CHAPTER 1

Conceptualizing the Actors’ Roles

A couple of years after the accession, some activists from the new member states stated that they wished that the pressure in the accession process to adapt to EU standards on their countries had been as strong as it is currently on Turkey, because this is the magic moment when doors did open to them.

—Roth 2008, 10

True to the accounts of those feminist activists from postsocialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, pressured by the European Union (EU), Turkey has been undergoing an economic, political, and legal transformation in order to qualify for admission to the EU. Taking advantage of this “magic moment,” women’s grassroots organizations, many of which are feminist, have been pressuring the state to amend gender discriminatory policies and to introduce new measures to improve women’s rights. This book aims to uncover how, why, and to what extent Turkish women, in addition to the EU and the Turkish state, have been involved in gender policy changes in Turkey.

Turkey is a democratic republic with a multiparty, parliamentary system. Its geographic area is larger than any current EU member country. With its close to 75 million citizens, about 93 percent of whom is under the age of 64, it is a dynamic and economically fast-growing country. Its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which has been increasing steadily since 1998, is $10,444. Currently, the growth rate of the GDP is higher than most EU members. The majority lives in the urban areas. Those who are in the labor force engage in work primarily
in the service industry and manufacturing sector. Once a significant economic component, agriculture now only accounts for 25 percent of the overall economy.\(^1\) Since its establishment as a republic in 1923 following the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has projected a place for itself among European countries. It became a member of NATO in 1952, and after the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), which is now known as the EU, it applied for associate membership to the Community in 1959 and signed the Ankara Agreement in 1963 to construct “ever closer bonds” (Nas 2011, 47).

The 1999 Helsinki Summit marked the beginning of the transformation in Turkey as the European Commission, the executive body of the EU, officially recognized the country as a candidate for EU membership. On October 3, 2005, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, publicly announced the opening of the accession negotiations with these words: “Today is a milestone in the relationship between the European Union and Turkey. A stable, modern, and democratic Turkey is an objective we should support actively in the European Union and in Turkey. This is why we are starting negotiations” (European Commission 2005). The announcement came about as a result of the passage of a number of reform packages in the Turkish Parliament in the early 2000s that led to the adoption of various EU standards, including some of the gender equality directives, and demonstrated the seriousness of the Turkish state in its quest for membership. The legislative changes continue, though at a slower pace, as I write this book.

Some see this transformation process as the diffusion of European values (Risse, Green Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Caporaso and Jupille 2001; Checkel 2001; Liebert 2003; von Wahl 2008), recognizing at the same time that internal institutional structures of countries influence “domestic adaptation with national colors” (Risse, Green Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 1). In the case of gender policies, which are categorized within the field of social policy in EU governance, the EU affirms gender equality as a fundamental European value and expects both the member and candidate countries to transpose and implement the equality directives (Roth 2008, 2007; Aldıkçaçı Marshall 2008; Kantola 2010). Obviously, the EU has more leverage over the candidate countries as it is holding the carrot of membership (Müftüler-Baç 2000; Lannon, Inglis, and Haenel-balcke 2001; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2003; Roth 2008, 2007). Turkey has been especially subject to an exhaustive scrutiny by the EU because it is the only country that has had such a long relationship with
the European Community while still remaining outside of it for reasons that will be discussed in chapter 5. The EU’s gender equality policies developed over time, affecting different countries that entered the Union at different times to varying degrees (Liebert 2003). By the time Turkey was declared an official candidate there were nine directives on gender equality to be transposed by the country.

As significant as the EU pressure has been, it is by no means the only element pushing the Turkish state toward amending its gender equality legislation. Women’s organizations, most of which are run by secular feminist women, have been influential actors in highlighting which policies should be introduced and amended as well as what the nature of the changes should be so that the gender regime—manifested by the legislation in place—shifts. Here the term gender regime refers to gender arrangements that shape institutions (Connell 1987, 2002) and is further explained in chapter 2. The influence of women’s organizations stems from engaging in on the one hand “the politics of location” (Kaplan 1994), as these organizations have focused on the ways in which women deal with difficulties and discrimination situated in the specific geographical setting of Turkey that “incorporates Islamic and secular, modern and traditional, and democratic but authoritarian tendencies” (Ertürk 2006, 79), and, on the other hand, transnational activism and universal rights regimes, as women’s organizations have increasingly realized how going beyond national borders to put pressure on the state can be particularly effective when EU membership is at stake (Ertürk 2006; Aldikaçtı Marshall 2008). I argue that these efforts of feminist activists should be conceptualized as sustained-pressure, a strategy that proved to be staggeringly beneficial when feminists asserted themselves as pivotal actors in reshaping gender policies in the 2000s.

Improving women’s rights has been crucial within the gender equality discourse of Turkish feminists since the beginning of the second wave feminist movement in the early 1980s. While recognizing the salience of the secular gender policies of the modern Turkish state as the legacy of the cadre of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the secular founder of the nation-state, and even citing these policies as evidence of “state feminism” (Tekeli 1986, 1992; Arat 1994; Durakbaş 1998; Abadan-Unat 1998; White 2003; Esim and Cindoğlu 1999; Kadıoğlu 2005), they have, nonetheless, openly and continuously pinpointed their shortfalls (Tekeli, 1992, 1998; Yeşim Arat 1994; Abadan-Unat 1998). With this stand, Turkish feminists have distinguished themselves from their grandmothers
and mothers who strongly supported the secular policies of the Turkish Republic, which in 1923 broke away from the Shari'a regime of the Ottoman Empire. The efforts of feminists to amend existing policies and to create new policies to further women's rights accelerated in the late 1990s and 2000s as the country began to take serious steps to align its laws with the laws of the EU.

It is this element, Turkish women as questioning, protesting, arguing, negotiating agents to shape gender equality policies, that is absent in the scholarly picture of the current EU-membership-related developments in Turkey. My aim in this book is to render feminist efforts in policy making and policy change visible and locate them in the multifaceted picture of the agents (primarily the governing bodies of the Turkish state and the EU) that take charge of public debates and decisions on what women’s rights are and how they should be reframed. These women’s organizations as extra-institutional actors—that is, actors that are outside of traditional public bodies of political parties, governments, and parliaments—have been part of a configuration, the other two parts being the EU and the Turkish state, that has undertaken action to reshape gender policies. They are extra-institutional; however, they have connections with the state at the national level and the EU (as well as the United Nations) at the supranational level. The organizations use these links to influence policy making, but at the same time keep their distance from these institutional bodies. Table 1.1 shows the relational trajectory of the opportunities for women’s groups and the pressure used by women activists on the state, the EU, and the United Nations.

My approach recognizes the multilevel governance and multitiered system frameworks’ endeavor to highlight the role of multiple actors in EU policy making; yet it differs from them in various aspects. The multilevel governance framework focuses on the dynamics of the EU policy system and variations in adoption of EU policies based on the actions of subnational and supranational actors (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996). Van der Vleuten points out that “Although this seems to offer room to include women’s actions and interests, multi-level governance fails to specify under which conditions these actions and interests are influential” (2007, 6). Furthermore, it primarily focuses on EU member states, ignoring the policy-making process related to EU integration in candidate countries. My analysis of the policy-making process of gender equality in Turkey centers on women’s interests and efforts, looking at the conditions under which certain efforts have become influential while
Table 1.1. Trajectory of Political Opportunities for Feminist Activists and the National and Transnational Pressure Used by Feminist Activists

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others have had limited or no success. It links local and transnational feminist actions at the EU and the United Nations level, with the Turkish state’s momentary and long-term political attitudes toward women’s status and EU membership.

The multilayered political system approach, on the other hand, sees the state as the decision maker despite pressure from the supranational and subnational actors, and thus treats it as “hierarchically superior” to the other levels (van der Vleuten 2007). It is the state that responds to pressure from multiple directions, being “sandwiched” to take action. It is the state that allows and restricts access to resources and determines the policy outcomes. Like the multilevel governance framework, the multilayered approach primarily deals with the EU and member state relationship, ignoring the status of candidate countries. I agree that it is the state that makes the final decision on policy making; however, the state power that this approach takes into account is not as prominent in candidate state–EU relationships as it is in member state–EU relationships. The EU has more power over candidate countries than member states (Zielonka and Mair 2002; Roth 2007, 2008; Aldıkaçtı Marshall 2008, 2009). Whether it is in member or candidate countries women’s groups have less power than the state and the EU. It is precisely because of this power hierarchy that this book takes women’s groups, rather than the state or the EU, as the central actor, developing a narrative of policy making in conjunction with women’s activism in Turkey. Studies that have not taken women’s actions as central for analysis of the EU membership and Europeanization processes in Turkey have so far treated them as ancillaries within the policy making and policy change on gender equality. Most have centered their discussions on the argument that the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, which required EU members and candidate states to uphold human rights and respect minorities, have been helping the consolidation of democracy and improvement of human rights (Sugden 2004; Usul 2011). A few of them have mentioned that women’s NGOs have been influential in pushing the state to comply with the Copenhagen criteria (Tocci 2005; Göksel and Güneş 2005; Müftüler-Baç 2005), but failed to do a thorough analysis of how, why, and under what circumstances women’s NGOs have been involved. They have overlooked the significance of the longitudinal struggle, which has shaped the feminist movement, and the dynamics of women’s national and transnational networking on changing discriminatory policies. Only a few studies have given more space to women as a collective force in gender policy changes. Kardam’s

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(2005) book on the adoption of global women’s human rights regimes by Turkey is one. However, the book mainly deals with how the notion of women’s human rights was understood by the state and a selected group of women’s NGOs, which designed and implemented programs to train other women. Because of this focus, the book does not consider the details (e.g., strategies, advocacy efforts, and lobbying efforts) of the involvement of women’s organizations in gender policy changes. Nor does it systematically analyze the dynamics of the relationships among women’s groups, the state, and the EU within this process.

In this book, I set forth a study of how women’s grassroots organizations, the Turkish state, and the EU have been involved in reshaping gender equality policies in relation to Turkey’s EU membership process. Keeping women’s organizations as the central unit of analysis, I look at the complex relationships among these subnational, national, and supranational bodies in reformulating a gender regime that has implications for the rights of women. I do not, however, restrict the analysis of women’s endeavors to the time period after the Helsinki Summit during which most policy changes happened. Since the elimination of discriminatory policies has been a significant component of the feminist movement from its beginning, I trace women’s activism from the early days of the movement to provide a holistic account of national and transnational advocacy done by women toward creating change before and after the EU membership process took effect.

Theorizing Women’s Visibility within the Configuration of the Grassroots Activism, the State, and the EU

My aim in this book is to uncover the efforts and strategies of women activists in shaping gender policies, and at the same time, to demonstrate the roles that the EU and the Turkish state have played in this terrain. To do this multilevel analysis I draw on several theories. First I look at the feminist theories of the effects of Europeanization on gender equality. I approach Europeanization as an integration process and part of globalization. Then, I point to the emergence of national and transnational opportunities for feminist engagement in policy making by employing the theory of political opportunity structures. Together, these theories support my argument throughout the book that feminists in Turkey have benefited from the trends of Europeanization and globalization when
taking action to reframe gender policies for a gender regime that they have envisioned. However, limiting women’s efforts solely to the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit, when the influence of the EU was heavily felt by ruling and civil society circles of Turkey, would not do justice to feminists’ continuous struggle with limited resources to improve women’s rights over the years. I conceptualize later that feminist emphasis on policy change as a long-term struggle that together with the benefits of Europeanization and globalization bore fruit mostly in the 2000s, during which Turkey began to make serious changes to its policies on various grounds, including gender equality. This long-term struggle of women against the existing gender regime in Turkey is highlighted with feminist discourse theory.

Put broadly, globalization “is a package of transnational flows—of people, production, investment, information, ideas, and authority” (Brysk and Shafir 2004, 3). This process has created new boundaries and coalitions among the nation-states. The EU is one of the most ambitious of these trends, and it is still in the making (Ferree 2006). As the next chapter discusses in detail, since its establishment in 1957, the EU has developed a gender-equality policy, affecting internal gender regimes of member states and those that are candidates for EU membership. This is part of a Europeanization process in which “a European dimension” has become the framework for the construction and dissemination of various policies, including policies to eliminate gender inequality (Wallace 2000; Liebert 2003). As a framework Europeanization requires from member and candidate states conversion to a shared approach to equality policies (Liebert 2003). It has been mainly through binding legal directives that the EU has put pressure on its members beginning in the 1970s, and increasingly over the years on candidates, to transpose an EU vision of equality to their national laws (Walby 2004; Morgan 2008; Ferree 2008). Although it became more comprehensive over the years (chapter 2), this vision is not perfect because, as the feminist studies on Europeanization show, it primarily focuses on the market and is concerned with equality of opportunity for and in employment (Rossilli 1997, 2000; Watson 2000; Walby 2004); it takes men as the norm for worker and citizen (Guerrina 2002; Walby 2004); and in areas other than employment, such as sexual preference and gender mainstreaming, the EU uses soft laws, “those that are advisory rather than judicially enforceable” (Walby 2004, 7). Nevertheless, the EU gender equality program has created opportunities for women’s groups with equality agendas to have influence on national
gender policies as well as the policies of the EU (Zippel 2004, 2006, 2008; Roth 2007, 2008). Thus, the EU’s stance on gender equality and its influence on member and prospective nations to improve their gender equality regimes are both criticized and seen as a positive development by a number of feminist scholars that examine Europeanization (Shaw 2001; Hubert 2001; Zippel 2006, 2008; van der Vleuten 2007; Roth 2008; von Wahl 2008; Kantola 2010). Strikingly, even in the form of soft laws EU pressure on Turkey in the areas other than employment has produced transformative results in this country’s gender regime mainly because for the first time the EU has used an expanded meaning of gender equality to seriously assess a candidate’s eligibility for membership. As I demonstrate in the upcoming chapters, in the EU’s evaluation of Turkey’s membership status, gender equality is not only about women’s rights; it is also about how “European” Turkey is.

The view that EU gender equality perspective has its shortcomings as well as strengths, creating both opportunities and challenges, parallels a line of feminist studies, which argues that the effects of global trends on women’s rights and gender relations are complex and cannot simply be reduced to a negative picture of unseen forces beyond nation-states disturbing local particularities of women’s lives (Moghadam 2005; Ferree 2006; Adams 2006; Thayer 2010). As Thayer (2010) states, those particularities that are disturbed by the globalization are often entangled with an oppressive patriarchal order. As the global interlinks with local, it opens up new venues for women and other marginalized groups to take action against the antidemocratic practices within nation-states and in the international arena (Moghadam 2005; Ferree 2006; Thayer 2010).

Collective action of women in response to the effects of global trends is not always marked by material and discursive resistance. Indeed there is a question of who in their local contexts and at the transnational level benefits more from those opportunities created by global trends and associations like the EU (Ferree 2006; Adams 2006). This issue comes up often with women’s movements, in which a considerable number of groups do not have enough resources and have to rely on wealthy international donors mostly from economically developed Western and Northern parts of the globe (Alvarez 1998; Schild 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002). Nevertheless, women have been among the most active in utilizing opportunity structures created by the new global order (Moghadam 2005; Ferree 2006).
The term opportunity structures, borrowed from the social movement literature, can be useful to capture the circumstances under which women are able to mobilize (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982, 1996; Tarrow 1989; Kriesi et al. 1992; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). It is mostly used to find out the effects of structural changes, especially the changes in state structures, on the emergence and the development of social movements (Tarrow 1996; Oberschall 1996; Zdravomyslova 1996). Gamson and Meyer (1996) identify “stable” and “volatile” as the two forms of opportunities that could lead to collective mobilization. Stable or long-term opportunities consist of worldviews and cultural climate whereas volatile or short-term opportunities can be measured as mass media access and policy change. Stable opportunities change slowly whereas volatile opportunities are momentary; they depend on the circumstances or the “open moments” of the time (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 280).

The increase in globalization and resulting emergence of transnational relations have led scholars to expand the term to capture the dynamics of the transnational mobilization efforts of various women’s groups (Ferree 2006; Roth 2008). New boundaries and coalitions that emerge as a result of globalization have created “transnational opportunity structures” (Ferree 2006) or “politics of possibilities” (Naples 2002; Desai 2009) leading to formation of relationships beyond the borders of nation-states between formerly unlinked groups. As a result, women’s groups have built new strategies to influence policy making. Ferree (2006) identifies three types of strategies: collaborating with the state bureaucrats to establish “women’s policy machinery” within state institutions, creating advocacy networks outside of state institutions, and creating and sharing knowledge. When using these strategies feminist groups around the world have benefited from and contributed to the expansion of a “post national human rights regime,” with its emphasis on universal human rights (Nuhoğlu Soysal 1994; Brysk and Shafir 2004; Monshipouri 2009). As Brysk and Shafir explain, “the universalism of human’s rights promises more than nation-state citizenship.” It promotes “not only the possibility of an international order, which a well-ordered state sovereignty system also promises, but also a global community” (2004, 4–5), in which the state is accountable to international judicial bodies (Brysk and Shafir 2004; Ross 2008). Global women’s coalitions that have emerged on the platform of the United Nations and outside have successfully utilized this human rights regime (Kardam 2004, 2005;
Ferree 2006; Ertürk 2006 in Ferree; Tripp 2006). Strong advocacy and lobbying efforts by these women’s networks at the international conferences supported by the United Nations have shaped the final documents adopted by the institution by “crafting much of the language” that recognized women’s rights as human rights (Kardam 2004, 2005).

As I illustrate in this book, the effects of Europeanization and globalization on Turkey in the policy field of gender equality has been remarkable notwithstanding some limitations. Subject to EU regulatory mechanisms, such as the Copenhagen criteria, and signatory to major transnational agreements, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), “Turkey subscribes to the principles of universal rights, equality, and individual freedoms within which women’s human rights are included” (Kardam 2005, 2). Having known that complying with the Copenhagen criteria and the international treaties, such as CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action, all of which the EU accepts, would increase its chances to be part of the EU, the Turkish state began to take action to make gender policy amendments in the early 2000s. Still, whatever the effects of Europeanization and globalization, it was in the end the Turkish state with its government and Parliament that transposed and interpreted the EU gender equality directives, as well as United Nations–backed international agreements, supporting the argument that sovereignty of the state remains in implementing rights (Brysk and Shafir 2004). Undeniably, the ideological makeup of the government and Parliament members, their interests, and their alliances all became crucial in shaping the content and the scope of the policies.

However, this picture of the EU’s supranational status and its power especially over the candidate countries, and Turkish state’s power to interpret and implement policies as well as its international interests and willingness to be part of the EU offers only a partial explanation when one tries to understand gender policies and the changes made in this field in Turkey. The partiality of the analysis even legitimizes the question of whether this is another top-down modernizing project employed by a country under the influence of Europe (Sullivan 1998; Kandiyoti 1998; Moghadam 2003). A more complete analysis would demonstrate that within the cultural climate of reform, supported by the worldview of the state elite that Turkey’s future lies in its EU membership, women’s organizations with equality agendas recognized the policy change process as an “open moment” to be influential. Favorable media coverage

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and strategic alliances inside and outside of Parliament, as well as at
the transnational level, furthered their goal of being the agents of policy
making rather than simply being subject to them. As chapters 4 and 6
demonstrate in detail, theirs was and continues to be an example of
“active citizenship” (Siim 2000, 5) as they have contested the status of
women’s rights through organizing, advocating, and lobbying.

Even though the political opportunity structure framework explains
the involvement of women’s organizations in policy making in the 2000s,
during which EU membership efforts of the state accelerated, it by itself
does not explain why and how women have been one of the most effect-
tive civil society groups in terms of pressuring the state. My argument is
that women were ready. They knew what they wanted and what had to
be done to accomplish their aims. This can only be conceptualized as a
product of a long-term struggle, a discursive struggle against the hege-
monic patriarchal gender regime embedded in culture and reflected in
official policies. The long-term discursive struggle that marked the 1980s
and 1990s allowed feminists to develop agendas and tactics that they
could use when the time was right in the 2000s. This strategy permitted
feminists to take credit for the successful reframing of gender policies.

In line with feminist discourse theory (Fraser 1989, 1997; Isanberg
1992; Brenner 1998; Mills 2004), I interpret hegemony as “the term for
the discursive face of power” (Fraser 1997, 381). It is a consensual mecha-
nism by which dominant patriarchal ideology is exercised. It implies
a cognitive strategy of management through discourse within which
patriarchal notions of femininity and masculinity are created and per-
petuated as “natural” and “acceptable” (van Dijk 1993). However, this
does not mean that women are completely powerless and simply passive
victims of male oppression. As Fraser puts it, hegemony “designates a
process wherein cultural authority is negotiated and contested” (1997,
381) by “non-hegemonic counterpublics” (Fraser 1989, 1997). In their
discursive struggle against conventional authority and ideology, coun-
terpublics or subordinated groups engage in the “denaturalization of
existing conventions” (Fairclough 1995, 94). As we see in chapter 4 and
later in chapter 6, the history of women’s activism toward improving
women’s rights and securing gender equality in Turkey is marked by
negotiating power and contesting long-standing patriarchal and family-
oriented gender regime. During this extended struggle they have shown
a colorful repertoire of local and transnational strategies from establish-
ing coalitions and advocacy networks with local and international ties

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to making fragile connections with the women’s machinery and other state institutions as well as individual bureaucrats. Although it did not spread like wildfire among all the feminist groups, framing of women’s rights as human rights has found solid ground in feminist strategizing.

Analysis of Strategies Used by Women’s Groups, the EU, and the Turkish State

The data used in this book is rich in multiplicity. It consists of interviews with key woman activists, electronic documents from websites of the women’s organizations, EU and Turkish state documents, and newspaper articles. With the exception of one, all interviews were conducted with feminist representatives of women’s organizations located in Ankara and İstanbul, the two largest cities in Turkey. Many women’s organizations with various political agendas and worldviews operate in these cities. Because the headquarters of the national media companies, government offices, embassies of foreign countries, and foreign media bureaus are also located in these two cities, women’s groups use them as the sites of advocacy, networking, public protests, and press releases.

The interviews were in-depth and semi-structured. An average interview was about an hour and a half. The meetings took place either at the activist’s organization or a public place that was chosen by the interviewee. All the participants openly talked about the subject matter and generously shared documents whenever they were available. The interviews included a total of fourteen women’s organizations: ten well-known feminist organizations, three Kemalist women’s organizations, and one Islamist women’s organization. Feminist organizations made up the largest group to be interviewed because they were the primary figures who criticized the patriarchal order and the state’s existing gender regime with its policies and mobilized to amend those policies. The majority of activists in feminist organizations in Turkey are socialist and radical feminists. These women have constituted the foundation of the feminist movement since its start in the early 1980s.

Although the feminist groups have been the most active in networking and advocacy toward eliminating the discriminatory policies, there have been some Kemalist and Islamist women’s organizations that have also been involved in mobilizing toward this aim. Kemalist women’s organizations utilize Kemalism as their ideological convictions.
Kemalism, which is derived from Kemal in Kemal Atatürk’s name, comprises six principles: secularism, republicanism, populism, nationalism, statism, and revolutionism. Kemalist women uphold these principles and especially believe in the secular foundation of the Turkish Republic. They often criticize and mobilize against Islamist groups, including Islamist women’s groups, which infuse religion into the public domain. Unlike the feminist organizations, Kemalist women’s organizations that were part of this study did not use feminism as an identifying mark in their founding principles; however, along with the feminist organizations, they played a significant role in advocacy and networking toward changing discriminatory state policies. Even though one representative from a Kemalist organization identified herself as only Kemalist and openly rejected being called a feminist, the representatives from the other two of the Kemalist organizations used both feminism and Kemalism as identifying marks for themselves. Activists who use both identifications are known as Kemalist feminist in Turkey. Notably, the Kemalist activist who did not identify herself as a feminist was an influential figure in the efforts to eliminate discriminatory policies. Whether they identified as feminist or not, it was this involvement of women activists from some Kemalist women’s organizations in changing gender discriminatory policies that prompted me to conduct interviews with them.

Furthermore, I conducted an interview with a representative from a large Islamist women’s association, which was the primary Islamist organization that joined forces with secular feminists during part of the gender policy amendments. Islamist women’s organizations employ Islam on political grounds for their various causes, among which the elimination of the ban on the türban (Islamic head cover) in state institutions such as schools, courts, and hospitals is significant. The participant of the interview from the aforementioned organization identified herself not only as an Islamist woman, but also a feminist. Unlike secular feminists, only a small group of Islamist women identify themselves as feminists in Turkey. They are known as İslamcı feminist (Islamist feminists), and they openly identify themselves as such. Throughout the book I use the term Islamist, (to refer to İslamcı), rather than Islamic or Muslim to distinguish those who politicize Islam and use Islam in organizing from those who identify themselves as Muslim or Islamic, but do not mobilize to politicize their religion (Göle 1996). The latter population makes up the majority of Turks. The usage of the terms is significant as these terms signify divisions or linkages among women (as well as men)
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within the ideologically rich Turkish context. Appendix A includes the list of the women’s organizations from which the interview participants were contacted.

The data also included electronic as well as paper documents. For analysis, I utilized the websites of the women’s organizations that participated in this study. Among these, the websites of Uçan Süpürge (the Flying Broom) and Kadının İnsan Hakları ve Yeni Çözümler Derneği (the Women for Women’s Human Rights/New Ways) have provided valuable information on networking and advocacy efforts of feminists and other women’s groups as these two organizations have been influential in launching campaigns and bringing women’s groups together for joint political action. I have monitored the websites of the EU, the Delegation of the EU in Turkey, and the Turkish parliament for upcoming and newly enacted gender equality policies. I collected the EU’s progress reports on Turkey since 1998 and examined the previous and revised texts of the Penal Code, the Civil Code, Labor Law, and the Constitution. Furthermore, in order to find out about the media attention to gender policy changes and the efforts of women activists, I conducted archival analysis of four national newspapers. Two of these, Hürriyet and Zaman, compete with each other for the highest circulation rates. Hürriyet along with another analyzed newspaper, Radikal, falls within the secular spectrum whereas Zaman and Yeni Şafak are known to have an Islamist ideological stance. Because the media in Turkey are monopolized by a few, the press coverage was analyzed as a microcosm of the media’s general stance on the coverage of gender policies and feminist activism.

Overview of the Book

The next chapter looks at the history of the construction of EU’s gender equality policies through hard and soft laws. It views the expansion of the EU gender equality regime through the lens of the Europeanization process and explains the link between gender equality and women’s citizenship rights in the context of an enlarging EU. It regards citizenship within the framework of gender equality and treats it as a broad concept that entails full participation in political, cultural, economic, and social life. Furthermore, citizenship is seen to be a contested terrain, the meaning of which continuously changes as a result of the power struggles of multiple actors at the subnational, national, and supranational

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levels. Particularly important for the discussion of gender policy changes and reframing of women’s rights in Turkey and its implications for Turkey’s Europeanization and European membership is the expansion of the meaning of gender equality to include issues such as violence against women and women’s representation in politics, and tying these to women’s European citizenship.

Chapter 3 looks at the history of the state’s gender regime in Turkey. It locates the emergence of the gender regime in the beginning of the Tanzimat or reform era that corresponded to the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Then, moving to the Kemalist regime of the Turkish Republic, the chapter examines legal and political discourses in Turkey before the Helsinki Summit to reveal the state policies on gender under the secular Turkish Republic. The Helsinki Summit is used as an historical mark to organize this and subsequent chapters. Although the Turkish state elites were in favor of Turkey’s EU membership before 1999 because they saw it as a “natural step in Turkey’s modernization drive” (Keyman and Öniş 2004, 183), it was not until the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit, where the EU declared Turkey’s official EU candidacy, that the state began to make substantial policy amendments (Keyman and Öniş 2004). The chapter contextualizes the family-centered governing model reflected in policies that upheld the Turkish patriarchal morality. At the same time, it highlights contradictory state policies that supported the existence of a state feminism.

Chapter 4 discusses the development of women’s organized response to family-centered patriarchal policies and traces later feminist efforts toward amending discriminatory gender policies back to the beginning of the feminist movement (second wave feminism) in the early 1980s. Feminist activism directed toward amending the existing discriminatory policies is viewed as a long-term discursive struggle and located within the notion of “active citizenship.” The chapter also gives an account of other women’s groups, namely Kemalist and Islamist organizations that were politically active during the 1980s and 1990s. It discusses whether they were involved in activities against the existing gender regime and policies.

Chapter 5 uses the concepts of “Europeanization” and “conditionality” to reveal the influence of the EU, especially through the European Commission and the European Parliament, on Turkey’s inauguration of gender policy reforms. It underscores the importance of the EU’s annual progress reports as well as the reports composed by the European Par-
liament in giving the EU leverage to impact the policy decisions at the state level in Turkey. Significant changes that happened since 1999 in the Civil Code, Penal Code, Labor Law, and Constitution are evaluated within the context of Turkey’s EU membership process.

Chapter 6 explores the ways in which women activists, secular feminists primarily, were involved in gender policy amendments that came about after the Helsinki Summit. It focuses on women’s strategies from coalition building at national and transnational levels to media use and public awareness campaigns. In so doing, the chapter identifies the meanings attached to gender equality and women’s rights by the grassroots activists. The efforts of women activists are compared to the institutional efforts of the EU and the Turkish state to assess the impact that women have had in reconstructing the meaning of women’s rights and gender equality. Furthermore, the chapter examines the relationship between the attitudes of Turkish policy makers from various political and ideological backgrounds and their support for or clashes with women grassroots activists.

The concluding chapter reviews the findings and discusses the implications of the changes to the gender regime in Turkey. It answers the following questions: To what extent do the changes in the gender regime fit into gender equality and citizenship framework that these grassroots (subnational), national, and supranational political bodies envision? What are the implications for Turkey’s prospects toward an EU membership? Are there, in fact, any significant implications? What are the new targets of political activism among women activists and how do these coincide with or diverge from gender equality and citizenship agendas of the EU and the Turkish state?