INTRODUCTION

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Within days of the collapse of the Berlin wall, marking the end of the Cold War in Europe, in December 1989 the U. S. armed forces intervened massively and unilaterally in Panama to overthrow its government. These twinned events call attention to the themes of continuity and change at the same moment in international history and remind us of the persistence of U. S. military intervention in the greater Caribbean region across time and circumstances.

In the recent past, the United States also intervened in Grenada in 1983 and in Haiti in 1994. Compared to the intervention in Panama, these two other interventions call attention to a third theme in the region’s history: under specific circumstances, other governments are prepared to join the United States to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of a neighboring country to advance goals they hold dear. In Grenada, U. S. forces were joined by those from Jamaica, Barbados, Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, and Antigua; in Haiti, the United States acted under the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. Collective military action came to play a significant role in the Caribbean at the end of the twentieth century.

The Caribbean has hosted some of the most decisive confrontations in the history of the United States as a world power. The United States had to secure the region for the safe passage of its ships during World War I and World War II to enable the successful deployment of U. S. forces to defeat Germany’s military might. And, in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union came closer to a nuclear confrontation than at any other time since nuclear bombs had been dropped on Japan in 1945.
The Caribbean, in short, is very much a part of the history of international security in our times, as it has been through centuries past. But the question of Caribbean security matters, above all, to its own people, who have been fought over and invaded by major powers since a small Spanish flotilla blundered into its waters in 1492. Even as the millennium comes to a close, the legacies of centuries of colonial rule remain evident in the Caribbean, where several island countries remain formal dependencies of the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and the United States.

The Caribbean's insecurities, today, as in centuries past, stem from far more than the confrontations amidst the major powers, however. Among governments, there remain serious boundary issues that have occasionally threatened to become reasons for war. The Dominican Republic and Haiti, Venezuela and Guyana, and Nicaragua and Colombia exemplify classic and still unresolved ancient interstate border disputes. In the Caribbean, serious military events have occurred at various times pertaining to Cuba. Cuba was at the heart of the U.S.-Soviet struggle in 1962, and it was the object of a U.S.-sponsored exile invasion in 1961; U.S. and Cuban forces fought each other on Grenadian soil in 1983; and Cuba sank a Bahamian Coast Guard ship in international waters in 1980 and shot down two unarmed civilian aircraft, also over international waters, in 1996.

The most common sources of insecurity in the Caribbean affect the quotidian experiences of ordinary people. The societies of most Caribbean countries are deeply affected by the spread of transnational crime, directly connected to the boom in illegal drug consumption in the United States since the late 1960s. Caribbean countries are ideally located on the transit routes of cocaine traffickers from the producing centers in South America. The spread of violence related to drug trafficking threatens to overwhelm the governments of the smaller islands and undermine and corrupt the governments of all of the islands.

Suppose, however, that we limit the word security to instances that involve the deliberate use of force for allegedly rational ends. This would include the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, as well as the violent actions of drug traffickers in the same broad category. There are, nonetheless, many other sources of insecurity in the Caribbean, as seen by governments and individuals in the region.

Hundreds of thousands of people from the islands migrate illegally to some other country every year; many are caught and turned back, others drown, but many others make the journey successfully. Such migration poses starkly the incapacity of governments to control their borders and the grave risk to the safety of those who seek to make the journey. The Caribbean suffers also from severe environmental problems. Deforestation and land erosion in Haiti, for example, threaten the livelihood and sur-
vival of an entire country, motivating pressures for emigration as a result. And Caribbean peoples are regularly victims of natural disasters, such as hurricanes, volcanoes, and earthquakes.

In this book, we will explore the connection between security themes, narrowly defined, and a panoply of processes, events, and circumstances that enrich our understanding of the conditions of this region and its people. It may be worth it to identify some of these overarching concerns that go beyond security issues.

THE OLD AND THE NEW

The Economy

Since the late fifteenth century, the Caribbean has been deeply integrated in the world economy. The concept of the "globalization" of the economy is often cited as a late twentieth-century phenomenon, but it has been an essential concern of life, work, and production in the Caribbean for over half a millennium. In the Caribbean, moreover, such globalization has always gone hand in hand with production specialization—as true of the sugar plantations of old as of the Club Med tourist enclaves today.

The principal shift in recent times in the Caribbean’s political economy stems from the retreat of the world’s major powers in their commitment to shield in some fashion the economies of the Caribbean from the gale winds of international market forces. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect on January 1, 1994, groups the United States, Canada, and Mexico; it greatly reduces the worth of U.S. and Canadian trade preferences for Caribbean countries codified in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Canadian-Caribbean Agreement (CARIBCAN), respectively. Similarly, the European Union’s Lomé Convention trade preferences for Caribbean bananas have been under sustained and increasingly effective attack by a coalition that has included the United States and other governments and firms, many within the European Union (EU). The Soviet Union collapsed, and with it disappeared its erstwhile subsidies to Cuba. In short, the Caribbean’s economy, always globalized, is today more internationally vulnerable.

The Caribbean has been an arena for the practical application of new technologies and for business innovation. Damnable as it was in its devastating effects on human beings, the Caribbean’s slave-based agricultural plantations were once models of international competitive efficiency. But
also at mid-millennium, the Caribbean was the site of impressive technological improvements in navigation and naval warfare. In the early twentieth century, its people built and Panama hosted a new interoceanic canal. And in the 1950s, Fidel Castro demonstrated how to make a revolution on television, in a country wired helpfully for sound and image.

In the 1990s, financial specialization, electronic banking, and innovative design of financial regulations have generated spectacular growth on many of the islands; this strategy has long been of critical importance to Panama’s development. Though most of these have been lawful activities, they have also incubated international money laundering. Efficient law-abiding firms continue to coexist with illegal ones in the Caribbean, however, today, all are principally in the service sector.

Environment and Health

Scholars of international relations at times refer to a new international agenda, the environment most prominently on it. Yet concerns about the environment have always been part of the region’s very being. Caribbean peoples know with utter certainty that hurricanes will arrive in the summer and autumn every year, though they never know the exact moment when these monsters will strike. The damage from these events has been incalculable.

Today, there are additional concerns about the environment. The extent of soil erosion on some of the islands is alarming. The potential effects of global warming as a result of changes in the world’s climate gravely threaten small islands. At the minimum, the beaches that are essential for tourism may be washed away; at the worst, an entire country could disappear. For some Caribbean islands, consequently, changes in global climate are as important as the effects of nuclear war. The rise in international concern about the environment has also injected many new actors into the Caribbean, principally nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with specific causes to advance.

The Caribbean, moreover, was founded on an epidemiological catastrophe. The diseases brought by the Europeans devastated the indigenous peoples who had not had time to develop natural immunities. They were replaced by Europeans, South and East Asians, and especially by Africans. Today, the Caribbean is possibly on the edge of a second epidemiological catastrophe through the spread of AIDS, a problem already severe in Haiti and Puerto Rico and rapidly expanding through all of the islands (except Cuba, whose controls have remained tough, intrusive, and effective).
Civil Society

Despite the best efforts of some of the first European conquerors and subsequent slave owners, the Caribbean has long featured a vibrant civil society marked especially by extensive voluntary and involuntary migration and the deep commitments of many to religious and philosophical communities of many kinds. In the 1990s, the Caribbean witnesses the wedding between some forms of migration and the spread of transnational criminality, as well as the exacerbation of religious interdenominational competition, nearly everywhere, but especially in Puerto Rico and Trinidad. The secular NGOs, moreover, recall to some degree the missionaries of old—committed, focused, resourceful, creative, generous, bearers of new wisdom, but also occasionally ignorant, arrogant, self-righteous, and pursuing agendas defined in the first instance from concerns derived outside of the region.

To the great dismay of European missionaries at mid-millennium and of governments ever since, informality has been a long-standing marker in Caribbean attitudes and behavior. Informality has applied to sex partnerships for centuries, where the census at times reports that the number of “free unions” exceeds that of formalized marriages. Informality is evident in religious practices, where Caribbean peoples have borrowed, invented, adapted, and preserved a joyful and complex variety of religious beliefs and practices. Informality is equally notable in linguistic practices, where Creole languages have been constructed on most islands to coexist with the languages imported from Europe.

Businesses that operate profitably and on a grand scale beyond the reach of government regulation, and nonstate actors armed with weapons and resources that challenge governments, have long been part of the Caribbean scene. They once were called smugglers and pirates, but they always have included many small businesses and individuals who consider themselves “good people,” though they operate beyond the reach of the law. Informal economies and informal armies are part of this region’s past and present. Today’s most worrisome heirs of this informality are, of course, the violent drug traffickers.

Politics

Contrary to its reputation for chaotic politics, the Caribbean has featured lasting stable rulers. Rafael Leónidas Trujillo and Joaquín Balaguer in the Dominican Republic, François and Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti, Fidel Castro in Cuba, Eric Williams in Trinidad, Forbes Burnham in Guyana,
Eugenia Charles in Dominica, the Bird family in Antigua, and Luis Muñoz Marín in Puerto Rico are all extremely different from each other on many dimensions but one—they governed their countries for a very long time.

More impressively, the Anglophone Caribbean, along with Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica represent the single set of countries, regionally defined, in the so-called Third World that have sustained democratic political systems for the longest period of time, witnessing repeated and peaceful turnovers of power from government to opposition. In more recent years, however, there is greater uncertainty about the future politics of Haiti, Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia, and also about the evidence of growing criminal violence in several Caribbean and Central American countries, as well as in Colombia and Venezuela. In terms of political stability or democratic practices, there is the worry that the future may be worse than the past.

Governments in the Caribbean have always had high ambitions, though more limited capacities. The old forts—vast in Cartagena de Indias, more modest in St. Kitts—recall the efforts of many to make their lands invulnerable to international forces. The history of each records several instances when such mighty fortifications were overcome. The governments of the region have sought to shape their societies and their economies to varying degrees—Cuba the most among them—but they have been discovering in the 1990s that their limitations and incapacies may require them at last to curtail their statist preferences. Even “fortress Cuba,” Fidel Castro has discovered to his great reluctance, has been compelled to recognize the limitations of its state’s hoped-for omnipotence.

In response to intrusive international attempts to organize behavior in the Caribbean in the times of colonial empires or, later on, when supposedly independent governments in the region were allegedly not up to the job, many peoples in the Caribbean, and often many of the governments, have cooperated little with outsiders—not even with other governments in the region. The Caribbean can be defined irreverently as a set of islands with their backs to the sea, and to each other. Even some of the countries on the mainland—whether Guyana or Venezuela—could be described as islands surrounded by land, and equally marked for having turned their backs on their neighbors. Faced with relentless and persistent insularity, governments in the Anglophone Caribbean and more gradually those of other countries have been looking for forms of collaboration. The Anglophones began to cooperate in the 1950s. Cuba and Venezuela “discovered” the Caribbean politically in the 1970s, Colombia did so in the 1980s, and U.S. policy in the 1980s forced the Caribbean and Central American governments to acknowledge that others perceived them as part of the same “Basin.” The Association of Caribbean States is the most recent and far-
reaching of the efforts of governments of the region to act as though they were united by the sea that washes up on their shores.

Colonized for centuries, and the object of U. S. intervention in this century, the Caribbean remains the object of sustained international tutelage over the economic practices of its governments (the “tutors” are the international financial institutions, the major European governments, Canada, and the United States) and also the object of international pressures to foster or consolidate democracy, and especially for fair and free elections—pressures evident in the 1990s, especially in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, and Suriname. Outside powers contribute less to the Caribbean than in times past, but seem to demand no less.

In this book, we explore several dimensions of Caribbean security and insecurity in the broad context previously suggested. We focus special attention on the islands but also consider to some degree most of the other countries on the mainland that border on the Caribbean sea. We do so because the themes sketched earlier retain special importance today and in the years ahead.

James N. Rosenau’s chapter views the Caribbean as a specific example of a much broader international pattern. He argues that the Caribbean can be viewed as an expression of a central tension that pervades world affairs, namely, the tension that derives from the simultaneity of pressures toward centralization, integration, and globalization on the one hand, and those pulling in decentralizing, fragmenting, and localizing directions on the other. These tensions, he avers, are powerful and continuous. He analyzes the components of these international and domestic collisions by examining the likelihood of cooperation and conflict as well as the prospects both for state-centric and mult centric social and political organization. He has coined the term *fragmegration* to label this mixture of processes at work in the Caribbean and, more generally, in the international system.

Anthony T. Bryan takes a different approach. He focuses directly on the Caribbean to discern the major challenges faced by the governments and peoples of the region. He explores the shift in the region’s political economy, leading countries toward market openings, and also assesses the renewed strain on democratic governance in various countries (Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela) where attempts have been made to overthrow governments by force and where such attempts have succeeded (Haiti). He notes, moreover, that the quality of democratic practice has weakened, as evidenced in declining voter turnouts, at the same moment that the overextended state is compelled to reduce many of its activities. He also calls attention to the Caribbean’s premier international issues: migration,
drug trafficking, the environment, the defense of democracy, and international trade integration.

Andrés Serbin links Rosenau's and Bryan's chapters by exploring first the global challenges that broad international trends pose for the region and second the process of regionalization within the Caribbean Basin that has been deepening interconnectedness among the countries of the region. In so doing, Serbin challenges older international relations approaches that are insufficiently sensitive to the multiltered reality of the Caribbean, long embedded in the international system, enveloped by global economic trends, but also rooted in the particularity of distinctive societies. Serbin explores in some detail various creative efforts to deepen and widen Caribbean regional integration, paying special attention to the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), established in July 1994. The ACS includes the islands (Cuba among them) and the countries of the mainland touched by the Caribbean Sea, except the United States. Serbin analyzes the attempt of the ACS to function as an entity in itself and also as a bridge connecting other integration schemes in the Americas to foster economic growth and consolidate democratic governance.

Jorge I. Domínguez focuses more narrowly on the Caribbean as an international political system to examine aspects of continuity and change. He argues that many aspects of the Caribbean's international experience have long-standing historical roots, among them the presence of superpower military hegemony, political and economic polycentricity, unauthorized international migration, and the powerful violence of nonstate military forces. The "units" in this international subsystem have never been just states. The Caribbean has also long been the object of attempts by major powers to impose international norms on the region, be it the abolition of the slave trade in the nineteenth century or the defense of markets in the late twentieth century. Domínguez argues, however, that the Caribbean is witnessing three major international structural changes: the military hegemony of one superpower is at last uncontested, quasistate military forces are no longer significant, and nonstate military forces have become more important than at any time since the Napoleonic Wars. He notes that the normative disposition to international intervention (military, political, economic) in the Caribbean also has risen markedly.

Ivelaw L. Griffith explores the geography of drug trafficking in the Caribbean. He locates the Caribbean as the spatial vortex of this traffic and demonstrates the ease of operation for international criminal syndicates. He identifies in some detail the patterns and methods of trafficking, providing in effect a census of these activities across the countries of the region. He explains the physical and social geography features that facilitate the movement of drugs from South American producer countries to con-
sumer countries in North America. Geography is, however, not as vital an element in the trans-shipment links with Europe; although geography helps explain the Caribbean-South American part of the trafficking to Europe, political ties between Caribbean and European countries, and the resulting commercial and immigration arrangements, are the key factors in this case. Griffith also examines the creativity and ingenuity of the drug operators and the people who collude with them, as well as the complex social organization, which characterize the traffic. Griffith considers the region's narcotics operations a manifestation of some of the dangerous dynamics of the interconnections of drugs, geography, power, and politics in the region.

Richard J. Bloomfield discusses the prospects for collective security mechanisms in the Caribbean. He identifies three peculiarities of security threats in the Caribbean: they are rooted in domestic social and economic problems, initiated by nonstate actors, and elude the control of governments. He assesses the utility of existing collective security mechanisms to address the potential security threats in the Caribbean and concludes that the mechanisms are not especially pertinent for the problems the Caribbean faces. Bloomfield concentrates instead on the defense of democracy as the principal objective of collective security endeavors in the region and argues that subregional collective security arrangements may be more effective than other forms of organizations at reaching this goal. He notes persuasively that continued U.S. involvement in the affairs of Caribbean countries is "inevitable," thus the practical choice for Caribbean countries is how to harness and shape such involvement toward constructive ends.

This book ends with a broad assessment of regional security prepared by Venezuela's Institute for Advanced Study in National Defense, a think tank that informs the strategic analyses of Venezuela's armed forces. The Institute takes the view that drug trafficking, migration, the environment, and democratic stability, as well as rules and institutions for international collaboration, are part of the agenda for regional security. It affirms the value of democracy and the utility of international cooperation to advance and safeguard the shared goals of the peoples of the region.

The authors of this book do not agree on every topic, but the editors have chosen not to impose an artificial consensus. Instead, we hope readers will sharpen their own understanding of the issues by reading convergent but different analyses. The authors differ, for example, concerning the definition of the region. Bryan, Griffith, and Domínguez emphasize the islands as the core of their analysis, while Bloomfield, Serbin, and the Institute employ a geographically wider definition. Another difference is evident in the definition of security. Bloomfield and Domínguez rely on a strict definition of security (directly related to the use of force), whereas Serbin and the
Institute employ a more comprehensive notion of security that encompasses environmental threats and migration, among other issues.

We all agree, however, that the affairs of the Caribbean are best understood as deriving from the combination of the domestic and the international, conscious as well that governments alone have never been the only actors in the Caribbean’s relations with the world. We affirm the proposition that the region’s future depends on addressing concerns that go well beyond traditional definitions of security. And, as in the title of Rosenau’s chapter, we are conscious of both the accidental, though recurrent, as well as the structural aspects of international intrusions on the affairs of the Caribbean and, we would also add, of the Caribbean’s intrusion on the interests of the people and government of the United States.