

1. *The human being has language—The word has the human being*

The “human being” “has” “language” (ratio et oratio), (“animal rationale” “is able” “to speak” and “speaks” necessarily by virtue of his essence).

The “word” “has” the “human being” (being-there “grounds”—guardianship of being [*des Seyns*]).

Crossing from the metaphysics “of” language toward the think-ing leap into the essencing of the being-historical word.

2. *The traditional understanding of “language” (λόγος)
and the essence of the human being (animalhood)
and Herder’s posing of the question*

If “language”—distinguishing the animal—then its essence on the *ground of the distinction between animal and human being*.

Two of Herder’s statements:

1. “Already as animal the human being has language” (5).¹
 - a) The human being is animal—
 - b) There is an animal language (sounding in sensations)
Language: to make oneself noticeable, percept-ible
“Mechanical language”: screams and sounds breaking out by themselves.
To make manifest: to feel-“with,” “dark, sensuous accord in the circle of its determination and activity” (24)
2. “Human beings are for us the only creatures endowed with language that we know . . . they distinguish themselves precisely through language from all animals” (21).
 - a) Language—the *non-animalistic, that which distinguishes* the human being
 - b) The human being not “only” animal.
3. *Compatibility of both statements*. The different and yet uniform concept of language. Formally: *making something noticeable by making manifest, “the pecu-*

1. J. G. Herder, *Über den Ursprung der Sprache*. From the prize essay awarded by the Academy of Sciences in Berlin in 1770. According to the second revised edition published in Berlin in 1789. In: *Herders Ausgewählte Werke in drei Bänden*. Edited with an introduction by Adolf Stern. Leipzig, Verlag Philipp Reclam, n.d., vol. 3, pp. 610–701.

Editor’s note: The page references for the interpretation of Herder’s text are not cited here from Heidegger’s personal copy mentioned above, but from the critical edition that he also used: Johann Gottfried Herder, *Sämtliche Werke*, edited by B. Suphan, Berlin 1891, vol. 5, pp. 1–154.

liar language of each creature” (25), the way of “coloring” and of “communication” that is appropriate to its sphere.

3. On the essence of language

1st class: On the (received) questioning concerning language. Philosophy of language—Science of language—Metaphysics of language (Question of “essence” and of “origin”).

2nd class: On the Western determination of the essence of language: Language as distinction of the human being—formal concept of language as an expression that makes something manifest—*ἄνθρωπος ζῶον λόγον ἔχον*.

λόγος: (1) Reason (Thinking) ratio et
 (2) Speaking (Discourse) oratio

as capacity of a living being (of an animal).

Language:

1. the distinctive capacity occurring in the living human being with a determinate cause of origination (“Nature”—God);
2. a “being,” extant.

Preview on *Herder*.

4. Why do we ask for the essence of language?

Has not this questioning already completely fallen out of the immediate acting “life”? Is there not a manifold entanglement and matting in it? The subsequent and elusive—or? something entirely other? (*The word of being* [des Seyns])

But how through such reflection? Only through the saying! But if potency and impotency surround and determine the possibilities—must not the original submission to the word first be grounded? Yet, how else this but as through a reflection on the essence?

For the word is already said—those who listen “are” not yet and find not yet into the essence.

Thus the thinkers are needed.

5. Our reflection on language

First following the guiding thread of the question concerning the “origin of language” [our reflection] does not have an eye on the science of language and its foundation. Just as little does it want to deal with a particular area, a discipline,

of philosophy. It also does not claim to make the “philosophy of language” the fundamental discipline of philosophy. Neither science of language nor philosophy of language is meant, but rather the reflection on the “origin” (ground of the essence) of language from the word; the word, however, as essencing of the truth of being [*des Seyns*]. Why this reflection?

The reflection on language counts here as a decisive way toward the leap into the completely other, namely being-historical thinking. “Decisive” in being-historical sense. *The poet of decision: Hölderlin.*

The crossing must, however, be undertaken from metaphysics, since it is not a matter of overthrowing, nor of counterbalancing. The “metaphysics” of language asks in the form of the question concerning the “origin of language,” because metaphysical thinking asks for the *ground* of beings.

6. *The distinction between animal and human being*

Fore-having: present-at-hand living beings

Fore-sight: ἄλογον—λόγον ἔχον + λόγος

Fore-grasp: on capacity—properties.

How does Herder develop this distinction? What result does this have for the determination of the essence of language? What is essential in language and as language? (The distinctive capacity of the human being, of the *being of the human being*—how and what for?)

7. *Herder's treatise*

1. *The external order of the train of thought* (Part I, Section 1 and 2, pp. 5–47)
2. *The proper approach*
3. *The essential line of vision and the metaphysical foundation*
4. *The standard determination of human language.*
 “Origin” and “essence” of the human language, concept of “inventing-by-finding.” Whither metaphysically the essence of language and with it also the possibility to experience and contemplate language becomes shifted?
 The human being—the animal that is able to produce verbal language:

On 1. *The external order of the train of thought, Part I, 1 and 2*

1st Section

- a) *The natural language of the human being* and “nature-” language in general (distinguished from artificial and technical language, invented at first for that purpose).

The sounding of sensations— in such utterances directed to other creatures (dark, sensuous accord).

The “interjections,” “throwing-in-between,” “exclamations” of *Nature*, not “principal fibers” and “roots,” but “the saps that enliven human language” (9) according to the natural law of a sentient machine. Natural law of the sentient machine not to be explained further—how “feeling” (sensation) can express itself in sound (63).

From such *cries* human language never originates (17). Thus: a particular ground for the origination of human language. *Animal language* and human language distinguished according to “*kind*” (quale).

Thus the question concerning the origin of human language *to be posed only on the ground of the difference in kind between animal and human being*, respectively, in connection with this distinction.

- b) *The difference between animal and human being*—distinction of the “spheres” and “capacities” (abilities). *Law of the inverse correspondence* between sphere and capacity (circle and abilities).

2nd Section

- a) The distinctive character of the human being: reflective awareness (fundamental power of reason and freedom)
 b) Reflective awareness (reflexion) and the invention of language
 c) The essence of human language
 Word of the soul (mark of the object noticed),
 “Expression” of this “word”

3rd Section

Which were the first (inner?) marks, of what kind were they in order to become “*elements*” of saying, of expressing, of announcing? They had to be in advance “distinct,” distinguishable: bleating, barking, cooing—

Saying and sounding—tone and hearing—ear

Being attentive—hearkening—hearing!

On 1. Does the human being hearken because he hears, or can he hear because he hearkens and obeys? And what makes hearkening possible, being attentive-on and attentive-toward as perceiving of “beings,” the perceiving of the sounding “acts”? “Processes”: “sighing,” “murmuring,” “rustling”?


But—is it the “phonetical” only, and is this sounding as such capable of giving something, if not *already mark*?

Herder sees the sense of hearing essentially in relation to the rendering possible of sounding and announcing—with regard to the “*outer*” word, but essential for the “*inner*,” that is, for that which lies before inside and outside. *The sense of hearing and obedience: the insistence that hearkens and awaits in the clearing*. Cf. Language and Hearing, no. 97.

On 2. *The proper approach* (in presenting the origin of human language)

- a) Immediate description of animal and the human being? Of their distinction and of the process of the invention of language? *No!*

- b) *The main steps:*
- α) *Starting point* with the animal—as *living being* (sphere and abilities in determinate relation).
 - β) *Conversely*, in the *same* respects, but *completely different* the human being.
 - γ) Here—animal language does not suffice for the human being, not rich, not distinct enough.
 - δ) The human being as human being also does not have any instinctual speech.
 - ε) *The human being born mute—destined to a large circle*. Greatest disproportion—lack and want of “nature” *impossible*—thus, compensation necessary.
 - ζ) For the human being as “living being”—from Mother Nature—a *gift of Nature required*, according to “reason” and “fairness,” that fulfills that want and thereby at the same time constitutes the *distinctive character* of the human being.
 - η) Such: *what cause of the wants* (in contrast with animal) and *what at the same time* the “*germ of replacement*” at the core of privation of artificial drives. (The free circle of reflection for “everything”). *In how far?*
 - θ) *If* in this necessary essential character the ground of the origination of language—*then* language necessarily a “natural” production (*invention*) of the human being appropriate to the human being’s nature, insofar as the human being himself must be “naturally” an *inventor* in order to replace this want itself and to balance the “great disproportion”; harmonia.
- c) *The essence of this approach*
- α) *Fore-leap* into the rational character of the human being: The great circle (the free circle of reflection of the cold, bright self-knowing reflective awareness—of “everything”).
 - β) Determined from this fore-having the “*katabasis*” to the animal and the starting point with the animal and the “*anabasis*” to the human being.
 - γ) The law ruling the stages of the “*anabasis*” is the *analogy, the presupposed correspondence*.
 “The great correlation that runs through the chain of living beings . . .” (23)

“The *correspondence*”—the human being— 

- δ) This correspondence grounds in the application of the “animal economy” (23), of the *regulated economy of all living beings*, of their “rational” and “reasonable” equipment, and conservation and regulation through the maternal Nature. *Harmonia*—“*Perfectio*” (omne ens bonum). God—the just and calculating and efficient father of the household for the world- (and soul-) economy, the economy of beings as a whole. Human reason thinks “according to” this “economy” and is therefore “rational,” prudent and practical!

Fore-leap: *human being as standard mid-point*

Starting point: *the liveliness of Nature.*

On 3. *The essential line of vision and the metaphysical fundamental position*

- a) “Metaphysics” toward:
- “Nature”—in the sense of Mother Nature (φύσις),
 - “natura” (source of the essence of all becoming and being),
(presence-at-hand, presencing and constancy of the emergence)
 - *animalitas*—liveliness
 - *rationalitas*—reflective awareness (calm possession of consciousness).
- b) *But this monadological? yes and no, “partly monadological.”*
- α) *The essence of the monad* does not (as Herder himself at the beginning of the treatise would like to make believe) consist in the bolted isolation of particular things, but
- β) 1st in the simplicity of the *fundamental power* and its respective *point of view and field of vision*. For Herder, essential:
- (1) *Power—fundamental power*, perceptio appetitus potentia conatus
 - (2) “Circle”
 - (3) *Correspondence*
 - (4) *perfectio—the most perfect of all worlds;*
yet everything from “outside” in spite of the sensitivity and liveliness.
- 2nd That indeed precisely every monad *mundus concentratus*—living mirror, wherein mundus sets *itself before itself* and this representing essence of the monad itself.
- 3rd In such a way related *essentially* to “universum”—not only through *outer mediation*. The latter conversely a possibility of the essence and result of the originally sole relation.
repraesentatio: representing that sets-before
Simple—uni-ty—being.
- γ) Therefore, in Herder the construction *through analogy* sets the standard. In the monadological interpretation of the ens as monas for the first time the *metaphysical presupposition* is created for the “anal-

ogy"—as *relation of the essence of beings themselves*—beyond a *merely comparative view*. The *co-respondence* as belonging to beings themselves! no longer "ens creatum" and *substantia* in traditional sense. Cf. Middle Ages "creatio"—ens creatum.

1. "The sphere" of the living being
 2. The simple, encompassing fundamental power
 3. The reflexion and regarding-the-reflection.
- δ) Everything in the realm of the monadology and thus in the fundamental positions of metaphysics; also the law of the *inverse correspondence*, cf. the hierarchy of the monads, the breadth of their field of vision, and its brightness, and the kind of fundamental power (perceptio—appetitus).

8. On the "Monadology"

Is the monad "egoistic"? that is, *intent on itself as "ego"* and only concerned with itself?—Egoism only where *egoicity*, I-ness. But egoism only one possibility of the essence into *unessence*, out of the latter as a result; never to determine the *ground of the essence* as "egoistic."

But then monad at least "I-like" (cf. Gerhardt, Brief an de Volder from June 20, 1703).¹ Yet, what does this mean? ego cogito, ergo sum—ego as "subjectum."

The monad in general is *veluti τὸ Ego vel simile* (ibid.), "I-similar," "I-like." Good, but what constitutes the essence of the "I"? (cf. *Monadologie* §§ 29, 30).² Reflexion, which for the first time makes possible the turning-toward-the-I, is "knowledge of the necessary truths" (understanding of being!!)

Here a great step is sensed: Selfhood grounded in the truth of being [*des Seyns*]! And yet! not able to be followed.

Egoicity—grounded in beingness and besides this in ego—primarily—mirroring of *mundus* and *itself mundus!* (cf. the mentioned Brief.)

But how the "windowlessness" of the monad? Not negative as locking up and isolating, but sign of the positive higher primordialness of *the world relation*—from which for the first time the phenomenal connexus and the relations of the derivative powers originate.

Leibniz regards the monas from the subjectum, from the "ego" as *subjectum* (that being, that which is to be encountered, what distinguished by the capac-

1. G. W. Leibniz. *Die Philosophischen Schriften*. Edited by C. J. Gerhardt. Berlin 1879, Second Volume, p. 251.

2. G. W. Leibniz. *Monadologie*. In: *Ausgewählte Philosophische Schriften im Originaltext*. 2nd vol. Edited by H. Schmalenbach. Leipzig 1915, pp. 133–51.

ity of the principles; therefore?) and yet, that which is essential is the “entelechy.”

But the “ego” [is] not “egoistic.” The monad “I-like”— but not “egoistic.”
 “I-like”: self, representing itself in the representing of mundus, *being-mundus*.

Monad:

1. simple standing-in-itself
2. originally unifying
3. isolating to itself—(but as mundus)
4. striving for—by-representing-that-sets-before
5. power—vis primitiva—activa—passiva
 5th can be understood from 1st–4th, that is, 5th is the ground of the essence for 1st–4th.
 “Entelechy”: in letting-presence as mundus repraesentatio—representing and “being” oneself in such way.