[Collective security requires us] to give up war for all the purposes for which sovereign communities have fought since war has been in existence, but we have still got to be willing to accept the risks and losses of war for a purpose for which hitherto people have never thought of fighting.

—Arnold Toynbee

Major international conflagrations during the last two centuries have regularly spawned hopes about an enhanced multilateral capacity to manage international armed conflicts. Inevitably, they have been quickly dashed—after the Napoleonic Wars, after World War I, and after World War II. The end of the Cold War was no exception. Automatic superpower deadlock seemed a thing of the past by the late 1980s, and the spread of democracy promised to help pacify large regions of the world. The reasoning behind this optimism was familiar: As the interests of states in promoting stability and peaceful change strengthened, they sought common rules and procedures to prevent and respond to armed conflict.

The post-Cold War euphoria, however, was short-lived. Optimism about the possibilities for human development, democratization, and conflict resolution, captured by former President George Bush’s “new world order” and by President Bill Clinton’s “assertive multilateralism,” ceded quickly to less optimistic assessments. Democratization spread but along with micronationalism, fragmentation, and massive human displacement. The end of the Cold War did not end history, but rather unleashed a more painful epoch than Francis Fukuyama and others predicted.
As part of the longer historical pattern, the onset of the post-Cold War era initially witnessed a reinvigorated United Nations (UN). But bullishness after the Gulf War turned to pessimism following troublesome UN operations in Bosnia, Croatia, Somalia, and Rwanda. After Somalia in particular, Pollyannaish notions about intervening militarily to thwart aggression or thugs and to rescue civilians trapped in war zones or fleeing from them were replaced by more realistic estimates about the limits of such undertakings. The new bearishness about collective conflict management differs from earlier disillusionments in that the founders of the United Nations, like their predecessors in designing world security orders, imagined that it would help keep the peace among rather than within sovereign states. Yet, since 1990, the UN increasingly has been asked to help out in civil wars. The fact that one out of every 115 humans has been displaced by this type of war, and probably an equal number have remained behind but whose lives are totally disrupted, represents the tragic human consequences of contemporary intrastate wars. Eighty-two armed conflicts broke out in the five years following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and 79 were civil wars; in fact, two of the three remaining ones (Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia) also could be categorized legitimately as civil wars.

Not surprisingly, scholars have had strong opinions about the prospects for multilateral management of international conflict. Since Woodrow Wilson articulated his 14 points, the debate over collective security—the idea that alliances are problematic and that all states should pledge themselves to automatically and instantly aid any state that is a victim of aggression—has been sharply polarized, especially in the United States. Realists have been pessimistic, and idealists and liberal institutionalists have been sanguine.

Whereas much of the recent literature similarly takes dichotomous positions, this book takes a different tack. Contributors ask whether some form of collective conflict management (CCM) is feasible amidst profoundly changing world politics. Rather than setting up a straw man of perfect collective security, they ask the following questions: Under what international and domestic conditions will multilateral security efforts tend to work? What types of operations will tend to work? Their chapters spell out the domestic and international conditions that circumscribe the possibilities. Before summarizing the most salient aspects of individual chapters, however, we first discuss the concept of CCM, objections to it, two alternative paths toward it, and a typology of multilateral security operations.

**What is Collective Conflict Management?**

We ask these questions about collective conflict management: How might it work? What benefits do states derive from it? How intractable are the political, financial, and organizational obstacles that impede it? Can it work in a world
where states still prize autonomy and, at times, a narrow view of their interests? How desirable is it in view of the benefits and obstacles? We define CCM as a pattern of group action, usually but not necessarily sanctioned by a global or regional body, in anticipation of or in response to the outbreak of intra- or interstate armed conflict. CCM includes any systematic effort to prevent, suppress, or reverse breaches of the peace where states are acting beyond the scope of specific alliance commitments, the traditional means of international security cooperation.

CCM covers a wide range of cooperative actions. It includes collective security as a polar type, but is broader and more flexible. Whereas collective security requires reliable procedures for collectively identifying and punishing aggressors, CCM includes a variety of multilateral efforts to maintain or restore order and peace, including those where international decisionmakers have not identified a particular aggressor. It ranges from the relatively nonintrusive monitoring of potentially dangerous situations to military coercion to quell breaches of the peace. Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter thus circumscribe our concerns. Its essence is coordinated action on the basis of broadly defined group standards or norms, or what many would characterize as elements of "international society" if not "international community." These norms rest on particular confluences of national interests, any state subscribing to them may participate.

By way of contrast, alliances are a form of decentralized international policymaking. They differ from CCM in that they protect only specific groups of states from outside threats. Security within alliances is a private good—that is, divisible and excludable. This differs from CCM, in which the benefits of collective action are at least potentially nonexcludable outside any fixed group. Alliances are not necessarily inimical to collective conflict management, although they are incompatible with classical collective security, where no a priori distinction is made between allies and enemies, and automatic responses against aggressors are a necessity.

Because classical collective security is the broadest security commitment that states can make, it is the least likely. Inis Claude, for example, recently revisited the issue and wrote: "Multilateral resistance to aggression will continue to be, as it always has been, selective, unpredictable, and, therefore, unreliable. This is to say that collective security, in the comprehensive Wilsonian sense, is no less an impossible dream today than in earlier postwar periods." By contrast, such CCM operations as third-party monitoring of elections, preventive deployments in crises, peacekeeping, and even humanitarian intervention may be possible short of the types of commitments required for collective security. Only if a reliable collective security were in place would alliances be superfluous. Short of that, states may need alliance protection. In fact, defensive alliances could supplement a CCM system that was defined in a nonexclusive way.

However, just as CCM cannot replace alliances, alliances often cannot substitute for CCM. The threat or use of force may not be so neatly containable within exclusive groups of states for which security may come to be viewed at
least partly as a public good. A CCM regime is one solution for such problems, and the differences between it and more decentralized types of international policymaking are summarized in Table 1.1.

We assume that states act on the basis of self-perceived security interests, not abstract ideals. But this does not preclude participation in CCM operations, which do not require idealism. What is critical to the success of CCM is the definition, breadth, and composition of state interests. Definitions of raisons d’état range from North Korea’s isolationism to Sweden’s internationalism. If states believe that aggression, civil war, or a breakdown of authority inside a state can affect others, they may act collectively, even if they have no immediate stakes in the situation. It is this broad conception of interests that induces a CCM system.

To succeed, a workable system of collective conflict management must satisfy a critical mass of key states in three ways. First, political leaders must believe that they can protect some of their foreign policy stakes multilaterally. Second, it must satisfy the political needs of critical domestic policy factions in the states that are most likely to contribute significantly to the system; without such domestic support, leaders cannot pursue stable and coherent policies. Third, the system also must be compatible enough with societal norms and the manifest wishes of ordinary citizens so that leaders can be confident that they will enjoy necessary popular support. These conditions are not unique to CCM; foreign, factional, and societal incentives must align for any strategy to work.

Since there exists a wide variety of security regimes, what distinguishes CCM? Broadly speaking, it is characterized by an internationalized rather than a selective response to the threat and use of force. This does not require auto-

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<td>decision criteria are</td>
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matic war against aggressors. But it does assume that states will try to coordinate policies when peace is in jeopardy or order breaks down, and that their actual response to events will be shaped by common obligations, norms, and understandings of mutual interest. In other words, CCM makes uncoordinated, unilateral behavior in response to the use or threat of force, humanitarian emergencies, or communal violence unattractive more than it mandates any particular multilateral action. States clearly are free to act unilaterally, but the potential value of collective conflict management suggests that they will consider joint action before deciding to go it alone. This is the overarching principle from which specific obligations and rules derive.\textsuperscript{13}

Heuristically, it might be useful to consider how a CCM mechanism might have functioned in the Balkans between mid-1991 and the Dayton agreements.\textsuperscript{14} Counterfactual history does not have the weight of evidence, but it can help us speculate about the conditions necessary for CCM to work in the kind of conflicts where it will be most needed. We can then judge how far we are from those conditions.

In 1991, the major Western powers failed to work out a common policy to deal with the likely disintegration of Yugoslavia, including recognition of successor states and a constitutional mechanism that potentially could have satisfied the rival claims of Serbs and Croats. These would have been hard to satisfy by multilateral means in any case because the Croatian Serbs were and are determined not to be ruled by a non-Serbian government, and all three ethnic groups inside Bosnia have major irredentist claims. In 1992, before the Bosnian war broke out in earnest, there was deadlock on a partition plan that would have given the Bosnian Muslims more territory than they are likely ever to receive. At this point, and in 1993 when the Vance–Owen plan to partition Bosnia fell apart, the United States was the recalcitrant party. In 1994 and 1995, although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was used sporadically to enforce the protection of safe areas for the Bosnian Muslims, fear that the Serbs would retaliate against British and French peacekeeping troops continually interfered with the execution of air strikes against Serbs. As a result, they repeatedly tested NATO’s and the UN’s resolve to enforce the so-called safe areas, and the Serbs’ opponents occasionally tried to provoke Serbian attacks in order to receive Western sympathy and support.

Each of these episodes marked a failure to define and implement an internationalized response to a breakdown of peace. If the rival communities inside Croatia had been constitutionally protected early on, such guarantees might have been extended to the rest of the Balkans, averting much of the subsequent war. This procedure was recommended by the European Community’s Badinter Commission but was ignored as Germany and the United States rushed to recognize new states. Moreover, mechanisms through which to implement a multilateral response did exist: the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) (which at the time of the outbreak of the Balkan War was the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE) was empowered to work out codes of conduct and guarantees. NATO also had agreed on a case-by-case basis to enforce its decisions. The CSCE could have but did not develop a common policy for recognizing independence along with the minority guarantees. Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia at the end of 1991 emboldened the Croatian and Serbian communities in Bosnia to escalate their demands. Recognizing these states might have averted war if Germany and the European Union (EU) had then tried to enforce multilateral norms about the use of force.

At this point, a UN protectorate or governorship over Bosnia might also have averted a war, but it might have required between 100,000 and 300,000 troops. This was between three and ten times the size of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) at its strongest and at least twice as large as the NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) after Dayton. There was no support for such a force from France, Britain, or the United States. As a result, nothing was done to stop mass expulsions, massacres of civilians, and other acts of aggression.

Despite this obvious lack of European as well as American resolve to suppress the conflict, President Bush emphatically categorized the Balkans as “Europe’s problem.” President Clinton effectively agreed until mid-1995. Nevertheless, fearing charges of selling out the Bosnian Muslims, Washington implicitly and sometimes explicitly held out hope that Bosnia would receive American help, thereby prolonging the war. Outside of a maritime embargo against Serbia that was fairly well enforced by NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), there was no effective multilateral response to the conflict until the Croatian-Muslim offensive in September–October 1995 embarrassed NATO into employing sustained air power. After Dayton, IFOR changed the pattern. Missing up to this point was a widely shared belief that this conflict was a serious potential danger and that the best response was collective international action to prevent or suppress it.

Admittedly, this would have been a hard case for any CCM mechanism to handle. Aside from a general lack of Western will to restore peace, the complexity of the conflict itself was daunting. For example, the Serbs were responsible for the highest number of atrocities, but Serbs in regions controlled by Croats also suffered. In fact, the largest involuntary flight in Europe since the 1956 Soviet crushing of the Hungarian revolt took place in the fall of 1995 as 150,000 Serbian civilians and 50,000 soldiers fled from the Krajina.

In any case, the Balkans represent a serious setback for advocates of developing a post-Cold War CCM system. What lessons might be learned from this episode? One of us argued a few years ago that a new “strategic concept” is needed that “would stress forestalling violence and war in addition to dealing
with their consequences. Under such a strategic concept, war might have been averted in the Balkans if states had prepared standby forces for CCM operations and had deployed troops preventively at the early stages of the conflict. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Brian Urquhart, who ran the UN secretariat's peacekeeping operations for a generation, have forcefully advocated these ideas. As yet, there has been little concrete support for them, but in fact there has been some genuine hostility.

This suggests that we are far from the kind of CCM mechanism that could have prevented, suppressed, or reversed the Balkan war. Some analysts end the discussion here, concluding that CCM is unworkable. We disagree. Little in the preceding discussion convinces us that CCM is inherently unworkable. Before examining how we could move toward such a system, it would be useful to examine objections to it in more detail.

The Objections to Collective Conflict Management

Critics of collective security have raised five objections that also apply to the broader range of operations that we define as CCM. They are as follows:

1. Because international institutions merely reflect the balance of power, they have no independent impact on mitigating conflict.
2. Free riding jeopardizes CCM by requiring too much of large states.
3. Cooperation on CCM is inherently fragile without an outside threat.
4. By demanding adherence to group goals, CCM is insensitive to states’ changing interests in different contexts.
5. CCM works best when it is least needed.

In this section, we discuss and respond to each critique.

Hobbesian Anarchy Makes International Institutions Weak

Realists argue that "what is most impressive about [international] institutions . . . is how little independent effect they seem to have on state behavior." In this view, self-help constrains states to care only about their relative power. Whereas liberal institutionalists see the main problem of international relations as the pursuit of Pareto-superior solutions in situations that could become “win-win,” realists see a much more zero-sum, distributional world, in which security is inherently hard to achieve. Realists conclude that this often rules out multilateral agreement on managing conflicts, since states tend to be wary of their potential losses as others gain.
Such arguments assume that states’ interests are fixed and unaffected by the institutional context in which choices are made. This proposition assumes that every international relationship turns on the balance of force, which in turn assumes that strong states can get their way regardless of the context. But such views of the utility of force apply only in the most “primitive” or Hobbesian of self-help systems. In these situations, interstate rivalry is at its fiercest. States do not recognize one another’s core interests and turn every encounter into a test of strength. As Barry Buzan argues, however, there are more “mature” variants of self-help. In these contexts, borders are generally respected and states coexist virtually free from predation or fear. Realists’ pessimism about the prospects for CCM and the ability of institutions to foster it assume that the Hobbesian variant of self-help is the norm. But Hobbesian anarchy is an ideal type, as is the benign version, and the present international system combines aspects of both. In self-help situations other than a Hobbesian one, mutually superior security solutions are thus not impossible.

If institutional solutions to a range of security problems are not impossible, what might this imply for CCM? Institutions can help states realize common objectives by reducing the costs of responding to every problem in an ad hoc fashion, by linking issues so that those who might defect find it more costly to do so, and by allowing policy information to be reliably shared multilaterally. In the security area, institutions are likeliest to be created when leaders share an aversion to war or its potential consequences. This may make institutions particularly useful for the kinds of multilateral operations that fall under the CCM rubric.

Free Riders

A second objection holds that free riding jeopardizes CCM because few states have incentives to do the work that it entails. This is a powerful argument. Unless there is a hegemonic state willing to assume large burdens, a regime must be as rational from the standpoint of individual states as it is from the perspective of the system or region as a whole. One result may be that the great powers with incentives to assume those burdens will be likely to deploy military force in areas of special interest, legitimated at most by vaguely worded support from bodies such as the Security Council. U.S. intervention in Haiti and the respective Russian and French versions in Abkhazia and Rwanda are recent examples.

Another result of the collective action problem may be less collective conflict management than is optimal. This has been evident since the backlash began after the debacle in Somalia. For example, President Clinton used his first speech to the UN General Assembly to say that the UN must know “when to say no”
to new involvements. In part, it is difficult to induce lesser powers and especially smaller states into sharing CCM burdens unless—as with Pakistan or Canada, for instance—their military organizations and populations essentially derive national satisfaction from such participation.

Neither of these problems, however, is intractable. The solution to loosely disguised endorsement of big-power hegemony is greater accountability, or an insistence by the members of such bodies as the UN Security Council that intervening states be held to standards that are consistent with general norms. A desire to avoid using the veto excessively may induce the permanent five Security Council members to compromise toward somewhat closer guidance from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Moreover, the burden-sharing picture is not entirely bleak. Medium-sized countries and regional powers perhaps can be enticed to contribute with selective benefits as a share in the command of military operations, a major voice in determining policy toward the country or region that is the target of the operation, and so on. Conversely, special military and economic privileges might be suspended to noncontributors. Unless these states discount such future benefits and penalties enormously, this should make them more willing to contribute. 27

To be sure, subcontracting to selected states for CCM operations is controversial. 28 But ad hoc coalitions of interested states, regional powers, and even hegemons may at times constitute the only constituencies with enough interest to act. William Maynes has called this “benign Realpolitik”—a revival of spheres of influence with UN oversight. 29 The Security Council is experimenting with a type of great-power control over decisionmaking and intervention, which the United Nations had originally been founded to end but which is increasingly pertinent in the light of some of the inherent difficulties of multilateral mobilization and management of military force.

An observer might ask, “What is new about this kind of rationalization? Is the secretary-general not grasping at straws in justifying a gun-boat diplomacy for the 1990s? Is this not simply Realpolitik?” Boutros-Ghali is aware of the dangers: “Authorization to serve as a surrogate might strengthen a particular power’s sphere of influence and damage the United Nations’ standing as an organization intended to coordinate security across regional blocs.” 30 The difference could be that major powers or their coalitions act on their own behalf as well as on behalf of the Security Council; they thus should be held accountable for their actions by the wider community of states authorizing outside interventions. 31 Although major powers inevitably flex their military muscles when it is in their perceived interests to do so, they do not necessarily agree in advance to subject themselves to international law and outside monitoring of their behavior. The political and economic advantages attached to an imprimatur from the Security Council provide some leverage for the community of states to foster heightened accountability from military subcontractors. However limited,
it nonetheless affords the possibility to influence the behavior of would-be subcontractors.

**CCM is Fragile without a Common Threat**

A third objection from Realists holds that multilateral security cooperation is unreliable and at best fragile without a major outside threat. Realists believe that no shared interest, especially one as vague as promoting stability, induces the same degree of commitment as a common threat. This may be true, but it is not necessarily a devastating argument undercutting collective conflict management. If specific CCM operations are undertaken by ad hoc coalitions, a regime would not need the same overall commitment and cohesion as a defensive alliance. Since participation in ad hoc coalitions entails no long-term obligations, the barriers against forming them are not high. By contrast, a more institutionalized coalition such as NATO had some collective defense and some broader CCM functions, it could be expected to loosen or tighten as external threats waned or grew, with greater or lesser participation as states' interests changed.\(^{32}\) NATO's efforts to create the Combined Joint Task Forces, through which states selectively participate in out-of-area contingencies under the umbrella of the core collective defense commitment, is an example of this kind of flexibility. Furthermore, a CCM mechanism may be better than alliances to induce security participation from states that want to remain nonaligned.\(^{33}\)

**CCM is Insensitive to the Political Context**

A fourth objection, also mentioned by many Realists, is that multilateral security norms are too inflexible. In a self-help system in which security may be hard to achieve and entail major opportunity costs, security cooperation requires rules and commitments that are sensitive to the context and the interests of individual states. This argument is weak. CCM is not akin to an insurance policy, in which states that uphold their obligations are regularly subject to moral hazard as others exploit them. CCM is implemented through political bodies such as the UN Security Council or NATO that either have weighted voting to protect the key actors from these problems or a unanimity rule. Of course, if no norms governing multilateral security operations shape states' behavior, there can be no CCM regime. Boutros-Ghali originally suggested (somewhat inaccurately with the benefit of hindsight) as much in noting that the world seemed willing to do more about starvation and bloodshed in the “rich man’s war” in the Balkans than in Somalia. But the need for legitimate, general commitments can be balanced with the need for flexibility in particular contexts, whether in Europe or Africa or elsewhere. If states collectively intervene in ongoing disputes and internal unrest with “finesse and attention to due process,” they will over time make their commitments more precise and normatively legitimate.\(^{34}\)
Expanding the UN Security Council while retaining the veto may be one way to accomplish both objectives.\textsuperscript{35}

**CCM is Most Effective when it is Least Necessary**

A fifth objection to CCM is that it can only work when international security conditions are so benign that collective action is unnecessary.\textsuperscript{36} To some extent, this is the case whenever coordinated behavior is called for in the face of risks to individual actors: the lower the costs of unilateral action, the less necessary the coordination with others. But this is not a fatal shortcoming unless one demands that a system provides total security immediately to all actors.

Two arguments support this conclusion. First, confidence in the system can be built gradually, and the degree of commitment that states make to common security norms can grow as confidence grows. Consider the evolution of a pluralistic security community in Western Europe since World War II. In recent years, analysts have tried to think through ways in which confidence in CCM operations could be built, particularly expanding the use of preventive diplomacy. Enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, for example, would arguably be more likely and more effective if preventive diplomacy could diffuse more potential conflicts without using force.\textsuperscript{37} If insertion of a third-party presence occurred regularly in situations of high tension, states that wished to manage conflicts collectively would have more time to do so before violence got out of hand as well as a clearer indication of when enforcement was truly needed.

Second, there is another reason to think that the risks of building a meaningful CCM mechanism are tolerable. As Charles Kupchan argues:

> Even if all states other than those that are directly threatened fail to uphold their commitment to collective action, the remaining coalition will have essentially the same strength as the alliance that would form through traditional balancing. . . . In terms of deterring and resisting aggression, collective security at its worst is equivalent to traditional balancing at its best.\textsuperscript{38}

This view is controversial. Richard Betts, for example, argues that if states expected CCM to work and it then failed, they would be unprepared for conflict when it came.\textsuperscript{39} But it is hard to see why this would occur unless the level of armaments in a CCM system was much lower than in a completely decentralized security system, which is unlikely. CCM does not require disarmament; it supplements rather than replaces decentralized self-help.\textsuperscript{40} As long as procurement policies and military strategies were sensitive to this fact, states would not run large risks by participating in CCM operations.

In sum, none of the five objections destroys the argument as long as CCM is seen as a partial rather than a complete solution to international security. We now consider two paths by which it can be pursued.
Two Paths toward Collective Conflict Management

An evaluation of collective conflict management requires answers to six questions:

1. Who are the actors involved?
2. What are their expectations about the purposes and obligations of joint action?
3. Who authorizes operations, and how?
4. Who defines the rules of engagement in military operations?
5. How is the burden of CCM operations shared?
6. Who commands collective military operations?

Answers to these questions vary from case to case, depending on how much CCM is institutionalized. In this section, we sketch out the characteristics of both noninstitutionalized and institutionalized paths and speculate about the conditions under which each would be used.

The least institutionalized variant of CCM is a series of ad hoc coalitions. Here, precedents derived from past experience would have only instrumental value for the future; the type of situation and nature of the coalition would determine most of the answers to the six key questions. In the Gulf War, for example, German and Japanese contributions to the Desert Storm coalition were driven largely by Washington's ability to twist arms and by a widespread belief that those who did not fight should subsidize those who did. Under these circumstances, neither the leverage to extract financial resources nor troop-contributing countries will necessarily be the same from case to case.

Such coalitions most likely will be assembled by major powers. A concert system could evolve if the major powers were regularly involved. Concerts have the benefit of flexibility because no treaty specifies when or how the members should act. They concentrate decisionmaking in the hands of the actors best able to support demanding operations. Moreover, because they typically form after major wars, concerts offer a respite from the competitive policies that often characterize the behavior of major powers. But concerts also have disadvantages. If they are used to intervene mainly in the periphery, they will appear to be an instrument of domination by big powers. And if the distribution of power changes, some members may become less attached to the status quo, making the entire system fragile.

A second path is also possible: a more institutionalized set of expectations about collective conflict management that would constitute a formal, however nascent, regime. Here, more of the six questions listed above will be preanswered. As we argued above, institutionalizations are valuable because they
allow expectations to converge around policy solutions that have become at least informal precedents. The UN Charter regime specifies in principle the content of major international security norms and how they are to be enforced. That NATO, the OSCE, and other regional bodies increasingly share in implementation is not an aberration but the fulfillment of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Formal institutions are needed when uncoordinated behavior leaves governments worse off than coordinated behavior. In these cases, rules are not self-enforcing because actors prefer that others cooperate while they do not.\textsuperscript{44} Several aspects of CCM fall into this category, including preventive diplomacy. States allied to one of the parties to a dispute may have too much at stake to participate in crisis management that calls for neutral, third-party intervention, and other states may not care enough to get involved at all. Left to their own devices, governments are unlikely to create a reliable capacity for intervention. By contrast, either predesignated forces available to the UN for such purposes or a volunteer, standing UN force would be readily available for these missions.\textsuperscript{45} Either way, a formal mechanism can help avoid a collective action problem. Guidelines or rules to share the costs of CCM operations would also be more efficient if they were institutionalized. Conceiving and implementing an equitable way to share the burden of these missions is a significant transaction cost when operations are ad hoc.

Institutionalization may also serve other political ends. Because IGOs give small states at least a formal voice, the resulting policies carry enhanced legitimacy in the Third World.\textsuperscript{46} Also, conflicts between small countries that are strategically unimportant to the major powers might receive more attention than others in the context of a formal regime because “if they are left to be resolved by ad hoc coalitions, they will probably not be resolved at all.”\textsuperscript{47}

At the same time, some issues do not involve major conflicts of interest, so the likelihood of uncoordinated behavior once rules are established is limited. In these cases, CCM cooperation can be ad hoc. The command and control of multinational military operations is an example.\textsuperscript{48} Once states choose command arrangements, which are likely to vary, depending on who participates in an operation and the scale of those efforts, they have strong incentives to follow those procedures.

For these reasons, different CCM issues probably require different degrees and kinds of institutionalization. We turn next to discussing the various types of CCM operations.

A Typology of Multilateral Security Operations\textsuperscript{49}

Collective conflict management encompasses a range of military and non-military activities. These constitute “the entire spectrum of activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement aimed at defusing and resolving
We highlight the distinction between operations that have the consent of the parties and those that do not; this affects the cost and risk to those who participate and the degree of military professionalism required. In practice, each type of operation exhibits or assumes some specific degree of consent, as illustrated in Figure 1.1:

**Degree of Consent from Parties to Dispute and Degree of Force Required**

As in virtually any foreign policy decision related to international peace and security, the international stakes and the domestic costs of peace operations are inversely related. Operations on the left end of the continuum are the easiest to justify domestically, since their costs and risks are low, but they are often unimportant in narrow strategic terms to the states that carry them out. Conversely, those toward the right end are harder to justify internally, but if successful carry higher strategic rewards to those that carry them out.

**Preventive Deployment**

This sits at the far left end of the continuum. It involves stationing observers or troops in an area of conflict before significant force is used by the belligerents. The idea is to provide a tripwire that would discourage recourse to force, as opposed to trying to stop it afterward. Boutros-Ghali contends that this could take place in a variety of instances and ways:

For example, in conditions of national crisis there could be preventive deployment at the request of the Government or all parties concerned, or with their consent; in inter-State disputes such deployment could take place when two countries feel that a United Nations presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities; furthermore, preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence along its side of the border alone.
But just because prevention is desirable in principle does not imply that it is plausible in practice. Preventive diplomacy is the latest conceptual fashion—according to one formulation, "an idea in search of a strategy." Such preventive actions as the symbolic deployment of a detachment of UN blue helmets to Macedonia or the expanded use of fact-finding missions, human rights monitors, and early-warning systems are being discussed and attempted. In addition, economic and social development are generally viewed as essential to help prevent armed conflicts, even if the results from substantial aid and investment in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are hardly encouraging for those like the UN secretary-general who wish to make a case for "preventive development" as a "necessary complement to preventive diplomacy."

In terms of forestalling massive human displacement and suffering, potentially the most cost-effective preventive measure would appear to be the deployment of troops. To be a successful deterrent, however, the deployed soldiers must be backed by contingency plans and reserve fire-power for immediate retaliation against aggressors. This would amount to advance authorization for Chapter VII in the event that a preventive force was challenged. Backup would not be easy to assemble either politically or operationally. Yet without it, the currency of preventive UN military action will be devalued to such an extent that preventive action should not be attempted. As such, prevention in practice could move from one end of the spectrum of peace operations to the other.

The rub is, of course, obvious: prevention is cost-effective in the long run but cost-intensive in the short run. Governments that are responsive to electorates rarely can imagine action whose time horizon extends beyond the next public opinion poll, and certainly not beyond the next electoral campaign. On the other hand, the growing preoccupation with saving resources could make a difference to such perspectives. In the former Yugoslavia, the "long run" lasted almost four years, whereas in Rwanda it was reduced to a matter of weeks. The argument that an earlier use of force would have been more economical in the former Yugoslavia runs up against the inability of governments to look very far into the future, and of their consequent tendency to magnify the disadvantages for immediate expenditures and to discount those in the future. In Rwanda, the costs of at least 500,000 dead, over four million displaced persons, and a ruined economy were borne almost immediately by the same governments that had refused to respond militarily only a few weeks earlier. The United States and the European Union ended up providing what is estimated to have been at least $1.4 billion in emergency aid in 1994 alone.

If political leaders decide to invest more in proactive rather than reactive efforts, it is possible that preventive military action may in some cases become more plausible. Reactions to Burundi's ethnic cauldron indicated that the terms of international discourse on this question have changed somewhat, though the willingness to deploy troops preventively lags far behind the rhetoric.
Peacekeeping (Monitoring a Pause)

This is one of the most misused terms in contemporary discussions about multilateral security. It has become common to attach such adjectives as “extended,” “aggravated,” and so on to the term, as a way to label every type of military undertaking on the spectrum of peace operations. One of the premier training institutes, the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Center in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, makes a conscious point of including every type of operation under the “peacekeeping umbrella.” But this makes “peacekeeping” as a distinct type of operation meaningless.

We define the term narrowly, as was common during the Cold War: peacekeeping refers to either the interposition of neutral forces in a conflict area once hostilities have ceased or observers to verify an actual agreement. Such forces thus monitor a pause. Peacekeeping is undertaken with the consent of the state on whose territory the forces are stationed and, ideally, with the consent of belligerents. The purpose of peacekeeping is to keep the disputants apart, supervise troop withdrawal and disarmament, and provide the opportunity for warring factions to come closer to a negotiating table. In fact, some criticism is that it works so well in places like Cyprus that there is no need for the adversaries to negotiate.

Historically, peacekeeping operations have taken two forms: observation missions and interpositional forces. The former consists of sending a limited group of unarmed observers to an area for purposes of monitoring a cease-fire—the most successful recent example was the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). The latter consists of deploying larger and lightly armed military contingents as a kind of buffer—the most controversial earlier ones being in the Congo (ONUC) and Lebanon (UNIFIL), and more recent examples being in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), Somalia (UNOSOM), and Rwanda (UNAMIR).

In general, blue-helmented peacekeepers are not only lightly armed, they also are limited to using force in self-defense. It is more the moral backing of the international community than fire-power that is their strength. The UN Charter does not mention “peacekeeping,” which is why Dag Hammarskjöld coined the expression “Chapter six-and-a-half” to characterize such operations. PDD 25 does specifically cite Chapter VI of the Charter as the legal basis for such action. Depending on the extent of consent and the need to use military force, however, many recent UN peacekeeping operations have been closer to Chapter VII’s coercion than to Chapter VI’s pacific settlement of disputes.

The extraordinarily rapid growth in demand for helping hands from UN soldiers meant that there were twice as many operations approved in the last eight years as in the previous forty—which in turn spawned a cottage analytical industry of peacekeeping. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wrote in January
1995: "This increased volume of activity would have strained the Organization even if the nature of the activity had remained unchanged." After stable levels of about 10,000 troops in the early post-Cold War period, their numbers jumped rapidly. In the last few years, 70,000 to 80,000 blue-helmeted soldiers have been authorized by the UN's annualized "military" (peacekeeping) budget that approached $4 billion in 1995. Accumulated total arrears in the same year hovered around $3.5 billion—that is, almost equal to this budget and about three times the regular United Nations budget. The secretary-general lamented that "the difficult financial situation ... is increasingly proving to be the most serious obstacle to the effective management of the organization." Although both the numbers of soldiers and the budget dropped dramatically in 1996, by two-thirds, related financial and professional problems point to a "strategic overstretch" by the UN of the type that Paul Kennedy attributes to empires. Overextension was the diagnosis of the world organization's ills on its fiftieth anniversary.

The UN perennially operates at the margin of solvency, and the secretariat now lacks the technology and enough human resources to monitor a myriad of complex conflicts. Whether states will invest in these resources and entrust them to a multilateral institution are key policy issues. An important question after the Cold War is how and whether the supply of peacekeeping forces can keep up with the demand, even if the United Nations is relegated to fielding only consensual rather than coercive operations. It is to the latter that we now turn our attention.

**Selective Enforcement (Imposing a Pause)**

Further to the right along the continuum, between peacekeeping and enforcement, is a type of peace operation that might be called "selective enforcement." Although traditional peacekeeping permits the use of force in self-defense, in certain other post-Cold War cases additional force has been authorized for specified purposes. In the Balkans, the UN Security Council authorized "all measures necessary" to protect humanitarian personnel and specifically authorized NATO air strikes to protect safe havens. In Somalia, the Security Council authorized "all necessary means" to ensure humanitarian access.

Selective enforcement constitutes a murky area, one that can be more like consensual peacekeeping or more like nonconsensual enforcement depending on the circumstances. Such operations go beyond traditional peacekeeping, but they do not constitute enforcement because they are not undertaken to defeat an aggressor. In other words, such forces impose a pause in the violence against whomever violates it. Analysts who believe that conflicts end only when the underlying political issues are settled find them so untenable that
they may make matters worse.\textsuperscript{63} Nevertheless, these operations often appear attractive for a period of time when states are authorized to use force to carry out limited objectives, including the delivery of humanitarian assistance, maintenance of safe havens, and even selective enforcement of human rights and democracy.

As with peacekeeping, selective enforcement is not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter. Nonetheless, authority for doing so can be inferred from Chapter VII—and, in fact, is implicit in mathematically rounding Chapter 6.5 upwards. Under Article 39, the Security Council may determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and under Article 42 it may impose non-forcible (economic) or forcible (military) sanctions in any of these situations. If it can authorize force in response to large-scale aggression, it can logically authorize more limited force in situations that fall short of explicit aggression. As Stanley Hoffmann quipped, the interpretation of “threats to international peace and security” constitute an “all-purpose parachute” for Security Council decisionmaking.

\textit{Enforcement (Imposing a Solution)}

These operations lie at the far right end of the continuum and as a group comprise Wilsonian collective security. They impose a collective solution. As such, they are partisan in nature: a violator of the peace is designated, and the community of states seeks to reverse this behavior. They thus require the most coercion and military professionalism of all CCM operations.

The best recent example of enforcement is the Gulf War, when Iraq committed a clear act of aggression against Kuwait. The Security Council condemned the attack and imposed sweeping economic and diplomatic sanctions. After efforts to reach a negotiated withdrawal failed, the council authorized the use of force. According to that authorization and in spite of questions about proportionality, coalition forces began military operations against Iraq, the first Chapter VII authorization since Korea.\textsuperscript{64}

Although Chapter VII of the Charter anticipates that a UN command will be established to carry out enforcement operations, the Security Council may choose to authorize a subcontracted operation, as has occurred in a number of crises. Such decentralization may be the most politically palatable for the states that will likely assume the bulk of the enforcement responsibility. Moreover, the Charter’s Chapter VIII specifically empowers the Security Council to employ regional arrangements to undertake enforcement operations.

Advocates for regional institutions, including the UN secretary-general, find them an attractive alternative to an overextended United Nations. As member states of these institutions suffer most from the destabilizing consequences of war in their locales, they have the greatest stake in the management and resolu-
tion of regional conflicts. Regional actors also understand the dynamics of strife and cultures more intimately than outsiders, and thus they are in a better position to mediate. Issues relating to local conflict are also more likely to be given full and urgent consideration in regional fora than in global ones where there are broader agenda, competing priorities, and distractions.65

This theory contrasts starkly, for instance, with efforts by the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Islamic Conference, which were so ineffective that only cognescenti of the Somali crisis are vaguely aware of their involvement. The advantages of regional organizations are more rhetorical than real. Most institutions in the Third World have virtually no military experience or resources. Even in Europe, the density of well-endowed and seemingly powerful institutions were of limited use—perhaps even counter productive—for the first four years of Yugoslavia’s wars.

Nonetheless, if coercion occurs at all, interventions soon will have to compensate for the military inadequacies of the United Nations. As such, UN decisions may require subcontracting enforcement to regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions of major states. Regional powers (for instance, Nigeria within West Africa and Russia within the erstwhile Soviet republics) could take the lead, combined with larger regional (that is, the Economic Community of West African States and the Commonwealth of Independent States) or coalitions. Perhaps only when regional powers cannot or will not take a lead should more global powers (for example, France in Rwanda or the United States in Somalia) be expected to do so. However, blocking humanitarian intervention, which some powers are willing to conduct when others are reluctant to get involved (for example, the United States vis-à-vis Rwanda between early April and late June 1994), should be ruled out.

The Chapters in this Collection

Part One of this volume, which has one chapter in addition to this introductory overview, sets the context for the more specific discussions by placing CCM in a theoretical and historical context. It asks when collective security, the most demanding type of CCM operation, can work. The four chapters in Part Two examine how political interests among and within states drive the military operations that they are willing to undertake collectively and the preparations that they make to do so. In Part Three, three chapters examine the humanitarian motive for several post-Cold War interventions. Here the authors analyze what animates an apparently new-found interest in collective humanitarian operations, the conditions under which such operations might succeed, and whether they portend any diminution in states’ sovereign rights to order themselves internally.
Alan Lamborn's chapter, "Theoretical and Historical Perspectives on Collective Security: The Intellectual Roots of Contemporary Debates about Collective Conflict Management," argues that the success of collective security depends on a number of linked political processes. It can succeed, he claims, when international, domestic factional, and popular agendas align. Where they do align, political leaders are more willing than otherwise to lengthen their time horizons to accept the outcomes generated by multilateral choice procedures. Under these conditions, the associated norms and rules then could take on more weight in policymaking, thereby giving states more of a substantive stake in conflicts that would not otherwise concern them. He concludes that undue pessimism about the prospects for a multilateral security regime is logically and historically unwarranted.

Lamborn emphasizes that collective security is not easily achieved. But neither is highly flexible balancing behavior. Any strategy requires that political leaders make tradeoffs between political and policy risks in a sustainable way. Lamborn thus offers an argument that can be used to think through most of the issues we have discussed so far, and that are discussed in greater detail in the rest of the chapters.

Joseph Leogold discusses "NATO's Post-Cold War Conflict Management Role" in the opening chapter for Part Two. He analyzes a number of roles that NATO could assume, ranging from "unspecified" collective defense—where NATO members would continue to view security as a private good but would not identify threats in advance—to institutional support for a tight concert of the major powers. Each step away from a traditional alliance will broaden the range of issues that NATO addresses as well as expand the breadth of multilateral rules that it employs. In practice, NATO members will choose its role by answering four key questions: How is pan-European security to be organized, and what is NATO's role in that process? Under what conditions will NATO try to manage out-of-area disputes? How will they alter NATO's military structure to accomplish those interventions? Under what conditions will NATO work with other security organizations?

In "The Limits of Peacekeeping, Spheres of Influence, and the Future of the United Nations," Michael Barnett argues that peacekeeping under UN auspices has at best limited future prospects. This stems directly from the collective action problem discussed in his chapter: UN members, he claims, are reluctant to contribute the required resources unless they have a vested stake in the outcome. As a result, the major powers seem determined to intervene unilaterally in areas that they think of as spheres of influence.

These findings appear to validate one of the key objections to collective conflict management. At the same time, however, Barnett shows that even very powerful states are likely to be held accountable for certain international norms to legitimate certain collective operations and interventions. He sketches out