Chapter 1

Room 217

Room 217 is a small windowless conference room on the second floor of the Maryland State House in Annapolis. A security guard sits outside the combination-controlled entrance from the hallway on one side. On the other, connected by a small vestibule just large enough for a loveseat, table and lamp, and a dormitory-sized refrigerator, is a private, “back door” entrance to the office of the governor of Maryland.

It is in Room 217 that the governor regularly meets with his staff and cabinet secretaries, legislators, or invited guests to discuss legislation, the formulation of state policy, or other issues. Though the photographs, plaques, and other memorabilia that adorn the walls of this somewhat airless room change from administration to administration, the function generally stays the same. The staff assembles at the appointed hour and waits for the governor to arrive and take his seat at the head of a long, narrow, dark wood table flanked with facing rows of upholstered chairs. From there he directs the discussion and asks the questions, which usually revolve around a detailed memo on the topic of the day sent to him in advance by members of his staff or state agencies.

It was in Room 217 in the spring and summer of 1996 that Maryland’s Smart Growth initiative was born. But no one called it that at first. It is improbable that any of the two dozen or more staff and cabinet secretaries who met in that room in different combinations throughout that year sensed they were doing anything especially momentous. Important to the governor’s agenda? Yes. Necessary to bring some order to the chaotic development that had spread across Maryland over the last thirty to fifty years? Absolutely. But few could have imagined that the land use program that was later to be officially titled the “Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation” initiative would gain national and even international attention and catapult its principal proponent, Democratic governor Parris N. Glendening, into the national limelight.
Fig. 1.1. Democrat Parris N. Glendening served as Maryland’s governor from 1995 until 2003. Photo courtesy of the *Baltimore Sun*.
Nor did those involved recognize at first the importance or lasting quality of the phrase “Smart Growth”—or that the very term “Smart Growth” would become so commonplace that it would evolve into a national shorthand for the broad set of concepts that include growth management, environmental protection, transportation and housing choice, walkable communities, fiscally responsible infrastructure investments, quality building design, farmland preservation, and more.

The program caught on fast, not only in Maryland, but around the country. Less than a year after the Smart Growth initiative was enacted, Keith Schneider, then executive director of the Michigan Land Use Institute, a growth management advocacy group based in the Traverse City region of Michigan, gushed in an article in the *Detroit Free Press* that “Maryland’s Smart Growth program is the most promising new tool for managing growth in a generation.” Accolades from elsewhere around the country poured in, often before the new program had even developed a track record. This almost instant recognition was, in part, testament to the pent-up desire among environmentalists, urban planners, and others for state governments to step up their involvement in local land use decisions and growing concern about the detrimental effects of sprawl development. It had been twenty-five years or more since Oregon, Vermont, Hawaii, Colorado, and Florida first established their growth management efforts, and about fifteen since Washington, Florida, and Maryland had engaged in a second wave of land use measures.

The praise coming Maryland’s way also was sparked by the state’s effort to shift the debate from “no growth” to “smart growth,” that is, from opposing growth to trying to find a way to accommodate it; and, to Maryland’s novel notion that growth could somehow be managed by state government using its financial support for development in certain specified areas, but not in others—an incentive-based approach rather than a more traditional regulatory approach.

The Smart Growth program that emerged from Room 217 at the end of 1996 was primarily the product of a governor who was both experienced with and interested in land use issues and who was determined to give state government a bigger say in local land use decisions. Leadership on this issue originated with the governor and never waned; in fact, the governor’s personal determination to make Smart Growth a success built and strengthened with each new initiative, with each positive editorial, and with each passing year. Toward the end of his second term, Glendening used his position as chairman of the National Governors’ Association to focus the attention of the nation’s governors on growth issues and their relationship to the economy and quality of life. At some point before his first term was over, it dawned on Parris Glendening that Smart Growth would be his “legacy issue” as governor. A governor who came to office thinking he would make his mark with economic development or education realized
the opportunity Smart Growth presented and he became determined to make the most of it. By the time he was elected governor in 1994, Glendening had been so routinely tied to development interests that he tried to change his image by listing more environmentalists on his campaign contributors’ list. But, when he left office eight years later, he had become so “green” that he felt comfortable giving his fellow governors copies of the Dr. Seuss children’s book, *The Lorax*.

Maryland’s Smart Growth program was also very much the work of a relatively new gubernatorial staff of planning, housing, transportation, economic development, and environmental officials who genuinely believed that past governmental policies had encouraged—even rewarded—costly and damaging sprawl development. A new policy approach, they reasoned, could reverse those trends. This approach was further shaped and strengthened by a team of top state agricultural and natural resource officials who had become increasingly alarmed at the rate that farmland and forests in Maryland were vanishing, the deterioration of the water quality and resources in the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries, and loss of the scenic vistas that made the tidewater villages and the farms in the piedmont hills of rural Maryland so beautiful.

At the time, however, the emerging Smart Growth program was just another new policy initiative that the governor intended to advance along with others in the upcoming 1997 legislative session. Neither he nor anyone else suggested or even thought Smart Growth would become the centerpiece of his legislative package for 1997, much less the principal legacy of the two-term Glendening administration.

Cabinet secretaries—and even the governor himself—candidly, but privately, worried whether a statewide land use measure had any chance of passage in the General Assembly, where it faced certain opposition from county governments and other powerful interests. Some of the governor’s political advisers went even farther, suggesting that even if Smart Growth did pass, no one would care. Compared with tax cuts, increased funding for education, or other potent pocketbook issues, Smart Growth seemed to them little more than a boutique issue of interest only to planners, government technocrats, and perhaps a handful of “greenies” from the environmental movement.

Moreover, it was risky, likely to generate division within the state’s political establishment, especially at the local level, and opposition from home builders, developers, and the other moneyed interests in the private sector who largely financed political campaigns. It would probably take a lot of the governor’s fast dwindling supply of political capital to get a Smart Growth proposal through the General Assembly and some of his cautious aides were asking one another whether it would be worth the effort.

For Glendening, a man who even before his first inauguration talked boldly (some would say presumptuously) about his plans to serve two full
terms as governor and whose 1998 reelection campaign was already being charted and planned in early 1996, Smart Growth was, in retrospect, an unusual and unexpected policy for him to push.

The Foundation for Land Use Management

It is tempting to look at Maryland’s Smart Growth initiative out of context, as if it were a discrete program that suddenly burst on the scene in 1997. In fact, it was just the latest in a continuum of land use measures in Maryland that dated back more than sixty years. The foundation on which Maryland’s Smart Growth program was built included, among other initiatives, the creation of the Maryland State Planning Commission in 1927, the oldest state planning commission in the country. By 1959, the commission staff became the State Planning Department and was subsequently elevated to cabinet status as the Department of State Planning. A steady stream of planning legislation followed: the State Planning Act of 1974, the Chesapeake Bay Critical Areas Act of 1984, and the Economic Growth, Resource Protection and Planning Act of 1992.

In a State of the State address to the Maryland General Assembly in 1973, Governor Marvin Mandel said: “One of the great issues facing Maryland today is the proper and wisest use of our rapidly diminishing land reserves. Orderly and balanced growth are no longer desirable goals. They are essential requirements if Maryland is to remain fit for human habitation.” Those remarks predated the Smart Growth initiative by twenty-four years, yet sounded like words Parris Glendening might easily have uttered.

“I do not join with those who would pave over our State, those who would overdevelop and bury us under rows of drive-in restaurants and service stations at the sacrifice of openness and beauty, those whose fetish for asphalt and brick would deny us a blade of grass,” said Mandel, a small, balding, old-school machine politician from Baltimore who might not have been expected to express such a personal connection with the natural beauty of rural Maryland.

After an obligatory statement professing that the state had no interest in usurping local government authority over land use decisions, Mandel nonetheless said, “I am convinced the State has a legitimate interest to protect. . . . I believe the State has every right to be concerned with—and a part of—decisions involving large developments that affect the State.”

“Finally,” he said, “I believe the State should take the lead in defining critical areas of Maryland—areas that should be preserved against encroachment, areas that would be damaged by improper development, over-development, and greater density of population. Yet we must plan with the thought in mind that we do not limit the availability of land so
greatly that we inflate its price beyond the reach of those who would make good use of it.”

In the years since Mandel’s term in office, Maryland has put in place an array of progressive environmental programs, including measures to protect both tidal and non-tidal wetlands, to preserve farmland, to purchase open space for parks, to regulate storm water runoff from development projects, and to require trees to be planted in place of those cut to make way for development.

Maryland citizens, relatively well educated, affluent, and, on most issues, politically progressive, generally supported these initiatives. That is probably because many of the proposals related to efforts to protect the Chesapeake Bay, which through the efforts of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Clean Water Action, and other groups has become an iconic symbol of the health of the environment and, by extension, the state’s overall quality of life. How else to explain the state’s acceptance of Governor Harry R. Hughes’s Critical Areas law in 1984, which for the first time placed constraints on development within a thousand feet of the entire shoreline of the Maryland portion of the bay and its tidal tributaries? The net effect of that single piece of legislation was, in essence, to downzone about 10 percent of the landmass of the state. Yet, Maryland citizens—with exceptions, of course—seemed to understand the purpose and support it. Increasingly, state leaders and the public began to acknowledge the connection between land use on the shore and water quality in the bay. Against this background, the Smart Growth effort seemed a logical next step.

The 2020 Commission Debacle

Six years before Smart Growth, the General Assembly was asked to enact a proposal that would have shifted much of the authority over land use in Maryland from local governments to the state. Even though it failed, the Maryland Growth and Chesapeake Bay Protection Act of 1991 elevated the level of debate on land use issues, brought into question the fundamental assumption that most land use authority should reside at the local government level, and set in motion changes that would provide the foundation for the Smart Growth initiative.

The 2020 Commission work grew out of a regional compact to protect the Chesapeake Bay. Governor Hughes had convinced the governors of neighboring Pennsylvania and Virginia, the mayor of the District of Columbia, and the administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to meet on December 9, 1983, at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, where they signed an agreement pledging to work together on bay issues. It was the clearest recognition yet that the traditional parochial approach, with each state going its own way, would not adequately address the multiple influences that affected the health of the Chesapeake. The bay watershed stretches over more than 64,000 square
miles in six states and the District of Columbia, includes 150 major rivers and streams, and extends from Southside Virginia as far north as Cooperstown, New York, and from the eastern mountains of West Virginia to the flat, sandy farm fields of Delaware.

In 1988, the members of this regional compact established a “2020 Panel” that was asked to produce a report on growth management regulations, environmental programs, and infrastructure requirements necessary to protect the bay through the year 2020, while still accommodating projected population growth in the region. The panel subsequently recommended six “visions” to guide policymakers as to how future development in the region should occur:

1. Development is concentrated in suitable areas;
2. Sensitive areas are protected;
3. In rural areas, growth is directed to existing population centers and resource areas are protected;
4. Stewardship of the Chesapeake Bay and the land is a universal ethic;
5. Conservation of resources, including a reduction in resource consumption, is practiced; and,
6. Funding mechanisms are addressed to achieve these visions.\(^8\)

In early 1989, Governor William Donald Schaefer appointed Michael D. Barnes, a lawyer and former four-term congressman from Maryland’s Washington suburbs, to head a “2020 Commission” that was to review the 2020 Panel’s recommendations and determine their application to Maryland.

In November 1990, just after Governor Schaefer had been reelected to a second term and two months before the 1991 General Assembly was to convene, the Barnes Commission unveiled its recommendations. The sweeping proposal called for local governments to designate land in their jurisdictions in four categories: developed areas; growth areas; sensitive areas; and rural and resource areas. The commission also recommended that the state establish specified permitted densities and performance standards within the growth, developed, and rural resource areas, and require local governments to inventory their environmentally sensitive areas and develop protection programs. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the commission proposed that the state be given approval authority over local plans, which then would remain valid for only three years.

It was a bold proposal to shift the balance of power over land use control in Maryland from the local level to a more shared responsibility with the state. Any seasoned legislative observer realized it would take months, if not years, for the General Assembly and affected local governments to absorb and react to the implications of such a drastic change. The ever-impatient Schaefer, nudged forward by the Barnes Commission members, never
hesitated for a moment, throwing this piece of red meat to the lions in the legislature right after Christmas.

Schaefer met directly with Barnes and others on the 2020 Commission, who urged him to take immediate action, recalled Ronald M. Kreitner, the director of the Maryland Office of Planning and a member of the commission.9 Jacqueline Rogers, then Schaefer’s housing secretary, was among those pushing hardest for action, Kreitner later said. Others, however, counseled patience.

“It was an unwieldy way to develop it with that commission,” recalled John R. Griffin, then the deputy secretary of Maryland’s Department of Natural Resources.10 Griffin said he drafted a memo for DNR Secretary Torrey C. Brown to send to Schaefer urging delay until the proposal’s most controversial elements could be worked out. Compromises were possible, he thought, but they would take time. But Schaefer, a former mayor of Baltimore with a volcanic personality, the conviction that he knew best, and a slogan, “Do It Now,” that summed up his approach to governance, would have none of it.

“We argued that we needed a year to go around and negotiate the details of that—don’t just throw it into the legislature, but ‘Mister Do It Now’ threw it in there and got clobbered. We needed to do a lot of fine tuning and talk with people and negotiate it,” Griffin said later.11

Even in progressive Maryland, the 2020 proposal went too far. “Response to the Barnes Commission bill was overwhelmingly negative,” University of Maryland Professor James R. Cohen reports.12 Though strongly supported by environmental groups, it was opposed by bankers, home builders, farmers, foresters, and, most vehemently of all, by county and municipal officials.13 The 2020 Commission proposal seemed the clearest possible evidence that their long-held suspicion was true: the state was determined to take away local authority over land use decisions.

The Barnes Commission bill never emerged from committee, although it did not die without a fight. State Planning Director Kreitner, whose state agency served as commission staff, said that, in retrospect, the commission’s openness may have been its undoing. The work of the commission had been so public and so widely disseminated, he said, that it gave opponents ample opportunity to develop strategies to fight it.

At the time, many opponents complained that the Barnes Commission recommendations failed because they had been worked out behind closed doors and sprung on the legislature at the last moment, but Kreitner called that argument “an absolutely bogus complaint.”14

“One could actually say that the reverse was true,” he later recalled. “What happened was that [opponents] got time to prepare. We had thirty-three members on the panel—we had people from MACO [the Maryland Association of Counties], MML [the Maryland Municipal League], the homebuilders, and others. All those people were there and they sat there and took the information out and rallied their troops against it.”
Kreitner recalled how executives of the Rouse Company, the developers of the “new town” of Columbia, Md., showed up to oppose the bill at one committee hearing only to see the company’s internationally known founder, James W. Rouse, seated in the audience waiting to testify in favor of the bill. The executives beat a hasty retreat, Kreitner recalled.

The longtime state planning director noted that the effort engendered strong editorial support from both the Baltimore Sun and the Washington Post, sharply raising the public dialogue on growth issues. It also produced products that would become prototypes for the Smart Growth battles later in the decade. For example, to make the case for stronger state land use authority, Kreitner’s office spent hours preparing what he called the first “measles maps,” which showed in splotchy red dots the dispersed development pattern that had become the statewide trend.

“The maps were critical. This was the first real use of a series of county level maps showing both changes in development and potential development based on approved subdivisions,” Kreitner said. “MACO was vociferous in attacking them. One they attacked was the map of Caroline County. They tried to undermine our credibility by showing one point on the map they claimed wasn’t really development, but was a farm manure holding facility.” In the end, Kreitner said, the experience “underscored for me the need to have great data and great visual images.”

The Barnes Commission proposal sank, in part, because the timing was wrong. It arrived before the legislature the same session in which Schaefer introduced a mammoth and wildly controversial proposal to revamp the state’s tax structure. That, in turn, coincided with a downturn in the state and national economy. Schaefer was further distracted by a very public spat over tax policy with his lieutenant governor, Melvin A. Steinberg, and some of the governor’s most loyal cabinet secretaries were split over whether to press forward with the Barnes recommendations or pull back and wait a year.

When the end finally came, it was a crushing defeat for advocates of stronger state authority over land use. It also served as a cautionary tale for subsequent political leaders who might otherwise be tempted to push for stronger state authority.

The ’92 Growth Act

Intent on rebounding from this rare loss, and politically looking for a way to save face, Governor Schaefer immediately pushed to pass a revised land use bill the following year, but one that was not nearly as forceful as the original 2020 Commission proposal. It was, by comparison, so diluted and inoffensive that even its something-for-everyone name ultimately had to be worked out by committee: the Economic Growth, Resource Protection and
Planning Act of 1992.\textsuperscript{17} To try to assure the broadest possible legislative support, the bill explicitly affirmed the state’s often conflicting “dual commitment to protect the environment and foster economic growth.”\textsuperscript{*}

The “Growth Act,” as it came to be known, nevertheless managed to put in place some modest advances. It placed into statute the 2020 Panel’s earlier six “Visions” to guide Maryland’s future development, but attempted to mollify the opponents of the 1991 legislation by splicing in a new “Vision” between the old number 5 and number 6 designed to make clear the state’s pro-growth position and to encourage the fast-tracking of development projects. The new number 6 read: “To assure the achievement of [Visions] 1 through 5 above, economic growth is encouraged and regulatory mechanisms are streamlined.” Also added was an eighth “Vision” that stated, “Adequate public facilities and infrastructure under the control of the county or municipality are available or planned in areas where growth is to occur.”

Perhaps the most important provision of the Growth Act was a requirement that all local government comprehensive plans be revised to be consistent with the Visions. The Growth Act also specifically identified four types of “sensitive areas” for special protection: streams and stream buffers; 100-year floodplains; habitats for endangered species; and steep slopes. But it was left to local governments to draft plans to protect these and other sensitive areas.

The Growth Act required local plans to contain recommendations that:

- Encourage streamlined review of development applications within areas designated for growth;
- Encourage the use of flexible development regulations to promote innovative and cost-saving site design and protect the environment;
- Use innovative techniques to foster economic development in areas designated for growth; and,
- Encourage more widespread use of flexible development standards.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{*Managing Maryland’s Growth, What You Need to Know About Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation, Maryland Office of Planning, May 1997, 18. This approach was not unheard of. Other states had previously tried to tie together land use, environmental protection, and economic development goals, often within a single agency. Oregon, for example, created a Department of Land Conservation and Development. More recently, Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney combined four major agencies, Environmental Affairs, Housing and Community Development, Transportation, and Energy Resources, into one super-agency, the Department of Commonwealth Development, with broad responsibility over issues related to growth management and the state’s capital investment program.}
Finally, the Growth Act created a seventeen-member advisory commission to monitor the progress made in implementing the new land use law, explore new solutions, and report annually to the governor and the General Assembly. Seats on the Growth Commission were designated to represent the full array of land use stakeholders: business, finance, agriculture, forestry, environmental, civic associations, planning, real estate development interests, counties and municipal governments, and the General Assembly.

For the next several years, the Growth Commission invested countless hours monitoring the land use actions of the state and its twenty-three counties. Relying on extensive staff support from the Maryland Office of Planning, the commission conducted studies, produced reports, and made recommendations to the governor and the General Assembly. It proposed revisions of “Article 66B,” the state law that entrusts local governments with land use authority and prescribes the duties and limits of that authority.19

The ’92 Growth Act, Kreitner believes, “started up a lot of processes for the state to examine [local] plans, set up a commission to monitor it, and generated a lot of stuff that was useful in ’96 when we were trying to say we had to go the next step. It was pretty fundamental groundwork for getting something else in place in later years.”20

Yet, in the final analysis, the Growth Commission was never more than a powerless advisory body. Despite solid research on Adequate Public Facilities Ordinances and other topics, without a champion in high political office, nothing the commission did or said could make the recipients of its reports listen or act. In later years, Governor Glendening and others considered revamping the commission to give it more authority and responsibility, but ultimately decided it was not worth the fight.

In 2002, after ten years, three chairmen, eight annual reports, and recommendations on public facility needs, modifications to the state planning law (Article 66B of the Annotated Code) and guidelines for transferable development rights, the governor and the General Assembly simply allowed the Growth Commission to “sunset” and go quietly out of existence.

“Directed Growth”

Before there was “Smart Growth,” there was “Directed Growth.” At least that was the name Governor Glendening and his staff used internally as they set about the task of devising a policy that later would be known as “Smart Growth.” The idea was simply to find ways to “direct growth” back to existing communities, which they thought would have the effect of “neighborhood conservation.”21

For the governor and his staff to be able to focus on an issue such as land use took unusual discipline given the way everything else had gone for Glendening during his first fifteen difficult months as governor. His
first year had been marred by a prolonged scandal involving lucrative pensions he and several of his top aides were to receive from Prince George’s County, where he had served as county executive for twelve years before being elected governor in November 1994. Even his election had been controversial, with Glendening winning by a whisker-thin margin of only a few thousand absentee ballots and then surviving a court challenge by his Republican opponent that did not end until the eve of his inauguration.

By spring of 1996, Glendening had just completed an equally tumultuous second legislative session. He had been forced to use every resource and political strategy at his disposal to convince a reluctant General Assembly to ignore vehement citizen opposition and authorize the use of public funds for not one, but two professional sports stadiums. One was a new stadium to be built in downtown Baltimore for the city’s new National Football League franchise, the recently arrived Cleveland Browns,* and the other was to provide highway and other improvements for the Washington Redskins’ new stadium in suburban Prince George’s County outside of Washington, D.C. The two projects were enormously contentious and complicated by the problem that every argument the governor and his staff made for one of the projects (e.g., publicly built, in the city) was contradicted by the facts of the other (e.g., privately built, in the suburbs). Members of the governor’s own political party were among his loudest critics, claiming he was using taxpayer dollars to enrich already rich sports team owners. The clash was ugly. Governor Glendening had further polarized members of the General Assembly—and the public—that year by making good on a major campaign promise to push through tougher gun control legislation. While many cheered the effort, his popularity rating, both inside the legislature and out, began dropping fast.

There was no end to the other controversial or difficult issues on the new governor’s plate. Yet, as far as the public or even legislators knew, none of them had anything to do with land use. Instead, they saw an administration embroiled in a freight controversy with Conrail, and fighting environmental groups who opposed administration plans to dump spoil dredged from the port of Baltimore’s shipping channel into the deepest recesses of the Chesapeake Bay. The governor found himself trying to prevent political defections from conservative, rural Democrats, fending off criticism of his aggressive fundraising tactics, engaging in school funding squabbles with Baltimore’s mayor, and trying to find solutions to problems as different as having too few blue crabs in the Bay and too many black bears in the state’s western mountains. There was a sense the administration was spinning out of control and the internal pressure to reverse the trend was daunting.

*Subsequently renamed the Baltimore Ravens.
Insiders, however, knew that land use issues were definitely on the governor’s mind. In his first months in office in 1995, Glendening had begun to probe for ways the state could more aggressively involve itself in local land use decisions. But, as someone who had spent most of his political career in local government—three terms as county executive of a major metropolitan jurisdiction, eight years before that on the county council, and two years before that as a city councilman in the old streetcar suburb of Hyattsville—Governor Glendening knew from experience and instinct that tampering with the balance of power over land use could be politically explosive. So, he worked on the issue steadily, but quietly.

In his inaugural year, the governor held a series of internal meetings with his cabinet and staff to focus them collectively on the issue of revitalization. The governor’s experiences in Hyattsville, though nearly two decades old by then, were still fresh in his mind. There, he was later to say, he watched helplessly as the county and the state consistently funded transportation, sewer and water, school construction, and other infrastructure or services to support new development, but rarely if ever turned their attention or resources toward older, inner-Beltway communities such as Hyattsville. The opportunity for revitalization was being lost, he thought. He felt he was getting little or no help to stem the steady deterioration of his community.

The areas he had represented, the areas he still identified with, were areas often populated by blacks, Hispanics, or other recent immigrants or whites of modest income. They were not sharing equally in the wealth of the state, the governor believed. These areas, he said, were often poor, working-class neighborhoods long neglected by state and county governments and in need of a helping hand.

Nor was it lost on the politically attuned governor that these areas—spread among the used car lots and tired strip malls that lined bedraggled U.S. Route 1 just south of the University of Maryland campus at College Park and hard against the state’s border with Washington, D.C.—also generally tended to vote Democratic. They were the areas that had given him his narrow margin of victory. These older parts of the state needed help. They had helped make him governor, and now he was looking for ways to return the favor. He decided to focus the attention of his entire cabinet on the issue of revitalization.

A decade later, some of Glendening’s detractors held that all he had cared about was rural land preservation. That was not true. There is no question the Glendening administration was extraordinarily successful in protecting farms and other rural lands from encroaching development. Yet the idea of revitalizing the state’s older communities was the new governor’s first goal and a concept that was the starting point for and remained the backbone of his Smart Growth initiative for the remainder of his term.
In retrospect, it is significant that the governor did not single out one department, say the Department of Housing and Community Development or perhaps the Department of Business and Economic Development, to address the issue of revitalization. Instead, from the outset, he encouraged a cross-departmental, team approach. What could the administration as a whole do to encourage revitalization? How could the administration as a whole direct new growth to older established communities? As the Smart Growth program was to build and expand in later years, this concept of cross-departmental cooperation and collaboration would become a hallmark of the initiative.*

In mid-December 1995, the governor’s cabinet convened one last time before the start of the 1996 legislative session, meeting at the Johns Hopkins Hospital on North Caroline Street in East Baltimore. Housing Secretary Patricia Payne welcomed the cabinet to Baltimore for what was billed as a “Cabinet Revitalization and Directed Growth Strategy Meeting.”22 Lt. Gov. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend spoke, as did Glendening’s secretary of state and chief political adviser, John T. Willis.

The all-day event featured briefings by Kreitner, the Maryland Historic Trust’s Bill Pencek, and Maryland Department of Transportation planner Henry Kay. Part of the morning was spent touring East Baltimore neighborhoods with Baltimore Delegate Hattie N. Harrison and Scot T. Spencer, then with the Historic East Baltimore Community Action Coalition. In the afternoon, a team of facilitators from Andersen Consulting led the cabinet through four hours of discussions designed to identify a statewide, interagency “revitalization and directed growth strategy.”

At that session, David L. Winstead, a land use attorney who had been brought into the new administration to serve as Glendening’s secretary of transportation, suggested there may be “a role for state ‘carrots’ as incentives to directed growth.”23 It was an image that would stick. Once the legislative session was over, that concept—the idea of using government incentives as a means of influencing where new growth occurs—would become the primary land use strategy the governor and his cabinet and staff would focus on for the remainder of 1996.

In later years, Governor Glendening would use photographs of bright orange carrots to help explain how he intended the Maryland Smart Growth program to work.

*Cross-departmental collaboration, for example, was identified as one of the achievements of the Smart Growth initiative in a study of the program performed by the European-based Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Maryland Smart Growth Initiative: A Thematic Policy Review, 9th Session of the Territorial Development Policy Committee, Martigny, Switzerland, June 27, 2003.