Moral Personhood

An Essay in the Philosophy of Moral Psychology

By G. E. Scott

Subjects: Ethics, Philosophy
Series: SUNY series in Ethical Theory
Paperback : 9780791403228, 202 pages, July 1990
Hardcover : 9780791403211, 202 pages, July 1990
Out of print (Hardcover)

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Table of contents

Preface
Acknowledgments

1. SQUARE ONE
1. Actual and Possible Human States, Beliefs, and Opinions
2. Relevant Concepts
3. Investigative Strategy

2. MATERIAL PERSONS
1. Material Objects: 'New-Type' Materialism
2. Intentionality as a Feature of Material Objects
Intentional Systems: First Order
The Intentional Circle
Intentional Systems: Higher Order
Intentional Causation, Intentional Explanation, Natural Kinds, and Anomalous Monism

3. MALLEABLE PERSONS
1. Malleability
2. A Model for Malleability: the Computer
Embodied Turing Machines: Hardware, Software, and Computer Science
Insights from Computer Science
3. Malleability and Evolution: Intentional Selection

4. MORAL THEORY
1. Intentionality and Our Ordinary Moral Language
2. Intentionality and Moral Theory
3. Moral Theory
Moral Theory, Problems: Moral Invisibility and Moral Semantics
Moral Theory, Solutions: Richard Boyd's Moral Realism and Homeostatic Consequentialism
Moral Theory. Solutions: Intentional Moral Realism and Intentional Homeostatic Consequentialism

5. MORAL PERSONS: I
1. Moral Persons: Theory
How to Make a Person: a Person Schema
How to Make a Moral Person: a Moral Person Schema
2. Moral Persons, Identity, and Moral Defects: Akrasia and Servility
Moral Persons amd Identity
Moral Persons and Servility
Moral Persons and Akrasia

6. MORAL PERSONS: II
1. Moral Persons and Possible Worlds
2. Moral Persons and Death
3. Moral Persons and Quality of Life

7. MORAL PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND LAW
1. Legal Rights and Moral Rights: Carl Wellman's Theory of Rights
2. Moral Persons and Privacy
Some Existing Views on Privacy
Moral Personhood and Privacy
Appendix: Some Possible Connections between Law and Morality

8. NOT QUITE BACK TO SQUARE ONE: RECONSIDERATIONS

Notes
Bibliography
Index

Description

This book presents a theory of personhood and moral personhood using results from recent work on intentionality in the philosophy of mind. An account of intentional kinds, causation, and explanation is provided to resolve some current issues in moral and legal theory, and to examine questions raised in law and medicine where it is necessary to deal with human individuals at the boundaries of their lives. Topics discussed include abortion, death, euthanasia, personal identity, rights — including the right to privacy and the right to die — servility, and suicide.

G. E. Scott is Professor of Philosophy at Warren Wilson College.

Reviews

"The book is a clear and forceful integration of current thought in philosophy of mind and value theory and it develops the implications of this dominant way of thought in these areas for moral personhood. Furthermore, it develops the implications of this view of personhood for important moral questions before the society. It is beautifully written, richly documented, and cogently argued. " — E. M. Adams, Kenan Professor of Philosophy, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill