

Chapter One

Autonomy and Its Explanations

It might be wholly wrong to think of unified nation-states as the world's basic political units or even as a feasible goal, but as a myth and an ambition they are alive and well. The idea of a correspondence between nation and state, that nations have states and states have nations, has been remarkably little diminished by the experiences of recent decades. It might only apply to a few places, such as Iceland and Portugal, but it still has great power over thought and legitimizes frightening politics. If we think each state has a nation, and each nation a state, then the world will be much more likely to put aside liberal democratic principles in order to excuse both homogenizing programs of states and separatist programs of stateless nations.

It might be wholly wrong to think of nationalism as a wave of primordial passion that, once unleashed, cannot be stopped, but, like the idea of the nation-state, it also seems to bear on reality. Abundant and often excellent theories focusing on the illogical, contingent, and constructed nature of nations and nationalisms have been the most common output from the decades of "Great Debate" about nationalism (Schöpflin 2000:3). By explaining it, placing it in history, and showing the contingency of national identity over time, twenty years of work have done much to strip away the idea that national identity is "tribal," fixed and ahistorical. But theories stressing the contingency and political uses of nationalism only go so far—deconstructing national identities might conceivably help to inoculate populations over time but seems unlikely to dampen conflict in Kosovo, Chechnya, or the Basque Country. Any social institution, after all, is ultimately contingent and historical but can still be a strong and very tangible reality in people's lives.

It is these theories' focus on the internal conflicts, malleability, and multiple political uses of nationalism that has excited more applied theorists.

If national identity, nationalist ideas, and nationalist mobilization all respond at least in part to structural conditions and the political opportunity structures facing national leaders, then practical politics and good institutional design might contain or channel nationalism in a liberal direction, avoiding the problems that come with state-seeking nationalism and nation-creating states. Such a view both accords with many findings, and also has the great virtue that it allows us to at least imagine doing something when faced with potentially dangerous conflicts between nations.

Scotland and Catalonia, Spain and the United Kingdom, play a special role in these debates, as exemplars first of the resurgence of stateless nationalisms and then of the use of territorial autonomy to resolve conflicts between state, majority and minority. Both the UK and Spain, faced with nationalist challenges, have created autonomous governments for their minority nations in Scotland, Wales, Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country. They have both increased the political autonomy and representation of the smaller nations while preserving the state as a whole. Internally, meanwhile, the politics and public discourses of Scotland and Catalonia are a world away from their neighbors in, for example, Northern Ireland; in both countries, most intellectuals and leaders take great care to be “civic” and tolerant, eschewing ethnic or sectarian politics in public.

It did not obviously have to be that way, which is why we study these largely successful cases of multinational accommodation in one state. When nationalism erupted in the 1960s and 1970s across the West, after a postwar lull, it seemed to presage a serious threat to modern states. Diverse nationalist movements and parties in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Catalonia, Quebec, Brittany, Corsica, Flanders, Catalonia, and in the Basque Country, to list just the most discussed, made serious claims for national self-determination and statehood, and in each of those places and others the arrival of politically mobilized nationalists made it easy to imagine their independence. Central states worried while academics and journalists flocked to study the many and contradictory manifestations of the “new nationalisms of the developed West” (Tiryakian and Rogowski 1985). Nationalisms, implicitly assumed to be state-seeking nationalisms, appeared to be everywhere.

The interest of the UK and Spain lies in what happened since (Keating 1992:224; Conversi 2000:138; Sturm 2006:147; Gunther, Montero, and Botella 2004:7). Decades later, the outcome is not quite what an observer in 1970 might have imagined. Nationalism in these places and others across Europe seems to have elided with other concerns to produce not nation-states but regional governments. Like other 1960s and 1970s social movements, they have produced reform rather than radical change. The UK, France, Spain, Belgium, and Canada are all intact, often with nationalist parties ruling some of their regional governments. Rather than pursue the

classic and still popular nationalist demand for a state to a successful conclusion, leaders of these mobilized nations have settled, more or less stably, into life as regional governments within larger states. Even as the breakup of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia reminded the world of the deadly possibilities of nationalism and the demand for statehood, Scotland and Catalonia were governed by regional parliaments that are popular and well entrenched but a far cry from states. The nationalism of these old nations had somehow merged into a broader trend of regionalization. Meanwhile, other places with little or no nationalism, “new” or otherwise, were pursuing regionalization with success. Corsica had nationalists and the cobbled-together French region of Provence–Alpes–Côte d’Azur (known as PACA) did not, but both were nearly identical regional governments; Cantabria was a newcomer to Spanish political history but was by 2003 under almost the same legal regime as the ancient nation of Catalonia.

What has happened in Europe’s stateless nations, then, is the rise of regional government—a type of meso-level government that has been gaining influence worldwide for decades (Sharpe 1993; Keating 1998). It is as if history’s wires had become crossed, turning classic nationalist fights for statehood into territorial, elected, agencies charged with social policy, public administration, and regional economic development. The result was regional governments for stateless nations and newly invented regions alike. That raises the question: what created regional governments in these countries? What explains the way the drive for territorial self-determination not only started, but also stopped? *Why, in short, did nationalist mobilization arise and develop momentum but also stop short of secession when it did?*

The answer lies in the relationship between political institutions and the struggles within Scotland and Catalonia, where separatist nationalists are by no means the only forces at play (alternative theories are in chapter two). They are thickly institutionalized, dense societies with complex interwoven interests and networks, and it is both an error and a disservice to them to regard them as simple peoples unified behind any political force. Regional autonomy is a consequence of the politics that play out from strong webs of regional organizations. Their interests, as regional organizations, lie in environmental stability and their own autonomy; this opposes them to both centralization and secession. Autonomy suits them perfectly by guaranteeing both. Where such regional organizations exist, they can be very influential in politics by virtue of the resources they control; in both Scotland and Catalonia, the party systems and institutional arrangements reflect the ability of regional institutional organizations to shape politics. They do this through their elective affinities with parties; coalition-building politicians, searching for strong supports, look for groups that will adopt their interests, and regional organizations are a major such group. If their support is needed for

a party to thrive, a successful party will take on their preferences regarding autonomy. Thus, when a nation that could be another case of nationalist secession instead stabilizes with an autonomous regional government, it should be explained by the presence and influence of regional institutionalized organizations whose pull attracts and strengthens parties and thereby undermines that of secessionist movements and centralists alike.

The rest of this chapter makes this argument, linking the high politics of nationhood, self-government, and statehood to the organizations and politics of civil society and public policy. Public policy actually matters in high politics; if nation identifies with territory and public policy is territorial and is worth the name, then policy issues can also create nationalist, regionalist, statist, or other coalitions, as much as state and minority nationalist parties that often occupy the limelight. It also makes the point that most people in a society are not concerned about their national identity most of the time, but that the politics of public policy, and the frustrations of regionally concentrated groups, also matter. Scotland and Catalonia—and Quebec, Flanders, and others—are not just nations. They are also societies. And at least in these comparatively rich societies of Western Europe, dense as they are with autonomous organizations, policy and diverse organizational interests that cannot be easily reduced to class or nation also matter. In such societies, it is an analytic error to leave out them and their systematic preferences when explaining either stability or change. In societies without such dense networks of autonomous organizations, it might be an error to adopt institutional solutions that rely upon them to guarantee stability. And, if it is correct, then there are dramatic implications for our understanding of the institutional arrangements, such as regional autonomy, that work in different kinds of multinational states and societies, and for our understanding of the worldwide trend toward decentralization of government and administration.

REGIONS AND GOVERNANCE

So the outcomes in Scotland and Catalonia, while they are to some extent probably driven by nationalism, are actually regionalization. Regionalization, a subspecies of authority migration, is the process of creating new meso-level governments, between the levels of the central state and the local level (Sharpe 1993; Harvie 1994; Balme 1996; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Nay 1997; Keating 1998; Le Galès and Lequesne 1998; Negriér and Jouve 1998; Loyer and Villanova 1999; Bukowski and Rajagopalan 2000; Bukowski, Piattoni, and Smyrl 2002; Gerber and Kollman 2004). It has been growing (Simeon 2005:18). While, in 1970, Western Europe's only regionally decentralized states were federal Germany and Austria, by 2002, Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, and the UK had established regions. These regional governments

occupy a territorial level not traditionally present in these states' diverse histories, and their rise redistributes power, accountability, and responsibility while reshaping politics and society. The confusion in the discussion of their rise is that they have blossomed and flourish with or without nations behind them; Andalusia is as much of a protagonist in Spanish politics as Catalonia, and German Länder are powerful actors in a decreasingly homogeneous country (Jeffery 2003).¹

The question is what has been driving the rise of these governments and to what end? There are functional explanations, which focus on the idea that the nation-state is too small for the big things and too big for the small things (Guiberneau 1995). The argument takes two variations: one proposing that regions are better units for the provision of important public goods (Balme 1996; Gobetti 1996) (and which often conflates economic or social regions with the inherited regional borders) and the other that the decline in geopolitical and economic usefulness of the state affords regions, particularly those with stateless nations, more protagonism as actors. More recent work focuses on the politics, identifying central states (V. Wright 1997; Mitchneck, Solnick, and Stoner-Weiss 2001; Boone 2003), parties (van Houten 1999; Meguid 2002; O'Neill 2003) or regional politicians' networks and activities (Bukowski, Piattoni, and Smyrl 2002) as agents of change that explain particular regional outcomes.

There are also more technical justifications for decentralization (Manor 1999). They come primarily from public finance, which focus on the likely misallocation of public resources when they are allocated centrally (the null hypothesis is that central allocation will produce over- or underprovision due to spatial variation and lack of information; Oates 1999; Wincott 2006). Finally, there is an abundant tradition of democratic theory that proposes participation is better in smaller units, with Machiavelli, Proudhon, and Montesquieu among those who have argued for small polities (Dahl 1967). So regionalization might, at least under some conditions, create better public administration, better democracy, and also reduce ethnonational strife. The conditions under which regions come into existence and get their powers, and their effects, though, remain relatively unclear—as one well-placed observer argued, we “know a great deal about what happens in regional politics. We are less well placed to offer generalizable explanations of how and why developments in regional politics take place” (Jeffery 2002:vii).

Perhaps the most important thing asked of autonomous governments in multinational states, ahead of their economic development, public administration, or social policy concerns, is that they reduce the likelihood of secession or conflict. One practical and theoretical debate to which the Scottish and Catalan experiences and turn to regionalization matter is the one about the conditions under which territorial autonomy arrangements

stave off or limit conflict. Repeated upsurges of national and group conflict around the world have justified decades of scholarly and practical work on institutional solutions to ethnic conflict. There are a variety of solutions to the problems that emerge when nation and state do not correspond, ranging from the extremes of making the population correspond to the state through genocide or mass expulsions to making the state correspond to the population by secession (McGarry and O'Leary 1993).

One of the most common proposals, desirable because it prevents state breakup while permitting cultural autonomy, is federalism or territorial decentralization to ethnic groups (G. Smith 1995). It is intuitive enough to argue that a measure of national self-government should satisfy most people (Lijphart 1977; Lapidoth 1996:121–125; Keating 2001; O'Leary 2003) and there is empirical evidence in both case studies (Bajpai 1997; Conversi 2000; Mitra 2000; Watts 2000) and cross-national studies (Cohen 1997; Bermeo 2002; Saideman et al. 2002:97; Amoretti and Bermeo 2004). Political autonomy for minority nations would mean that “groups, states, or nations would govern themselves while participating in supranational political institutions . . . in order to solve common problems. . . . It is not that federalism eliminates all ethnic conflict. Rather, it provides mechanisms by which this type of conflict can be checked by groups committed to maintaining an interconnected system without necessarily trampling on the interests of minorities” (Jusdanis 2001). The idea is logical (Hechter 2000) and historical precedents, above all the enormous history of indirect rule in sophisticated empires throughout history, suggest that it has promise. Empirically, states such as Canada have been able to manage the tensions between diverse populations for many years via federalism; “granting a substantial measure of autonomy and self-government to distinct groups within the polity may in fact contribute to enhanced unity . . . all the evidence points to the fact that, if there had not already been provincial autonomy, the [Quebec separatist] movement would have been much stronger, not weaker” (Watts 2000:48).

The reason is simple enough; modern states' abilities to penetrate individual life are so great that they are almost certain to routinely touch sensitive areas of culture and group life with their educational, regulatory, legal, economic, and other policies (Bendix 1969; Gellner 1983; B. Anderson 1991; Jusdanis 2001). If these policies clash with the group's practices, then they will become a point of contention and the state will clash with that group. Since the state is likely to be reflecting some other nation when it does so, and possibly some other nationalism, the result is all of the ingredients required for conflict in divided societies—unless the state devolves responsibility for these intrusive functions onto the minority groups. Once they are allocated in ways that cleave to national divisions, there is no necessary reason the different nations cannot share a currency or foreign policy.

In such circumstances, federalism can be thought to mitigate the security dilemma, in which mutual mistrust leads to increasingly defensive and aggressive behavior by each group, which thereby increases mistrust and can eventually explode into violence (Posen 1993; Rothchild and Lake 1998:211–212). Furthermore, such a view of the relationship between state and group suggests what would need to be devolved to a self-governing group—namely, the areas of public policy and administration such as education that are most likely to touch on group preferences and values. Federalism might not be enough to prevent conflict and keep a state intact and decent, but Simeon and Conway find that “federalism does not guarantee ‘success’ but it is hard to see any form of successful accommodation of multiple nations within a single state that does not include federalism” (Simeon and Conway 2001:364–365). So Alfred Stepan’s judgment is that “if countries such as Indonesia, Russia, Nigeria, China and Burma are ever to become stable democracies, they will have to craft workable federal systems” (Stepan 1999:20).

The logic and whole history of indirect rule by the world’s empires, the relationship between group identities and practices and the omnipresent modern state apparatus, and the ability of federal systems to flexibly balance different territorial, including national, interests against each other all appear to justify territorial autonomy as a solution. The developing literature on nationalism and territorial politics in comparative politics is, though, broadly skeptical about territorial autonomy as a solution. What do these scholars² find wrong with territorial autonomy, that is, autonomy for regional or federal governments whose borders correspond to the territorial extent of a nation?

The chief problem, these studies argue, is that of a “pathology of federalism” that accentuates differences (Watts 1998; also Simeon 2006:31). Creating ethnic units risks making the national groups the bases of politics while reducing healthy cross-cutting interactions between groups and creates insecure minorities in the ethnic units (Roeder 1991:197–199; Lieven and McGarry 1992:72; Schöpflin 1992:183; Agnew 1995:299; Popovski 1995:188; Brubaker 1996:24–25; Leff 1999). Given that cross-cutting cleavages and personal networks are one of the most important obstacles to ethnic violence (Varshney 2001), or in Robin Williams’s formula “connection, complementarity, and consensus” are the prerequisites of peace, ethnic or otherwise (2003:235), it is not obvious that we should adopt institutional forms that disconnect national groups from each other. Furthermore, even if these could be defined as appropriate responses to the reality of national identity and mobilization, there is the charge that they create political incentives to polarize politics around the claims of ethnic groups as represented in the new national units. Forcing ethnic entrepreneurs to compete for power in the central state would, by contrast, create incentives to build larger and presumptively

less divisive coalitions (Linz and Stepan 1992; Horowitz 2002). The new autonomous units can make their own claims to ethnic purity, or even establish the distinctive public policies such as language education that justify them, and thereby create new security dilemmas for their minorities. Meanwhile, autonomy equips them with many properties of states, save sovereignty; once they have their state-like flags, leaders, institutions of socialization such as schools, and political systems, it is easier to both imagine and attain greater sovereignty, autonomy, or ethnic purity (Cornell 2002:251–252). Snyder (2000:327) summarizes the case against autonomy:

This method has had a terrible track record, yet it remains popular with liberal problem-solvers, in part because it seems to allow national self-determination without the nasty fuss and bother of full-fledged partition . . . ethnofederalism tends to heighten and politicize ethnic consciousness, creating a self-conscious intelligentsia and the organisational structures of an ethnic state-in-waiting. When mass political participation expands, these ethnofederal structures channel it along an ethnic path. For these reasons, ethnofederalism is at best a last resort that risks fueling rather than appeasing the politicization of ethnicity.

Local units can also be more easily seized by corrupt or eccentric local elites; a key reason for centralized states in the nineteenth century was precisely that they were less vulnerable to capture by retrograde local elites, and it is not wholly accidental that local and regional governments have a reputation in so many countries as sinks of corruption and incompetence. Decentralization can “facilitate regional deviant behavior” to the point of permitting local authoritarian states in some places (von Beyme 2000:38).

So is decentralization a good way to govern a state, multinational or otherwise? Is it useful as a remedy for conflict despite its price? Is it a creator of conflict? The answer, as so often with this kind of debate, is that it depends. The next question is—on what does it depend?

What the current indeterminate answers in the literature suggest is that we should look at the interactions between institutions and societies. If similar institutional forms seem to have different effects, then it might be time to examine the social structures, interest, and socialization that also shapes the actors who confront institutional incentives. Despite their fundamentally institutional nature, the questions about the relationship between federalism and nationality cannot be answered purely in terms of institutional incentives and design (Forsyth 1989:6; Watts 2000:49–50; Simeon and Conway 2001:340; Williams 2003:234). We must include the social forces at work—the people with various kinds of power, the people who seek to mobilize

resources to some end, their coalitions and their fallings-out. It is they who respond to incentives and, as often as not, explain the institutions on paper and in reality. The most successful analyses of national and regional politics have always been those that break it down and reveal the complexity and contingency of politics in a nation, whether as an explicit point (Díez Medrano 1995) or not. The society that interacts with the institutions matters because its politics cannot be reduced to individuals and elites facing a set of incentives or a unified nation seeking an appropriate institutional home. It might not seem interesting to point this out, but it is striking how often nations are anthropomorphized or institutions are studied purely for the incentives they present to otherwise undifferentiated and sometimes rational individuals.

A THEORY OF TERRITORIAL POLITICAL CHANGE

How might we enrich a theory of territorial politics by engaging with the complexity of politics? One way to understand their role is via the logic of resource mobilization and dependencies (Tarrow, Katzenstein, and Graziano 1978; Rhodes 1981). The actions of organizations are powerfully contingent on their resource dependencies. Their preferences and constraints are not to be mechanistically derived from a single variable (such as class or nationality) but are part of complex webs of resource dependencies and mobilization in which organizations maintain themselves. The reasons organizations do what they do—throw their weight in one direction or another—should come from their resource dependencies.

In this, political parties are organizations like any other; their links into society and forms of mobilization give them specific characteristics, resources, and limitations (Panebianco 1988). They can strategically pursue voters, but their activities and existence are shaped by a fact, found in many party studies, that a “key feature of the party system . . . was less their electoral role and more the way they forged and shaped socioeconomic coalitions, policy-making structures, and public policies” (Pempel 1990:14).

They are dependent on other organizations, just like any other, and when they mobilize activists instead, that constrains them, too. Thus, it is a mistake to focus entirely on the electoral strategies of parties, despite its undeniable heuristic and simplifying value. It is a mistake because the axes of conflict, the permissible positions, and the preferences of parties are all constrained by the people who shape politics and parties. Resource dependencies in regional politics are what shape party *preferences* and are thus crucial, and combine with electoral positioning to account for the *intensity* and *timing* of the party actions.

In turn, that means it is too simple to code outcomes such as the Scottish parliament and the competencies of the Catalan regional government as

simple electoral plays by parties—parties are more than their electoral strategies. Parties' internal coherence, possible strategies, and possible positions all varied with their own insertion into regional societies. Britain's Labour Party demonstrated this with the 1979 devolution fiasco in Scotland, discussed in chapters two and six, when it tried a regionalist electoral strategy in the face of regional elite opposition to regionalization. It found an electoral strategy unmoored from its local resource dependencies led to humiliation in a referendum that split Labour and failed. The response of statewide parties to nationalist electoral challenges explains Labour's activities in the 1970s—which did not lead to Scottish (or Welsh) autonomy.

Dependence on Institutions and Its Consequences

Parties can get their resources from two different sources. The first kind of source is stable, institutionalized connections with other institutions. That means reliable connections with institutions that do not have to worry much about self-preservation, whether banks or universities. If the organizations on which parties depend have clear preferences for regional government, those parties will of necessity develop a preference for regional government. Such regional webs of organizations are rare but potent (V. Wright 1997). An organization is regional when the bulk of its resource dependencies are regional—when it depends on relationships with other institutions grounded in the region and/or mobilizes around issues found only in the region (such as nationalism). The extent to which an organization's key resource dependencies are on either a region itself (its population, language, economic specialization) or on other regional organizations is the extent to which an organization is regional. The indicators of an organization's territorial resource dependencies might vary with context, but they should reflect the organization's needs and the conditions under which it receives those resources. Thus, under what conditions does a given organization receive the resources necessary to it—above all, its funds, its staff, its clients or activists, and its political or regulatory role? This entails three questions. First, research must establish empirically what the organization requires: trades unions in both cases here, for example, rely on members, fees, and a particular role in industrial relations law. Second, it should then establish whether those are territorially contingent: in the example of a membership organization, do the members join because the organization is regional or statewide or for some other reason (such as its effect on their wages), are the fees set in some way that is regional or regionally conditioned (such as by region-level bargaining or regulation), and who makes industrial relations law? Third, most organizations seem to have some mixture of resource dependencies; the question is which kind bulk largest in terms of the amount and importance of the resources.

There can be organizations that are so culturally of a place (for regions, the Church of Scotland, for the central state the Spanish military) that a resource dependency test appears beside the point. Nevertheless, there are more elites than those easy cases, and they can surprise—the Comissions Obreres (CCOO) de Catalunya, a union, is both proudly Catalan and is today fundamentally Madrid-oriented by its resource dependencies (on statewide labor negotiations and laws). CCOO could not pursue its main organizational goals, on which its resources are contingent, by privileging the Catalan level. It follows that a resource dependency test is the most useful way to understand the territorial ascription of an organization (and if an organization's loyalties and resource dependencies are out of line, something logically will give when the resource providers demand different loyalty). By using this test of resource dependency, it is possible to establish which organizations are regional and thus which organizations' elites should defend regional autonomy and stability.

If an organization's resource dependencies are not regional, it is opportunistic (dependent on no particular area of territory) or linked to the central state. The Scottish Conservatives and the Partido Popular in Catalonia both depend on funding from their central sibling parties and support from organizations linked to the state. There are other levels of territorial ascription, not generally relevant here, and opportunistic organizations. Local government controls resources that are linked to its territory, and which might or might not reinforce regional governments' demands. Many organizations are opportunistic, with diversified resource dependencies across territory, and would want to stay that way.

Regional organizations will seek autonomy and stability for themselves and, as a condition of this, for the region (compare Logan and Molotch 1987). Regional (predominantly nationalist) social movements will seek to further their goals of greater autonomy for the region, with independence as a likely eventual goal. Most organizations probably find it in their interest to be opportunistic rather than be tied to a particular level of government. Regions, in particular, might not be very appealing; local social goods (such as sanitation and some policing) and state ones (such as macroeconomic policy) are inescapable whereas a region might or might not reflect a natural economic or social zone of interest (Lange 1998; Dupuy and Le Galès 2006). Thus, business groups in Scotland and Catalonia work hard to avoid completely concentrating on one level. Central state organizations, whose fates rise and fall with the central state's extent as the regional ones' depend on the region's autonomy, will defend the central state. There are other groups—local organizations, and now European and even global organizations—but they are extraneous to the argument (although they should matter in explaining other levels of territorial governance, such as the EU and local governments' powers).

An institutionalized organization by definition does not depend on voluntary decisions to assist it (Jepperson 1991:145,148). It does this because expectations of others include its existence (subject to it behaving as expected). It is embedded in a web of relationships with other organizations through which flow resources and support. The mere fact—of organizational leadership—should give it preferences about the political and social environment in which it functions. I assume organizations are corporate actors (whose decisionmakers are elites) with corporate interests in their autonomy, survival, and strength; the latter gives elites an interest in the stability of their environment (i.e., their ability to predict what will affect them, the better to survive and grow) (March and Olsen 1989; Scharpf 1997:64). I posit that environmental stability (in resource flows and institutional framework) and organizational autonomy (to allocate them and self-organize) are what they seek across the board and in addition to whatever else they seek personally or as organizational leaders. This should mean that they seek to preserve the autonomy and the stability of their organizations in politics. In turn, their preferences for autonomy and stability should be connected to the level of government they prefer to have governing them. They will seek a government and a broad political environment responsive to their concerns, and one that does not destabilize their environments.

Dependence on Collective Action and Its Consequences

The second way to assemble resources is via collective action-inducing activists to give their time and resources in return for the rewards of belonging to a movement or party with certain principles. To some extent all parties do this, but the extent to which it dominates their resource mobilization varies sharply. Parties that depend on mobilization to the near exclusion of resource dependencies on other stable organizations are movement-parties; rather than depend on institutionalized organizations, they rely on repeated voluntary decisions to assist them. They are more constrained and driven by the goals of their members than by the goals of allied organizations. These include the Scottish National Party and, until 2003, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). They have different constraints related to their resource dependency on collective action; needing to maintain collective action means needing to maintain some combination of the incentives required to win activists and the cultural dynamics that win their continued participation even in the face of a seeming lack of incentives. This in turn means that they will look erratic (as they pursue strategies born of mobilizing and are constrained by the conditions under which they mobilized their existing activists), will reflect activist milieux that can vary quite dramatically but might

or might not appeal to regional elites, and will be constantly pushed toward maximalist objectives. Crucially, this means that these parties are almost always weaker (although they can do well, as with the SNP). They lack the resources—the legitimacy, the press, the money, the infrastructure—of parties that are reliant on big outside organizations. That means they lack the stability that comes from dependence on outsiders, whether those outsiders are banks, trades unions, churches or the press. They also therefore are well suited to the protest voters and charismatic leaders who have historically been the core of regionalist parties' support (de Winter 1998). The result is a vicious cycle: weakness and dependence on collective action gives them destabilizing ideologies, which means they do not attract organizational allies, which means they are weak and dependent on collective action.

The key point about weights is that the political contest is stacked against organizations dependent on collective action. Even if the SNP is the main opposition party in Scotland, its ability to bring about a social coalition against it (of all the organizations supporting environmental stability) exceeds its ability to muster its own activists and public support in support of independence. Its dependence on activists means that it looks unstable, and with its commitment to independence (and their commitment), regional organizations find a safer regionalizing partner in Labour while those who seek a protest vote can, in the new Scottish parliament, opt for a Green or a Scottish Socialist Party with more radical élan than a large party like the SNP can have.

Summary

According to this theory, the politics of regionalization is essentially a contest between regional and central organizations. The nationalist movement-parties range between epiphenomenal to the process of regionalization and threatening to the regional and central organizations that structure regional governments. The key actors are the regional institutionalized organizations where they exist. This means both the elites—those who run the organizations—and the people in them. A policy acts on an organization, and that affects its members who can have resources as well as its elites. The vice-chancellors organization that represents British university leaders is far less influential than the combined opinions of their thousands of faculty; if a policy offends universities, both are likely to respond. The hostility of doctors, repeated when chatting over consultations or expressed through leaflets in waiting rooms, matters just as the statements and campaigns of their peak organizations matter. If the organizations are convincingly regional, the members will defend their autonomy and stability as well. They are the only

actors bound to a level of government but with preferences that are not directly set by the level of government to which they are bound—they are not necessarily obliged to defend the central state or maintain regional mobilization. They can see threats from both the central state and the nationalists, and thus will adopt stances in territorial politics in response to whatever is the greatest threat—central state centralization or nationalist instability. They matter because of their influence on politics and parties in their regions and in some cases in the state capital, and because they can pivot. Their crucial role ties in with the broader strand of historical sociology led by Stein Rokkan, whose analyses focused on the characteristics of different European states and societies in order to work out what led to integration of peripheries or its failure (Eisenstadt and Rokkan 1973; Rokkan and Urwin 1982, 1983; Flora, Kuhnle, and Urwin 1999). The strength of a distinct regional society, whether due to its dense networks (as in these two cases), or because it was too difficult to assimilate it (as in Wales or Galicia), is just as crucial in their studies across time and space as it is here.

The pressure of regional organizations for autonomy and stability is why the regional government of Scotland and Catalonia took the form that it did—a formalization of the autonomy of their dense networks of territorial institutionalized organizations. In explaining the outcome, the key point is the way dependence on regional organizations both made particular parties, Labour in Scotland and *Convergència i Unió* in Catalonia, strong in their regions and committed to regionalization. The rise of nationalism in Scotland, and to a lesser extent Catalonia, took scholars and policymakers by surprise, and now their politics of autonomy are what are interesting. These are mysteries only if we focus exclusively on nationalist parties and ideas, since the actual politics of territorial political change in both are difficult to understand without examination of the role of their strong regional societies.