Introduction

Social and Political Reconciliation

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We open the newspaper, watch and listen to the news, or follow social media, and we are inundated with reports on old and fresh conflict zones around the world. And yet, less apparent in political rhetoric and public awareness are the many attempts at bringing together conflicting and warring parties through various large- and small-scale reconciliatory efforts.

The question of how to redress wrongdoings and work toward reconciliation between former adversaries is as enduring as the observation that human history has been marred by violent conflicts that have left scores of individuals and communities harmed and traumatized. Reconciliation is both an idea and a practice that seeks individual and collective healing in situations where seemingly irreparable harm has left people in broken relationships characterized by fear, mistrust, and anger. While proponents of forms of reconciliation differ in their understanding of the term, the questions in post-conflict situations remain the same: Can enmity be replaced by amity? Can the seemingly “unforgivable” be transformed into peaceful coexistence? Is reconciliation desirable? Is it possible? What intellectual resources and practical experiences do different communities provide to stitch together a ripped and stained social fabric?

In the broad terms of social repair, the concept of reconciliation shifts the focus away from asking either about how to prevent atrocities from
occurring or whether to intervene militarily and politically in conflict zones. Rather than being primarily a means of prevention or intervention, reconciliation can be seen as an issue of “postvention.” It refers to efforts of bringing together communities and societies ripped apart by violent conflict, of establishing conditions for coexistence, of social healing, and of overcoming fear and mistrust on collective and individual levels. Insofar as postvention efforts can contribute to preventing recurring cycles of violence, the lines between pre-conflict and post-conflict cannot be clearly drawn.

Reconciliation is of seminal importance in today’s world, since we need to find pathways of living together in communities and societies in the aftermath of violence. Recent studies in memory and trauma point to the long-lasting effects of unhealed wounds from the past. If left unattended, they fester and become a source of renewed outbreaks of violent conflicts.

This volume on Reconciliation in Global Context: Why It Is Needed and How It Works argues for the merit of reconciliation and for the need for global conversations around this topic. The various contributors describe and analyze examples of “reconciliatory practices” in different national and political environments.

As a team of scholars and scholar-practitioners from the United States, South Africa, Ireland, Israel, Zimbabwe, Germany, Palestine, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Switzerland, and The Netherlands, we bring expertise from different academic disciplines to this topic. All of us are keenly aware of the long-term effects of diverse forms of political violence, whether it concerns the Holocaust as a paradigmatic example of genocidal violence or the repercussions of European colonialism in Africa; the racism of Apartheid systems or the breakdown of the authority of nation-states; interreligious and interethnic conflicts or political conditions of ideological entrenchment. Each of the countries represented in this volume addresses a different set of past and present conflicts; what connects them are examples of where and when reconciliation “happens.”

Reconciliation as a Concept

The term reconciliation itself has strong religious connotations, but it is employed today also in international debates about transitional and restorative justice. It did not enter into the philosophical vocabulary until late in the twentieth century, though the Western philosophical and political traditions have certainly discussed concepts related to reconciliation (such
Arguments have been put forth that query the assumption that reconciliation is a moral good in and of itself. For example, one trajectory of the Aristotelian tradition—among whom one can count Adam Smith (1854/2000), Margaret Walker (2006), and Thomas Brudholm (2008)—is to value anger as an appropriate response to injury and injustice. In this view, (legal) retribution and (emotional) resentment—rather than reconciliation and forgiveness—are seen as ethically appropriate and politically effective ways to ensure moral and social repair.

In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the international community and civic initiatives have called for greater accountability toward crimes and awareness of the legacy of traumatic memories. Although retributive justice based on the idea of punishment is still a strong international mechanism to seek legal redress, reconciliation is a different way of thinking about the needs of communities in which people have experienced acts of mass violence. The concept of reconciliation can be approached politically, as an issue of coexistence and interdependence; psychologically, as an issue of social affect within interpersonal relations and intersubjectivity; judicially, as an issue of restorative justice and rehabilitation; philosophically, as an issue of resentment and forgivability; and religiously, as an issue of healing, mercy, and atonement. In this volume, the contributors pay attention to these levels of inquiry, asking whether reconciliation is necessary, under what conditions it might thrive, how it works, and where its limits are.

In the last decades, the political dimension of reconciliation has become more prominent because of the work of various national truth commissions. Given that reconciliation has entered the vocabulary in international and interstate relations, we can ask whether reconciliation should become a tool in the power of the state, or, to the contrary, whether it should be put into the hands of individual agents. Likewise, we can ask whether deeds of radical evil are unforgivable (as argued by German-Jewish political philosopher Hannah Arendt [1989]) or whether we need to advance a transformative vision of personal and political reconciliation, as South African archbishop Desmond Tutu has suggested (Tutu 1999; also Minow 1998).

Among the key terms in the study of reconciliation are trust, forgiveness, truth, justice, trauma, empathy, societal healing, rehabilitation, conflict management, and transformation. Advocates of reconciliation emphasize that reconciliation is not a static concept but an active dynamic that propels former adversaries into newly defined relationships. We therefore suggest
speaking of “reconciliatory practices” or “reconciliatory processes” to indicate the open-endedness of the work that needs to be done. Rather than being prescriptive of a particular goal, reconciliation is a commitment to a specific posture of thinking and acting. In this sense, reconciliation might be best understood as a core phenomenon of human interaction that is future-oriented, constructive, and empathetic and that transcends the limitation of self-interested action by moving toward an other-directed care.

A Polysemic Phenomenon

The contributions to this volume are embedded in the enduring question of how to make life viable in communities and societies in the aftermath of political mass violence and atrocities. Reconciliation—as an ethical concept, a moral good, and a social and political practice—is one promising possibility to counteract the damaging long-term effects left in the wake of such violence. Reconciliation might be difficult to implement, and yet it is needed in communities that have been literally and symbolically disfigured by widespread injustices and violence-induced harm.

As a concept and phenomenon, reconciliation is polysemic: it cannot be contained in or reduced to a single meaning. This becomes apparent when we look, for example, at the multiple ways through which we can organize our understanding of reconciliation: Do we approach it as a phenomenon that is personal or political? Social or intrapsychic? Institutional or attitudinal? Relational or structural? Interpersonal or communal? Do we pursue a bottom-up or top-down approach when implementing reconciliation? Do we focus on individual transformation or social change? Do we invest in national efforts, legal paths of transformative justice, philosophical inquiry, or quasi-therapeutic settings?

Valerie Rosoux, in an entry on reconciliation as part of peace-building processes, distinguishes between three approaches: “structural, social-psychological and spiritual” (2008, 544). Whereas the first (structural) focuses on fixing political, economic, cultural, and security problems in order to establish cooperation and coexistence between the affected parties, the latter two prioritize the improvement of relationships between parties. According to Rosoux, the social-psychological approach emphasizes “cognitive and emotional aspects” in order to affect attitudinal and motivational changes, whereas the spiritual approach emphasizes “collective healing and forgiveness.” The social-psychological approach aims at
“forging a new relationship,” the spiritual approach at “restoring a broken relationship” (ibid., 545; emphasis in original).

Rosoux’s suggestion to differentiate between “restoring” relationships and “forging new” relationships may not be fully persuasive, but her point of distinguishing between structural and relational approaches is important. Whereas a structural approach tries to change societal structures (legal, economic, institutional, etc.), the relational approach to reconciliation occurs when, according to Al Ramiah and Hewstone, “members of previously hostile groups come to mutual acceptance” and “experience a changed orientation toward one another” (2013, 535).

In the background of our contributors’ inquiry is an understanding of the polysemic nature of the phenomenon of reconciliation. Though the chosen focus of this volume is on psychosocial and relational aspects of reconciliation, those aspects cannot be grasped without alertness to politics and policy issues. Hence, the contributors address both the interpersonal dimension (religious, ethical, psychological) and the political dimension (institutional, judicial, policy-based) of reconciliation.

Political and Social Reconciliation

When conceptualizing reconciliatory practices, it is helpful to distinguish between political reconciliation and social reconciliation, a difference that somewhat parallels Rosoux’s (2008) distinction between the structural and social-psychological approaches as outlined above.

Political reconciliation has the purpose of “moving beyond collective forms of enmity” (Pope 2014, 179; also De Gruchy 2002, 26). It prioritizes issues of structural interdependence (economic, sociopolitical, security) over interpersonal relationships, and is usually negotiated by officially authorized bodies, such as truth commissions. Social reconciliation, on the other hand, seeks to overcome “alienation between and within communities” (Pope 2014, 179; also De Gruchy 2002, 27). It prioritizes human relationships (psychological, emotional, cognitive, reparative) over structural concerns, and is usually practiced on grassroots and communal levels, such as intergroup dialogues and encounters. These two kinds of reconciliation differ in their emphasis and prioritization of two basic elements that are operative in the practice of reconciliation: knowledge and acknowledgment. Discussing briefly this difference below, we will further introduce the elements of truth telling, storytelling, and emotional memory work.
Let us begin with knowledge. Knowledge is necessary in order to establish a factual basis regarding the acts of wrongdoing that precede the need for affected parties to reconcile. Establishing a knowledge base is necessary for political reconciliation. Although facts in the aftermath of violent conflicts will always remain contested within a politicized context, at least an attempt must be made by domestic or international bodies to arrive at some legal and moral judgment on past wrongdoings. By collecting testimonies and scouring archives, various truth commissions over the last three decades have been seeking to establish some “truth,” even if such commissions may decide to abstain from recommending particular options, such as retribution, restoration, reparations, or amnesty (Cobban 2007; Hayner 2002; Rotberg and Thompson 2000).

In social reconciliation, however, the verification of factual knowledge is less urgent. In these settings, knowledge is transmitted through a different mode of communication, often through storytelling, in which the truth of personal memory is more vital than forensic evidence.

In both political and social reconciliation, a form and forum of credible and genuine communication are needed in order to create a trusted base in which “knowledge” becomes verified and accepted. Otherwise, the knowledge that is gained will fail to motivate political transitions or social change. The difference between political and social reconciliation is that the former gives credibility to truth telling (ruled by legal or quasi-legal frameworks), while the latter puts its trust into storytelling (ruled by what is perceived as personal sincerity and integrity). In political reconciliation, truth telling is seen as a valuable tool to heal some of the rifts between social macro-units, often in the service of advancing national unity. Social reconciliation, on the other hand, relies on storytelling to build up trust between people in order to forge human and communal bonds on the microlevel.

Truth telling and storytelling operate on different principles. They follow what we might call different reconciliation “moods.” In the case of truth telling in national truth commissions, the prevailing mood could be described as social verification and public drama. Truth telling in these cases can be backed up with archival and forensic evidence, be incentivized with legal promises of amnesty, and may lead to public apologies (Tavuchis 1991; Govier and Verwoerd 2002b). The resulting proceedings and reports are debated, assessed, and criticized by numerous national and international players (media, politicians, judges, interest groups, journalists, scholars, clergy, etc.). It is no exaggeration to state that every official truth commission has received its share of public criticism.
In distinction to truth telling in political reconciliation, the prevailing mood of storytelling in social reconciliation can be described as personal honesty and interpersonal reliability (Bar-On 2000). Storytelling in settings such as intergroup dialogues is backed up by the integrity of the personal narrative (Chaitin 2011, 55–75). Many of these groups opt for some degree of confidentiality about what transpires in their meetings. The incentive for participants is emotional release, being listened to, and human connectedness.

Besides knowledge, it is acknowledgment that really matters to the injured parties, as scholars and practitioners of restorative justice and reconciliation have repeatedly pointed out. Acknowledgment confers recognition of suffering to individual victims and victimized communities. Whereas knowledge alone is limited to gathering evidence and factual information, acknowledgment is a moral activity. It is partisan insofar as it gives voice and agency back to people who have been harmed and victimized. In this sense, acknowledgment is a crucial step toward moral repair. “Moral repair,” philosopher Margaret Walker argues, “is the process of moving from the situation of loss and damage to a situation where some degree of stability in moral relations is restored” (2006, 6).

Emotional (Memory) Work

A vital part of the task of acknowledging the harms inflicted and endured is to engage in emotional memory work. Since reconciliation is not needed unless wrongdoing has occurred in the past, memory and remembering play a critical role in the processes of social healing. Because the inflicted and received injuries may have been suppressed, or otherwise have remained publicly unacknowledged, the act of remembering is as important as it is burdened by unresolved emotions (Gobodo-Madikizela 2012). Depending on the degree and extent of the harm inflicted, we can speak of traumatic memories (in case of intolerable harms) or injurious memories (in case of harms that do not lead to psychic disintegration and fragmentation). In either case, the activating of memories—whether in public settings, such as truth commissions, or in interpersonal settings, like intergroup dialogues—is emotionally painful.

Memory work—as opposed to memory in and of itself—refers to an active process of working through the past. Simply put, we all have memories, but not all of us are willing to engage them critically. Memory
work remains cognizant of the interplay between the traumatic content of injury, the narrative form it takes to get communicated, and the socio-political context within which it gets a hearing. Memory work, hence, is a form of both critical and empathetic inquiry. “Memory work,” Annette Kuhn writes, “makes possible to explore connections between ‘public’ historical events, structures of feeling, family dramas, relations of class, national identity and gender, and ‘personal’ memory” (1995, 4).

When it comes to emotional memory work in political reconciliation, the record is checkered at best. Some national truth commissions, for example, restrict themselves to legal frameworks and proceed perfunctorily. They do not offer psychological support services or do not regard people’s emotions accompanying injurious and traumatic memories as important for the reconciliatory mechanisms they employ. This can lead to a loss of credibility in the eyes of victims. In other cases, however, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, mental health assistance is provided (Hamber 2009). And yet, as Priscilla Hayner reminds us, “truth commissions . . . do not offer long-term therapy; they offer survivors a one-time opportunity to tell their story” (2002, 135).

In the case of social reconciliation, emotional work (including emotional memory work) is a core element in addressing fractured and injured interpersonal relations. Space is provided to express anguish. Emotional memory work opens doors to those unforgiven zones of human agony where people have experienced manifestations of human cruelty and grave immorality. Confronted with moral injury and physical trauma, an instinctive reaction might be to recoil from facing it, or to leave such labor to the professional intervention of psychiatrists and psychotherapist. Within intergroup settings, however, the task of emotional memory work is not therapeutic healing of individuals but is, instead, geared toward the integration of human agony in the presence of the Other.

Mechanisms of political reconciliation might be criticized for neglecting the value of emotions; practices of social reconciliation, on the other hand, might be cautioned against giving emotions too much weight. In the latter case, such caution is prudent in order to avoid giving emotive responses a priori credibility. It is important to remind ourselves that the power of anguished personal testimony lies in its immediacy, which renders it instinctively persuasive. It has a direct impact on the listener. A personal narrative in intergroup settings might be compelling precisely because it articulates strong emotions. Participants, however, may not be sufficiently alert to how personal stories are shaped by, and actively shape,
affective identifications with large-group identities. Thus, such stories may reproduce rather than repair the injurious memory of a group’s social identity. In other words, to face memories productively we need critical distancing devices that allow us to engage our emotions also cognitively. This kind of reconciliatory process I have described elsewhere as a form of “cultural therapy” (Krondorfer 1995, 91). As cultural therapy, reconciliation in intergroup settings reaches beyond political and legal frameworks (even when pursuing alternative forms of justice), but also beyond the confines of personal therapy (even when injured and traumatized individuals might benefit from therapeutic interventions). The practice of interpersonal reconciliation in group settings is one in which the psychosocial, psychopolitical, and emotional dimensions are addressed that underlie and feed specific conflicts (Hamber and Gallagher 2014; Volkan 2013).

Becoming aware of the affective dimension that undergirds much of the discourse and practice of reconciliation allows us to pay attention to aspects of reconciliation that get easily sidelined if the focus remains predominantly on structural reform and policy-driven debates. Questions of the weight of trauma, the stumbling block of large-group identification, the usefulness of apologies, or the merit of empathy now move to the foreground.

In sum: This volume largely subscribes to a conceptual framework that understands reconciliation in relational and psychosocial terms, while deemphasizing its structural and policy aspects. Reconciliation here is understood as a restoring of “right relations” (Llewellyn and Philpott 2014b, 23) and as a way of “coming together again, in restored relationship, after a rift from actual or perceived wrongdoing” (Govier 2002, 141). In the same vein, others have spoken about reconciliation as an overcoming of “distrust and animosity” (Krondorfer 1995, 71) or a “building or rebuilding of trust . . . in the wake of tension and alienation” in relationships (Govier and Verwoerd 2002a, 185). All contributors to this volume nevertheless remain keenly aware of the political dimension of reconciliation in each national context. While some authors accentuate the question of Why Reconciliation Is Needed (by contrasting, for example, failed official policies with reconciliation efforts on the ground), others focus on the question of How Reconciliation Works (by describing, for example, detailed interpersonal encounters with groups in conflict). What brings us—this team of scholars—together are shared assumptions about reconciliation as a deep commitment to the flourishing of “the conditions of human relationship” within a conception of justice after trust in human relationships has been gravely violated or destroyed (Llewellyn and Philpott 2014b, 22).
Structure of This Book

The scholars we have pulled together as a team for this volume are embedded in national contexts and also represent multiple nationalities. Hence, our experiences with and comprehension of conflict are deeply rooted in acknowledging the power of social identities within national borders while also recognizing the practical need for reconciliation across cultural, ethnic, religious, and national boundaries. All of us have had direct experiences with reconciliation efforts, from facilitating psychosocial intergroup workshops to critically evaluating official policies vis-à-vis actual needs in communities. For this reason, we have asked all contributors to integrate into their analysis some reflections on personal motivation. These two features—multiple national identities, and the inclusion of select biographical notes on our motives and journeys—make Reconciliation in Global Context: Why It Is Needed and How It Works unique.

This volume does not aim at being comprehensive with respect to analyzing reconciliation processes, either in terms of geographical scope or disciplinary breadth. Rather, we use our experiences to exemplify how reconciliatory efforts work in different (national) settings and why they are needed. The exemplary nature of our endeavors in specific zones of conflict are aimed to inspire other scholars and scholar-practitioners to reflect on the value, necessity, and limits of reconciliation in their own settings, blending academic concerns with practical engagement.

The chapters are arranged along an arc that spans from cases describing and interpreting actual processes with groups in conflict to cases in which the conceptual merits and constraints of reconciliation are brought to the fore. The volume begins with Björn Krondorfer’s reflections on how the framework of interpersonal and psychosocial reconciliation makes possible deep encounters between people who have been historically in conflict or are currently in conflict. He illustrates select key features of this kind of work with examples from his facilitation of Israeli-Palestinian and German-Jewish groups. Having grown up in postwar Germany and now residing in the United States for the last three decades, Krondorfer is keenly aware of the binding and, at times, blinding potency of large-group identifications.

Wilhelm Verwoerd and Alistair Little report and reflect on their reconciliation work with individuals who are ex-combatants and veterans. Motivated by their own experiences with social identities rooted in political-national aspirations, Verwoerd and Little have reached out to
ex-combatants especially from South Africa and Northern Ireland. Alistair, as a teenager, had participated in political violence as a loyalist in Northern Ireland (he was later imprisoned); Wilhelm comes from a white, Afrikaner family background in South Africa, with a grandfather who is considered the architect of Apartheid. Together, Alistair and Wilhelm present a cogent argument of why apologizing for wrongdoing—an act that seems so desirable in reconciliatory processes—can turn into stumbling blocks when working with people who once belonged to opposing militant and military organizations.

Joram Tarusarira, born to the Shona people in Zimbabwe and today pursuing his academic career in The Netherlands, analyzes the ongoing civil strife in Zimbabwe through the analytical lens of instrumentalist nationalism. This provides him a platform to trace and list the negative psychological repertoire that inflicts people in violent political situations; to counteract such negative effects on the social fabric of communities, he suggests creating forums of psychosocial reconciliation. Tarusarira ends his chapter with sharing his experiences with applying the “Training for Transformation” method to the Zimbabwean conflict.

Zilka Spahić Šiljak and Julianne Funk are the co-authors of the chapter on Bosnian Muslim peacemakers in postwar former Yugoslavia. Zilka is a Bosnian Muslim and feminist scholar and activist; Julianne is an American-born scholar and Christian peace activist who divides her time between her academic study in Switzerland and NGO work in Bosnia. Together, Spahić Šiljak and Funk reflect on the need to include religious peace agents into the reconciliation efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although faith-based activists have been largely shunned by secular NGOs working in Bosnia—because these NGOs regard “religion” as a major culprit in the 1990s ethno-religious wars in former Yugoslavia—Spahić Šiljak and Funk make a compelling case that the inclusion of religiously motivated activists benefits the still-divided communities.

What Spahić Šiljak and Funk describe as “vocation” regarding the commitment to peace activism by individual Muslims corresponds on a communal level with the Arabic idea of *wasat* (middle). In a footnote, they mention *wasat* as a form of moderate Islam, an Islamic middle way that promotes interfaith and interethnic dialogue. Zeina Barakat, a Palestinian woman who completed her PhD at a German university, makes *wasat* an important tenet of her chapter on reconciliation options for Palestinians. Though *wasat* is more implicitly assumed than explicitly stated in much of Barakat’s chapter, she argues for following a middle path of moderation dur-
ing times of conflict so that justice, tolerance, and reconciliation can flourish. Having joined at some point the Wasatia movement of Mohammad Dajani Daoudi, she also refers to Hölderlin’s maxim, “Reconciliation happens in the middle of strife.” By including the eighteenth-century German poet into her wasat path, she creatively blends insights from different cultures. Based on her experience of growing up in an unending conflict, Barakat strongly advocates for reconciliation to happen in the midst of conflict—rather than waiting for an end of conflict before setting up reconciliatory mechanisms.

Avner Dinur is an Israeli scholar and peace activist who has facilitated heterogeneous groups and has participated in trilateral encounters between Israelis, Palestinians, and Germans. Like Zeina Barakat, he is deeply troubled by the entrenchment of both the Palestinian and Israeli communities that prevents any meaningful solution to the conflict. He argues for a conceptualization of reconciliation that takes seriously the need of each community to be recognized by the other the way it is, and not the way one wishes the other to be. Recognition of each other’s social identity and collective narrative must be part of any reconciliatory practice. At the same time, Dinur argues, each side has to be willing to make room for the other and identify those issues that are valued by both. Land, trauma, and violence, Dinur suggests, are three central components that are important to each community; hence, addressing them together would open possibilities for a shared ethos in the future.

In the last chapter, we return to the post-conflict setting in former Yugoslavia. Heleen Touquet, a researcher from Belgium who specializes in post-conflict peacebuilding in the Balkans, and Ana Milošević, born into the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia, of Serb nationality, and now studying in Belgium and The Netherlands, lead us into a discussion of the political failure of reconciliation. They show how and why there is little patience for any talk about reconciliation in the now-divided enclaves of Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs, and Catholic Croats. They trace some of these knee-jerk hostile reactions to the imposition of a particular model of reconciliation by international third parties, and in particular by the European Union. In addition, local, regional, and national leaders have politically manipulated and misused reconciliation to either exculpate themselves or to further their nationalist agendas. These factors, Touquet and Milošević argue, have inhibited the transformative potential of reconciliation to flourish, at the expense of recognizing in meaningful ways the suffering of victims and especially of survivors of sexual violence.
In her Epilogue, Valerie Rosoux, an expert in international relations, comments on this volume’s chapters in analytical and creative ways, asking hard questions but also appreciating the relational approach to reconciliatory practices we have chosen to take in this book. She concludes with a cautionary and challenging remark: Do the reconciliatory practices we are engaged in actually help the communities in whose name we promote reconciliation? For if they do not, we may have lapsed into valuing an abstract principle more than the relational and open-ended spirit of reconciliation and may have reverted to a self-interested action rather than a commitment to an other-directed care.

Notes

1. On political reconciliation and nation-building, see Teitel (2003) and Wüstenberg (2003; 2009). Generally speaking, around the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, which was “a period of accelerated democratization and political fragmentation,” transitional justice shifted from international trials of retributive justice to forums of political reconciliation and restorative justice “associated with nation-building” (Teitel 2003, 71). Theologian Ralf Wüstenberg, who echoes this perspective in his comparative analysis of post-Apartheid South Africa and post-1989 Germany, writes: “To overcome the division of the past, political decision making prioritized nation-building” (2003, 139). For a positive ethical assessment of political reconciliation, see also Philpott (2012).


3. Hayner’s study of various truth commissions list significant differences. Among those with little credibility are, for example, Zimbabwe’s Commission of Inquiry that was never made available to the public or the nonrelease of the Burundi investigations. The Nunca Mas report of the National Commission in Argentina, to name another example, was politically contested but effective; but it explicitly shunned “reconciliation” because, in Argentina’s context, it was perceived as a code word for doing nothing (Hayner 2002).

4. Brandon Hamber, born in South Africa and director of a conflict research institute in Belfast, is a clinical psychologist, who has been involved with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and has written about the process of reconciliation and the psychological implications of political violence.

5. Alternative forms of justice can be transitional, traditional, or restorative justice. See Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena (2006); Kritz (1995); Llewellyn and Philpott (2014a); Braithwaite (2014).
Works Cited


