Introduction

Elodie Boublil and Antonio Calcagno

In his liminal essay on existence and hermeneutics, Paul Ricoeur denounces the philosophical illusion that consists of either absolutizing the ego and the self—along the lines of Cartesian methodological doubt—or reducing all realities to their natural or historical evidence. The polarization of the “for-itself” and the “in-itself,” the reflexive subject and the outer world of objects and matter found throughout the history of Western thought, has led philosophy to be forgetful of its paradoxical function: to bring to light and to language the complexity of lived experiences whose precise articulations cannot be exhausted by speech or symbols. In this original state of wonder before the world’s and the other’s concrete reality, we are often led back to question the status of our interpretations and reflections. In delineating the hermeneutics of such trajectories, Ricoeur reminds us of the necessity of digging further, always, into the layers of interpretation through which we apprehend and live our interactions:

The cogito is not only a truth as vain as it is invincible; we must add, as well, that it is like an empty place which has, from all time, been occupied by a false cogito. We have indeed learned, from all the exegetic disciplines and from psychoanalysis, that so-called immediate consciousness is first of all “false consciousness.” Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud have taught us to unmask its tricks. Henceforth it becomes necessary to join a critique of false consciousness to any rediscovery of the subject of the cogito in the documents of its life; a philosophy of reflection must be just the opposite of a philosophy of consciousness.¹
Continental philosophy, especially hermeneutics, phenomenology, and post-structuralism, beyond their methodological and ontological disagreements, has nonetheless manifested a common effort to “deconstruct” the *cogito* and renounce its solipsist attempt to discover objective truth in the solitary act of its reflections.

The rejection of the Cartesian cogito and its ambition to grasp the infinite in the contemplation of its own possibilities is motivated by the existential acknowledgment of our finitude and the opaqueness of our desires and motivations. From a historical point of view, the philosophical and epistemological separation of the soul from the *psyche* in the post-Nietzschean world of subjective values and meanings expressed this repatriation of the spiritual dimension within the thickness of its embodied expressions. In this sense, the philosophical question of interiority seems to have been marginalized, if not relegated to the philosophy of religion, becoming itself, as tantamount to speculating on the soul, a matter of faith. Moreover, the self has also been denounced as a fallacy, as if it were meant to designate the “I” that dwells in one’s interiority.

However, such a philosophical shortcut, which would read the question of the self’s constitution in continental philosophy along the lines of a dichotomy between interiority and exteriority, misses precisely the complexity to which the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and others point, as well as the intertwining between the anthropological, the metaphysical, and the ethical levels of our experience that forbids us to reduce the subject either to its ability to reflect and constitute meaning or to its failure to master completely the forces and the life that make it exist. In other words, the contemporary primacy given to space and exteriority and the consequent rejection of interiority reveal a misunderstanding about what these dimensions refer to once they are mapped out as territories rather than lived-through experiences. The constructive and positive part of the task proposed by Ricoeur, namely the “rediscovery of the subject of *cogito*,” is yet to be undertaken.

Certainly, the spatial metaphor distinguishing exteriority from interiority has been used consistently throughout the history of philosophy, as it is closely linked to the affective life that inhabits the human psyche. As Jean-Louis Chrétien observes,

> Not only thought, but affectivity itself can only be understood spatially: anguish constricts, contracts, and petrifies; joy and hope expand, dilate, mobilize, this being so little metaphorical that
the narrow or the broad, absolutely speaking, are not physically observable (on what scale and by what measure?), but originally existential and affective terms. There is no need in this to want to escape our condition, any more than to see it as a degradation. But of course, interior space should not be hypothesized as if it always existed by itself but led back to acts of speech and consciousness which open it up to various horizons.3

In other words, the inner world points to our ability to live our experiences through our individuated bodies and, at the same time, distance ourselves from that very experience by reflecting on it.

The emphasis on spatiality is related to the necessity to delineate and communicate the content of the experience that is described, and it fits with the movement of “return” implied by reflection and introspection. This framework indicates the paradoxical dynamics of a “space” that is yet never fixed or “hypothesized” and that expands and retracts itself as it breathes in and out its experiences of the surrounding world. Consequently, one of the major contributions of Chrétien’s work, and of the phenomenological work on interiority for which Ricoeur’s diagnosis calls, is precisely to cancel the dichotomy or strict separation between two allegedly heterogeneous domains, namely interiority and exteriority. As Heidegger already explained in his characterization of Dasein: “For the Dasein there is no outside, for which reason it is also absurd to talk about an inside.”4 In fact, Heidegger refers here to the very structure of intentionality brought to light by phenomenology and according to which subjects as monads are not closed off entities—with or without windows—but rather always already engaged and attuned to the world through their relations to objects and other subjects. The task, then, as Ricoeur mentions, lies more in a critique of the philosophy of consciousness proposed by transcendental idealism than in a rejection of the individuating and individuated imprint on the lifeworld left by the self through its words, feelings, values, and actions.

Consequently, reopening the question of “interiority” means rethinking these dynamics of alteration and appropriation that constitute the subject and its interpretations, while analyzing these dynamics in relation to what precisely resists and transcends them: the lifeworld, the other, or God. Recovering one’s inner dimension implies a recognition that it is “already always there” as the inner world of experiences and meanings that infuse, and are manifest in, the expressions of the lived body, the intentionality of
the sentiment, or the constitution of values. A quick reading of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s foreword to the *Phenomenology of the Perception* might lead us to believe his critique of Augustine is a condemnation of interiority:

> The world is there prior to every analysis that I could give of it, and it would be artificial to derive it from a series of syntheses that would first link sensations and the perspectival appearances of the object together, whereas both of these are in fact products of the analysis and must not have existed prior to it. Reflective analysis believes it moves in the reverse direction along the path of a previous constitution and meets up with—in the “inner man,” as Saint Augustine says—a constituting power that it itself has always been. Thus, reflection carries itself along and places itself back within an invulnerable subjectivity, prior to being and time. Yet this is a naïveté, or if one prefers, an incomplete reflection that loses an awareness of its own beginning.⁵

Merleau-Ponty’s claim consists less in denying the very experience of interiority than in reconnecting it with the expressivity of the flesh—in all its dimensions—thereby overcoming both idealism and materialism. According to Merleau-Ponty, materialism and idealism suffer from the same reductive gesture that leads to objectification and misses the dynamic and vivid dimensions of human experience: “While the living body became an interior without an exterior, subjectivity became an interior without an exterior, that is, an impartial spectator. The naturalism of science and the spiritualism of the universal constituting subject, to which reflection upon science leads, share in a certain leveling out of experience: standing before the constituting I, the empirical Myselves are merely objects.”⁶ A similar diagnosis can be found in the working notes of the *Visible and the Invisible*, written fifteen years after the publication of *Phenomenology of Perception*, in which Merleau-Ponty insists on the need to describe “the spiritual part” of the human being and characterize phenomenologically the interiority of Being itself: to “redescribe the all interhuman and even spiritual life.”⁷

As a result, Augustine’s words, according to which God is “more inner to me than I am,” sound less outdated than they seem and point to a profound metaphysical and anthropological experience of an account of interiority that resists the self-transparency of the Cartesian cogito while it opens a dimension in which encountering resistance and opacity, or conversely a vivid presence, seems like a new form of *epoché*. To Augustine, the
revelation of interiority precisely overcomes the subject’s attempt to consider itself the source of all acts and realities. As Chrétien explains, “The way to interiority, to the center of the self, far from leading to recognizing oneself as a source, invites me to go beyond what I have higher or deeper, to discover myself, in the strong sense, inhabited or inhabitable by a presence other than mine.” And further, “the path to interiority is therefore not the loss of the immense, but the plunge into an even more disconcerting immensity, because its excess is in me, it is me. The Augustinian privilege of interiority does not lie in excluding exteriority, but in including and exceeding it.”

In other words, a closer consideration of our lived-through experience of time and intersubjectivity leads us to go beyond the spatial and sequential figuration operated by diachronic consciousness and turn to the critical transformation and individuation a renewed account of interiority may generate both at the personal and collective levels. This non-objectifying account of interiority may fit well with what Ricoeur calls the dimension of the “sentiment,” which describes a qualitative relation to the world, to oneself and others, at the intersection of the cognitive and the affective domain, beyond the dichotomy between mind and body—a relation that intertwines the “intentional” and the “intimate” (l'intentionnel et l'intime) and features the being-in-the-world of a vulnerable subjectivity, marked by its openness to life and others:

Feeling is the felt manifestation of a relationship to the world that is deeper than that of the representation which institutes the polarity of subject and object. This relationship to the world goes through all these secret threads, “stretched” between us and beings, which we precisely call “tendencies.” We can only grasp these pre-predicative, pre-reflexive, pre-objective links in two broken languages, that of behavior, that of feelings; but they are the common root of these two languages; a tendency is both the objective direction of conduct as feeling; the felt manifestation of that “to what” is approaching, “far from what” is moving away, “against what” our desire fights.

One may already find this intertwining of intentionality and intimacy and this porosity over against which desire constitutes itself in the phenomenological descriptions of empathy (Einfühlung) elaborated by Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, or Erwin Straus. Indeed, the phenomenon of empathy reveals a phenomenon of interaffectivity and intercorporeity that does not abolish
the frontier between the inner world and the outer/other world. Rather, it points to a relational ontology—a kind of alterology—that makes the other really present to the self as other, as the one that paradoxically opposes itself as other yet communicates its feelings and inner world to the subject.

Erwin Straus also described a process of *Einfühlung* with the world itself—a process that overcomes, as well, the dichotomy between interiority and exteriority without merging plurality and difference into one single identical and homogenous world. Inner states relate us to the world. They are like dynamic shades that shape the subject’s individuation process as well as the world: “The states of mind hidden in the interior are not for us isolated states of mind, separated from the world, locked in their interiority: they all have a communicable meaning. . . . The states of mind hidden in the interior are not in themselves interior states, they are in communication with the world, and are not thoughts about it.”¹¹

This universal form of sympathy is not another form of hidden idealism or panpsychism but rather the utmost reality felt through human interactions. In other words, instead of locking down the subject, interiority reveals the interdependency and connection between it and other beings in such a way that the latter are presented to the self without abolishing its sense of radical freedom and individuation. One hypothesis to be investigated could be phrased as follows: overcoming the philosophy of objectifying consciousness clears the way for new accounts of the self that are dissociated neither from the lifeworld nor from the ethical need for personal conscience actualized through human agency.

As this volume will show, these various layers (metaphysical, anthropological, and ethical) can offer a promising renewal of the question of interiority. We have briefly sketched a reorientation of the philosophical reflection that enables it to question further: What can interiority bring to current debates in critical phenomenology, as well as in social and political philosophy? The lived-through experience of shared alienating feelings confronts the subject with the inner creative resources they can use and appropriate for themselves and with others to transform their environment and lifeworld. Also, and more fundamentally, a reflection on interiority opens a range of considerations on the nature of our relation to the lifeworld and other living beings.

Specifically, this volume examines the constitutive aspects of interiority, including the lived body, subjectivity, affectivity (e.g., joy), gender, power, intersubjectivity, world, meaning, God, and transcendence. The essays not only contribute to an understanding of the rich, constitutive aspects of interiority but also mine and expose new and/or understudied phenomenological
sources, from recent interventions in French phenomenology to insights from early women phenomenologists including Edith Stein, Gerda Walther, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius. The limits of interiority will be explored by engaging with Japanese philosophy while also teasing out social and ethical implications that stem from a phenomenological account of interiority. To this end, the volume is divided into three parts: interiority and subjectivity, alterity and transcendence, and interiority and world.

Part 1 explores the relationship between interiority and what it means to experience oneself as a subject, an I and/or a self. Starting from a renewed investigation of the main authors of the phenomenological tradition, namely Husserl and Heidegger, this section further explores phenomenological approaches to interiority and the self by referring to the works of Conrad-Martius and Henry, who both investigated our inner life in contrast with corporeality, affectivity, and the general phenomenon of incarnation.

Carla Canullo’s “The Spatiality of Acosmic Interiority: A Phenomenological Attempt to Rethink ‘Lived Space’” presents a new account of what it means to live spatiality. Interiority has often been associated with the intimacy of the subject and understood as the opposite of exteriority. Consequently, it is thought to have emerged, for the most part, from the inside/outside opposition and the Kantian distinction between time/inner sense and space/outer sense, and its fate has been linked so closely to the subject's fate that it has been undone by its own crisis. To rethink interiority, Canullo suggests we leave behind this conception in order to grasp interiority and the subject together within a spatiality that characterizes the subject's interiority conceived as a “lived space.” She argues that the Husserlian conception of interiority is largely premised on positing a distinction between the inner and outer, the inside and outside. The interior is justified insofar as it is distinguishable from its opposite, namely exteriority. Also, the different senses of time that accompany the interior and the exterior reinforce the distinction between the two realms. This Husserlian model, Canullo argues, is overcome by Michel Henry, who identifies the interiority of the subject as manifest not in time but in life and in the flesh. This immanent interiority is “acosmic” because it is not grasped in the outside of the world. “Acosmic interiority” does not mean, however, interiority without space. To rethink the subject's interiority, Canullo posits a new kind of spatiality, a “lived space” that does not contrast with, and ultimately rely on, exteriority.
Hans Rainer Sepp’s chapter, “Interiority, Exteriority, Being-In: A Concise Analysis” draws upon Eastern philosophy and phenomenology to further discuss the unique relationship between inner and outer, interior and exterior. Engaging Buddhist thought, as well as thinkers including Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Sepp highlights the role of the corporeality in shaping the aforementioned relationship. Two modes of being-in are distinguished: in the first, an anonymous self relates to itself and its experiences, whereas in the second, a world is constituted by relations to and with others and objects—a world of meanings. But these two primary senses of being-in, which are lived from within our interiority, are distinguishable from historically conditioned forms of subjectivity and interiority. One realm is not reducible to the other, nor is one realm given priority over the other. They are unique but related realms, but the significance of the historical realm and its external force can only be grasped from within the realm of our interior being-in, from the very experience and resistance the interior is living through its externalization. Sepp observes,

Both, the real (reell) subjective of the self and the real, which I am not, are not relative to the historical world of being-in-the-world. Therefore, it would be inadmissible to designate this difference with the relation of inside and outside. Such a relation limited to sense would miss the fact that both the self-performance of the absolutely subjective and the original experience of the absolutely real—that is, the pure experiencing of the primal interior and the original experience of a primal exterior—transcend any context that would govern the meaning of historical situation.

Consequently, far from being relegated to idealist accounts of the self, this phenomenological exploration of interiority requires a realist perspective that paradoxically includes the overcoming of any attempt to reify the inner experience and the acknowledgment of its vivid reality.

In “Self-Owning, Self-Transparency, and Inner Nudity: Hedwig Conrad-Martius on Interiority,” Christina Gschwandtner analyzes, along these lines, the rich phenomenological legacy of the philosopher Hedwig Conrad-Martius, one of the founding yet understudied figures of the phenomenological movement. After completing her studies with Alexander Pfänder, Conrad-Martius left the University of Munich to study with Husserl. Part of the Göttingen School of Husserl’s thought, she defines phenomenology, against more idealistic accounts, as a realist project that seeks to uncover the
real being of reality. Gschwandtner examines Conrad-Martius’s thought to uncover an account of inner subjective life, described as an inner nudity, in which the self comes to appear as it is, making possible real and meaningful self-disclosures and ownness. It is these possibilities of the self, manifested inwardly, that distinguish humans from other forms of animal life. Our human souls, as opposed to other animal souls and spirits, have a unique capacity of self-understanding that can guide and shape the way we stand in relation to ourselves and in our comportment toward ourselves. Gschwandtner argues that the possibility of self-awareness, as well as one’s relationship to oneself, can help foster relations between the individual and other beings, including other animals and God. She sees in Conrad-Martius, especially on account of the philosopher’s deep interests in biology and cosmology, an inner awareness that can transcend traditional substantializing and objectifying views of human and animal nature.

Part 2 investigates the very possibility of transcendence contained within interiority, albeit in limited and shifting ways, and the way it is also a space of encounter, relationality, and alterity. Angela Ales Bello ponders the important role of interiority in discovering who and what we are. She argues in her chapter “‘In interiore homine’: The Presence and Absence of the Divine in the Human” that searching within ourselves allows us to analyze the structure of the human being. Drawing upon phenomenological insights, in particular those of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein, she investigates the lived experience of interiority to understand the following question: What is the human being? The answer is drawn from within through analyses of lived experience, rather than from the “outside.” This mode of inquiry reveals the existence of an all-powerful something that transcends us, that lives within us as presence/absence; it is the means by which we understand our limits and finitude. We call it the divine. For Ales Bello, interiority is also a place of radical encounter where human beings can come to transcend the human and find the divine, a space where we meet that which is radically other to ourselves, ultimately giving rise to religious experience.

Brian W. Becker’s “‘It Is No Longer I Who Do It’: Interiority and the Foreign-Body” explores the relationship between the lived body and interiority. He analyzes the unique phenomenon of the phantom limb, which many phenomenologists have written about, most famously Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception. The phantom limb creates a unique relationship between the subject and one’s own lived body. Becker chronicles how psychology, phenomenology, and theology analyze the experience. In some individuals the phantom limb is lived as a separate, foreign being, one
over whom control is not possible. If the experience of the phantom limb is inwardly lived as an experience of the foreign other, the relationship has implications for the ways in which one lives the experience of the other person: the other’s presence is to be viewed not only as an object that stands outside and against me but as most traditional views of the object also maintain. The other, however, establishes a new relation between me and the other, as lived inwardly, as internalized. To understand how the other may be uniquely positioned within me, Becker suggests three important phenomenological aspects that characterize the inward relation to the other: time, space, and identity. Ultimately, the foreign other is understood as thanatonic; that is, like the phantom limb, it is not something I can control according to my own will. As Becker concludes, “The foreign-body belongs to another logic, which shall be called the thanatonic phenomenon. It reveals, like the erotic phenomenon, an alterity that meets me in my bodily existence, but this time in its lived and material dimensions where I confront an originary fissure and alienable origin. . . . In the thanatonic phenomenon, the foreign-body that comes from elsewhere collapses all distance in excorporating my body and flesh, consuming my space, my time, and my identity.”

Emmanuel Housset’s chapter “Inner Distance and Surreptitious Patience According to Jean-Louis Chrétien” mines the work of the recently deceased French philosopher Jean-Louis Chrétien for its phenomenological implications for interiority. One of Chrétien’s last books, *L’espace intérieur* (Interior Space), explores the writing of ancient and medieval thinkers to show how the concept of an interior space is developed and defended in their works, ultimately creating an inner space for God to dwell in human beings. Housset phenomenologically develops Chrétien’s idea to show how the creation and cultivation of an inner space and an inner life require a specific kind of questioning, namely patience, understood as a kind of deep listening and waiting for a response. Here, in this new configuration of patient listening, the centrality of an active I, who is the central figure and actor, is displaced. The other is given priority, and it is the other who transforms us. In patient listening, meaning emerges. “What exceeds all expectations,” Housset observes, “is the foundation of surreptitious patience, and this excess of the immemorial and the unexpected is both what divides our present and what gives it its true thickness, one that is much more decisive than the thickness resulting from retention and recollection. Therefore, interiority is not primarily the place where a passive and active subject master meaning and where their presence is loaded by a past and holds no future. On the contrary, it is the place where meaning emerges while confronting alterity,
which is not overcome but encountered.” The idea of an I who is in control of its own inner sphere of ownness is displaced by the other, to whom we patiently and surreptitiously listen through questioning and response.

Drawing on the relational dynamics that shape our inner experience, the part 3 of the volume focuses on the relation between interiority and world in metaphysics and ethics.

In “The Self-Awakening (jikaku [自覚]) from the Citadel of the Self: Everything is Interconnected with Everything,” Steve G. Lofts, like Sepp, draws from Eastern philosophy to rethink the relationship between interior and exterior. Lofts considers the radical possibility that the Western concept of interiority is largely influenced by the identification of substance with identity, thereby reducing the interior realm to the domain of the substantial I of identity. Interiority, then, is simply the experience of the I living its own reality. The other is also subsumed and defined through the life of the I. Lofts discusses the categories of interior and exterior, self and other, and subject and object and their dependence on Western constructs of substantial identity. These constructions have had deep and often dire social and political consequences. To overcome the simultaneous identification and bifurcation of the aforementioned concepts, Lofts proposes that we engage with Zen philosophy to understand that, in fact, exterior and interior must be thought in relational rather than oppositional terms. The Western claim of the existence of two distinct zones of immanence and exteriority is false; everything is interconnected. As Lofts notes,

To the degree that we can speak about interiority and exteriority, we must always speak about them as reciprocal and relational notions that exist only in reference to the other. They must not be conceived as autonomous regions that need to be bridged, but rather as two relational limits of a single reality. Thus, it is not a question of finding a way out from interiority to the exteriority of the world, to the realm of objects, or to the other self, nor is it a question of explaining how the exteriority of the world enters the interiority of the self.

Christian Lotz, in “Ultima Ratio Decisions and Absolute Interiority: From Hegel to Bonhoeffer” investigates one of the classically defining aspects of interiority, namely conscience. His chapter seeks to give a phenomenological account of conscience, not simply as a form of knowledge, as more traditional forms of conscience conceive of it, but as a mode of
action, what Dietrich Bonhoeffer calls the “a-rationality of moral agency” or what Hegel terms “the very practical form of self-consciousness.” Lotz’s phenomenological discussion of conscience reveals it to be a unique form of human activity that can engender action capable of resisting evil. Analyzing the writings of Hegel and Bonhoeffer, Lotz discovers that the agency of consciousness produces not simply the awareness of acting subject or self but the very possibility of an absolute responsibility that makes an appeal to be heard, to be enacted, with the knowledge that one is never capable of fully answering the absolute nature of the call of responsibility. The rise of the call of responsibility for action is a sign of concrete hope that seeks to resist an evil or compromising situation. The inner reality of conscience makes possible both resistant hope and action.

Ann Murphy’s “Critical Phenomenology and the Rehabilitation of Interiority” introduces the perspective of critical phenomenology while it reconfigures the contemporary meanings of inside and outside, considering social and political shifts. Critical phenomenology is phenomenology that takes power seriously. Even as it maintains fidelity to phenomenology’s methodological commitment to the first-person description of the basic structures of experience, it draws attention to the broader power structures that frame these accounts. For this reason, phenomenology’s critical turn has emphasized the ways in which power structures experience, exteriority shapes interiority: the external world determines psychic life. She argues here that a properly critical phenomenology must also consider the importance of interiority for our ethical and political analyses, against the Foucauldian claim that phenomenology cannot do so. Drawing on the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Frantz Fanon, and Lisa Guenther, Murphy argues for an understanding of critical phenomenology that foregrounds a relational yet conscious limit of the phenomenological ego, capable of grasping constitutive inner states like pain, vulnerability, and affectivity while dwelling within the complex forms of conditioning intersubjectivity that are part of a meaningful world.

The aim of this volume, in part, is to shed light on important phenomenologists whose works and ideas have not been fully investigated. We conceive of our work here as helping scholars and philosophers become familiar with understudied but valuable sources of thinking on the question of interiority, in particular Edith Stein and Gerda Walther, two important figures in the early phenomenological movement. To this end, Elodie Boublil’s chapter, “Joy, Interiority, and Individuation: A Steinian Account,” notably relies on the works of Edith Stein to argue that joy unveils the dynamic process of
subjectivity’s individuation through the expansion of the subject’s vital force and the awareness of an inner sense of being. Joy, a particular feeling that emerges from the depth of our beings, namely from our hearts, reveals the meaningfulness of our relation to the lifeworld through the movements of our hearts (Gemütsbewegungen) and our attunement to Being and the living. More specifically, a phenomenological analysis of joy uncovers the link between intentionality and creativity. Joy reveals the structure of the inner sense of subjectivity. In a reciprocal movement that intertwines passivity and activity, the subject expresses, through joy, openness to the world and others, as well as irreducible transcendence. Joy becomes the ontological marker of our individual capacity for freedom and hope.

Antonio Calcagno’s “Gerda Walther’s Phenomenology of Interiority and the Idea of a Fundamental Essence” looks at the work of Gerda Walther, a member of the phenomenological movement as it took up residence in Freiburg, where Husserl occupied a tenured, full professorship in philosophy. Like Conrad-Martius, Walther arrived from Munich, sent by her teacher Pfänder, to study with Husserl, and like her contemporaries Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein, Walther’s phenomenological approach is distinct. But though these thinkers developed their own respective views, they shared a deep concern for the question of what it is to be human and a commitment to justify the possibility of interiority or an inner life. Calcagno argues that one can find in Walther’s writings on mysticism, and in other texts as well, a robust account of interiority. But what distinguishes her account from others is that the self and the I can be radically displaced, for example in intense experiences of community, telepathy, and mystical experience, such that the I becomes fused with others, a we, or God. The interior is often conceived as a deep, almost impervious realm of identity, an inalienable I. Walther shows how interiority is more porous than traditional accounts maintain, thereby allowing us to grasp how we can truly bond with others in the world or suffer great distress caused by external forces or even mental illness. Interiority, then, is not simply a realm of I or personal life but also a communal and social realm.

The chapters contained in this volume expose and help develop a phenomenology of interiority, expanding received phenomenological and philosophical accounts by uncovering important constitutive layers of the phenomenon. It is our hope that readers will find novelty and inspiration in the chapters, ultimately making possible both critical dialogue and further research.
Notes


