism is a natural response to threats from abroad, whether the threats come from other tribes or from forces of change. The fear that contact with the secular values of the West would destroy traditional ways of life motivated the Islamic revolution in Iran.

The response to globalization of intensified tribalism, be it ethnocentrism or nationalism, makes evident a dynamic that governs politics within nations and among nations: the tension between individuals and groups with a dualist model for political interaction and those with a holistic model. Within nations, for example, the tension is revealed in the animosity that militarists express toward
peace activists, whom militarists condemn as unpatriotic for their unwillingness to fight national enemies, their defiance of national authority, and their involvement in transnational causes. At one end of the continuum of cooperative behavior predominate unquestioning allegiance to the group, hostility toward outsiders, and obedience of authority; at the other, allegiance to democratic laws and principles, some of them transnational.

The purpose of this book is to investigate the way the tension between political dualism and political holism influences political discussion in the United States at a time when the international social order is being transformed into a global society. The tension structures ideas of government, arguments over foreign policy, relationships among intranational cultural groups, and concepts of patriotism. Since the same dynamic generates conflict, much of it violent, in many other parts of the world as well, the book may be seen as a case study in the confrontation of tribalist values with globalist forces.

In the book I shall be using the terms *tribalism* and *ethnocentrism* to mean unquestioning allegiance to one’s group, the belief in the inherent superiority of the group, and the tendency to view other groups as alien competitors. With the word *ethnocentrism*, I emphasize the group members’ perception of their ethnic “sameness,” whereas with the word *tribalism* I emphasize behavior.

I shall use Anthony D. Smith’s definition of the term *nation* as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (A. D. Smith 14), but I shall expand his definition of *nationalism*, “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (A. D. Smith 73), to include the concept of devotion to the interests or culture of one’s own nation. Where nationalism shares with tribalism the characteristics of absolute loyalty and belief in the group’s superiority over others, I shall use the term *nationalist patriotism*.

By the term *globalization*, I refer to the emergence of a single global society, effected by satellite communication, transnational corporations, economic interdependence, common markets, and environmentalism. While *globalism* signifies the consciousness of the
world as an interactive whole, the terms globalism and political holism are not synonyms because consciousness of the world as a single econo-political system does not necessarily include concern for the health of all the components or for the health of the natural environment. Globalism, in fact, can be seen as an imperialist ideology supportive of the “new world order,” the global economic-military-industrial complex of nations and transnational corporations that President Bush praised when he led the United Nations Coalition to war against Iraq.  

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The Rushdie incident epitomizes the difficulties all cultures will experience in the coming decades as ethnic and religious segregation yields to global integration. Ayatollah Khomeini, representing a religion and a culture whose beliefs and customs are threatened by the spread of Euro-American ideas, believed that he was defending Islamic civilization against an individual who was endangering it.

In *The Satanic Verses*, Rushdie had portrayed Muhammad’s moment of divine inspiration as the climax of a homoerotic wrestling match, when the angel’s voice spilled onto Mahound’s body; had suggested that the rules of Islam originated in the intentional mistranscription of Muhammad’s revelations; and had given characters in a brothel the names of Muhammad’s wives. In short, he had mocked what was most sacred to the Muslims in a postmodernist novel most of them were incapable of reading. He had treated as myths accounts of the world that many Muslims took to be truth, had satirized traditions they held sacred, and had shown disrespect for values they took to be absolute.

On February 14, 1989, the ayatollah issued the *fatwa* calling for Rushdie’s assassination:

> There is only one God, to whom we shall all return. I would like to inform all the intrepid Muslims in the world that the author of the book entitled *The Satanic Verses*, which has been compiled, printed and published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet and the Koran, as well as those publishers who were aware of its contents, have been sentenced to death.
I call on all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they find them, so that no one will dare to insult the Islamic sanctions. Whoever is killed on this path will be regarded as a martyr, God willing. (Quoted in Appignanesi and Maitland 68)

The ayatollah was asking that his followers admit no compromise with Rushdie. Devotion to Islam required, in his view, the willingness to die, to sacrifice one’s life for the sacred.

On February 23, the ayatollah said that God had provided for the publication of The Satanic Verses so that “the world of conceit, arrogance and barbarism would bare its true face in its long-held enmity to Islam.” Muslims must understand the action as another attempt by the “world devourers” to eradicate their religion (Appignanesi and Maitland 75).

What we are witnessing in the Khomeini-Rushdie conflict is a hostile ideological and political competition between tribalism and globalism, being played out in this particular instance as a contest between Islam and Western secularism. Benjamin R. Barber describes the relationship as “Jihad vs. McWorld”: retribalization as a reaction to the forces of global integration and uniformity. At the same time that global communication and commerce threaten to homogenize the world, individual cultures, religious sects, and ethnic minorities engage in war to preserve their identities and reinforce their communities. The struggle is intense because global television, broadcasting images of Western lifestyles, builds the desire for a higher standard of living in peoples whose traditional customs and values would be destroyed by the importation of Western products and the adoption of Western capitalism.

While Islamic fundamentalists viewed the ayatollah’s edict as an endeavor to protect Islamic society from the Western “world devourers,” Americans and western Europeans viewed it as the most extreme form of censorship. On February 22, Article 19, a London-based international organization dedicated to monitoring censorship, joined American PEN and the Authors Guild in sponsoring a public reading of The Satanic Verses. At this well-attended New York meeting, Article 19 called the ayatollah “an outlaw and enemy of all humankind” (Appignanesi and Maitland 152), various writers denounced his actions as terrorism, and author Gay Talese led the
five hundred people crowded inside the building and the three thousand people gathered outside in the Lord’s Prayer (Decter 20). In early March, the United States Senate passed Resolution 72 declaring its “commitment to protect the right of any person to write, publish, sell, buy and read books without fear of intimidation and violence” and repudiating “religious intolerance and bigotry.”

Rushdie and his supporters believed that they were defending an ideal that was universally desirable: freedom of the press. But their advocacy of it constituted an imposition of Western values upon the Islamic Middle East; and because freedom of the press inevitably produces change, their promotion of it meant tacit approval of the destruction of Iran’s traditional way of life. The opposition to the ayatollah’s fatwa, in the name of the free exchange of ideas everywhere, was not free of Western chauvinism, as the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer at the PEN meeting revealed.

Purity and Mongrelization

A year after Ayatollah Khomeini had issued his fatwa, Rushdie described the ayatollah’s action as a resistance by “apostles of purity” to the “forces of mongrelisation.” The Satanic Verses, he said, celebrated the forces of “hybridity, impurity, intermingling,” of “mass migration”; it showed the danger of “the absolutism of the pure.”

Throughout human history, the apostles of purity, those who have claimed to possess a total explanation, have wrought havoc among mere mixed-up human beings. Like many millions of people, I am a bastard child of history. Perhaps we all are, black and brown and white, leaking into one another, as a character of mine once said, like flavours when you cook. (Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands 394)

Rushdie is a political holist, uncommitted to Islam or to any other religion, and without absolute allegiances. In celebrating hybridity, impurity, and intermingling, he celebrated the forces that destroy all longstanding cultural identities. He wrote The Satanic Verses not for Muslims but for the world.
In October 1988, four months before the ayatollah had pronounced Rushdie’s death sentence, Syed Shahabuddin, a member of the Indian Parliament, saw the dissension developing over The Satanic Verses as a conflict between the religious East and the secular West: “Call us primitive, call us fundamentalists, call us superstitious barbarians, call us what you like,” he declared to Rushdie, “but your book only serves to define what has gone wrong with the Western civilisation—it has lost all sense of distinction between the sacred and the profane” (Appignanesi and Maitland 38).

Shahabuddin may have been right to fear the influence of “Western civilisation” on Islam, but he was mistaken in seeing the opposition as a conflict between the religious East and the secular West. Western civilization has its sacred symbols as well, its symbols of identity. And although Americans, for example, may imperialistically disrespect or ignore the sacred symbols and texts of non-Western civilization, perhaps failing to appreciate their emotive power for other people, many protect the expressions of their own religion or national culture with zeal equal to that of the Muslims. In 1988, American Christian fundamentalists voiced as much outrage at the release of Martin Scorsese’s Last Temptation of Christ for its unorthodox portrayal of Jesus as Muslims did over the publication of The Satanic Verses, even though The Last Temptation of Christ did not mock Christianity. Some protesters interpreted the distribution of the film to be not just an insult to their religion but a dangerous and ungodly act. And in 1989, public anger over an artwork titled What Is the Proper Way to Display a U.S. Flag?, which invited viewers to step on the flag, and a Supreme Court ruling that flag burning was protected by the First Amendment moved the U.S. Congress to pass legislation prohibiting “desecration” of the American flag.8 Advocates of the flag legislation, like the advocates of mandatory recitation in the public schools of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, accused their adversaries of being unpatriotic.

Each of these conflicts erupted from the natural tribalist defense of a group against disruptive external forces. The defenders of the sacred—of the biblical account of Jesus’s life, of the flag, of the Pledge—saw their opponents, in Shahabuddin’s words, as having “lost all sense of distinction between the sacred and the profane.”
While many of the advocates of flag protection and the mandatory Pledge of Allegiance were not ideological purists, their posture in the national debate was that of protectors of the faith against those lacking proper commitment, whom they judged morally deficient. The protectors of the faith feared the promotion of tolerance and free speech for the danger it posed to their group's cohesion. They also feared the destruction of the group's longstanding identity.

The promoters of tolerance and free speech were acting as citizens of the world, whose desire for the unrestricted exchange of ideas across group boundaries supposedly superseded any "hard-core" allegiance to their own group. Like Rushdie they saw their opponents as "apostles of purity," dangerous to a global society. But their defense of freedom of the press signaled disrespect for other groups' "sacred" ceremonies, texts, icons, and beliefs; and their championing of the unrestricted exchange of ideas—political, aesthetic, and scientific—was for some also promotion of the values of their own group, Western society, for which free speech has been an ideal. Liberal societies officially sanction the unrestricted exchange of ideas and officially tolerate "mongrelisation." In a global society the confrontation of liberalism with ideological conservatism, which has always structured local and national politics, has global implications for cultural identities.

What becomes evident in the many cases in which "apostles of purity" battle advocates of mongrelization is that the relationship is an inevitable consequence of cultural evolution. Whenever cultural change endangers a group's identity, that group will defend its "purity" against outsiders who threaten destruction. Even when cultural change is brought by global forces, an endangered group will define an enemy—usually another group—to occupy the role of mongrelizer. Not to define an enemy is of course to capitulate. So the effort to preserve group integrity leads to political dualism.

Clashes between defenders of the sacred and defenders of free speech—or between "apostles of purity" and advocates of mongrelization, or between ideological conservatives and liberals—are not unique to the late twentieth century. But these particular controversies—over The Satanic Verses, The Last Temptation of Christ, and the flag artwork—alert us to the almost insoluble problems that will arise with global social change. Can groups that have absolutistic conceptions of morality and truth live peaceably in or
with societies that encourage tolerance of different opinions and behaviors? Tolerance is an abhorrent ideology to absolutists; it signifies disbelief. In the age of global communication, can any culture maintain intact its traditional beliefs and customs without censorship, without repression? Is intensified tribalism, whether it be ethnocentrism or nationalism, an inevitable response to mongrelization?

Of course, mongrelization is simply a way to characterize the natural process of human interaction over time. Human society, like nonhuman nature, has never been “pure.” As Darwin showed in 1859 in the *Origin of Species*, there are no immutable species types; there is no eternal order of things. Nature is characterized by continuous change. Races are simply populations of individuals that have remained isolated long enough to develop distinct gene pools and distinct phenotypes. Geographical barriers separated groups of people physically, but then linguistic and religious differences further constrained social interaction, creating distinguishable genetic and cultural identities and establishing a correspondence of culture with race. Ethnocentrism, in deterring exogamy, protected cultural and racial identities. Over time, the diverse populations acquired the appearance of racial or cultural purity, worth defending, many people believed, against the forces of mongrelization.

But just as geographical and cultural conditions produced the genetic and cultural isolation of populations, new conditions will produce their genetic and cultural interaction, changing racial as well as cultural identities. Environmental conditions allowed populations to develop distinct beliefs, values, social practices, and languages; when environmental conditions change, the cultures will change as well in their interaction with one another. That is what is happening now. New varieties are developing.

The concept of cultural purity, like the concept of immutable species, is deeply rooted in religious notions of an eternal order transcendent to the world we know. And because it is reinforced by ethnocentrism and the need for psychic and social stability, it is tenacious. The evolutionist concept of mongrelization, at the other end of the political spectrum, is born of the intellectual awareness that stasis is unnatural. The tension between the desire for cultural stability and the recognition of flux as natural both in the biosphere and in the sociosphere, a tension experienced even by the globalists,
structures many of the social quarrels today, within nations as well as between nations. What makes difficult the transition to a cooperative global society is the naturalness of ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and political dualism.

**Nationalism and Religion**

The perception of "sameness," whether in a tribe, an ethnic group, or a nation, results not simply from the group's common skin color, language, physical location, or ancestry, but also from ideological forces, which function through symbolic systems to define groups and effect group cohesion. Such ideological forces as nationalism and religion owe their power to the human desire for group identity. Nationalism, in fact, is not unlike religion in its effect upon individuals, as well as in its dependence upon a set of ceremonies, texts, icons, and beliefs to distinguish the group from its supposedly inferior rivals. Nationalist patriotism is akin to religious persuasion insofar as it involves uncritical acceptance of the group's ideals.

For example, the flags, anthems, parades, oaths, memorials, and celebrations that build a national identity have counterparts in the symbols, rituals, and attitudes of Christianity. Both Christianity and American nationalism have their holy days. Like Easter, Christmas, and other religious holidays, the Fourth of July and Memorial Day are national festivals, in which Americans celebrate the privilege of citizenship in the United States and honor those who have sacrificed their lives in defense of the country. Parallel to the Apostle's Creed, which is central to Christian liturgy, is the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag. Parallel to the image of the cross, sacred to Christians, is the image of the flag, held sacrosanct by most Americans; neither is to be treated casually; both are to be handled ritualistically. Both are signs of identity. There are religious societies dedicated to protecting the religion's sacred symbols and patriotic societies dedicated to protecting the nation's sacred symbols (see Hayes). Missionary Christianity sought to save pagans; European imperialism sought to bring civilization to primitive peoples; both were founded upon an ethnocentric faith in the correctness of their groups' values, customs, and beliefs.
Both in nationalism and in religion, a set of narratives unifies the group by indoctrinating its members. Christianity is underpinned by New Testament explanations for its superiority over other belief systems. American nationalism employs a number of stories—about the discovery of America, the Constitutional Convention, the winning of the West, our leadership in the defeat of the Nazis, our victory in the Persian Gulf War—that bolsters our national loyalty and our belief in the superiority of the American way of life. Critics of traditional accounts of America’s past are often accused of not loving their country, just as critics of Christian dogma are often accused of not loving God.

Defenders of dogma treat critics with hostility because their group’s solidarity is at stake. The narratives are codes of identity that structure the way the group’s members think of themselves, of the group, and of the world. As Wilson says in his discussion of religion, “To the extent that the reigning code has been sanctified and mythologized, the majority of the people regard it as beyond question and disagreement is defined as blasphemy” (E. O. Wilson 186). To challenge the truth of such narratives, or to parody them, as Rushdie did the stories of the Koran, is to threaten the group’s cohesion and, consequently, its long-term survivability.

Such ceremonies, symbols, icons, creeds, and narratives develop commitment, ostensibly to God in the case of religion but actually to the group’s ideology. Many individuals relinquish willingly, to a certain degree, the psychic or social independence they might otherwise have, obtaining pleasure from surrendering themselves to the more powerful—to their church, to their priest, to their fatherland, to their political leaders; in so doing, they obtain a socially acceptable identity and derive personal strength from their engagement in a cause. By shifting some responsibility for their lives to their leaders, they increase their leaders’ ability to control the group and thereby increase the group’s ability to compete militarily with others (see E. O. Wilson 176, 185–88). To the extent that they see their commitment to the group as a moral commitment to a transcendent ideal, they will view their commitment as desirable for everybody. Since commitment to the group benefits the group in bellicose competition, group members will consider lack of commitment to be treachery—whether atheism, infidelity, apostasy, disobedience,
anti-authoritarianism, perfidy, or treason—deserving of punishment or ostracism.

The comparison of nationalism to religion shows that nationalism is, in effect, a kind of religion, obtaining its power from collective belief. It establishes transcendent ideals and offers individuals membership in a group; it also creates group identity in terms of the group’s differences from other groups. Because of its ideal of solidarity, with the accompanying presumption that cooperation ought to be among those who are the “same,” nationalism promotes antagonism toward those who are “different.” It is conducive to peaceful, nondominant relationships among unlike nations. If tribalism—in its many forms—is as deeply embedded in the human psyche as Darwin and Wilson believe it to be, because until now it has been evolutionarily advantageous, then the global technological, political, social, cultural, and economic revolution underway will be accompanied by much violence, for a community that comprises the entire human race will have components quite unlike each other. As long as nations instill in their citizenry a belief in their superiority over unlike other nations, international relations will be characterized by rivalry. The only foreseeable check on antagonistic rivalry is international interdependence.

**Political Holism**

In his 1940s essay “The Land Ethic,” wildlife ecologist Aldo Leopold described the history of Western ethics as a continuous expansion of one’s “community.” Defining an ethic as “a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence,” which originates in “the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of cooperation,” he stated that all ethics rest upon the premise that “the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts” (Leopold 202–3). Instincts prompt the individual to compete for a place in the community, but ethics prompt the individual also to cooperate with other members, “perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for.” In the course of three thousand years, the idea of one’s community had evolved from one’s tribe or social class to encompass all humans; eventually it would include the “land”
itself. "The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land" (Leopold 204).

According to Leopold’s theory, when individuals think of the tribe as their ethical community, they will voluntarily accept certain limitations on their freedom in order to enhance the tribe’s well-being; they will cooperate with other tribal members for their own long-term benefit—for example, to preserve a place in the tribe. When they conceive of their nation as their community, they will likewise accept certain limitations on their freedom to enhance the nation’s well-being. Once they see that they are dependent not just on other members of their human community but on the “land” itself, individuals will expand their ethical community to include the land, abandoning their traditional Western role of “conqueror of the land-community” to become “plain member and citizen of it” (Leopold 204).

Leopold’s vision has been extraordinarily influential among environmentalists, who understand human society and nonhuman nature as composing a single interactive socio-biotic whole, a system for which we humans have moral responsibility. We are the only species capable of intentionally modifying the system. The effect on the planet’s atmosphere and hydrosphere of the actions of individual nations and cultures has in recent years made evident to scientists throughout the world that the planet’s many different peoples are interdependent, in need of cooperation with one another and with the land. The global society, developing long after his death, confirms Leopold’s theory that the recognition of interdependence is the basis for the definition of one’s ethical community. Now the concept of “human rights” is widely accepted.

Leopold is a political holist, for whom the Western dualism of culture and nature has fostered attitudes destructive of nonhuman nature, attitudes which will, in the long run, jeopardize human existence. Like environmentalists, holists have a way of thinking about the world that is based on the ecological concept of nature. In holism, everything must be considered in terms of its function in multiple dynamic systems. Human communities evolve in relation to each other just as do the constituents of ecosystems. There is no transcendent ideal order governing either nature or culture and no genetically static population of humans. Political holists
believe in no natural hierarchy of peoples, races, or nations, have no typological concept of any population's identity, and see diversity as natural. Their preference for cooperation over competition as a mode of social interaction is based on the ecological principle that survival of the diverse components of a complex system requires cooperation.

Political holism is thus an ideology, a vision of social reality as a continuously evolving system of diverse, interdependent individuals, cultures, and nations in which the long-term interests of any one constituent of the system may best be advanced by cooperation with the others. To the political holist, for whom the health of any single group potentially affects the health of all the others, the individual—person, culture, or nation—gains from social contracts made among the unlike constituents of the whole. The health of a group, like that of an organism, is defined by the productive interaction of all its members. Environmentalists, because they see humans as part of a sociobiotic planetary system, seek a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship with the land. Environmentalism is an aspect of political holism.

The patriotism that is compatible with political holism is the kind that former Attorney General Ramsey Clark defined as “a personal commitment to make one’s country honest and just in all its acts” and to “motivate the whole country to be as good a neighbor in the community of nations as the conscience of individuals motivates them to be in the communities where they live” (Clark, “Patriotism” 81). Neighborliness involves not aggression but negotiation in cases of conflict of interests, not intransigent support of one’s country’s immediate interests but compromise for the long-term good of all parties. The means to achieve peace is the assurance of justice for all, not suppression of the enemy. Such patriotism necessitates, at times, criticism of one’s own country.

Although its evolutionary advantage to groups may not have been obvious until the emergence of the global society, political holism is founded on “soft-core altruism,” which, as Wilson argues, is of evolutionary advantage to individuals. Ultimately, soft-core altruism is more beneficial to individuals and more productive of social harmony than hard-core altruism because it allows for negotiation among a group’s unlike components. In a global society, composed of unlike groups, political holism in individuals may be expressed
as ideological independence, anti-authoritarianism, an absence of chauvinism, and a willingness to cooperate with members of different—that is, unlike—groups.

Yet to political dualists, cooperation with individuals and groups that are “different” is dangerous. Since in their model, the model of competition, difference means difference in rank or worth, for a nation to restrict its own freedom of action in favor of the health of a group of nations is to lose its position of dominance, to lose its control over resources beyond its borders; it is to risk its prosperity. In political dualism, to refuse to conquer is to be conquered.

Political dualists, for whom patriotism means unquestioning allegiance to the group, are therefore distrusted not only of “foreigners” but also of their fellow citizens who are not as apparently patriotic as they. For example, to political dualists, members of international peace organizations, who would settle disputes through compromises and social contracts among unlike peoples, appear to be not only “soft on the enemy” but also dangerous, capable of weakening the nation’s resolve to fight. Non-conformists, those who do not conform ideologically or behaviorally to traditional standards, who show disrespect for political or social authority and thereby undermine national unity, are likewise unpatriotic; in the mind of the hard-core patriot, they are not good citizens. Nor are environmentalists. Environmentalists, who wish to relinquish the role of “conqueror of the land-community” to become “plain member and citizen of it,” are equally traitorous, if not foolish; in advocating limitation of human beings’ freedom of action, they are betraying their species. In the competitive model, conquest is the means to ensure survival. Cooperation makes one vulnerable to conquest by others.

**Globalization**

The predominant social issue of our time is thus the tension, apparent within cultures and among cultures, between tribalism and the force of globalization, between the desire for purity and the force of mongrelization, between political dualism and political holism. It results from the expansion of the individual’s ethical community, the community within which the individual willingly cooperates to further his or her competitive viability, to include more and
more culturally, ethnically, and ideologically unlike constituents. Global economic interdependence, global communication, global migration, and the problems caused by global pollution increase both the need of human society for cooperative relationships that extend beyond communities of "like" individuals and the desire of individuals to preserve intact the familiar rituals, customs, beliefs, religion, language, and even color of the group to which they belong. At the turn of the twenty-first century, intercultural and international cooperation is simultaneously vital to cultures and nations and destructive of cultures' and nations' longstanding identities. When unlike groups intermingle, each is irreversibly changed.

Leopold's explanation for cooperation is not incompatible with Darwin's argument that natural selection produced the patriotism, fidelity, and obedience that enhance a tribe's competitiveness. Nor is it incompatible with Wilson's observation that while tending to be ethnocentric, human beings will make social contracts for their own long-term benefit. Leopold is saying that humans will make social contracts within the "community," which in the course of time has expanded to encompass the whole of our species. Where Wilson departs from Leopold is in his emphasis on the relationship between the individual's cooperative instincts and the size of the community. For Leopold, interdependence, whatever the size of the group, induces the desire to cooperate. For Wilson, the size of the group is critical, because of the psychic need for group identification. The size of the community is inversely proportional to the narcissistic gratification an individual obtains from identifying with it, Wilson says; the larger the group, the less cohesive are the members' bonds and the greater the probability that the groups' members will form subgroups (Wilson 163).

Within the United States the principle appears to hold as well. The efforts to preserve ethnic and racial identities—such as Native American, Mexican-American, and African-American—are a response to threats of amalgamation. So is the resurgence of belligerent white racism, seen in the actions of the Ku Klux Klan and the neofascist groups. Native speakers of Spanish, for example, who know that their cultural traditions and beliefs are embedded in their language, wish to keep their language alive in the United States, while many native speakers of English, for whom the iden-
tity of the United States is embedded in English, support the English-only movement, which aims to preserve English as America’s “native” tongue. As the country’s population becomes more racially and ethnically diverse, as its citizens become more mongrelized, and as the society becomes too large for individuals to obtain narcissistic gratification from identifying with the nation as a whole, it will not be unusual for individuals to maintain or reestablish social ties with those they perceive to be of their own kind. Their hostility to groups that would weaken their own group bonds will mark the depth of their desire for such group identification.

To overcome such an instinctual inclination as political dualism will require a conscious acknowledgment of its long-term disadvantage in a global society. Although it necessitates resistance to ethnocentric impulses, both for the individual and for the society, that acknowledgment may become increasingly common, not only because of the interdependence of national economies but also because of the widespread intermingling of races and cultures. Within decades, few of the world’s cultures will not have been mongrelized. It is this force of mongrelization—the introduction into traditional cultures of “foreign” races, ideas, beliefs, and customs, the global dispersal of family members, and intercultural and interracial marriages—that will weaken political dualism.

Education, just as it combats superstitions, also will diminish the power of ethnocentrism, as it enlightens individuals to what human beings of all cultures share. Knowledge of human and cultural variation in the global population will both enlarge individuals’ category of “the same” and increase individuals’ tolerance for “the different.” In developing individuals’ sense of their own uniqueness and their own potential for thought and action, education increases individuals’ ideological independence from their political authorities and from their groups. Consequently, education may disunite the group, making authoritarian control of the group difficult. Because education is ideology laden, battles for the control of a group’s educational institutions will be inescapably political.

Political dualism and political holism are thus competing ideologies. They are also, finally, abstractions, at the poles of a continuum of social behavior. Ecologist Eugene Odum applies to political behavior the ecological axiom that organisms compete under some circumstances and cooperate under others, that neither competition
nor cooperation characterizes all of any organism's behavior (Odum, *Ecology* 178). Efforts to preserve cultural identities, like efforts to preserve individual rights, will compete with efforts to establish a peaceful global society, for which the individual cultures and nations must willingly compromise. Political holism is an ideology driven by globalization, but it will always be contested by tribalism of some sort.