

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

In this book I attempt to formulate a well-evidenced statement of the philosophical doctrines belonging to the Stoic philosopher, Chrysippus. Only fragments of his writings are extant, and in dealing with these remains of his philosophy I have not deviated from the following principle: unless the author of a cited fragment states explicitly in the body of the fragment that a given doctrine belongs to Chrysippus, that it is to be found in one of his books, or that the words themselves are taken verbatim from Chrysippus, it may not be admitted as evidence for any assertion about Chrysippus' philosophical position. This is not to say that I have precluded the use of fragments purporting to convey general Stoic doctrine. I shall, however, make use of such fragments only to elucidate doctrines explicitly ascribed to Chrysippus in other fragments and not to make inferences about the philosophy of Chrysippus on the strength of the suspect assumption that what is Stoic is of necessity Chrysippean.

It can be argued that such a procedure ought to be followed generally when dealing with philosophers whose works are no longer extant, but of whose works there exist in the writings of others numerous quotations and summaries.<sup>1</sup> And this method of proceeding seems especially apposite with respect to Chrysippus, for in the discussions of the past several decades<sup>2</sup> another method has been employed so that, at present, it is hard to say precisely and specifically what Chrysippus taught.

The methodological principle, which I am here rejecting, was given authoritative support and emphasis in Arnim's monumental

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ludwig Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius", *American Journal of Philology* (Vol. LVIII, July 1936), pp. 286-325. Here such a method is used in an investigation of Posidonius' philosophical system and on pp. 286-288 are explained some of the problems that have arisen from a failure to attend exclusively to the explicitly attested Posidonian fragments.

<sup>2</sup> Hans von Arnim, "Chrysippos," *Paulys Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumwissenschaft* (Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller, 1899), cols. 2502-2509. Émile Bréhier, *Chrysippe* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1910). Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, 2. Auflage, 2 Vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1959).

work,<sup>1</sup> published at the beginning of the century, in which for the first time all or nearly all<sup>2</sup> the fragments of the ancient Stoa were made accessible; for in the determination of what material was pertinent Arnim employed one standard for all the philosophers<sup>3</sup> except Chrysippus and another for Chrysippus. With respect to the first group Arnim admitted material to his collection only if it was relevant by explicit testimony, only, that is, if the name of the philosopher appeared in the passage under scrutiny. With regard to Chrysippus Arnim, in addition to passages relevant by explicit testimony, admitted also passages which convey the doctrines of the Roman Stoa or the Stoa as it existed in the age of the emperors.

Arnim's reason for employing this criterion with respect to Chrysippus lay in his belief that the doctrines of the Roman Stoa were derived *in toto* from Chrysippus.<sup>4</sup> This premise permitted him the inference that the fragments from the Roman Stoa which bear upon Stoic doctrine are *ipso facto* mineable for Chrysippean doctrine. Arnim, then, in two volumes of his work, includes enough fragments to exhibit as fully as possible "that form of the doctrine which existed in the age of the emperors,"<sup>5</sup> even though this procedure involved the inclusion of many fragments which are not in an obvious way pertinent to Chrysippus, for his name does not appear in them. Arnim's supposition, to be sure, is more moderate than that of Stein, who had maintained that *every* doctrine introduced with the expression, "the Stoics", could be regarded as a declaration of Chrysippus' view, unless it had been shown to be the doctrine

<sup>1</sup> *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Vol. I, 1905; Vol. II, 1903; Vol. III, 1903; Vol. IV (Index), 1914, Leipzig. The fragments are henceforth cited by number and volume; for example, II 386 is fragment 386 in Vol. II.

<sup>2</sup> Max Pohlenz, in his enthusiastic review of the second volume of Arnim's work (*Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, XXIII (August 1, 1903), pp. 962-971), mentions several fragments (*infra*, note 2, p. 131) overlooked by Arnim. I miss the definition of philosophy attributed to Chrysippus by Isidore of Pelusium (*Patrologia Graeca*, V, 78, p. 1637, Migne) and cited by Bréhier (*op. cit.*, p. 29, note 1).

<sup>3</sup> Zeno of Citeum, Aristo, Apolophanes, Herillus, Dionysius of Heracles, Persaeus, Cleanthes, Sphaerus, Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylonia, Antipater of Tarsus, Apollodorus of Seleucia, Archedemus of Tarsus, Boethus of Sidon, Basilides, Eudromus, and Crinis.

<sup>4</sup> *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Vol. I, p. III.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. V. An important modern study which presupposes the correctness of this view is Otto Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der Stoischen Ethik* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1933). See p. 20 of Rieth's study for his view of Arnim's work.

of another Stoic thinker.<sup>1</sup> Stein's view was rightly not accepted, but Arnim's more qualified view has met with general approval; for example, Pohlenz clearly sides with Arnim when he (Pohlenz) writes that, in the Age of the Empire, "Chrysippus indisputably prevailed as the real authority and protector of orthodoxy."<sup>2</sup>

It might, of course, be true that the doctrines of Chrysippus and the Roman Stoa are identical, though even Pohlenz, undermining his own thesis, suggests the contrary, for he himself in the course of his book, makes clear "how many new and different trends appear in the philosophy of the Roman Stoics."<sup>3</sup> In any event the problem of Chrysippus' relation to the Roman Stoa can never be satisfactorily resolved until we possess a statement, as comprehensive as the explicit evidence allows, of Chrysippus' philosophical doctrines.

Émile Bréhier's study<sup>4</sup> is the only one since the publication of Arnim's work which claimed to provide such a reconstruction. Bréhier, too, holds that Chrysippus was assigned a "place prépondérante" by the Roman Stoa,<sup>5</sup> but he does not systematically introduce material from that period for assertions about Chrysippus. Even so, his success in providing the desired reconstruction is, as I shall now try to make plain, ostensible only.

The first section of Bréhier's book, entitled *Chrysippe* in 1910, deals with Chrysippus' life and works. It is the only part of his book in which Chrysippus alone is considered. The remaining three sections, apparently concerned with the philosophical doctrines of Chrysippus, contain, in fact, expositions of philosophical doctrines belonging to "the Stoics" with only occasional references to Chrysippus. Bréhier himself evidently became aware that he had given his book an inexact title, for the ninth edition, which appeared in 1951, bore the more telling title, *Chrysippe et L'Ancien Stoicisme*.

Of course a book about Chrysippus and Stoicism is better than

<sup>1</sup> Ludwig Stein, *Die Psychologie der Stoa* (Berlin: S. Calvary, 1886), p. 173.

<sup>2</sup> Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, I, 292. And in his review of Volume II of Arnim's work (*op. cit.*, p. 963), Pohlenz wrote, "Vorläufig begrüße ich es immer mit Freuden, dass Chrysipp in den Mittelpunkt des Ganzen gestellt ist und offenbar als der Vertreter der orthodoxen Stoa erscheinen soll."

<sup>3</sup> Ludwig Edelstein, review of *Die Stoa* by Max Pohlenz, *American Journal of Philology*, (LXXII, October, 1951), p. 429.

<sup>4</sup> Émile Bréhier, *op. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

no book at all about one of the ancient Stoics. But Bréhier's inclusion in his book about Chrysippus of an excessive amount of material having to do with the Stoics, Stoicism, and Stoic doctrine blurred his account of Chrysippus. The substantiated assertions which one can make about the Stoics generally are far more in number than those which one can make about the philosophy of Chrysippus. This circumstance, I believe, lured Bréhier into saying a great many more things about the Stoics and Stoic doctrine than about Chrysippean doctrine. The end result is that one who reads Bréhier's book acquires a rather comprehensive view of Stoic doctrine, but neither the distinctive features of Chrysippus' thought nor his contributions to Stoic philosophy are brought into sharp focus.<sup>1</sup>

Bréhier's study is replete with comments upon "the Stoics" and "Stoic doctrine".<sup>2</sup> To say it once more, if it could be known with certainty that at least Chrysippus is denoted by "the Stoics" in every assertion containing that expression, then a well-evidenced book indeed might be written about Chrysippus' philosophical position. But, in advance of an independent investigation of the explicitly Chrysippean testimony, it cannot be assumed that a doxographer or biographer who refers to the Stoics is at the same time referring, either wittingly or unwittingly, to Chrysippus. Bréhier's book cannot satisfy the requirements which one who wishes to get at the philosophy of Chrysippus based upon a rigorous exclusion of all evidence not explicitly Chrysippean must impose on oneself.

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<sup>1</sup> Bréhier himself had in the Introduction to his book contrasted the diversity and original features of the various Stoic thinkers with the traditional and arrested contours of Epicurean thought. But as one moves through Bréhier's book, with its innumerable "les Stoïciens" and its occasional "Chrysippe", one cannot help but get the impression that the uniformity of Stoic thought is in degree not less than that of Epicurean philosophy. Consequently Bréhier himself unwittingly betrays one of the valuable insights which characterize his work. Bréhier's chapter on the writings of Chrysippus, a chapter in which he attempts to make intelligible some of the titles in Diogenes Laertius' incomplete list of Chrysippus' writings, is concerned exclusively with Chrysippus and is one of the most illuminating parts of his book.

<sup>2</sup> Bréhier, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-276, *passim*. For example, in the first chapter of Book II, there are 39 occurrences of the expressions "les Stoïciens" and "la doctrine stoïcienne", while "Chrysippe" appears only 29 times. And these statistics, which may seem picayunish, are genuinely indicative of the real subject of Bréhier's book.

The foregoing remarks have, I trust, made it clear that the work I have undertaken is justified on methodological grounds as well as by the present state of investigations into the philosophy of Chrysippus. It should contribute to the establishment of an articulate criterion by which what is and what is not Chrysippean can be distinguished not only in the doctrines of the Roman Stoics, but in all the doxographical material about the Stoics in general. But, as was stated at the outset, the primary aim of the book is to give a well-substantiated picture of Chrysippus' philosophy.

A further consideration would be a careful examination of the authors of just those fragments which purport to be about Chrysippus. Why were they citing Chrysippus or some one of his books? Were they trying to understand, undermine, or propagate his doctrines?

Cicero is interested in Chrysippus and our philosopher appears several times in the *ἀπόγραφα* of the Roman, and Cicero seems in general to report fairly.<sup>1</sup> Diocles Magnes mentions Chrysippus more infrequently, but when he does so, his report is a reliable one. Sextus Empiricus gives us some of our most detailed accounts of Chrysippus' logical doctrines, and they seem correct.

Galen and Plutarch, perhaps, constitute our richest sources, but unhappily each is hostile towards Chrysippus. Galen's reports are biased because he uses Posidonius, whose acid criticisms of Chrysippus are attested.<sup>2</sup> Plutarch makes no secret of his antagonism towards the Stoics. One of his books, *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*, is written explicitly to set forth, from Plutarch's point of view, the contradictions infecting Stoic principles and the discrepancies between the lives of some of the Stoics and the doctrines which they professed. Such a writer might be disposed to snatch at straws, for example, to take what is an apparent contradiction for a real contradiction. To cite a case in point, it is no contradiction, as Plutarch would have us believe,<sup>3</sup> to affirm that the parts of philosophy are ordered in two ways—in one way with respect to their logical relation to one another and in a second way with respect to the manner in which they ought to be introduced to the student.

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<sup>1</sup> One passage constitutes an exception; I discuss it in detail, *infra*, pp. 77-79.

<sup>2</sup> Ludwig Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius," pp. 306, 323.

<sup>3</sup> II 30; II 37; II 50.

But Plutarch can make it appear to be a contradiction by ignoring<sup>1</sup> the respects in which the two arrangements of the philosophical disciplines differ. It becomes the task of the interpreter to scrutinize carefully the sometimes not-so-artful devices of such hostile writers.

These are indeed important issues and deserve close scrutiny. In this book they receive cursory attention only, for to investigate fully the motives and principles according to which later writers may have used Chrysippean material would have led me too far away from my task—not a mean one—to reconstruct the thought of Chrysippus from the fragmentary remains of his writings and summaries of his doctrines to be found in other writers. Before the statue can be rounded and smoothed the stone has to be hewn. This fundamental step, it is hoped, is accomplished in the following formulation of Chrysippus' philosophical doctrines, based on the kind of evidence that has been described.

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<sup>1</sup> He himself has preserved for us the knowledge of these different "respects" But since they resolved the contradiction which he wished to attribute to Chrysippus, he ignored them. Cf. Max Pohlenz, "Plutarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker." *Hermes*, Vol. 74 (1939), pp. 1-33.