

# 1



DANIEL M. GROSS

## Introduction

### Being-Moved: The Pathos of Heidegger's Rhetorical Ontology

Tradition has long ago lost an understanding of rhetoric—such was the case already in the Hellenistic and Early Middle Ages inasmuch as rhetoric became merely a school discipline. The original meaning of rhetoric had long since vanished. Insofar as we forget to ask about the concrete function of Aristotelian rhetoric, we lose the fundamental possibility of interpreting it and making it transparent. Rhetoric is nothing less than the discipline in which the self-elaboration of *Dasein* is expressly executed. *Rhetoric is no less than the elaboration of Dasein in its concreteness, the hermeneutic of Dasein itself.*

Die Tradition hat längst das Verständnis für die Rhetorik verloren, sofern die Rhetorik einfach eine Schuldisziplin wurde, schon im Hellenismus und Frühmittelalter. Der ursprüngliche Sinn der Rhetorik war längst verschwunden. Sofern man vergißt, nach der konkreten Funktion der aristotelischen Rhetorik zu fragen, begibt man sich einer Grundmöglichkeit, diese so zu interpretieren, daß dabei durchsichtig wird, daß die Rhetorik nichts anderes ist als die Disziplin, in der die Selbstausslegung des Daseins ausdrücklich vollzogen ist. *Die Rhetorik ist nichts anderes als die Auslegung des konkreten Daseins, die Hermeneutik des Daseins selbst.*

—Martin Heidegger, SS 1924<sup>1</sup>

“Heidegger and hermeneutics” trips off the tongue. But “Heidegger and rhetoric”? This story has not been adequately told, despite Heidegger’s intense conviction expressed above.<sup>2</sup> Indeed it is often assumed

that the rhetorical sensibilities of a Ricoeur, Derrida, or Foucault developed primarily in the wake of that other specter of modern German philosophy, Friedrich Nietzsche. The year 1872 would thus mark the emergence of modern rhetorical theory—the year that Nietzsche taught his modest course on Ancient rhetoric and began to formulate a notion of truth grounded in “a mobile army of metaphors.”<sup>3</sup> But now this source story doubles. In the summer semester of 1924 Martin Heidegger, then a young professor at the University of Marburg, delivered an idiosyncratic series of lectures on Aristotle’s rhetoric under the course title “Grundbegriffe der Aristotelischen Philosophie” (“Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy”) and referred to, among other places, in Karl Löwith’s transcript as “Aristoteles: Rhetorik II.”<sup>4</sup> Like Nietzsche’s course on classical rhetoric, Heidegger’s could mark the emergence of modern discourse theory.

When *Being and Time* was published in 1927, rhetoric as a discipline had been substantially absorbed into the body of Heidegger’s existential analytic, never again to fully resurface. The “hermeneutics of facticity” that predated SS 1924 by at least two years reemerged as the only way in which the basic structures of Being could be made known.<sup>5</sup> Subsequently projects in a Heideggerian vein have recognized only a distant relationship to the rhetorical tradition, if any. But Theodore Kisiel has suggested how we can draw a direct *genetic* link between Heidegger’s reflections on rhetoric and *Being and Time*, his philosophical masterwork. Indeed SS 1924 can be seen as a formative moment in Heidegger’s lifelong project of grounding metaphysics. As Kisiel describes it, SS 1924 is one of Heidegger’s “greatest courses, breaking ground not merely in Greek philosophy but also for his entire path of thought.”<sup>6</sup> During these Marburg years Heidegger had been trying to get a book out on Aristotle and thereby secure a university chair. The book never appears, but ripens instead into the first draft of *Being and Time*. As such Kisiel posits, SS 1924 “provides us with perhaps our best glimpse into how that book on Aristotle might have looked.”<sup>7</sup> In fact the list of concepts molded in part or in whole during Heidegger’s ruminations on rhetoric does read like a glossary of key terms from *Being and Time*, though the explicit connection to SS 1924 has been lost. One purpose of this book is to trace the rhetorical genealogy of some of these key terms: Being-with (*Mitsein/koinōnia*), belief (*Glaube/doxa*), Being-in (*Lage*), care (*Sorge*), mood (*pathos*), moment (*Augenblick/kairos*), ecstasy (*ekstasis*), fear (*Angst/phobos*), deliberation (*Überlegung*), articulation (*logos*), and decision (*Entschluß/krisis*). For it turns out that Heidegger’s general description of how we move from concerned understanding to theory, and back—a cornerstone of the *Being and Time* project traceable through the succession of these terms—is worked out first in his elaboration of basic concepts in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (BT 158).

Certainly we understand Heidegger's philosophy better when we consider his engagement with rhetoric. But much can be gained as well by looking at SS 1924 from the perspective of the rhetorical tradition *per se*. Four important aspects of that tradition are radically revised by Heidegger in new philosophical terms, and these revisions help compose the substance in which contemporary rhetorical theory moves.

1) Though Heidegger gives the classical rhetorical subject *elocutio* only modest attention, what he does say is innovative, and ties into the explicit focus of SS 1924: conceptuality. Troping appears as poetic logos; it provides the nontheoretical distance necessary to see how we are in our everyday situations and how we are moved. Setting Aristotle against Plato, Heidegger claims for instance that if the "good" man were not already transformed by a trope such as the "good" thief, the concept "good" would be unrecognizable (as would be any univocal Platonic Idea). Without the ambiguous turn in language measured out in a trope, human expression would be one dimensional, like the yelp of a dog. We would lose the unique capacity we have as speaking beings to disclose ourselves against the world, to see always that "things might be otherwise." So tropes are neither ornaments to a univocal core of language, nor are they "originary" in the manner described *say*, by Nietzsche. Instead a trope, acting in concert with its staid manifestation as a concept (*Begriff*) marks the contours of contingency.

2) Heidegger sees language neither as an ideally transparent means of communication between minds nor as an arbitrary system of differences, *pace* Saussure. Instead language is understood discursively, that is to say rooted in shared moods, human institutions, and the nonchronological history these institutions compose. In this regard there is also an important relationship between Heidegger's early thoughts on language—its use and abuse, its emergence and silence—and the later Heidegger of *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Reversing the traditional "art of speaking," Heidegger describes rhetoric as the art of listening. What this vivid re-description does is efface the facile image of a Cicero or a Demosthenes: ingenious orators molding words that either elicit from an audience the intended passion or dissolve before a structure of logical reasoning. Heidegger describes instead a being who, insofar as that being can hear, is constituted as someone among others, someone in a particular situation that demands action. In his later essays Heidegger describes the art of listening to language constitutive of *Gelassenheit*, the attitude of "releasement" that accepts the contingency and partiality of our understanding of Being and just lets "beings be." Thus the art of listening in SS 1924 obviously has a more practical orientation than does later Heideggerian poetics. But what remains throughout is an insistence on language as medium, not means. Following Foucault we tend now to call

language so described “discourse.” But SS 1924 demonstrates that Heidegger laid early tracks to a language part and parcel of human institutions and their histories.

3) Anticipating rhetorically minded theorists of the constructed subject, Heidegger shows how human beings simultaneously compose discursive institutions and are composed by them. *Heidegger thus relocates rhetoric at the heart of his fundamental ontology.* We are human insofar as we can generate shared contexts, articulate our fears and desires, deliberate and judge in the appropriate terms of our day, and act meaningfully in a world of common concern. Moreover, in all such activities we are simultaneously agent and patient, mover and moved (to use Aristotle’s terminology). The critique of Heidegger as a radical antihumanist and deconstructor of human agency thus falls short of its mark. Moreover, Heidegger’s rhetorical ontology is important in terms of the history of the discipline: he departs from the epistemology of tropes popular during the Enlightenment (for example, Dumarsais and Fontanier) and from the critique of ornamental style (Ramus and the Port Royalists through the eighteenth-century British Elocutionary movement). At the same time Heidegger manages to dissociate rhetoric from the romantic tradition that tended to make rhetorical invention a matter of individual genius and passion a matter of individual psychology.

4) Finally, Heidegger characterizes pathos (variously “passion,” “affect,” “mood,” or “emotion”) as the very condition for the possibility of rational discourse, or *logos*. No cynical and crowd-pleasing addition to *logos*, pathos is the very substance in which propositional thought finds its objects and its motivation. Without affect our disembodied minds would have no heart, and no legs to stand on. We would have no grounds for concern, no time and place for judging, no motivation to discourse at all. No doubt the priority of pathos does have a vibrant tradition in theology running from Augustine through the Christian Grand Style of the Renaissance to Luther’s Reformation theology, the latter being a tradition with which Heidegger was deeply engaged during his Marburg years.<sup>8</sup> What Heidegger emphasizes in the tradition like none before is the fact that without others, pathos would remain unarticulated (as it does in nonhuman life) and rational discourse would never get off the ground. Here is the theme that this introduction follows in most detail: the passions are actually phenomena constitutive of social life.

Heidegger’s conception of language and *Mitsein* are densely entwined in contemporary philosophy. Despite the reevaluation that the terms undergo over the course of Heidegger’s career, language and *Mitsein* are essentially conceived in terms of rhetoric. Thus rhetoric, to state my broadest argument in the form of a syllogism, lies at the heart of much contemporary philosophy, especially in its “continental” and poststructuralist

strains. Most immediately, SS 1924 was one of a series of courses on Aristotle that influenced generations of philosophers in Germany, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt, Walter Bröcker, Herbert Marcuse, and Ernst Tugendhat. This notable set of names is a first indication that SS 1924 exerted some force on twentieth-century German philosophy in particular. But Gadamer and Arendt are typically thought to have elaborated their most important work in the wake of *Being and Time*. In the following section I will emphasize instead the connections between ideas developed in SS 1924 and the philosophies of Gadamer and Arendt, suggesting that Heidegger's unique spin on the rhetorical tradition lies at the heart of a political philosophy articulated in the shared places and common concern of the body politic. But this is no static analysis of how things are. A true political philosophy must also analyze change. Hence the central role Heidegger gives pathos in his political philosophy—key to the art of moving people.

Why, finally, if so productive, does Heidegger drop rhetoric as the antidote to metaphysics? Why, in other words, do hermeneutics subsume rhetoric after 1924? A close reading of the course offered in this book will provide us with responses that go to the heart of Heidegger's politics, including his subsequent Nazism. SS 1924 turns out to be a complex discourse on rhetoric and politics crucial to understanding Heidegger's own life work, as well as communitarian politics broadly conceived.

## I. HERMENEUTICS OR RHETORIC?

When we move from rhetoric to hermeneutics we suffer a political and ethical loss. But this loss is not absolute. In making the move, we solidify a formal and universal method of interpretation unavailable to rhetoric practiced in ad hoc fashion as a proactive art. Second, though cast in a new guise, hermeneutics rearticulates crucial rhetorical insights. By looking briefly at the best known work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, we can see both how this gain can be maximized and the ways in which rhetoric—and Heidegger's rhetoric in particular—has left a deep impression upon Anglo-European philosophy. Moreover, in typical and instructive fashion, Gadamer downplays the political loss suffered when rhetoric gives way to hermeneutics.

It is well known that *Truth and Method* is a work indebted to Heidegger's temporal analytics of Dasein. And the rhetorical bent of Gadamer's masterwork is also no secret: he acknowledges that a review of the first edition of *Truth and Method* by the romanticist Klaus Dockhorn led to significant revisions of the second edition in a rhetorical vein.<sup>9</sup> Gadamer's rhetorical turn has had an afterlife, moreover,

inspiring for instance Germany's top contemporary university program devoted to the discipline, the Seminar für Allgemeine Rhetorik in Tübingen. So we have Heidegger, and we have rhetoric. But what about *Heidegger's rhetoric*? Is there any evidence that Heidegger's lectures on the rhetoric of Aristotle had any lasting effects on the work of attendee Gadamer (see chapter 2)? What happens when we read *Truth and Method* with these lectures in mind? If we can plausibly identify some characteristic features of Heidegger's rhetoric residual in the work of Gadamer, then the argument for influence begins to take shape, and we can begin to see how the priority of pathos was depoliticized with the turn to hermeneutics.

Broadly conceived, Aristotle's rhetoric is the discipline that allows Heidegger to establish logos as a derivative mode of construing the world, a mode grounded in everyday, pathetic situations ("der *logos* in den *pathē* selbst seinen Boden hat" [177]).<sup>10</sup> This is a fundamental reversal of the philosophical hierarchy inherited from Plato, in which particular human dispositions and momentary passions only obscure the logic of good judgment. Like Heidegger, Gadamer places his philosophical hermeneutics firmly in the tradition of a Platonism—if not turned on its head, at least taken in a heretical direction. "In both rhetoric and hermeneutics," Gadamer insists, "theory is subsequent to that out of which it is abstracted; that is, to praxis."<sup>11</sup> And Aristotle's "anthropological foundation for the art of speech," that is his *Rhetoric*, is identified by Gadamer as a primary source of this insight.<sup>12</sup> As Gadamer tells the story, Heidegger broke ground when he situated Aristotle's insight in a counterhistory of transcendental philosophy and thereby revealed a new way to understand practical life. "I must have ground under my feet" [Ich muß Boden unter den Füßen haben]: this is Aristotle's imagined cry to Plato over the course of SS 1924 (37). Our everyday doings and sayings need not be abstracted in order to retain their wonder. Praxis need only be grounded and subject to time—at which point the very distinction between praxis and theory dissolves in its Platonic form.

But Plato's *Phaedrus* or Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are for Gadamer not quite enough on their own if one is to develop a modern understanding of language, even if these works are read sympathetically. Nor is Heidegger on himself the end of the story. For in his self-explanatory statements Heidegger denied what Gadamer calls "the significance of the Humanist tradition" and thus was blind to the very medium in which his most radical insights developed.<sup>13</sup> We will see that Heidegger does indeed provide a genealogy for his reflections on the derivative nature of rational discourse, and that genealogy is most definitely not secular humanist. Rather it is essentially theological. What the theological tradition running from Augustine through Luther to August Hermann Francke provides is

an account of pathos as the ground of rational discourse (logos) and not simply its supplement. It is nevertheless useful to play out in some detail Gadamer's account of the secular humanist tradition and the sympathy he finds there with Heidegger's project. Such an account will allow us to specify later precisely where Heidegger leaves this tradition behind in his treatment of rhetoric during the course of SS 1924.

Humanism, exemplified for Gadamer in the figure of the early eighteenth-century Italian rhetorician Giambattista Vico, defended the *sensus communis* against the encroachment of Cartesian critical science. And in doing so, humanism returned in a new fashion to Aristotle's breakthrough: social phenomena are neither random nor perfectly predictable, but they are subject to a socially constituted practical knowledge, or *phronēsis*, manifest above all in the Aristotelian triad of politics, ethics, and rhetoric (see chapter 7).

Practical knowledge, *phronēsis*, is another kind of knowledge. . . . Primarily, this means that it is directed towards the concrete situation. Thus it must grasp the "circumstances" in their infinite variety. This is what Vico expressly emphasizes about it. . . . The Aristotelian distinction refers to something other than the distinction between knowing on the basis of universal principles and on the basis of the concrete. Nor does he mean only the capacity to subsume the individual case under a universal category—what we call "judgment." Rather, there is a positive ethical motif involved that merges into the Roman Stoic doctrine of the *sensus communis*. The grasp and moral control of concrete situations require subsuming what is given under the universal—that is, the goal that one is pursuing so that the right thing may result.<sup>14</sup>

But the concept of the *sensus communis* was "emptied and intellectualized" by the German Enlightenment culminating in Kant, who made practical sense a general faculty in all men. Vico's radical concept of a "sense that founds community" was thereby digested and transformed.<sup>15</sup> But via Dilthey, the rhetorical conception of *sensus communis* would burst onto the scene once again, and as Gadamer tell the story, it would come in the form of Heidegger's historicism.

This is what Gadamer calls Heidegger's "fresh beginning." "Understanding," which is *Dasein*'s essential mode of being according to Gadamer, is described as a composite of prejudices and projections that are always subject to change.<sup>16</sup> In other words fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception—the famous SS 1924 triad of the hermeneutic situation—establish the horizon in which our everyday doings and sayings can make sense.<sup>17</sup> But once realized, "sense" tends to crystallize into concept, superim-

posing a theoretical *telos* upon the world of multiform activity. Words would be used as simple indicators of things or fixed concepts, and human behavior could be rationalized. This is what Gadamer calls the “Enlightenment slogan,” perpetuated by the likes of Habermas: “to dissolve obsolete prejudices and overcome social privileges through thought and reflection.” But in Gadamer’s view, the Enlightenment thinking that still dominates our technological age underestimates the “affections” that motivate the human mind, as well as the historical contingency of ideas.<sup>18</sup> Such historicism is also undeniably a factor for the Marburg Heidegger: “I actually see a being-there in its Being when I see it in its *history*.” [Ich sehe ein Daseiendes eigentlich in seinem Sein, wenn ich es in seiner *Geschichte* sehe (35).]

Reforging Heidegger with the humanist tradition, Gadamer makes the bold claim that rational-scientific discourse is a special case of language generally conceived in terms of rhetoric.<sup>19</sup> And what rhetoric builds, hermeneutics understands. But this general rhetoric could never be described in terms of a purified theory, as a system of interlocking communication rules abstracted from empirical data, pace Searle or Habermas. It could never take structuralist form (Group  $\mu$ ) or the form of a systematic treatise on rhetorical *technē*. Aligning himself implicitly with the Marburg Heidegger, Gadamer suggests instead that rhetoric is a manifestation of human being in its historicity. It reveals the force that historically sedimented language quietly exerts on who we are and what is possible, and gives an account of what makes any particular human expression either resonant or forgettable. It is a phenomenology of language capable of relating passions, change, and nothingness to expression that would be purely instrumental. The medium in which hermeneutic understanding takes place is language, rhetorically conceived.<sup>20</sup> And following Heidegger, Gadamer insists that understanding comes before any pragmatic or theoretical interest. Now science’s concept of objectivity appears to be a “special case” while both the human and the natural sciences can be seen “as achievements of the intentionality of universal life—i.e., of absolute historicity.”<sup>21</sup>

But in claiming in *Truth and Method* that “understanding” and not “affect” comes before any pragmatic or theoretical interest, Gadamer overlooks a crucial element of Heidegger’s Marburg project, ceding ground thereby to the very rationalists he sets out to criticize. To think in terms of “organizing a perfect and perfectly manipulated information” is to pave over the immediacy of discourse—its affective context most of all. And as Gadamer sees it, this is a turn that modern rhetoric seems to have taken, Jürgen Habermas leading the charge. But unlike Heidegger, Gadamer chooses not to reclaim for rhetoric the doctrine of affections (*Affektenlehre*) as taught by the likes of Luther or Schleiermacher. Instead he cedes that,



in the age of the written word, communication no longer depends on the orator and his ability to suspend critical examination, arouse the emotions, and “carry the listener away.”<sup>22</sup> Communication now depends more on a productive understanding, which Gadamer calls “hermeneutics.” However we will see in the next section that rhetorical art according to the Marburg Heidegger in no way suspends critical judgment and certainly cannot “carry the listener away.” In fact pathos provides the very ground for critical judgment (*krisis*), first moving the listener to be realized in some form. In other words, Heidegger might object that Gadamer’s masterwork ultimately portrays rhetoric from a rationalist perspective, thereby rendering it a vulnerable and inviting target for rational reconstruction of a Habermasian bent. For only if Gadamer had already lost a fundamental understanding of rhetoric could he conclude that the sense of mutual interpenetration of rhetoric and hermeneutics had faded away, “leaving hermeneutics on its own.”<sup>23</sup> Significantly, in our interview (chapter 2) Gadamer radically revises the pessimistic understanding of rhetoric voiced in *Truth and Method* and aligns more closely with the position Heidegger takes in SS 1924.

Heidegger’s conception of language and *Mitsein* has become the golden goose for a communitarian political philosophy contrary to liberal individualism. But for some, communitarian thinking depends on recovering Heidegger’s “more originary sense of hermeneutics” obfuscated by the likes of Gadamer and Ricoeur. This makes less sense in light of SS 1924. True, Gadamer takes Heidegger’s hermeneutics ever further from its proactive origins, which as we have seen entails a certain loss. As Christopher Fynsk puts it in his introduction to Jean-Luc Nancy’s *The Inoperative Community*, “the *hermeneuein* of existence . . . consists not in the interpretation of a prior meaning to which *Dasein* would have access, but in the opening of meaning that occurs as *Dasein* projects for itself a horizon of significations.”<sup>24</sup> Hermeneutics, in other words, is not supposed to be just reception of a tradition (though it is that also), but is as well a kind of “performance” that is simultaneously the instantiation of tradition and an expression of freedom. And it is this traditional difference (or *partage des voix*) measured out in a plurality of voices that is the articulation of a community—a community logically prior to the *logos* in which it is expressed. SS 1924 shows that rhetoric is the discipline that most comfortably lays out possibilities for concrete being. A return to a more originary sense of rhetoric, and not hermeneutics, would with only slight adjustments provide precisely the account of performative discourse constitutive of a pluralistic community that Fynsk and Nancy seek. And what the rhetorical tradition provides any political philosophy that hermeneutics cannot is an account of how people are moved, as well as the specific institutional context in which human passions are constituted.

This brings us to another supposed champion of the communitarian cause and another student at Marburg, Hannah Arendt.

Dana Villa has argued that Arendt appropriates both Heidegger's "general description of human existence" as articulated in *Being and Time* and the distinction between authentic and inauthentic disclosedness. Arendt's innovation, according to Villa, is that she "spatializes" the distinction in such a way that the public realm—now the arena of agonistic politics—could be seen as the proper venue for authentic disclosure of who we are. Arendt's political space is contrasted to Heidegger's lonely venue of uncanny works and poetic words.<sup>25</sup> On Villa's reading then, Heidegger "denies a priori any relation between the disclosure of Being and *politics*," while Arendt's contribution to modern political philosophy lies precisely in affirming this relation.

SS 1924 proves Villa wrong. The lecture course in fact reveals an original Being—with obfuscated by *Being and Time*, and practically invisible in Heidegger's later work—as Villa rightly points out. Nevertheless it appears that Heidegger's reading of Aristotle leaked into Arendt's political philosophy, even though she did not arrive in body at Marburg until the winter semester of 1924 (see chapter 6). Although what Dana Villa has called the *topos* of political being is described differently by the two philosophers—Arendt's plural space indeed contradicts the more rarefied authenticity-unto-death of Heidegger's later essays—it would appear that Arendt's conditions of authentic politics is quite close to that of the Marburg Heidegger. Arendt's "speech" is for all intents and purposes, Heideggerian/Aristotelian "rhetoric."<sup>26</sup>

Briefly, here is where the two concepts meet. "Speech," Arendt proclaims in *The Human Condition*, "is the actualization of the human condition of plurality."<sup>27</sup> Without speech we might be able to assess a situation and grunt a warning to others, but we would be incapable of constituting ourselves as a particular kind of person capable of acting virtuously. For Arendt speech discloses individuals by rendering actions salient and meaningful in a life story as well as in a shared history. In the Aristotelian tradition described by Heidegger, "judicial rhetoric" is the kind of speech that similarly provides a perspective on "what has happened." To draw a classic example from Aristotle, an act (say a sacred vessel is stolen from a private house) is defined in a particular manner (theft or sacrilege) and the act is then ascribed to an agent (the man is a thief; he can be punished accordingly).<sup>28</sup> Though Arendt does not concentrate on legal discourse, both she and Heidegger submit that linguistic disclosure of the past helps constitute who we are. But both reject a world without freedom or a world in which we would be the self-possessed authors of our actions. We constitute and are subject to those institutions in which our acts make

sense. Outside of a world with religious laws and objects, an act of sacrilege, for instance, is unthinkable.

The rhetoric of praise and blame, or *epideictic*, gets short shrift in Heidegger's course, as it does in Aristotle's text (see chapter 4 in this volume). But Heidegger does extensively gloss what he calls the heart of the discipline: "deliberative" rhetoric. Traditionally this form of logos allows an advocate addressing a political assembly to characterize a problem, lay out concrete possibilities for future action, and forge a common opinion regarding what is to be done (124–125). Arendt seems to recall Heidegger's terms when she describes the speech that allows humans to "plan for the future and foresee the needs of those who will come after them."<sup>29</sup> So when we test the link between Arendt and Heidegger's political philosophy outlined in SS 1924, we find one fundamental bond. Each of these basic possibilities for meaningful speech—judicial and deliberative rhetoric—reveals a political community: "Being-with." There can be no agent or patient, no speaker or hearer, unless one presumes a shared domain of past and potential meaning. And it is in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* that Being-with, or *koinōnia*, is given its definitive form. Gadamer and Arendt draw upon this particular Aristotle, but critical elements were also left behind—the priority of pathos first among them. To understand the importance of what has been lost, we turn now to Heidegger's odd reinvention of the *Rhetoric*.

## II. PHYSIS, POLIS, AND HEIDEGGER'S STYLE

We have recently seen a revival of interest in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, now consistently placed alongside the Roman rhetorical works of Cicero and Quintilian.<sup>30</sup> The philosopher's reaction has been quick and covetous: "It is time to reclaim the *Rhetoric* as a philosophic work."<sup>31</sup> This is a characteristic protest of Amélie Oksenberg Rorty in her preface to a collection of essays on Aristotle's most misunderstood legacy. Eugene Garver insists in the same tone that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* be read "as a piece of philosophic inquiry, and judged by philosophic standards."<sup>32</sup> In fact quite a bit of attention has been given recently to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*—and most of it in the name of philosophy. But SS 1924 shows Heidegger preparing for this philosophical counterthrust: "That we have the Aristotelian *Rhetoric* is better than if we had a philosophy of language." [Daß wir die aristotelische *Rhetorik* haben, ist besser, als wenn wir eine Sprachphilosophie hätten (117).] And in a fashion so provocative that it elicits a question mark of apparent disbelief from auditor Bröcker: "the philosophers are the real Sophists" [die Philosophen sind die rechten Sophisten (136)]; this because,

Heidegger explains, philosophers are supposed to know the limits of knowledge, like the true Sophists (136). Then finally by way of sarcastic understatement: “It would be welcome if the philosophers would decide to reflect upon what it actually means to speak to others.” [Ich weise nur darauf hin, daß es vielleicht angebracht wäre, wenn die Philosophen sich entschließen würden, zu überlegen, was es überhaupt heißt, zu anderen zu sprechen (169–170).] Of course the art of rhetoric is all about speaking to others.

Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle flies in the face of conventions old and new, and does so in telling fashion (see chapter 3 in this volume). As passages like these show, the course is polemical and unconventional, and in it Heidegger makes claims that are far-fetched. But as is often the case with Heidegger’s provocations, hasty dismissal can be a missed opportunity for thought. Such is the case, for instance, with Heidegger’s holistic treatment of Aristotle’s corpus. Over the three-month course Heidegger treats in holistic fashion Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, *Politics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Rhetoric*, *Topics*, *De anima*, *De motu animalium*, and *Physics*. Pathos, a key term in the rhetorical tradition, provides the transfer point between social and naturo-physical phenomena. And it is this pathos at the heart of Heidegger’s ontology that grounds philosophy in a new way.

The *Rhetoric* was given very little attention in late antiquity, where it was viewed as a logical tool rather than a practical or productive art. Symptomatically the editor Alexander of Aphrodisias (AD 200) situated the *Rhetoric* in the *Organon*, following the *Topics* and preceding the *Poetics*. Though preserved intact, the *Rhetoric* received equally meager attention from writers in the Roman empire and the early Middle Ages. In contrast when it resurfaced as an important text in the fifteenth century as a result of George of Trebizond’s new Latin translation (1472), Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was recast as an authoritative treatise on the passions and practical wisdom. Italian humanists read it primarily for its political and moral teachings, and the first English translation (1637) was provided by the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes.<sup>33</sup> This is largely how we find the *Rhetoric* situated today—in the recently reexamined domain of practical reason (*phronēsis*), where rhetoric is purged of its sophistic ambiguities and reconstructed as a philosophy of everyday language.<sup>34</sup> We are now urged to “philosophize” about social phenomena, but without the scientism that would treat these phenomena as natural objects.

The *Naturwissenschaft-Geisteswissenschaft* distinction is then read back into Aristotle. Even the synthetically minded Aristotle scholar Richard McKeon underscored Aristotle’s distinction between the practical human sciences, and theories of “natural” things: the first treats changeable human habits, skills, and institutions, while the second treats physical phenomena subject to precise definition and knowledge. Indeed it is a

distinction that McKeon calls “sharp and unbreakable” despite the “easy analogies which had been found even in the time of Aristotle between social and physical phenomena.”<sup>35</sup> Shattering centuries of interpretation of Aristotle while staying stubbornly in character, Heidegger takes such analogies seriously. Heidegger treats Aristotle’s practical and naturo-theoretical writings holistically, and by doing so he relocates the long misplaced discipline of rhetoric. According to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, Being-with-one-another turns out to be only one way of being among many—living and nonliving, human and nonhuman. The shared ontology of all Being, claims Heidegger, is grounded in the categories of Aristotle’s *Physics* (284). The pathos of a stone allows it to become part of a wall, the pathos of a plant to grow, the pathos of an animal to perceive imminent danger and to shriek a warning to others. Unique to human pathos is a dependence on *nous poiētikos*: the human faculty that allows us to extend into every domain of being and be moved even by things that are not there in body. Thinking allows us to be with others in a manner unattainable for other animals (“In diesem Denken-daran bin ich mit ihm” [326]). Though only human being is moved to discourse, or logos, Being-moved is essential to all (*Sein-in-Bewegung*). What we share with things of all sorts is body-in-movement, a movement characterized by pathos. Heidegger sees this as one of Aristotle’s most profound insights into the nature of rhetoric: Being-moved—the heart of rhetorical thought—necessarily exceeds the rational psyche because people have bodies of a certain sort. We are there, we grow and decompose, we can be damaged or excited, mobilized or dispersed. “When Being in a *soma* belongs to a living thing, then *soma* also belongs to the right understanding of the basic phenomenon of the *pathē*, and the *physikos* is disclosed in this bringing-forth.” [Wenn zum Lebenden mitgehört das Sein in einem *soma*, dann gehört auch zur rechten Erfassung des Grundphänomens der *pathē* das *soma*, und der *physikos* ist mitbeteiligt an dieser Herausstellung (226).] Being-moved in a human way is thus a continuous function of physiology and shared minds. What we have here is “embodied philosophy” at its most literal.

Significantly, this aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy drops out before 1927—with political consequence. Already wary of a technological orientation that posits things in the world and its inhabitants as equipment “standing-in-reserve,” the Heidegger of *Being and Time* is intent on demonstrating the derivative nature of Being-in-space. “Dasein is never present-at-hand in space, not even proximally. Dasein does not fill up a bit of space as a Real Thing or item of equipment would.” Indeed to talk about Dasein’s real embodiment would be “ontologically inappropriate,” for where we are is a matter not of substance in space, but rather of where we care to be (BT 418). More appropriate would be to talk about Dasein’s essential “place.” If Dasein cannot be understood by asking where it is on a

spatial grid posited by modern physics; it can be understood by asking where it stands relative to everyday equipment and things of potential concern, social institutions (*das Man*) and a limit such as death: “Because Dasein as temporality is ecstatico-horizonal in its Being, it can take along with it a space for which it has made room, and it can do so factually and constantly. With regard to that space which it has ecstatically taken in, the ‘here’ of its current factual situation [Lage bzw. situation] never signifies a position in space, but signifies rather the leeway of the range of that equipmental totality with which it is most closely concerned—a leeway which has been opened up for it in directionality and de-severance” (BT 420).

Our brief discussion of Heidegger and Arendt suggests that this *Being and Time* “situation” is in fact a substantial development of rhetorical context and rhetorical genres: judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. But at this point I would like to highlight what drops out—namely the special materiality of human Dasein and the way that this materiality determines how we encounter others. In Heidegger’s 1924 discussion of Aristotle, the extension of naturo-physical phenomena comes explicitly into question: “Must the physicist research the Being of life in all its possibilities and entire breadth, or is his subject only a particular aspect of life relative to its Being?” [Hat der *physikos* das Sein des Lebens in allen seinen Möglichkeiten und seiner ganzen Erstreckung zu erforschen, oder ist für den Physiker nur ein bestimmter Ausschnitt des Lebenden hinsichtlich seines Seins Thema? (233).] And as indicated above, Heidegger’s answer is also clear: Aristotle’s basic ontology is grounded in the physical categories. Moreover, these categories do not just ground individual beings as such, but social being: *Miteinandersein*.

Heidegger sets out this argument in the style that had already made him something of a cult figure by 1924. In order to get a sense of how this style works, it is helpful to take an extended look at the dense and mantralike passage in which the argument is made. Heidegger is insistent: Socrates put *physis* in the background when treating social phenomena, and Aristotle saw this as a fundamental mistake. *Physis* and *polis* are in fact essentially bound because we are there concretely for each other—simultaneously subject and object. This passage should also give readers a good sense of Heidegger’s style of appropriating classical texts for his own purposes. It is clear that Heidegger is doing much more than a simple historical treatment of forgotten philosophical problems. Heidegger’s revisionism puts Aristotle to immediate use, moving into a sarcastic attack on the *Lebensphilosophie* popular in Germany during the 1920s.

Socrates advanced the project of treating the things themselves—in fact during this period general interest in the *zetein peri physeōs* slackened. People turned to the *politikē* while the *physei ontā* re-

ceded into the background. But this turn was not the result of simple omission, as if the human sciences were simply studied more than the natural sciences. Rather it was a fundamental oversight. The concepts of Being-in-the-polis also have their foundation in the concepts of nature. Aristotle saw this and shifted the weight of his work initially to the investigation of physis as Being. He thereby established the foundations for an investigation of Being as such.

Our take on the characteristic Being of living things has shown us that living means Being-in-a-world. This determination now becomes *ambiguous*:

1) The Being of this living nature is determined in its *eidos* as the *dynamis* of Being-in-the-world—that is to say it is determined in the first instance as *eidos*, as the *determination itself of the Being of Beings* [and]

2) as *an encounter from out of this world*. The living thing is in the world then in a second sense: it belongs *to the world*. My Being is Being-in-the-world while simultaneously it belongs to the world in such a way that I can be encountered in the world by another, like a chair.

For the Greeks both are *eidos*. The Greeks knew nothing about the difference between an interior and an exterior viewpoint. When we consider this we gain a broader sense of the fundamental interconnection of the Being of living things. Now I would like to point out that *Being-with-one-another* has been subject to a *more precise determination*:

1) Beings with one another are Being-with-one-another in such a way that all are Being-in-the-world for themselves. *They are there in such a way that encountering another is Being-there for another, so that each Being that is for another is in the world*. The one who encounters is in the world of the encountered—there for another Being.

2) In Being-with-one-another we have with an Other the same world. Being-with-one-another is at the same time *having the same world with an Other*.

When someone writes a book on epistemology it is presupposed that pertinent questions can still be posed in the required manner.

Answers can be left up to the epistemologist himself. Now we hear that a fight rages among the philosophers whether philosophy should be “philosophy of life.” One side claims that philosophy cannot be philosophy of life, the other that it must indeed be so. But “philosophy of life” is like “plant botany”! The emphatic claim that botany has to do with plants is just as strange and senseless as the reverse.

[Sokrates hat die Aufgabe, mit den Sachen selbst sich zu beschäftigen, gefördert, allerdings ließ in dieser Zeit das *zetein peri physeōs* nach, man wandte sich ab auf die *politikē*, die *physei onta* kamen in den Hintergrund. Das ist nicht ein beliebiges Versäumnis, etwa so, daß sie mehr Geistes- als Naturwissenschaften getrieben hätten, sondern es ist ein fundamentales Versehen; auch die Begriffe vom Sein-in-der-*polis* haben ihre Grundlagen in den Naturbegriffen. Aristoteles sah das und verlegte das Hauptgewicht seiner Arbeit zuerst auf die Erforschung der *physis* als Sein. Von daher hat er den Boden gewonnen für die Seinsforschung als solche.

Aus dieser Betrachtung des Seinscharakters des Lebenden haben wir gesehen: Leben besagt In-einer-Welt-sein. Diese Bestimmung wird jetzt *doppeldeutig*:

1) das Sein dieser lebenden Natur ist in seinem *eidōs* bestimmt als diese *dynamis* des In-der-Welt-seins—also einmal als *eidōs*, als *Seinsbestimmung selbst des Seienden*.

2) als *Begegnung aus der Welt her*. Das Lebende ist noch in einem zweiten Sinne in der Welt, im Sinn der *Weltzugehörigkeit*. Mein Sein ist In-der-Welt-sein, zugleich im zweiten Sinne in der Welt als zu ihr gehörig, so zwar, daß ich in der Welt für einen anderen begegnen kann, wie ein Stuhl.

Für die Griechen ist beides *eidōs*, der Grieche kennt nicht den Unterschied zwischen äußerer und innerer Betrachtung. Dadurch ergeben sich fundamentale Zusammenhänge des Seins des Lebens im weiteren Sinne. Ich weise darauf hin, daß das *Miteinandersein* jetzt eine *schärfere Bestimmung* erfahren hat:

1) Miteinandersein sind solche Seienden miteinander, die jedes für sich In-der-Welt-sein sind. *Das Einanderbegegnen ist Füreinanderdasein, so, daß jedes Seiende, das für das andere ist, in der*



*Welt ist.* Das Begegnende ist in der Welt des Begegneten, ist da für ein anderes Sein.

2) Im Miteinandersein haben wir miteinander dieselbe Welt. Miteinandersein ist zugleich: *miteinander dieselbe Welt haben.*

Wenn man ein Buch über Erkenntnistheorie schreibt, ist das Voraussetzung. Ob dann die Fragen noch in der üblichen Weise gestellt werden können, kann man den Erkenntnistheoretikern selbst zu entscheiden überlassen. Dann herrscht heute, wie wir hören, ein großer Streit unter den Philosophen, ob die Philosophie "Lebensphilosophie" sein soll. Von der einen Seite wird behauptet, die Philosophie kann nicht Lebensphilosophie sein, von der anderen, sie muß es ja sein. "Lebensphilosophie" ist wie: "Botanik der Pflanzen"! Die emphatische Behauptung, die Botanik habe es mit Pflanzen zu tun, ist genau so komisch und unsinnig wie das Gegenteil (240-242).]

First to a point about the form of this passage—and its content. What can seem in this passage like tautological nonsense actually performs a critical role in the development of Heidegger's argument about the inter-connection of *physis* and *polis*. In one respect the argument is classically antiskeptical: to question the existence of "other minds" is nonsensical. If one is situated in a language and a world so deeply that the question can even be asked, then *de facto* the question has been answered. Or to put the argument back into Heidegger's phenomenological terms, political community and "I" are "equiprimordial" because any subject position I can take presupposes the world of common concern in which and from which I distinguish myself. I am there in the world going about my business (the interior, subjective view) and there in the world as the business of others (the exterior, objective view). But here the antiskeptical argument takes a new stylistic turn. For these are not two moments that can be distinguished in time, nor can they be adequately represented in the spatial configuration implied in a sentence that links two predicated subjects with an additive conjunction (I am this *and* I am that). Hence Heidegger's stylistic dilemma. What Heidegger wants to characterize is the inherent multiplicity in the One, the simultaneity of being active and being passive, the nature of a life at the same time constructive and constructed. Such could be expressed by the Greeks in the middle voice, as many critics of instrumental thinking from Nietzsche to Derrida have pointed out. But despite his reverence for ancient Greek as one of the only two languages in which one could truly think, Heidegger was intent upon exploiting possibilities in the German language to reach new and supposedly more

authentic modes of expression. Among the possibilities Heidegger had at his disposal were variations on the verb *sein* and a German language that allows one to nominalize agent and patient in a way that expresses their interanimation: “Das Begegnende ist in der Welt des Begegneten, ist da für ein anderes Sein.” Heidegger experimented with these morphological, syntactical, and poetic-associative possibilities throughout his career, with mixed results. But in this case his stylistic stutterings allow him to produce a discussion of *Miteinandersein* achievable by no other means. This particular achievement, however, has been dramatically misunderstood.

### III. HEIDEGGER THE HUMANIST?

At the heart of debate about the politics of poststructuralism lay Heidegger’s appropriation of the Greek middle voice and its Derridian consequences. Pressing questions were raised: Does the middle voice leave us completely without political agency and without the ability to recognize ourselves as both subject and object of ethical discourse? Does it lead to bureaucratic apathy—a conservative resignation before the juggernaut of linguistic institutions that call us into being? Or is discoursing in the middle voice inherently progressive insofar as it deconstructs the grammar of activity and passivity, thereby undermining the oppressive illusion of the liberal subject—a subject assumed to be author of his own actions, master of the universe, and perpetrator of his own misfortune? Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Paul de Man, J. Hillis Miller, Vincent Pecora, Luc Ferry, and Alain Renaut among others weighed in on this debate about humanism and the death of the subject in the last three decades, and the late Heidegger’s discourse on language became both a topic of debate and locus classicus for a (failed?) middle voice. But regardless of their position, advocates on both sides presented Heidegger’s discourse on language as the attempt to dissolve passion and action, subject and object. In light of our stylistic reading of *SS 1924*, we can now see this as a serious error.

Here is Jacques Derrida in 1968 on the middle voice—a passage from *Margins of Philosophy* designed to illustrate a crucial claim about his notorious neologistic gerund, *différance*. It is a key passage insofar as it both recalls Heidegger in no uncertain terms and misreads him famously. And in what seems to be an unintentional, but for our purposes fortuitous allusion, Derrida actually exemplifies the modern middle voice by way of the French translation of *kinēsis* or the German *Bewegung*: *mouvance*.

Because it brings us close to the infinitive and active kernel of *différer*, *différance* (with an *a*) neutralizes what the infinitive de-