

Contemporary Terrorism

Origins, Escalation, Counter Strategies, and Responses

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Introduction

Terrorism is a tactic of political violence employed by state actors and nonstate actors alike. Generally targeting civilians, terrorists rely on the fear they induce via bombings, assassinations, or kidnappings to meet their goals. Specific motivations vary, but the aim is consistent: encourage the targets and/or their supporters to engage in behaviors desired by the terrorists, such as abandoning resistance to, or support for, an incumbent regime or withdrawing troops from a contested area.

Although terrorism has been employed throughout much of history (for example, first-century Siccarri Zealots, thirteenth-century Shi'ite Assassins, and Mongol raiders compensating for their small numbers by destroying towns to demonstrate their determination and ruthlessness), the literature has not fully conceptualized these activities. One indicator of this elusiveness is the tendency of observers to place terrorism somewhere on the continuum spanning between genocide and gang violence.¹ The exact nature of this continuum has yet to be specified, but the underlying message is that terrorism is a criminal justice topic; acts of terrorism, particularly those engaged in by nonstate actors, are often viewed as criminal behavior. Yet this assumption largely stems from rather recently established, Clausewitzian notions that states and their uniformed soldiers should monopolize legitimate warfare and weapons. Nonstate actors attacking state actors are thus illegitimate or criminal.

Contrary to this notion of criminality, many acts of terrorism that capture contemporary imaginations are clearly politically motivated. For example, terrorist tactics were adopted by nineteenth-century socialists and anarchists and twentieth-century colonial nationalists. Marxist revolutionaries employed terrorist tactics in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently, jihadists have relied on terrorism in their efforts to overthrow secular regimes in the Muslim world and to drive Western troops from their homelands.

Conventional academic analysts have been slow to focus on terrorism behavior, as opposed to specialists in criminal behavior and counterinsurgency tactics who have worked extensively on addressing terrorism. This is a tendency that is only gradually being reversed in view of the increasing difficulty of avoiding the subject and the growing realization that terrorist acts involve elements beyond criminal behavior.

One consequence is that a substantial proportion of books written on terrorism either describe groups that employ terrorist tactics (e.g., who they are, what they want, who supports them) or instruct how best to combat their tactics. This statement can be supported empirically, which may help to clarify how this book differs from the terrorism norm.

This Book and the Terrorism Norm

We conducted a search on Amazon.com using the phrase “terrorism.” Categorizing the nature of the first 100 titles listed in Table 1.1,² we created a set of coding categories based on what seemed to best capture the types of books in the list. Obviously, some entries might qualify for more than one category but our interest was in matching the books to the coding categories that predominately described the approach of each book. We ended up with the 10 categories that are described in Table 1.2 (page 8). The left-hand column in Table 1.1 reports the outcome of our coding.

Table 1.3 (page 9) summarizes the coding outcome. A fifth of the works on the list were general surveys of terrorism that are hard to categorize because they often survey samples of all of the categories in Table 1.2. That is, they look at such topics as the history of contemporary terrorism, trends in activity, representative and well-known groups, and approaches to counterterrorism. Another third of the books were volumes that discussed strategies and tactics for dealing with terrorists. Nine percent were devoted to legal and human rights issues raised by terrorism and counterterrorism practices. Another fifth focused on specific types of terrorism (religious terrorism or weapons of mass destruction—13

Table 1.1. One Hundred Books on Terrorism

Type Code	Authors and Title
O	Hoffman, Bruce. (2006). <i>Inside terrorism</i> .
H	Chaliand, Gerand, and Arnaud Blin. (2007). <i>The history of terrorism: From antiquity to al Qaeda</i> .
O	White, Jonathan R. (2008). <i>Terrorism and homeland security: An introduction</i> .
R	Gabriel, Mark A. (2002). <i>Islam and terrorism: What the Quran really teaches about Christianity and violence and the goals of the Islamic jihad</i> .
P	Reich, Walter, and Walter Laqueur. (1998). <i>Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind</i> .
A	Bjorgo, Tore. (2005). <i>Root causes of terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward</i> .
O	Simonsen, Clifford E., and Jeremy R. Spindlove. (2006). <i>Terrorism today: The past, the players, the future</i> (3rd ed).
O	Kegley, Charles W. (2002). <i>The new global terrorism: Characteristics, causes, controls</i> .
O	O'Neill, Bard E. (2005). <i>Insurgency and Terror: From Revolution to Apocalypse</i> (2nd ed., rev.).
W	Clunan, Anne, Peter Lavoy, and Susan Martin. (2008). <i>Terrorism, War or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons</i> .
O	Martin, Clarence A. (2006). <i>Understanding Terrorism: Challenge, Perspectives, and Issues</i> .
R	Spencer, Robert. (2007). <i>Religion of Peace?: Why Christianity is and Islam Isn't</i> .
P	Bongor, Bruce, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, and James N. Breckenridge. (2006). <i>Psychology of Terrorism</i> .
CT	Allison, Graham. (2005). <i>Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe</i> .
LHR	Zinn, Howard. (2002). <i>Terrorism and War</i> .
P	Post, Jerrold M. (2007). <i>The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda</i> .
CT	Davis, Anthony M. (2008). <i>Terrorism and the Maritime Transportation System</i> .
CT	Borard, James. (2004). <i>Terrorism and Tyranny: Triangulating Freedom, Justice and Peace to Rid the World of Evil</i> .

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Table 1.1. (Continued)

Type Code	Authors and Title
CT	Pillar, Paul R. (2004). <i>Terrorism and US Foreign Policy</i> .
CT	Feith, Douglas J. (2008). <i>War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism</i> .
H	Hartwright, Christian. (2002). <i>The Red Roots of Terrorism</i> .
W	Levi, Michael. (2007). <i>On Nuclear Terrorism</i> .
O	Ross, Jeffrey I. (2006). <i>Political Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach</i> .
CT	Bevelacqua, Armando S. (2003). <i>Terrorism Handbook for Operational Responders</i> , 2nd ed.
LHR	Cole, David, and James K. Dempsey. (2006). <i>Terrorism and the Constitution: Safeguarding Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security</i> , revised and updated.
O	Martin, Clarence A. (2007). <i>Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies</i> .
O	Badey, Thomas J. (2006). <i>Annual Editions: Violence and Terrorism 07/08</i> .
CT	Howard, Russell D. James J.F. Forest, and Joanne Moore (2005). <i>Homeland Security and Terrorism</i> .
CT	Robb, John, and James Fallows (2008). <i>Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization</i> .
CT	Webber, Jane, Debra D. Bass, and Richard Yep. (2005). <i>Terrorism, Trauma, and Tragedies: A Counselor's Guide to Preparing and Responding</i> .
CT	Walker, Alice, Jodie Evans, Medea Benjamin, and Arundhat Roy. (2005). <i>How to Stop the Next War Now: Effective Response to Violence and Terrorism</i> .
LHR	Maggs, Gregory E. (2005). <i>Terrorism and the Law: Cases and Materials</i> .
P	Horgan, Jon. (2005). <i>The Psychology of Terrorism</i> .
CT	Sheehan, Michael A. (2008). <i>Crush the Cell: How To Defeat Terrorism Without Terrorizing Ourselves</i> .
CT	Dershowitz, Alan M. (2003). <i>Why Terrorism Works, Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge</i> .
O	Badey, Thomas J. (2008). <i>Annual Editions: Violence and Terrorism 08/09</i> .

- OTH Lilley, Peter. (2006). *Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism*.
- CT Rotberg, Robert I. (2005). *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*.
- CT Hunsicker, A. (2006). *Understanding International Counter Terrorism: A Professional's Guide to the Operational Art*.
- LHR Tsang, Steve. (2008). *Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism*.
- A Richardson, Louise. (2006). *The Roots of Terrorism*.
- A Pape, Robert. (2006). *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*.
- O Combs, Cynthia L. (2008). *Terrorism in the 21st Century*, 5th ed.
- CT Howard, Russell D., and Reid L. Sawyer. (2003). *Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security Environment*.
- O White, Jonathan. (2002). *Terrorism: An Introduction*, 2002 update.
- CT Khalsa, Sundri K. (2004). *Forecasting Terrorism: Indicators and Proven Analytical Techniques*.
- A Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. (2005). *The Political Economy of Terrorism*.
- CT Burke, Robert. (2006). *Counter-Terrorism for Emergency Responders*, 2nd ed.
- W Howard, Russell D., and James J.F. Forest. (2007). *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism*.
- R Morse, Chuck. (2003). *The Nazi Connection to Islamic Terrorism: Adolf Hitler and Haj Amin al-Husseini*.
- A Rosen, David M. (2005) *Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism*.
- CT Purpura, Philip. (2006). *Terrorism and Homeland Security: An Introduction with Applications*.
- CT Netanuahu, Benjamin. (1997). *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists*.
- LHR Stone, Geoffrey R. (2005). *Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime: From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism*.
- SP Hewitt, Christop. (2002). *Understanding Terrorism in America*.
- CT Cronin, Audrey Kurth, and James M. Ludes. (2004). *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*.
- P Volkan, Vamik. (1998). *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*.
- O Whittaker, D. (2002). *The Terrorism Reader*.

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Table 1.1. (Continued)

Type Code	Authors and Title
SP	William, Philip P. (2002). <i>Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy</i> .
CT	Bennett, William J. (2003). <i>Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism</i> .
CT	Lessor, Ian O. (1999). <i>Countering the New Terrorism</i> .
CT	Poland, James M. (2004). <i>Understanding Terrorism: Groups, Strategies, and Responses</i> , 2nd ed.
LHR	Beckman, James. (2007). <i>Comparative Legal Approaches to Handle Security and Anti-terrorism</i> .
O	Martin, Clarence A. (2004). <i>The New Era of Terrorism: Selected Readings</i> .
OTH	Kasimenis, George. (2007). <i>Playing Politics with Terror: A User's Guide</i> .
LHR	Farer, Tom. (2008). <i>Countering Global Terrorism and American Neo-Conservatism: The Framework of a Liberal Grand Strategy</i> .
P	Jones, James. (2008). <i>Blood That Cries Out From the Earth: The Psychology of Religious Terrorism</i> .
O	Combs, Cindy C., and Martin W. Slann. (2007). <i>Encyclopedia of Terrorism</i> .
CT	Ray, Ellen, and William H. Schaap. (2003). <i>Covert Action: The Roots of Terrorism</i> .
LHR	Pious, Richard M. (2006). <i>The War and Terrorism and the Rule of Law</i> .
OTH	Van De Ven, Susan Kerr. (2008). <i>One Family's Response to Terrorism: A Daughter's Memoir</i> .
SP	Parenti, Michael. (2002). <i>The Terrorism Trap: September 11 and Beyond</i> .
W	Falkenrath, Richard A., Robert D. Newman, and Bradly A. Thayer. (1998). <i>America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack</i> .
CT	Micheletti, Eric. (2003). <i>Special Forces: War Against Terrorism in Afghanistan</i> .
O	Townshend, Charles. (2003). <i>Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction</i> .
O	Gupta, Dipak K. (2005). <i>Current Perspectives: Terrorism and Homeland Security</i> .

- A Crenshaw, Martha. (1994). *Terrorism in Context*.
- CT Biersteker, Thomas J., and Sue E. Eckert. (2007). *Countering the Financing of Terrorism*.
- R Sageman, Marc. (2007). *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*.
- R Adams, Neal. (2002). *Terrorism and Oil*.
- CT Burton, Fred. (2008). *Ghost: Confessions of a Counterterrorism Agent*.
- O Smith, Paul J. (2002). *The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the Twenty-first Century*.
- SP Tellis, Ashley J., and Michael Wills. (2004). *Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power*.
- W Boyle, Francis A. (2005). *Biowarfare and Terrorism*.
- R Emerson, Steven. (2006). *Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US*.
- CT Posner, Richard A. (2008). *Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps*.
- CT Chandler, Michael, and Rohan Gunaratna. (2007). *Countering Terrorism: Can We Meet the Threat of Global Violence?*
- CT Heymann, Philip B. (2000). *Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society*.
- A Krueger, Alan B. (2007). *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism*.
- CT Banks, William C., Mitchel B. Wallerstein, and Renee de Nevers. (2007). *Combating Terrorism, Strategies and Approaches*.
- R Stern, Jessica. (2004). *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*.
- O Thackrah, John R. (2003). *Dictionary of Terrorism*.
- CT Danieli, Yael, and Danny Brom. (2005). *The Trauma of Terrorism: Sharing Knowledge and Shared Care, An International Handbook*.
- A Norris, Pippa, Marian R. Just, and Montague Kern. (2003). *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public*.
- O Nyatepe-Cao, Akorlie A., and Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted. (2003). *Understanding Terrorism: Threats in an Uncertain World*.
- LHR Pohlma, H. (2002). *Terrorism and the Constitution: The Post 9/11 Cases*.
- W Weinstein, Raymond S., and Ken Albek. (2003). *Biological and Chemical Terrorism: A Guide for Healthcare and First Responders*.
- O Harmon, Christop. (2007). *Terrorism Today*.

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Table 1.1. (Continued)

Type Code	Authors and Title
CT	Kessler, Ronald. (2007). <i>The Terrorist Watch: Inside the Desperate Race to Stop the Next Attack.</i>
OTH	Livingstone, David. (2007). <i>Terrorism and the Illuminati: A Three Thousand Year History.</i>

Source: Based on a search using the word “terrorism” on Amazon.com in June, 2008.

Table 1.2. Coding Categories and Operationalizations

Category	Definition
CT — Counter terrorism	Focuses primarily on how to defeat terrorists—strongly policy oriented
O — Overviews of the phenomenon	Focuses on providing a survey or overview of the terrorism phenomena, often in textbook format or anthology of collected readings
LHR — Legal/human rights considerations	Focuses primarily on either legal implications or impact on human rights
A — Social science analysis	Focuses primarily on terrorism as a form of political violence utilized to oppose governments within a sociopolitical context
R — Religious/jihadi specific	Focuses primarily on current role of religious fundamentalism/Islam in terrorist activity
W — Weapons of mass destruction	Focuses primarily on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and connections to terrorism
P — Psychology of terrorists	Focuses primarily on explaining how terrorists think
SP — Terrorism in specific places	Focuses in various ways on describing terrorism in various locales
H — History of terrorism	Focuses on analyzing terrorism in the past to the current manifestations
OTH — Other	None of the above

Table 1.3. Coding an Amazon Sample of the Current Terrorism Literature

Category	Distribution
Counterterrorism	33
Overviews of the phenomenon	21
Legal/human rights considerations	9
Social science analysis	8
Religious/jihadi specific	7
Weapons of mass destruction	6
Psychology of terrorists	6
Terrorism in specific places	4
Other	4
History of terrorism	2

Note: The numbers represent both absolute and proportional outcomes because the number of books examined totaled 100.

percent in all), terrorism in specific places (4 percent), and the psychology of terrorists (6 percent).

Only 8 percent encompassed what we have labeled as “social science analysis.” The label is admittedly awkward, but the entries in this category examine terrorism as merely one type of political violence in the arsenal of dissidents, subject to variations based on the characteristics of the states, societies, and time-periods in which they take place.³ The emphasis is not to condemn terrorist activity as criminal or evil, nor to propose ways to defeat terrorist activity. Instead, the emphasis is placed on how to explain the causes and impacts of this distinctive type of political behavior, relying on social science theory and methods.⁴ The list displayed in Table 1.1 encompasses books written in the last 15 years for the most part, so it is clear that movement toward this type of analysis is slow—on average, one book every two years.

Authors often write books to sell them to the reading public. Therefore, one could look at the list in Table 1.1, shrug, and say that it simply reflects what sells. We have no disagreement with this observation. Our minimal point is merely that neutral analysis of terrorism as a political behavior, whether it sells or not, remains fairly scarce. But something more can be gleaned, we think, from the list in Table 1.1. Standard operating procedure for writing about terrorism tends not to focus on conventional political science or sociology. Journalistic description and policy advocacy is far more common.

We do not say this to denigrate description or policy advocacy. These types of approaches can be valuable. Descriptive information is

certainly useful for targets of terrorism in contemplating ways to defend themselves. Analysis of any kind can hardly proceed without empirical data. Given public outrage and insecurities about terrorism, the impulse to discuss preventive policies is certainly understandable. Even so, we suggest there is also a need for more dispassionate study of terrorism as a form of political behavior.

Another way of making our case involves looking at a list of 490 desired research topics recently published. This list was developed initially by the United Nations' Terrorism Prevention Branch and updated by social scientists. It is not surprising that a terrorism prevention branch would place a great deal of emphasis on counterterrorism research topics. That is their mission after all. What is disheartening is that there are so few topics that address interpreting what terrorism is, under what circumstances it is likely to occur and succeed/fail, and what impact terrorism is likely to have on other structures and processes.

There are, to be sure, topics within categories 1 (types), 2 (linkages), 5 (state responses), 11 (evolution), 12 (war), 15 (public), 17 (trends), 18 (consequences), 19 (organization), and 25 (background factors) that are pertinent to the type of analysis of which we would like to see more done. Not coincidentally, the chapters in this book address many of these topics. Yet there is something about terrorism that keeps conventional academic treatments in the minority. Most of the 490 desired research topics summarized in Table 1.4 concern counterterrorism in one way or another. Our rejoinder is that better counterterrorism techniques might be forthcoming if we first had a stronger contextual understanding of what the varieties of terrorist political behavior represent.

We are not so naive to think that counterterrorist policies will wait while our social science understanding catches up to the need for responding to terrorist attacks. Our point is only that we have much to learn about what terrorism is, as well as when, where, why it might occur. Fortunately, research has been done on these topics and more is underway.

Both types of books on terrorism, which either describe groups that employ terrorist tactics or instruct how best to combat their tactics, are valuable; descriptive information is certainly useful for targets of terrorism in contemplating ways to defend themselves. What remain relatively scarce are attempts to bring terrorism within the boundaries of social science explanation, as opposed to a topic awkwardly stuck between genocide and gang violence.

The key to mainstreaming terrorism analyses into regular social science discourse involves two steps. First, avoid treating the terrorism topic as if the word "terrorism" began with a capital T. Terrorism is a violence tactic in the arsenal of groups (and states). Whether we regard it as evil,

Table 1.4. United Nations' Terrorism Prevention Branch Research Desiderata

Research Categories	Number of Topics and Comments
1. Types of terrorism	23 topics on whether different types of terrorists behave differently
2. Linkages	14 topics on whether terrorist organizations have links to other types of networks (criminal, drugs, and political parties)
3. Kidnapping/hostage-taking	6 topics on how kidnapping behavior works
4. International cooperation	22 topics on counterterrorism cooperation among various organizations
5. State responses	19 topics on how different types of states engage in counterterrorism
6. "Best Practices" and "lessons learned": UN member states experiences	14 topics on what works best in counterterrorism
7. Psychological and sociological factors	25 topics on the mindset of terrorists and using psychology for counterterrorism
8. Security	27 topics on preventive counterterrorism
9. Legal efforts	14 topics on legal regulation of terrorist behavior
10. Training	6 topics on training for counterterrorism
11. The evolution of terrorism	11 topics on how terrorist organization and tactics change over time
12. War and terrorism	29 topics on the interactions between war and terrorism and how to use military forces to suppress terrorism
13. Terrorism and the criminal justice system	11 topics on terrorists on trial and in prison
14. Media	12 topics on how terrorism is portrayed in the press and in the cinema
15. Terrorism and the public	6 topics on terrorism's impact on the public and public opinion about terrorism
16. Counterterrorist measures and responses	86 topics on various approaches to counterterrorism
17. Trends and statistics	8 topics on counting different types of terrorism

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Table 1.4. (Continued)

Research Categories	Number of Topics and Comments
18. Consequences of terrorism	5 topics on assessing the effects of terrorism
19. Terrorist groups: organizations and characteristics	23 topics on how terrorist groups are organized
20. Victims	16 topics on the problems terrorist victims experience
21. Terrorist demands and tactics	54 topics on terrorist tactics and how to deal with them
22. Theoretical/conceptual/definitional considerations	7 topics on how analysts write about terrorism
23. Risk analysis	8 topics on assessing risk and threat
24. Dynamics of terrorism	15 topics on terrorist motives and repertoires and what might be done about them
25. General background factors facilitating international terrorism	21 topics on the domestic and international contexts in which terrorism take place

Source: Based in part on Schmid and Jongman (2007, 268–291).

legitimate or illegitimate, criminal or noncriminal, or a threat to civilization is beside the point. Social scientists study a number of phenomena that they do not necessarily like. But if analysts begin with the assumption that a particular type of behavior should be eliminated altogether from the possible behavioral repertoire of political actors, any subsequent analysis is likely to be strongly influenced by the author's repugnance.

Second, and much more difficult to accomplish, is to analyze terrorism in order to test theories about political violence. Authors on terrorism often choose their topics according to which groups have been most prominent in the media or, alternatively, which groups have been labeled terrorists by antagonistic governments. Area specialists, of course, are most likely to focus on terrorist groups in their selected corner of the world. We propose instead that analysts begin first with a theoretical question and then select appropriate phenomena or groups that allow one to assess the validity of more abstract propositions. In many cases, this type of analysis will not contribute to governmental interests in suppressing terrorism. Nor will it necessarily highlight the clearest threats to political stability. But, it may help us to interpret just where terrorism fits in within the political landscape, and how it relates to political structures and processes.

Accordingly, there are no specific methodological techniques that necessarily deserve priority over others. Case studies, large-N statistical analyses, game theory, polling, interviews, archival investigation, and content analysis are all germane. It is not so much a matter of how one pursues hypotheses about terrorism but rather why. The ideal situation entails pursuing hypotheses about terrorism as a way of assessing theories about political violence—as opposed to only describing, condemning, or praising terrorism, or, alternatively, developing strategies to defeat terrorism. We realize the ideal is not often achieved. Nor is it necessarily a goal in which all analysts of terrorism will be interested. Nonetheless, it remains a goal for social scientists to work toward as much as is feasible.

General Layout of the Book

One complicating factor in bringing terrorism into the social science realm is the tendency of the phenomena to change its shape over time. For instance, it was once conventional wisdom to believe that nonstate terrorists were inclined to minimize casualties so as not to completely alienate their intended audience. Yet the latest form of terrorist behavior by jihadists sometimes seeks to maximize casualties to better gain attention for its cause and weaken the will of its opponents. Terrorist behavior is complex and subject to change. We need to explore the origins of multiple varieties of terrorism, each within its appropriate historical context, examining how and when terrorism tactics escalate. We also need to consider the responses engendered by terrorism tactics, not only in terms of what works or does not work, but as appropriately contextualized, reciprocal behavior between attackers employing terrorist tactics and defenders generating responses.

In short, we must “mainstream” terrorism just as we are coming to terms with asymmetrical warfare in general (e.g., insurgencies and civil wars) as inescapable dimensions of contemporary reality. Terrorism is much more likely to evolve than disappear any time soon. We need to accept this reality and learn how to conceptualize terrorism, theorize about it, and model it, just as we do other phenomena in the social sciences.

Modeling terrorism is what distinguishes this volume from journalistic description and coping strategy advocacy. We organize this work in four parts, each including three or four chapters that share an analytical focus. The first part of the volume includes contributions by Manus Midlarsky, Christopher Butler, and Scott Gates, Rhonda Callaway and Julie Harrelson Stephens, and Erica Chenoweth, focusing on the origins of contemporary terrorism. The second part of the volume includes three articles, written

by Sandra Borda, David Sobek and Alex Braithwaite, and Lyubov G. Mincheva and Ted Gurr, which study processes related to the escalation and expansion of contemporary terrorism. A third part includes three chapters focusing on counter strategies in fighting terrorism, written by Gil Friedman, William Josiger, and William Zartman and Tanya Alfredson. Finally, the fourth part of the volume, focusing on broader responses to contemporary terrorism, includes four articles, written by Christine Fair and Bryan C. Shepherd, Peter Romaniuk, Michael Stohl, and John Mueller. Taken together, the 14 chapters paint a holistic picture of origins, escalation, and expansion of terrorism, and counter strategies and responses to cope with it. An overview of the chapters in each section follows.

Part One: Origins

The first part of the volume examines the origins of terrorism and the forces contributing to rise in terrorist acts. The four chapters analyze the roots of twentieth-century political extremism, evaluate the effect of organization patterns, study the effect of state repression in Chechnya, and the role of democracy and democratization in the rise of terrorist activities.

Opening the origins section, Midlarsky focuses on the contexts, etiology, and behavioral traits of the early-twentieth-century European fascism as modal cases of political extremism. He defines them as social movements that pursue goals or programs that existing states view as unacceptable. Another common denominator is that these movements suppress concerns for individual rights in their pursuit of collective goals and are quite prepared to engage in mass killing of any opponents to their programs. Why might this be the case? Midlarsky's explanation focuses on a sequence of initial subservience to external forces, followed by a period of societal gain that is abruptly disrupted by catastrophic losses in population or territory. War losers are especially susceptible to this type of situation. The emotional response is apt to be one of anger over the injustices brought about by some unpopular group that is blamed for the outcome. The intensity of emotion and anger leads to a commitment to doing something radically in order to improve the situation. Midlarsky closes his chapter with the suggestion that this model can be used as a template to understand contemporary terrorist groups, particularly ones engaged in fundamentalist religious programs. In the case of intensely angry jihadis, a long period of subordination to the West was seemingly ended by successes in Afghanistan only to be reversed by the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. The commitment to the restoration of a Caliphate is similar to fascist plans to rebuild their states

along collectivist lines. Thus, from Midlarsky's perspective, modern terrorism should be viewed as one type of political extremism.

In the second piece, Butler and Gates seek to disentangle the technology of terror. They argue that actors facing a state of unfavorable peace have three primary choices: absorb the losses imposed by this state of affairs, engage in conventional warfare to change the status quo, or engage in unconventional warfare to do so. The choice of unconventional warfare is further disaggregated into activities involving terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Disentangling the technology of terror requires, Butler and Gates argue, a focus on the asymmetrical aspects of the problem, the interactions between superior state forces on one side and the insurgents and their complicit public on the other. Fighting superior state forces is viable as long as the cost of war for the insurgents is not too high. When discontented actors are much weaker than the state forces they face, the costs of conventional and guerrilla warfare may be prohibitive. The use of terrorism, in contrast, may entail low enough cost to make it a viable alternative course of action. The focus on asymmetry suggests the state may more successfully quell dissent by "being just" than by increasing its power and investing in defense.

Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens have different curves in mind to explain terrorism. They argue that terrorism is a function of political participation, quality of life, and security but that each variable has a different relationship with the probability of the emergence of terrorist tactics. The relationship between political rights and terrorism is linear and positive. The more open the political system is, the less likely are members of the population to employ terrorist tactics. The quality of life-terrorism relationship resembles an inverted U, with terrorism most likely to be exhibited in the middle of the inverted U. The security-terrorism relationship is more complicated. Regimes capable of total suppression of dissent have less to fear from terrorism than do regimes that fall short of that control extreme. Moreover, the more blatant is the regime's attacks on its population, the greater is the popular support for terrorist activity. Thus, repressive regimes that fall short of complete control are the ones most likely to encourage terrorist attacks.

The authors apply this theory to the growth of terrorism in Chechnya with mixed results. Political rights were and remain limited. The old Soviet regime had approximated the extreme end of the continuum prior to the advent of Gorbachev. The subsequent relaxation of regime control encouraged the emergence of an independence movement. Thus, the political participation and regime security control variables seem to fit. The one variable that does not conform is the quality of life factor, which remained consistently low, thereby neither satisfying a J-curve or

an inverted U expectation. Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens conclude with some speculations about intervening variables. One possibility is that political systems with a colonial history of subordination interacting with metropolises of fluctuating strength may exacerbate the probability of violence. Another is that the introduction of foreign fighters into the conflict zone can lead to situations in which the local, extreme dissident movement is basically hijacked by external actors. One or both of these factors may help explain why Chechnya only partially conforms to their analytical expectations. Ultimately, more cases will be needed to sort out the explanatory power of the theory and to establish what are or may be deviant cases.

Concluding the origins section, Chenoweth examines why terrorist groups seem more prevalent in democracies than in autocracies. She argues the answer has to do with intergroup competition among terrorist groups of various ideologies. Motivated by the competitiveness of the political regime in a democracy, the competition between terrorist groups explains, she hypothesizes, an increase in the number of new terrorist groups. She tests this hypothesis by conducting a statistical analysis of 119 countries from 1975 to 1997, employing the number of new terrorist groups as the dependent variable. The key independent variables are agenda competitiveness and intergroup competition. The findings support her hypothesis, but also suggest the relationship is curvilinear: both the most competitive and the least competitive regimes exhibit the largest number of new terrorist groups. Chenoweth concludes that effective counterterrorism policies must consider intergroup dynamics. Officials espousing democratization as a cure for terrorism may have it wrong; intense democratization may actually encourage terrorism.

Part Two: Escalation and Expansion

Moving to the second part of our volume, the escalation and expansion of terrorism processes do not occur randomly. Conditions need to be conducive for terrorism to increase its level of violence or to expand its geographical scope. The three chapters included in this part of the volume shed light on these escalatory and expansionary processes, demonstrating them in three particular cases, Colombia, Israel, and Kosovo.

Escalation processes can seem inadvertent. Two sides engage in tit-for-tat exchanges until one side is seen as responding more violently than the other side's attacks. Suddenly, the exchanges have moved to new heights of lethality without either side fully anticipating the escalation.

Alternatively, escalation can occur when domestic fighting in one country spills over the border into adjacent states. Borda, however, writes about a different type of escalation—one that is explicitly intentional. Prior to September 11, 2001, the U.S. government was aiding the Colombian government in attempting to suppress the flow of drugs from Colombia to North America. At the same time, the U.S. government was reluctant to provide resources that the Colombian government could employ with domestic insurgents. Borda argues that Colombian decision makers began portraying its domestic opponents as terrorists after 9/11 so that they could manipulate the newfound U.S. interest in terrorism suppression to obtain more external military resources. In this the Colombian government was successful, but not without potential costs. Internationalization of a domestic conflict can gain the government more resources but it can also tie its hands should there be an opportunity to negotiate with the opposition. In other words, the trade-off can be resources for decision-making autonomy and possibly more protracted conflict.

In chapter 7, Sobek and Braithwaite address two additional aspects of our problem: the effect of a country's international dominance and its choices of conciliatory or retaliatory responses to attacks by its weaker political foes on the number of terrorist attacks against it in a time period. In previous work, Sobek and Braithwaite have investigated these questions in the context of the U.S. diplomatic and international military dominance and terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and properties around the world. In this chapter, they shift focus to Israel, ascertaining the effect of Israel's military and economic dominance in the Middle East and concessionary or retaliatory policy choices on the number of attacks occurring within Israel or leading to Israeli casualties abroad in a given year or quarter. The findings suggest that when Israel enjoys high levels of capabilities relative to its neighbors it faces more attacks. Israeli concessions reduce the number of attacks, argue the authors, while retaliatory actions increase attacks.

Concluding the second part of this volume, Mincheva and Gurr study synergies between international terrorism and organized crime. The authors argue that, though the goals of terrorists and criminals differ, the politically motivated terrorist groups and greed-motivated criminal syndicates sometimes work together. Seeking to explain this fact, Mincheva and Gurr's theoretical framework is based on ideas drawn from social movement theory, conflict analysis, and criminology. They propose that one condition for terrorist-criminal collaboration is the existence of trans-state nationalist, ethnic and religious movements, which promotes collaboration based on shared values and mutual trust. Other conditions

include the occurrence of an armed conflict, providing incentives and possibilities for cooperation, and forces facilitating transnational illegal exchanges, which often involve intermediaries and corrupt state security forces. Mincheva and Gurr illustrate the operation of their model in the case of the Kosovar Albanian separatist movement, which has evolved into a political-criminal syndicate. Other cases are mentioned in passing, involving Colombia, Afghanistan, and Turkey.

Part Three: Counter Strategies

Moving to the third part of our volume, which focuses on counter strategies employed in the war on terror, we discover the patterns of terrorism and the contexts within which it operates are not uniform across time and space. As a consequence, the counter strategies employed in fighting terrorism and the broader responses of populations to terrorism are apt to be more complex than a simple terrorist action-governmental suppression reaction model might suggest.

Friedman concurs that modeling counterterrorism strategies is a complex undertaking. Focusing on what he calls asymmetric protracted conflicts, he believes it is possible to model the costs and benefits associated with a dominant rival's counterterrorist strategy, but not without bumping into some serious problems. Once violence begins, the dominant rival needs to address the subordinate rival's ability and willingness to engage in violent attacks. Yet once violence is underway, the subordinate rival is all the less likely to be prepared to make concessions and the dominant rival will also avoid concessions for fear of being perceived as lacking in resolve. Should a subordinate rival make concessions, with or without ongoing violence, the dominant rival may lose its motivation to respond appropriately, thereby encouraging the subordinate rival to return to, or to escalate, its level of violence. If the dominant rival responds to subordinate violence with repression, its dilemma is that it must be sufficiently coercive to deter subordinate attacks but must avoid too great of an expansion of anger/hatred within the subordinate population. Throw in such additional ingredients as subordinate organizational disintegration, perceptions of possible settlements, and high religiosity, and the complexity of the asymmetrical protracted conflict situation begins to defy both modeling and operationalization.

Josiger, however, is more sanguine about making generalizations about what works and what does not work in counterterrorism for the older, more affluent states of Europe (in particular, the United Kingdom,

Spain, and France). After several decades of experience, he thinks the following generalizations have support. One, if terrorism lacks domestic support, governments can employ firm responses. But if terrorism enjoys some domestic support, more complex approaches drawing upon political-economic and social changes are necessary if the government hopes to do more than merely contain the violence. Two, contrastingly, under-reaction and/or oscillations in the firmness of the response will work against governmental success. Three, decentralized efforts among different layers of domestic governance tend not to work. Four, terrorists should always be treated as ordinary criminals. Five, international cooperation is absolutely essential.

Friedman and Josiger focus on much different types of political milieu. Zartman and Alfredson further complicate the counter-terrorism guidelines by noting that governments with internal rebels that employ terrorism often end up (80 percent of the time) negotiating with them. Why and when governments and rebel terrorists choose to negotiate is not a straightforward proposition. The rebels may be willing to surrender some goals if they think they can achieve others. Governments may think they can encourage splits within the rebel ranks, isolate the most radical elements, and work out arrangements with the less radical rebels.

Attempting to pin down these circumstances further, Zartman and Alfredson turn to a consideration of five case studies (Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Palestine). An analysis of the case studies suggest that governments will avoid negotiation unless they feel they have little choice but to make some type of agreement. In this respect, a mutually hurting stalemate can enhance the motivation for both sides to consider coming to terms. So are situations in which third-party mediators lead the way or rebels choose to revise their own goals independently. The irony here is that rebel groups need to stay unified if they hope to moderate their own demands successfully. Otherwise, radical elements will break away and continue the fight. If governments seek to split their opposition, an often-tempting proposition, they may actually make successful negotiations less likely.

Part Four: Responses

Finally, the last part of our volume enlarges the picture to consider the responses to terrorism in a broader sense. Two chapters in this part seek, respectively, to uncover the attributes of people supporting terrorism in Muslim countries, and the effect of Northern norms on the responses of

people in South and South East Asia to the global war on terror. The third chapter considers how to measure whether responses, strategies, and actions in the war on terror are successful and efficient. The fourth chapter evaluates the consequences of fear as a persistent factor in the reaction to terrorism.

Beginning this part of our volume, Fair and Shepherd examine determinants of public support for terrorism in Muslim countries. They investigate this subject using data recently made available. The data, which so far have not been used extensively for this purpose, consist of survey responses of 7,849 adults from 14 Asian and African countries with Muslim majorities or large Muslim minorities. The findings suggest that females are often more likely to support terrorism than males, younger persons are more likely to do so than older people, relatively richer people are more likely to do so than the extremely poor, and people believing that religious leaders should play a larger role in politics or that Islam is under threat are more likely to do so than others. Despite these generalizations, Fair and Shepherd stress that the particular effects vary across countries, suggesting that counterterrorism policy interventions must be tailored to the target population in question.

In chapter 14, Stohl observes that officials and scholars who lack appropriate metrics to evaluate whether the global war on terror is being won are politicizing the discussion. The root of this observation is the failure of analysts to ground the existing metrics in a theoretically based understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism. The development of appropriate metrics requires consideration of both the terrorist act and the audience reaction. The governmental counterterrorism tasks involve foiling attacks, arresting terrorists, reducing the risk of attacks, and making the public feel secure and confident in the authorities' actions. Since terrorism crosses borders, foreign perceptions and actions are also important. It follows, argues Stohl, that the metrics need to be multidimensional, including measures such as the number of terrorist attacks across time and space, the extent of networks supporting the terrorists, number of arrests and other disruptions of terrorism, the extent of the counterterrorism global alliance, domestic and foreign publics perceptions of their security and the success of the war on terror, and the condition of human rights in the countries of the anti-terror global alliance.

The last chapter of this volume contributes a sobering note. Mueller argues that terrorism receives a great deal of attention but actually does relatively little damage and claims fewer victims than lightning strikes, bathtub drownings, or allergic reactions to insects (at least in the United States). If the global likelihood of being a victim of a terrorist attack is