

Chapter 1

Congress and Diaspora Politics

The Influence of Ethnic and Foreign Lobbying

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The Obama administration's push to approve a nuclear accord with Iran in 2015 captured the attention of many Americans, especially those of Jewish descent, not just because of its potential security implications for Israel, but because of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's (AIPAC) inability to corral lawmakers on both sides of the aisle to produce their desired policy result. The lobbying powerhouse, which some argue has undue influence over Congress,¹ was offset by J Street, a liberal lobbying group that advocated support of the nuclear deal.² The opposing sides waged dueling campaigns to persuade undecided lawmakers that they best represented the concerns and views of pro-Israel voters.³ AIPAC spent tens of millions of dollars in television and social media advertisements against the deal, mobilized grassroots opposition rallies, steered activists to meetings and town-hall gatherings with lawmakers around the country, formed a tax-exempt group—consisting in part of former lawmakers—to educate people about the “dangers” of the deal, and led two congressional trips—one with Democrats, the other with Republicans—to Israel during the sixty-day period in which Congress had to consider the agreement.⁴ In turn, J Street executed its own multi-million-dollar media blitz, as well as deployed former military officials and diplomats to Capitol Hill to assuage those members of Congress, particularly Democrats, who feared a backlash from Jewish voters and donors for supporting the deal.⁵

*The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and not the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other entity of the U.S. government.

While few political observers see AIPAC's failure to block the nuclear deal with Iran as an end to its political sway on Capitol Hill, the setback does represent an important and emerging trend, as different ethnic lobbies have been able to argue that their positions are part of the American national interest. Historically, some ethnic groups have exercised more influence in Congress than others, especially those with large blocks of unified voters.⁶ Yet success is no longer limited to just a few. The number of ethnic groups now lobbying the U.S. government has increased significantly in recent years, as has the political skill and electoral clout of those groups. Indeed, the importance and power of diaspora politics has never been greater. Whereas ten years ago, for example, Armenia was of little concern to most members of Congress, today the Armenian-American lobby is one of the most active ethnic lobbies on the Hill, a power that stems from the heavy concentration of Armenian Americans in states like California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York.⁷ Working with key lawmakers and the ninety-five-member Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues, they have successfully lobbied for a steady stream of foreign aid to Armenia,⁸ although they have fallen short of their goal of getting the United States to formally recognize what they refer to as the "Armenian genocide." Likewise, the emergence of black ethnic Congressional Member Organizations (CMOs), such as the Congressional African Immigrant and Diaspora Caucus and the Congressional Ethiopian-American Caucus, have provided African immigrant communities with a legislative voice in ways they have not seen before.⁹

Foreign governments also are increasingly relying upon hired lobbyists—often former lawmakers and their staff—rather than just their diplomats to promote their policies with members of Congress and officials of the executive branch.¹⁰ This practice is nothing new to Washington, DC, however. Starting in the 1970s, many nations began to work directly with Congress by having their ambassadors and other representatives meet directly with members of the House and Senate to advocate for policy alternatives important to their home countries. Of course, many of these meetings were arranged by American lobbyists paid by those foreign governments. In addition, countries well-known to Americans including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom had begun to spend large sums on lobbyists by the 1990s. Other countries even closer to home—Canada and Mexico—spent millions to lobby on U.S.–Canadian Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement, respectively. These practices have only been expanded in recent years. Millions of dollars are spent each year on hired guns. In 2015 alone, Saudi Arabia hired eight different American lobbying firms and spent more than \$9.4 million in

an effort to block legislation that some said could potentially expose the Arab kingdom to litigation over the 9/11 terrorist attacks.¹¹ According to OpenSecrets.Org, from 1955 to May 2017, Saudi Arabia paid millions of dollars annually to 1,281 top lobbying organizations, recently including Hogan & Hartson, Podesta Group, Squire Patton Boggs, Glover Park Group, and Hill & Knowlton. Even nations that do not have strong diplomatic ties with the United States are looking for outside help.¹² As an example, several Washington, DC lobbyists were paid more than \$500,000 in 2014 to counsel the small, West African nation of Gabon on a potential bilateral investment treaty between it and the United States.¹³ Foreign government lobbying became front-page news in early to mid-2017 during the controversy over Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Amid several investigations (by congressional committees, a special prosecutor in the Department of Justice, journalists, and others) into the matter, the activities of some Russian lobbyists were brought to the fore. In particular, the activities of Rinat Akhmetshin, a Russian-American lobbyist, and his partner Robert Arakelian were reported. Lobbying reports showed the pair's work on behalf of The Human Rights Accountability Global Initiative Foundation totaled roughly \$50,000. Akhmetshin and Arakelian "reported lobbying on adoption issues related to the Magnitsky Act, a U.S. law reviled by Vladimir Putin that sanctioned Russia for human rights abuses in the death of a Russian whistleblower named Sergei Magnitsky."¹⁴

Congress first regulated lobbyists for foreign governments in 1938 with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) in an effort to curb growing Nazi influence within the United States. FARA, however, has evolved over time. The first focus after World War II was communism and secret agents inside the United States. In the mid-1960s, FARA was amended to move away from hidden agendas and toward agendas that were arguably more transparent—those of governments more friendly to the United States who would try to influence U.S. policy. An additional evolution was the addition of provisions that call for the criminal prosecution of foreign agents who make campaign contributions to federal candidates in the U.S. Today, any foreign agent who lobbies and conducts political activity on behalf of a foreign government must register with the Department of Justice, detailing the extent of their relationship with the foreign nation, how much they are paid, etc. Even so, FARA has seen relatively weak enforcement and few prosecutions. However, FARA in general and its criminal provisions in particular came into greater focus during the first months of Donald J. Trump's presidency with investigations, indictments and guilty pleas surrounding accusations made against the 2016 Trump campaign. In December 2016, a bipartisan group of members of Congress

introduced legislation to strengthen FARA, to ensure that the American public knows who is trying to influence their policy.¹⁵

The lobbying efforts of ethnic groups, particularly ethno-national diaspora, at times combine with and promote the interest of a homeland government, especially in the area of U.S. foreign policy.¹⁶ An increasingly professional and well-funded Indian diaspora, for instance, lobbies on issues of concern to the nation of India.¹⁷ In 2008, working both through the U.S. India Political Action Committee (USINPAC), the most influential Indian-American lobby, and through lobbying firms retained by the Indian government, Indian Americans helped shepherd through Congress the India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Agreement.¹⁸ Taking a page from AIPAC's lobbying playbook, USINPAC created a strong foundation for its organizational strength by starting a national outreach program that coalesced different viewpoints within the Indian-American community, particularly those in politically influential states such as California, New York, Texas, and Illinois.¹⁹ It also initiated a youth committee to "perpetuate the new vision of Indian-American leadership, and starting a national outreach program to bring together different Indian-American viewpoints."²⁰ It built a large funding base by soliciting donations from its members, and encouraged them to write letters to lawmakers urging them to support the deal. A tracking system was designed to closely monitor lawmakers' sentiment toward the nuclear agreement. This, in turn, informed campaign contributions to key lawmakers who represented areas with significant Indian-American populations.²¹ USINPAC framed its message in a way most likely to obtain congressional approval by linking the agreement to other goals in U.S. policy related to India. Through issue briefs to members of Congress and staff, office visits, and receptions it framed the deal in terms of economic and environmental goals as well as trade potential in the civilian nuclear sector.²² When progress on the deal stalled in India, USINPAC met with senior leaders in the Indian legislature to understand their differing perspectives on the issue.

At other times a diaspora's interests might diverge from its home government.²³ This sort of cleavage was on display in 2006 when Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although Congress had no direct role in the country's accession to the WTO, as with other communist countries, U.S. trade relations with Vietnam were subject to the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment. As such, Congress needed to enact legislation to grant permanent normal trade relations (PNTR)²⁴ status to Vietnam if the United States was to benefit fully from the terms of its WTO membership. The Vietnamese embassy in the United States retained three different Washington, DC lobbying firms to help obtain a clean (i.e.,

free of amendments), stand-alone bill extending PNTR for Vietnam by conducting various meetings with congressional members and staffers.²⁵

Lawmakers whose constituencies had large diasporic communities of Vietnamese, however, opposed granting PNTR status to Vietnam on the basis of poor human rights and religious freedom conditions in Vietnam. “Just two months ago, the Vietnamese government arrested my constituent, a U.S. citizen, Cong Thanh Do,” declared Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA). “Mr. Do had posted comments on the Internet while at home in San Jose, California advocating that Vietnam undergo a peaceful transition to a multiparty democracy. For exercising his U.S. Constitutional right of free speech, the Vietnamese arrested him and held him in prison for 38 days in Vietnam without charges.”²⁶ Lofgren further stated: “Other U.S. citizens have been imprisoned in Vietnam for what appear to be political reasons, including the sister of another one of my constituents, Thuong Nguyen “Cuc” Foshee.²⁷ Similarly, Representative Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), a member of the pro-trade New Democrat Coalition CMO, but whose district includes Little Saigon, home to approximately 10 percent of the entire Vietnamese-American population, voiced opposition to normalizing trade relations with Vietnam without “mandating essential human rights protections.”²⁸

To the surprise of House leadership, congressional opposition stymied its initial attempt to expeditiously consider PNTR as a stand-alone measure under Suspension of the Rules.²⁹ The measure had majority support, 228 to 161, but it failed to muster the two-thirds needed to pass under the suspension procedure. Leadership subsequently had to fold PNTR into a larger measure, invoke marshal law, and bring it to the floor under a closed rule, with no opportunity for amendments.³⁰

In another example, at the start of the new Obama administration, Afghanistan increased the amount it paid lobbyists by more than 205 percent compared to previous years during the Bush administration.³¹ It also spent \$324,000 and retained five different lobbying firms in the first half of 2015 to persuade President Obama and Congress to delay the planned troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.³²

This volume addresses several themes related to the topic, including the strategies and tactics employed by ethnic groups in the United States and foreign nations abroad, a range of issues—in both domestic and foreign policy—that are of interest to foreign governments and ethnic groups in the United States, and the successes (and failures) of these efforts. Before turning to more details on the volume, we examine ethnicity and lobbying in a broader context. These examples of only a few recent instances raise questions about the general practice of lobbying by different ethnic

groups and foreign nations who have interests being considered by the U.S. government, and Congress in particular.

Ethnicity and Lobbying

Ethnicity, as an agent of change on Capitol Hill, is afforded an underappreciated role in the study of Congress. Moreover, the importance of lobbying is either derided³³ or given relative little attention compared to other topical areas, such as congressional elections, partisanship and polarization, and members' voting patterns, to name just a few. Yet lobbying is an invaluable and constitutionally protected right found in the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the . . . right of the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances." And growing ethnic populations and their political goals are shaping the congressional landscape through sophisticated lobbying campaigns that include direct lobbying, grassroots and "grasstops" mobilization, advertising, social media, coalition building, survey research, supporting think tanks, involvement in election campaigns and other advocacy tactics.³⁴

While an exhaustive review of literature on ethnicity and lobbying is beyond the scope of this book, providing some context of how these two topics come together is important.

Scholarly examination of these combined topics has been arguably inconsistent over time. Studies of ethnicity and lobbying or ethnicity and foreign policy more generally have not been as numerous as other topics covered in political science. There are, however, some noteworthy aspects to the study of ethnicity and lobbying. First, this is not a new field of inquiry. Scholars were examining the impact of ethnicity and lobbying as early as the 1950s and 1960s.³⁵ However, the bulk of the work has been more recent. Even with this more recent work, much of it is dated given how politics and policy have changed generally in the United States, how Congress has evolved in its consideration of policy alternatives, and how issues confronting the United States—and the world, for that matter—have developed over time. For instance, early works on immigration policy in the United States³⁶ are helpful to understand where policies have come from but are focused on decades-old political contexts. Additionally, even though those that are more up-to-date have come to include arguments on what immigration means for America's political identity and its public policy choices, including its foreign policy, that are outdated given more recent political dynamics that have appeared in the United States.³⁷ In

short, an updated examination of some of the most current and pressing issues in American politics affected by ethnicity is needed.

Another characteristic of much of the literature at the intersection of ethnicity and lobbying is that it is segmented. For instance, much work has been done on the impact of ethnicity or ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy in particular.³⁸ However, other areas of policy also merit study and attention. There are also excellent volumes full of case studies that pick up on themes explored in this volume.³⁹ Some studies focus on the impact of ethnicity on member behavior, but these are typically part of a larger study on Congress and are inconclusive about the impact of ethnicity on member behavior.⁴⁰

Few scholarly works exist that center directly on ethnic lobbying and fewer still focus specifically on Congress, as we do here.⁴¹ However, as Lindsay and Ripley have noted previously when suggesting future research directions in the area of ethnic lobbying and Congress:

We know a reasonable amount about the impact of interest groups in U.S. politics. But we know least about interest group influence on foreign and defense policy. Part of the problem lies in the diversity of groups lobbying on foreign policy issues. Some lobbying efforts, most notably those involving defense contracting and trade policy, involve the same politics that surround domestic distributive policy, a domain that has received ample scholarly attention. Others, however, look quite different. Numerous groups are organized around ethnic ties (e.g., the Jewish lobby or the Greek lobby) or specific policy issues that are not primarily economic in content (e.g., arms control or U.S. relations with individual countries in Central America). Ethnic and policy lobbies also differ from each other: most ethnic lobbies are well institutionalized and wealthy, while policy lobbies (especially on the left) often are not.⁴²

Many of these same observations can be made today. In addition, Lindsay and Ripley's description of the work on ethnic lobbying being anecdotal also still holds today. Their important work that describes some possible future research in the area identifies several areas that we hope are somewhat addressed in this volume. For instance, Lindsay and Ripley suggest studying the tactics groups use in their attempts to influence members of Congress. In addition, they urge scholars to study the conditions under which lobbies succeed or fail when it comes to influencing U.S. foreign policy.

DeWind and Segura adeptly showcase the policy convergence/divergence between the U.S. government and different diaspora in shaping of foreign policy.⁴³ There are two basic analytical approaches to understanding this dynamic predominate, they argue. One sees policy convergence “as a result of diaspora and government representatives’ identification of overlaps between what seem to be essentially objective, preexisting national and group interests and goals.” The other views convergence and divergence “as the result of a shaping of national interests in the give-and-take of democratic processes, including lobbying, and sees them as involving compromises and/or the predominance of one side over the other.”⁴⁴ Through their collection of essays they conclude that “the influence of diaspora and the U.S. government on one another in shaping foreign policy increases when convergent interests and goals become recognized, whether these are preexisting or constructed, and decreases when interests and goals are seen to be divergent.”⁴⁵

And in their comprehensive study, Paul and Paul skillfully shed light on the influence of ethnic lobbies and U.S. foreign policy by examining what factors attribute to their success and why.⁴⁶ As with other domestic interest groups, ethnic lobbies confront the same obstacles on Capitol Hill. Their strategies therefore may include *direct* lobbying methods, such as information or electoral support in terms of votes and/or campaign contributions, or *indirect* efforts such as grassroots lobbying, coalition building, advertising, social media, and monitoring of legislative activity.⁴⁷ Paul and Paul further compare the influence of ethnic lobbies against other actors, including business groups, the media, and foreign lobbyists. Larger ethnic groups, such as the Jewish or Israeli and Cuban lobbies, for instance, are able to affect the course of U.S. foreign policy relative to smaller ethnic groups because they are well organized and better positioned to identify members of their ethnic community across congressional districts to wage grassroots lobbying campaigns.⁴⁸

This volume is at the confluence of two important areas of study: ethnicity and lobbying. We intend to help further bridge this gap, thereby contributing to the dearth of research on the subject by exploring and analyzing not just the effectiveness of various ethnic and foreign interest lobbies, but to better understand how these very important constituencies attempt to persuade Congress. Where other studies on ethnic lobbying confine their focus primarily to foreign and trade policy, or frame their theoretical discourse through the interest group literature, our goal is to enhance the understanding of ethnic and foreign lobbying in the legislative arena and to enrich the literature on Congress. This is done in several ways. First, various case studies examine interest groups that form around

a particular ethnic community, including Muslim Americans and Cuban Americans. Second, policy areas with domestic implications are addressed. Third, the focal point throughout the collection of essays is Congress and the lobbying efforts—including strategies and tactics employed—of both ethnic groups and foreign governments. Lobbying can and is commonly done by nations that have interests in policy outcomes, and this dynamic is examined through different policies that are lobbied. Finally, the volume features cases in which a diaspora and its home government were intractably juxtaposed to one another on an issue, highlighting an age-old dilemma of representation—legislating between local interests and national needs.

The chapters that follow cover a wide-ranging number of issues and parts of the world. This is by design. The number of issues that can be lobbied either by ethnic groups in the United States or foreign governments is vast. So, too, are the number of groups and nations that are interested in trying to influence U.S. policy. The chapters are essentially case studies of either ethnic groups in the United States or foreign nations and their efforts to influence an area of U.S. policy. Issues range from those related to immigration, trade, defense, foreign policy generally, and others. Different areas of the world are well represented, including Latin America, the Middle East, the Far East, and Europe. While no one volume can cover every issue or all parts of the globe, this volume begins to fill gaps in the literature and address many parts of the world and interests of the peoples from those areas.

Themes and Structure of Volume

The chapters that follow are a collection of essays that connect in myriad ways to the topic of ethnic and foreign lobbying in Congress. The volume begins with some foundational information, first from two different perspectives on questions such as who, what, where, when, and how ethnic groups and foreign interests lobby in the United States. Following this introductory material, chapters on specific lobbying efforts by specific interests are considered. However, we also add a practitioner perspective with chapters from those who have worked on both sides of the lobbying equation—A View from K Street (the lobbying side) and A View from the Hill (the government side). Additionally, we include chapters on nations, interests, and ethnicities from across the globe. Chapters that address interests and nations from the conflict in the Middle East are the first to be considered. It is natural to include back-to-back chapters on Israel and Jewish Americans, and Muslim Americans. After those chapters,

however, comes a chapter focused on issues related to another nation close to the region: Turkey. Questions centering on Hispanic Americans are also grouped with chapters on Mexico and Cuba. Finally, a chapter on a less-familiar, but sometimes-powerful, group of Americans—Asian Americans, and specifically Vietnamese Americans—is provided.

Some shared themes appear across chapters. These include how domestic ethnic groups, foreign governments, and other interests employ strategies, tactics, and resources to influence policymaking. Also covered are challenges lawmakers face when diaspora interests collide and intersect with national interests. Finally, we include chapters that illustrate how and where foreign interests affect the legislative process.

As noted above, foreign governments spend millions each year to influence opinions and policy on a range of issues, such as military and economic aid, bilateral relations, trade development, immigration, public relations, and tourism. This is done informally through personal meetings and foreign-sponsored travel, and more formally through legislation, floor statements, and CMOs concerned with improving relations with another country or region of the world. In the 114th Congress (2015–2017) alone, for instance, seventy-three House congressional caucuses—nearly one quarter—were country-specific. Lobbying efforts may be narrowly focused, such as when the embassy of Ecuador hired a Washington, DC-based lobbying firm for \$300,000 to help counter growing congressional criticism against the South American country for refusing to rule out asylum for Edward Snowden, the computer programmer who copied and leaked classified information from the National Security Agency in 2013.⁴⁹ Or they may be part of a country's broader attempt to gain long-term influence in Washington, DC. As an example, Algeria spent slightly more than \$86,000 in 2006 for strategic advice on ways to support "legitimate interest and policy goals." It then paid the same lobbying shop another \$150,000 to assist coordinating meetings with members of Congress to discuss trade and foreign policy affecting Algeria, as well as facilitating the creation of an "Algerian Caucus" of those members with special interest in the North African country. Since then, the same lobbying outfit has received more than \$400,000 a year from Algeria to maintain access to policymakers and congressional staff to promote Algerian-U.S. relations and respect for human rights.⁵⁰

Chuck Cushman leads off the volume by addressing three key questions that help provide foundational information for questions addressed in later chapters. First, what can foreign governments legally do to shape American policy decisions? Second, which nations make the main efforts at influencing Congress, and why? And, third, how do they do it—who meets whom, and how do they target their lobbying efforts? These fun-

damental questions are examined through the lens of how defense and foreign policy issues generally are lobbied by foreign governments on Capitol Hill.

Patrick Griffin and William Danvers also provide an examination of fundamental questions but do so in an analysis derived from their many years of experience on K Street and in government in both the legislative and the executive branches. They examine the players and issues central to many lobbying campaigns foreign interests, including governments, corporations, and non-government organizations. As Griffin and Danvers contend, the practice of lobbying on behalf of international interests and issues has similarities to more traditional domestic lobbying. It is about getting the facts to the right people on Capitol Hill or in the executive branch at the appropriate time and in the right context. Successful lobbying campaigns by international interests, as is also true of domestic lobbying, requires crafting message-tested arguments, constructing winning coalitions with like-minded stakeholders, and employing communications outreach efforts, both in Washington, DC and beyond.

As noted above, this volume includes chapters on traditionally ethnically based lobbies and how they have used their resources (including wealth, influence, votes on Election Day, and political connections with key members) to advocate for their agendas. The first two chapters that strike this chord come next, focusing on an oft-studied part of the world: the Middle East. The effectiveness of Jewish efforts in advocating pro-Israel foreign policy positions on both sides of the partisan aisle is frequently viewed as a textbook example of how particular ethnic groups successfully influence lawmakers. AIPAC, for instance, coordinates Jewish lobbying activities on virtually all issues related to Israel and vigorously supports sympathetic legislators as well as backs challengers of unfriendly incumbents. In short, they have been a lobbying juggernaut in previous years. To this end, Kirk Beattie examines various approaches used by Jewish-American individuals, lobbyists, and interest groups to influence Capitol Hill and the legislative process. Techniques involved include the use of campaign finance donations throughout the electoral process, direct and indirect contacts with members of Congress, provision of information, talking points, policy preferences, drafts of legislation, encouragement and threats, as well as the application of pressure to determine memberships of important committees and subcommittees, the selection of “expert witnesses” for briefings and hearings. There is great diversity of positions and approaches adopted by a large number of predominantly Jewish-American groups, Beattie argues. These groups, of course, vary tremendously in their resources, staff sizes, and experience. The chapter

also assesses which groups are described as most successful, and why, in the eyes of congressional staffers.

Khalil Mousa Marrar examines the impact of the Arab Spring turned Winter on Arab- and Muslim-American interest groups and the concomitant interaction between them and U.S. policy toward the Middle East and North Africa. It does so through a series of related questions: How did Arab- and Muslim-American organizations see the Arab Spring and the U.S. reaction to it as relevant to their larger agenda? How did they attempt to influence members of Congress by entering into the discourse about the Arab Revolts? In what way did the Arab revolts figure into the activities of Arab and Muslim groups on Capitol Hill and elsewhere? And how did U.S. diplomatic, economic, military, and political actions toward the revolts in the Middle East and North Africa influence Arab and Muslim lobbying efforts? Marrar addresses these questions by examining the positions toward the Arab Spring of the following organizations: the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), the Arab American Institute (AAI), the American Task Force on Palestine (ATFP), and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). While all of these organizations supported the aspirations underlying the Arab Spring in some manner, their lobbying on and off Capitol Hill varied across different revolts, their consequences, and American policy reactions to both. They were also forced to adapt to the rapid evolution of U.S. national interests in the broader region as mass protests gave way to Islamist violence, embodied by ISIS and other terror militias.

The book continues with a chapter centered on the lobbying efforts over another longstanding debate and disagreement that is not far in geographic terms from those covered in the previous two chapters. Julien Zarifian examines the political struggle between Armenian Americans and Turkey—their strategies, their successes, and their failures, over the course of these past few decades—to get Congress to recognize the Armenian massacres of 1915 to 1917, perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire, as genocide. His chapter begins with background on the state of the Armenian genocide recognition in the United States, discussing which national institutions and political figures have recognized the Armenian genocide and which have not. It then turns to the U.S.-Armenian lobby and its activism and the (non-)progress of the genocide recognition by the United States. It concludes with an analysis of how Turkey lobbies Congress and interacts with the executive branch to incite it to pressure the legislative one, evaluating its successes and failures.

The volume then moves across the globe and examines lobbying efforts affecting Hispanic Americans. Walter Clark Wilson and William

Curtis Ellis explore the increasingly interwoven histories of U.S.-Mexico policies on immigration and trade. Drawing on archival research and first-hand accounts from policymakers and lobbyists, their analysis illustrates the complex interests that determine whether Mexico assists or opposes the initiatives of Latino advocacy organizations, and reveals the extent to which cooperation between Mexican-American interests and those of Mexico often ends, and conflict begins, at the border.

Next, Patrick J. Haney analyzes the dynamics between Congress and the executive branch over the end of the Cuban Embargo. Similar to the Jewish-American community and AIPAC, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and its Free Cuba PAC regularly flexed its muscles in American foreign policy toward Cuba by getting Congress to pass restricting legislation in the area of trade. After a brief recap of the working parts of the embargo from the 1980s and the emergence of the Cuban American National Foundation, he focuses attention on Congress: its rise in embargo politics in the 1990s, particularly in the Cuban Democracy Act and Helms-Burton, the way Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush fought back to retain control over policy, and into the Obama era. Ultimately, a fast-evolving Cuban-American community that was also rapidly receding in political clout; shifting national opinion on the embargo; a divided Republican Party on the issue; and a second-term president not beholden to the embargo brought the embargo into question—something not seriously considered beforehand.

Yet Congress still has a key role to play thanks to its efforts in the 1990s to codify the embargo into law.

The final chapter examines a small but sometimes influential group in the United States—Vietnamese Americans. Christian Collet's chapter discusses the conflict between Vietnamese Americans and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRVN) in contemporary Washington, DC. It begins by considering the transformation of Vietnamese Americans as a group and voting bloc and explains how issues related to Vietnam have been a core element of their political identity across two generations in U.S. society. It then moves to a discussion of a parallel transformation in the SRVN. The strategy and tactics of both sides are considered and compared. The chapter then includes the results of an empirical analysis of Vietnam-related legislation in Congress and an evaluation of the effects of Vietnamese Americans and partisanship on legislative action. It concludes with an evaluation of "who's winning" in the conflict, explaining that while Vietnamese Americans have had considerable success in winning advocates and attention for human rights issues in Congress via the democratic process, they have struggled to exert any strength among

Washington, DC's foreign policy elite to disrupt the momentum toward closer trade and diplomatic relations with the SRVN.

The volume concludes with another practitioner perspective. A long-time Hill staffer, Gregory C. McCarthy, indicates that the influence of ethnic lobbies, particularly in foreign policy, crosses both sides of the political aisle and is often unpredictable in its political effect. From his congressional perspective, several examples over the last two decades demonstrate how ethnic lobbies are received by their target audience, which is frequently through former lawmakers, constituent mobilization, and issue interest. Despite the potential liability of objectionable characteristics or political embarrassment, he argues, members generally subject themselves to ethnic lobbies, most of which are supportive allies, others less obviously so.

Members of Congress are regularly pulled in many directions. One of the great tensions in representative government is the relationship between the legislator, who might be hearing from his or her party leaders about a critical vote, and the representative, who might be hearing a different message from his or her constituency. Although individual legislators do not necessarily mirror their constituents in terms of demographic characteristics, the electoral process yields many who favor local views and prejudices, including those who live in their district or state who do not share the member's ethnic background. Members also serve the nation, however, and are expected to keep the national interest in mind when legislating. Yet they frequently are influenced by local attitudes, even when those attitudes conflict with the national interest. The result is a constant tension between the demands of representation and those of legislating. The former requires advocacy. The latter requires accommodation of differing views and interests. These cross-pressures can be difficult for members to balance when they are centered on a domestic issue. The tension can become greater when it involves an issue that influences foreign policy or is centered on a foreign government or interest. Our hope is that the chapters in this volume help to shed light on some of the central issues surrounding this tension, where they stem from, how they are manifested in lobbying efforts, and how the actors on both sides of the issue handle them.

Notes

1. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby," *London Review of Books* 28(6) (March 23, 2006): 3–12.

2. The founders of J Street formed the group to counter, in their view, the influence by neoconservatives and evangelical Christians on U.S. policy toward Israel. See Michael Abramowitz, "Jewish Liberals to Launch a Counterpoint to AIPAC; Political Funds, Lobbying to Promote Arab-Israeli Peace Deal," *Washington Post*, April 15, 2008, A13.

3. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Pro-Israel Group Creates Plan to Lobby Against Iran Deal," *New York Times*, July 18, 2015, A3; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Fierce Lobbying, Even on Vacation, for Iran Accord," *New York Times*, August 18, 2015, A10.

4. Karoun Demirjian and Carol Morello, "How AIPAC lost the Iran deal fight," *Washington Post*, September 3, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/09/03/how-aipac-lost-the-iran-deal-fight/>; Scott Wong, "Lawmakers to meet with Netanyahu in Israel," *The Hill*, July 28, 2015, <http://thehill.com/homenews/house/249497-lawmakers-to-meet-with-netanyahu-in-israel>

5. Alexander Bolton, "Nuke deal strains relations with big Jewish donors," *The Hill*, November 26, 2013, 1.

6. Patrick J. Harvey and Walt Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation," *International Studies Quarterly* 17 (Dec., 2002): 343; John F. Stack, Jr., and Colton C. Campbell, "Congress: How Silent a Partner?" in *Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy*, ed. Colton C. Campbell, Nicol C. Rae, and John F. Stack, Jr. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 22–43; David King and Miles Pomper, "The U.S. Congress and the Contingent Influence of Diaspora Lobbies: Lessons from U.S. Policy Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan," *Journal of Armenian Studies* 8(1) (Summer, 2004).

7. John Newhouse, "Diplomacy Inc.," *Foreign Affairs* 88(3) (May/June, 2008): 10; Stack, Jr., and Campbell, "Congress: How Silent a Partner?" 37–40.

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13. Data derived from U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938* (Washington, DC: 2014).

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24. By authorizing PNTR status, formerly known as “most favored nation” status, the United States agrees not to discriminate trade arrangements between trading partners.

25. *Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the six months ending December 31, 2006*, p. 242, United States Department of Justice, <https://www.fara.gov/reports/December31-2006.pdf>, accessed August 5, 2006.

26. Representative Lofgren, speaking on legislation to extend PNTR status to Vietnam, 109th Congress, 2nd session, *Congressional Record* 152, pt. 17: 21844.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Representative Sanchez, speaking on legislation to extend PNTR status to Vietnam, 109th Congress, 2nd session, *Congressional Record* 152, pt. 17: 21843.

29. Marshal Law bypasses the procedural requirement to wait a day after the Rules Committee passes a special rule establishing floor debate parameters before voting on a piece of legislation after it has been reported out of committee.

30. Suspension of the Rules is a procedure the House uses to expeditiously consider legislation—routinely non-controversial and non-complicated measures.

31. Percentage increase calculated by authors. See *Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the six months ending June 30, 2009 and December 31, 2009*, <https://www.fara.gov/annualrpts.html>.

32. *Ibid.* See *Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the six months ending June 30, 2015*.

33. Tal Kopan, “Poll: Lobbyists rank last on ethics,” *Politico*, December 16, 2013, <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/lobbyists-ethics-gallup-poll-101187>

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