Introduction

This is a book about human embodiment. My thesis is that although the corporeal dimension of the human being can be accurately described in biological (and physical and chemical) terms, to understand it adequately requires transcending the categories used in analyzing animal and other merely natural forms of life. Only then can we see that what is most properly called “the human body” is not a body given by nature, but one produced by spirit (or human subjectivity$^1$) for itself.

The body is one of the rare topics in philosophy that is both of perennial interest and of heightened contemporary concern. However, the attention paid to the body is both a blessing and a curse: while the contemporary reader can be grateful for the breadth of work on this topic, she may also be daunted by the sheer mass of arguments and doctrines concerning the body that have accumulated over the centuries. Gaining familiarity with the contributions of past philosophers on this topic is made especially difficult in the case of systematic philosophers like Hegel, whose writings on the body are hard or impossible to separate from the rest of his theory. Yet the accounts of human embodiment offered by other prominent philosophers of the past century as well as the general trend toward understanding human life and experience holistically suggest that many today would be interested in and sympathetic to Hegel’s theory if they were familiar with it.

Hegel’s theory of human embodiment is mostly contained in a section of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline that he calls “the anthropology.”$^2$ Because few, even of those with doctorates in philosophy, are familiar with Hegel’s anthropology, some might suppose it resembles Kant’s better-known “pragmatic anthropology.” The two are similar in that both attempt to explain the peculiar corporeal existence of humanity, which is often characterized by its transcendence of embodi-
ment. Yet different methodological commitments make Hegel’s deduction and organic development of humanity out of nature different from Kant’s curious descriptions of the natural variety in which humanity finds itself. A better analogy (and one that Hegel himself makes) would liken the anthropology to Aristotle’s De Anima. Like the latter, Hegel’s anthropology is investigation of “the soul,” which, as he understands it, is what makes the human body different from other bodies. Hegel’s anthropology is thus a study of the intersection or overlapping of what is distinctly human and what is corporeal, or of the specifically human form of embodiment.

Some prefer to leave this topic to natural scientists, who know best how a human brain differs from that of an ape, or how the genome of the human species is unique. But while the natural scientist is the one to consult if one wants to know how the biological system of the human species differs from those of other species, the question of whether the corporeal dimension of the human being is best understood as a biological system at all is not one natural science is prepared to ask much less answer, unless we classify anthropology as a natural science. Yet within the field of anthropology itself there is vigorous debate about whether it should associate itself more with the sciences or the humanities, and how one answers this determines whether anthropology really is capable of answering whether humanity should be defined strictly as a biological species. It is telling that the one discipline (other than philosophy) that aims to understand humanity in all of its complexity has ended up divided into subdisciplines whose partisans often see little in common with each other: those studying “physical” (or “biological”) anthropology present humanity as simply an anatomical system developing under evolutionary pressure in the same way other species do, while “cultural” (or “social”) anthropologists—while acknowledging the biological side—present humanity as above all an agent for recognizing and establishing meaning in the natural world and its own institutions.

Given these apparently separate and independent methods, it is not clear how we are to understand what Marcel Mauss called “techniques of the body” like walking or swimming. These actions do not come from instinct (and so are not purely “natural”) but rather have their foundation in this or that particular culture, such that there is no such thing as regular human walking, but only a way of walking that is French, Somali, Japanese, and so on (notwithstanding that these differences are increasingly covered over by cultural homogenization through mass media). Yet, these techniques appear to exist in some form across all, or nearly all, cultures.
and to have not only been made possible by the unique trajectory of our evolution, but to have played a role in guiding it. It is by refusing to ignore or to minimize either the obvious naturalness of humanity or the equally clear discontinuity between humans and all other species (including our closest evolutionary relatives) that the best anthropologists distinguish their discipline as one of almost unparalleled depth and sensitivity.

A philosophical understanding of humanity and human embodiment must likewise come to grips with our biological constitution and that in us that is not and cannot be captured by biological explanations, without sweeping either under the rug. But, to compare philosophy with anthropology, what the philosophical enterprise lacks in ethnological fieldwork and empirical detail, it more than makes up for in its comprehensive scope (integrating questions of human identity with moral, political, epistemological, and ontological questions, all rigorously interrogated in their own right) and its especially critical methodology (though anthropology is certainly more reflective about its method than most other disciplines).

To capitalize on philosophy’s strengths, one could hardly find a thinker whose work is wider ranging and who more thoroughly sorted out methodological problems than Hegel. His writings on the body bear this out, as he is keen to show that “body” is not a univocal word denoting a certain biologically determined way of existing and experiencing the world, and that we cannot understand the human form of embodiment by analysis and interpretation using only evolutionary-biological concepts. Studying human embodiment entails studying not just the physical stuff composing humans, nor even human behavior in pursuit of ends having material origins in the human biological constitution, but also and primarily how a mind that can seem independent of the corporeal world is yet situated in a body that is very much its own, even as this mind thinks actively and spontaneously. Although studies of the mind or body in isolation from the other yield fascinating results, in the process the mind and body tend to recede further and further from each other, making the human experience of embodiment more, not less, baffling. On the other hand, taking human embodiment as a topic is to focus on where the rubber meets the road: whatever is involved in the complex relationship between thinking subjectivity and corporeal objectivity will have to show itself in the embodiment of the thinking human being.

Yet research into this topic is often stymied by the common assumption that there is a certain essential nature that all bodies share. This approach to embodiment seems to go hand in hand with the idea that the mind and
body are substantially distinct and may be treated separately. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the reduction of all bodies to one shared essence can be traced back to Descartes, the most famous modern dualist. According to Descartes, corporeity is essentially extension, parts outside of parts, such that all differences between bodies boil down to different ways of being extended. For instance, living and nonliving would be mere modes of extension, differing only based on complexity of parts (organic matter being more complex than but essentially the same as inorganic matter).

Descartes's conception of human bodies as complex machines has since been both celebrated and condemned for bringing the methods of modern natural science to bear in investigations into human identity. This push to make philosophy scientific has gained momentum throughout the modern era, but its direction was altered decisively in the work of the German Idealists, who drew their inspiration from an admirer and a critic of the scientization of philosophy, Immanuel Kant. Kant legitimized science's exploration of corporeal nature by limiting the extent of its claims, arguing that whatever falls within the bounds of possible experience must be determined in certain ways and hence obey certain basic laws (given by the conditions for possible experience). Kant thus granted to natural science a broad scope but denied it standing regarding questions concerning objects beyond all possible experience (God, immortality, freedom, etc.). Kant can easily give the impression that human embodiment as well is a part of nature and hence falls within the field consigned to natural science. However, his notion of human embodiment was much more nuanced, as Angelica Nuzzo has recently highlighted. Rather than being a mere object of experience, the body (and not just a nebulous transcendental ego) must be considered a transcendental condition of all experience and thus cannot be treated as having the same nature as other sorts of bodies.

The claim that the natural sciences are not in the best position to understand human embodiment (which is not to say that the sciences are “wrong,” provided they restrict their claims to what is visible according to their methods) has also received support in the twentieth century, most notably from Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Judith Butler. Despite their admitted differences, all three offer arguments resembling that of Kant in significant ways. All argue that the problem in trying to understand human embodiment purely through natural science lies in the way natural science constructs a theory of what embodiment is, and subsequently hypostatizes this theoretical construction to the experiencing self, which is not an object but rather a condition for the experience of
objectivity. In this way, subsequent experience gets distorted and “confirms” the scientific account of embodiment in a question-begging way.

There are passages in the works of these philosophers that seem to indicate a different approach to the body. For instance, Heidegger sometimes seems to accept the idea that the human body is merely one object among others in the world and is defined by extension. In articulating his notion of being-in-the-world for instance, he distinguishes the being-in proper to Dasein from the spatial insideness that a body (including the human body) can have relative to a larger body. Yet his point in making this distinction is to show that Dasein’s spatiality (the spatiality proper to humans) is not founded on its being “in” a body that is extended. Rather, Dasein’s spatiality is founded on Dasein’s having care (being outside of oneself in the sense of being preoccupied with and absorbed in one’s surroundings) as its fundamental existential structure: all experience of corporeal bodies and their extension is posterior rather than prior to the immediate experience of being immersed in a world.9

Merleau-Ponty offers a similar argument. Thus for example I may read in a psychology textbook about the so-called “law of effect,” namely, that as a rule, people seek to recreate pleasant experiences and avoid painful ones, such that a person’s experience is ordered toward the end of egoistic survival, or crude pleasure. According to Merleau-Ponty, this conception of human embodiment can then act as a filter by which I determine what is real in my experience and what is illusory, that is, what counts as valid scientific data and what is irrelevant, perhaps a suitable object for literature but not science. With this approach, the unreflective feeling of empathy I have toward another person I see suffering would be dismissed as unreal, as in truth only disguised egoism insofar as my anxiety at seeing another suffer lies in my fear that I too may suffer. Empathy would then be rejected as an imaginative ideal celebrated in art and religion but not part of genuine (i.e., quantifiable and empirically observable by a third party) human experience. However, my immediate experience of the psychology textbook—and indeed, the immediate experience of the psychologists who wrote it—is prior to any theoretical construction, including the notion of humans as biologically determined to seek pleasure even at the expense of others. Such theoretical constructions may be valid for some purposes, but they can never legitimately reach back, rearrange, and violate the original and undeniable reality of the immediate experience on which they were founded; nor may these theoretical constructions delegitimize my equally original and immediate experience of empathy.10
Her different aims notwithstanding, Butler presents a similar argument in opposition to the idea that the body (and its supposedly determinate sex) is a stable, material, and extra-discursive foundation on which cultural products like gender may be constructed. Rather, she argues, the so-called purely material part of embodiment (e.g., "sex") is assigned this character (as extra-discursive) through our discursive activity (from which it is thus never truly independent). Moreover, drawing on Freud and Lacan, Butler argues that our experience of our bodies (as something ostensibly foundational and independent of thought, culture, and experience) is phenomenologically co-originary with our experience of (sexual) pleasure and pain, and the latter always already involve a certain gendered way of experiencing.\(^{11}\) Thus the material body cannot be the foundation for cultural products like gender and sexuality. Rather, what counts as the body is from the beginning influenced by our own gendered and sexually oriented subjectivities.

Thus Kant, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Butler all object to the way natural science (and philosophy inspired by it) tends to lump the human body in with other bodies in nature. And the underlying reason for their objections is that human embodiment is in some sense a condition for the possibility of the experience of natural bodies (or the experience of bodies as "natural," and independent of the experiencing subject). In this, all four resemble Hegel as well, though Kant could not have known Hegel’s position, and while the other three are certainly well versed in Hegel, none to my knowledge gives any indication of familiarity with Hegel’s “anthropology.” Indeed, the philosophical public generally is largely unaware that Hegel’s anthropology exists, or why it is important.

Yet Hegel’s theory is important, not least because it offers something unavailable in the works of those other profound thinkers. That is, not only does Hegel show how human embodiment cannot be understood simply according to the concepts of the natural sciences, he also shows remarkably well how the specifically human form of embodiment relates to mechanism, chemical polarity, and biology (the forms of embodiment recognized by the sciences as characterizing other parts of nature and, to a limited extent, the human body itself). In other words, Hegel shows how human embodiment is genuinely built upon the more abstract forms of embodiment (like spatial extension, chemical relations, and organic processes), yet also that the human form of embodiment goes beyond these, profoundly changing how they must be understood in the human body. Hegel’s argument thus allows us to show both: (1) the precise way in which the human body does
indeed display “merely natural” characteristics (such as extension), and (2) that the concepts natural science uses to understand merely natural bodies are of limited use in understanding human embodiment.

Granted, of the aforementioned philosophers, Heidegger and Butler have not taken as their precise theme the way human embodiment bears mechanical, chemical, and biological determinations and yet is not reducible to them. It would be unfair to blame them for not providing an answer to a question Hegel asks. Merleau-Ponty on the other hand has devoted a great deal of attention to this ambiguity in human embodiment.12 Merleau-Ponty’s extraordinary contribution in this area is generally acknowledged, in contrast with Hegel’s largely unknown contribution. Yet even granting the value of Merleau-Ponty’s work on the topic, Hegel’s anthropology should command our attention, because the methodological difference between the two means that however much we may legitimately get from Merleau-Ponty on this question, we cannot get from him what we can from Hegel. Merleau-Ponty’s method (which he assiduously defends) involves remaining within a prereflective way of apprehending bodies and describing the experience without the interposition of any “reflective” theory.13 In contrast, Hegel’s method is to carry out an immanent critique of concepts of embodiment: that is, to analyze a concept of embodiment, drawing out its presuppositions and implications to show how it already contains within itself other concepts of embodiment or points beyond itself toward them. In this way he can show how the meaning and applicability of extension is qualified and reinterpreted in the context of a living body, and how extension and life are reinterpreted by their integration into human or “anthropological” embodiment.

While it may seem that Merleau-Ponty would consider Hegel’s approach to be “reflective” in the damning sense, one should not jump to this conclusion: Hegel was nothing if not critical of the “reflective” approach, which he associated with the machinations of the abstract understanding (the Verstand, conceived as a bare subject waiting to encounter bare objects). Rather than this kind of “reflection” (which Hegel associates with Kant and derisively likens to the attempt to learn to swim before getting in the water14), Hegel’s method of immanent critique involves making no assumptions about what experience is, what does the experiencing, or what may be experienced, but rather taking experience as it presents itself and persistently drawing out its presuppositions and implications. He never crosses the threshold into “reflection” in the pernicious sense because the implications drawn out dialectically do not reach back to
substantially revise or categorically invalidate the original experience, but only integrate it into its proper context (in which it must be integrated given other, equally valid experiences).\textsuperscript{15}

Yet suppose that Merleau-Ponty would have called Hegel’s approach “reflective,” and suppose further that this accusation is just. Still, there would be good reason to study Hegel’s anthropology. Merleau-Ponty renounces reflection from the beginning because of the insoluble problems he says it leads to: a subject only accidentally and inexplicably located in a body; the encounter with bodies in nature that appear to reflection as independent and indifferent to knowing subjectivity and consequently alien to any kind of value or significance—such that value judgments are considered mere subjective opinions. Yet if Hegel’s dialectical method is “reflective,” then by delving straight into such “reflection,” Hegel shows how the conclusions Merleau-Ponty thinks reflection leads to are not only not inevitable, but patently false. In other words, even if Hegel engages in “reflection” in the pejorative sense (and I maintain that he does not), his approach would still be very worthy of study insofar as where Merleau-Ponty would fear to tread, to prevent “cutting up what is lived into discontinuous acts” and thus being drawn into “impasses we are trying to avoid,”\textsuperscript{16} Hegel would boldly go and lead the way out of the apparent impasse. I do not claim that we can give Hegel’s account as he wrote it a full-throated endorsement, and I will make clear where Hegel’s approach errs in being inconsistent, outdated, bizarre, or otherwise unhelpful. Yet I do contend that his approach can shed a great deal of much-needed light on human embodiment. Accordingly, I intend this book to be not just a commentary on Hegel’s anthropology, but a criticism, a qualified defense, and a creative extension of it.

Despite the renewed interest in Hegel in recent decades and the increasing attention devoted to embodiment in philosophy generally,\textsuperscript{17} the theory of human embodiment Hegel presents in the anthropology remains fertile ground for study. Russon has provided a welcome study of the place of embodiment in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, showing correctly for example that Hegel understands the body must be understood as the expression of spirit (i.e., thinking human subjectivity);\textsuperscript{18} a commentary on the anthropology, where Hegel gives his most detailed and sustained study of embodiment, can supplement this work. Wolff has written an admirable book devoted to explaining the relation between the corporeal world and human subjectivity as distilled through a single paragraph of Hegel’s anthropology.\textsuperscript{19} It is difficult to praise this book highly enough, but there remains something to be gained by presenting a study of the anthropology.
as a whole. I have been fortunate to benefit from many books and articles that treat embodiment in Hegel, or parts or aspects of the anthropology, but I mean my contribution here to rectify the absence of a book-length study focused on the anthropology and treating the whole of it.20

In order to show what is distinctive about anthropological embodiment, I begin in chapter 1 with a discussion of the different ways in which something can be embodied according to Hegel: mechanically, chemically, biologically, and anthropologically. This discussion is meant to lay bare some of the ambiguities surrounding the idea of a body and to introduce the forms of embodiment that Hegel distinguishes, as well as the relations between them. In this chapter I also develop in a preliminary way the thesis of the whole book, namely, that the human form of embodiment is different in kind from that of animal life, because the human body is a body of spirit rather than a merely natural body.

Chapter 2 is devoted to Hegel’s concept of spirit (Geist) and the place of the anthropology in his philosophy of spirit. After a more general explanation of this concept, I offer a close reading of the four paragraphs outlining the “concept of spirit” in the Encyclopedia. Hegel’s conception of spirit is multifarious: not only the human body and the inner life of the human being (desire, thought, will, language, memory), but also things like property and contracts; moral codes and acts; as well as familial, economic, and national ties are forms of spirit. Indeed, even the most horrendous things such as crime, moral evil, and war are forms of spirit, along with the most divine things, like fine art, religion, and philosophy itself. I have made use in my explanation of spirit of many such examples, while also identifying the shared structure that makes them all forms of spirit. I intend this book to be helpful both to Hegel experts interested in a thorough study of the anthropology and to those educated in philosophy but unfamiliar with Hegel. Readers conversant in all three volumes of the Encyclopedia may decide to skip this chapter.

Chapters 3 through 7 are devoted to different parts of the anthropology. In these I show how our anthropological embodiment entails three different cognitive relations to other bodies and our own embodiment. The precise themes of the anthropology’s different sections are not always clear from Hegel’s subtitles (e.g., “natural qualities,” “natural changes”), but I make clear what justifies the lines along which the anthropology is articulated. For instance, my third chapter is called “Immersion in Nature,” because Hegel understands the phenomena he groups under the name “natural qualities” to be ways in which the soul unreflectively identifies with and
finds meaning in external nature: this is the first of the three cognitive relations to embodiment I examine. This immersion also involves the various racial and national characters that according to Hegel correspond to differences in land and climate. While not letting Hegel off the hook for his shortsightedness here, I place his controversial remarks in context and draw on other parts of his work to begin to present a more critical account of race and nationality.

Chapters 4 and 5 continue examining ways we unreflectively find meaning in nature, while steadily showing how other ways of relating to nature are developed out of this naïve absorption. The themes of chapter 4 are: growth (including not just physical but psychosocial development), aging, and death; gender; and sleep and waking life. This chapter is called “The Inner World of the Soul,” because it is in the section that Hegel calls “natural changes” that he articulates the difference between the soul’s immediate absorption in its body and its apprehension of external nature and the implicit dependence of the latter on the former. Because we have access to external nature only through immediate absorption in our own body, the interiority of the soul begins to come into view, but only as something dark and mysterious.

Chapter 5, “Sensation and the Oblivion of the Body,” explores further the dependence of perception of external nature on the failure of apperception. Hegel relies heavily on De Anima for his theory of sensibility but he does not merely rehash Aristotle: Hegel’s account overflows traditional boundaries between mind and body, spontaneity and receptivity. Just as Hegel presents sensation as knowing that which is incarnate, he presents nature not as dead, inert matter but as corporeity that raises itself up to intelligibility. Hegel’s romanticism is most clearly seen in his theory of the emotions, also treated in this chapter. It is in emotion that the embodied spirit first senses its own self.

Chapter 6, “Perverse Self-Knowledge,” concerns “feeling [Gefühl],” which is a precise, technical term for Hegel without the broad sense it has in everyday English. Gefühl is affective self-knowing that is immediate. Emotion belongs to chapter 5, but in some ways it seems more like a feeling than a sensation. In emotion the soul knows itself (rather than an external object) but still does so by way of some part of the body (as anger is felt in the chest, embarrassment in the face). Genuine feeling involves the second of the three ways of relating to embodiment: circumventing the naturally given body altogether and feeling immediately in a way that can appear miraculous, but for spirit feeling is in most cases rather a sickness of the soul.
Feeling relates to its content immediately, such that it is unable to distinguish itself from what it knows to be a mere contingent object: this is how Hegel understands mental illness, the subject of chapter 7, “Mental Illness and Therapy.” The therapy that cures mental illness may be prompted by a psychiatrist, but whether such a professional is present or not, therapy according to Hegel is the inculcation of “habit,” which creates for the soul a new form of mediation between itself and its contents. I situate Hegel’s theory of mental illness and therapy in relation to Foucault’s influential presentation of the modern misunderstanding of madness, showing that although Hegel’s theory bears some superficial similarities to what Foucault criticizes, there is no reason to think Foucault was even aware of the anthropology and his criticism is generally inapplicable to Hegel’s account. Habit is the third and final way the anthropology gives of relating to embodiment: in habit, the soul wrests itself from its attachment to any particular content in order to identify instead with the continually forming and reforming broader pattern characterizing its experience. Habit provides a way to order not just the content of an individual soul (which I cover in chapter 7) but also individual humans into a larger social community, the theme of chapter 8.

In chapter 8 I extend what Hegel’s analysis of habit gives us to return to unresolved questions from chapters 3 and 4, attempting a critical theory of race and gender. What I give there is not Hegel’s own account, but I submit it as: (1) an interpretation of Hegel’s analogy between individual habituation and social integration; and (2) an extension of this analogy, an exploration of social analogues for other ways individual selfhood is constituted. Habit lies at the heart of acculturation because it assigns the meaning that legitimates social identities and rules. Racism and sexism can be understood as social pathologies that persist to the extent that the culture, the social body through which its members experience their social world, is organized according to one of the lower, more abstract levels of development belonging to earlier parts of the anthropology. Hegel’s anthropology can thus point a way forward today for us, who live in a fundamentally unjust culture.

A Note on the Text

The anthropology consists of a mere twenty-five short paragraphs, some also with short remarks (Anmerkungen) appended to them (added by Hegel in the Encyclopedia’s second and third editions). These original paragraphs
with the added remarks constitute the *Haupttext* or main text. I will also however make careful use of the *Zusätze*, the additions from Hegel's lectures collected and published by Boumann (one of Hegel's students) after his death. Hegel intended the *Encyclopedia* to be a handbook for use in his classes and therefore expected that its readers would also get the benefit of hearing his lectures. As one might expect, the lectures give more examples and the language is generally more down to earth. This can of course be very helpful in understanding Hegel. However, because these additions were never actually published by Hegel, one must always take what is attributed to Hegel there with a grain of salt, seeking corroboration in the *Haupttext*: a student might always insert his own interpretation. Even if a point appears in the notes of several students, or in the lectures given over different semesters—that is, even if it is extremely likely that Hegel did actually make a certain point in his lectures—it must be acknowledged that Hegel no doubt spoke with greater latitude in his lectures than he would have allowed himself in his written, published work.

Boumann's *Zusätze* also conceal any divergence among the various transcripts of the “circle of friends” from which they are composed. Thus any changes Hegel may have made over the course of his lectures on subjective spirit from the summer of 1820 to the winter of 1829/1830 are also concealed in these *Zusätze* for the sake of achieving a speciously authoritative status. Recently however, the transcripts of Erdmann and Walter from the winter semester of 1827/1828 have been published by Felix Meiner Verlag. Editors Hespe and Tuschling confirm the unprecedented reliability of the Erdmann transcript, especially as it can be cross-checked with Walter's version\(^2\) (both are published together but not merged into one version that glosses over the differences between them).

Yet any exegetical work on Hegel's anthropology must begin by plainly acknowledging that Boumann's *Zusätze* contain much more material on certain parts of the anthropology than do Erdmann's or Walter's transcripts. Accordingly, the presence of the *Zusätze* in some of what follows is more pronounced. However, I still make every effort to use the *Zusätze* critically, for example, giving preference to remarks that also appear in Erdmann's and Walter's transcripts. I will rely more heavily on Boumann's *Zusätze* only when Erdmann's and Walter's transcripts do not cover a certain aspect of the *Haupttext* or cover it minimally. Furthermore, any lecture notes are used only for the sake of illustration of or elaboration on a point made in the *Haupttext*. Thus while the *Zusätze* should not be neglected, one must be very careful in making use of them to interpret.
Hegel. One must always allow Hegel's published material to have the final word, and when a Zusatz makes a point on which his published material is silent, one must discount what is said in the Zusatz accordingly. The only writing of unimpeachable authenticity therefore are the twenty-five paragraphs and their occasional remarks that constitute the Encyclopedia’s anthropology “in outline.”

I have found that I could not substantially improve on Petry's authoritative translation of the anthropology, and so unless otherwise indicated I use it throughout the book. However, even as I use it I will render Begriff as “concept” (rather than “Notion” as Petry does) in order to preserve a closer etymological connection (as greifen and capere both mean “to grasp”). I will also avoid capitalizing Hegel's technical terms (like “idea” or “concept”). Hegel only capitalized these because all nouns in German are capitalized. Capitalizing them in English can remind the reader that the term means something special for Hegel, but I prefer to accomplish this through an explanation of such terms and proceeding with the normal style in English. Finally, I will render Selbstgefühl as “self-feeling” rather than “self-awareness,” as Petry does, first because this preserves the connection between self-feeling and other forms of the feeling soul; second, though it has an important role to play, Selbstgefühl is in an important sense a perversion of spirit—not just an abstract, early stage, but a disease spirit sinks into—“self-awareness” sounds too innocuous to convey this. I have preserved Petry's use of boldface to show text added in the second or third editions of the Encyclopedia. For all of Hegel's texts, where numbers for section or paragraph ($) are given, I will cite them. And since these are usually more precise and hence preferable, I will use them as well in citing the Phänomenologie des Geistes: these are not given in the German, but they are familiar among Anglophone readers of Hegel from A. V. Miller's translation (published by Oxford University Press) of the Phänomenologie. I will refer to Hegel's works using the abbreviations given following this introduction. For those Zusätze that span several pages, I have also given the page number.