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Second, and following from the idea of wisdom as a “mode of knowledge” is the contention that “wisdom becomes the best guide for what is the *summum bonum*, or ‘supreme good.’” As a kind of knowing of “the whole,” “wisdom helps the person decide what is the optimal course of action for his or her own self.” Wisdom is therefore understood to serve the function of “the foremost public virtue” in its ability to attain the good. However, the researchers remark that “the findings of modern psychology and the social sciences in general now can be seen as casting grave doubts on this ancient belief that ‘truth shall set you free.’” When demarcating wisdom as a virtue, the researchers make a valuable observation about some omissions from its body of meanings in modern understanding: “Here again, as in the case of searching for universal truth, it seems apparent . . . that modern sensibilities have completely abandoned the hope, as well as Plato’s suggestion that a compelling ethics will follow from the contemplation of Truth.” Among many ancient writers it was thought that knowledge of the good was enough to ensure good action and good behavior; it was thought that nobody knowingly chooses to do anything bad; we only act to achieve bad ends out of ignorance—thinking either that what we are doing is really good when it is in fact bad, or else ranking the good that we achieve by our actions as a higher good than it is in reality. This basic view is several times discussed in Plato’s dialogues; it is also at the heart of Hindu Samkhya philosophy in its emphasis on liberating the self from suffering through insight; and again, it is present in Nagarjuna’s Madhyamika philosophy