Acknowledgments

1. Interpretation and Explanation: Claims and Concerns

2. Standard Accounts of Interpretation and the Principle of Charity

2. 1: Standard Accounts of Interpretation

2. 1.1: The Holism of Interpretation

2. 1.2: A Fundamental Principle of Charity

2. 2: Common Refinements to the Principle of Charity

2. 2.1: Modifications Related to Stages of Interpretation

2. 2.2: Modifications Related to Types of Error

3. A Better Codification of the Constraints on Interpretation

3. 1: The Primacy of the Principle of Explicability: The Central Argument

3. 2: Two Concrete Illustrations

3. 2.1: The Treatment of Observation Sentences

3. 2.2: The Treatment of Truth-Functions

3. 3: Elaboration

3. 3.1: Empirical Adequacy

3. 3.2: Rules of Thumb

3. 3.3: Solving the Problem of Irrationality

4. On the Supposed A Priori Status of Minimal Rationality

4. 1: The View that Rationality is Constitutive of Intentional States

4. 1.1: A Priori Truths and "The Subject" as a Conceptual Matter

4. 1.2: Needed Perspective: An Extensional Notion of "The Subject"

4. 2: On an Argument from Measurement

4. 3: On the Argument from Charity in Interpretation

4. 4: Is Minimal Rationality Preponderant Rationality: What is Central to Present Theory?

4. 5: Summary and Significance

4. 6: Further Reflection on Minimal Rationality: Stich's Concerns

4. 6.1: Empirical Versus Conceptual Truths Revisited

4. 6.2: Acceptable and Unacceptable Similarity Bases for Interpretation

5. On the Supposed Privileged Place of Rationalizing Explanation

5. 1: Preliminaries

5. 1.1: The Basic Issue and What Is Sought to Resolve It

5. 1.2: The Rudimentary Received Model of Rationalizing Explanation

5. 1.3: On Theory-Dependent Versus Transcendent Preferred Statuses

5. 2: Rationalizing Explanation in Light of a General Account of Intentional Explanation

5. 2.1: Dispositions, Functional Analysis, and Semantic Interpretability

5. 2.2: Rationalizing Explanation and Nomic Generalizations

5. 2.3: Rationalizing Explanation and Irrationalizing Explanation are Epistemologically on a Par

6. Rationalizing Explanation and the Scientific Explanation of Events

6. 1: Restating Our Issue

6. 2: Why Explanations are Non-extensional and Why Normative Principles are Explanatorily Impotent

6. 3: Applications To International Explanations

7. The Nomic Status of Psychological Generalizations: Handling Rosenberg's Refinability Problem

7. 1: Rosenberg's Challenge: Nomicity and Refinability

7. 2: An Illustrative Casev

7. 3: Bootstrap Testing: Using our Theoretical Resources

8. In Defense of Heteronomic or Soft Laws

8. 1: The Issue: Can Psychological Generalizations Be Nomic?

8. 2: Davidson's Suggestion That Heteronomic Generalizations Do Not Cite Causal Factors and Thus Cannot Be Nomic

8. 3: The Prima Facie Case for There Being Nomic Heteronomic Generalizations Citing Causal Factors

8. 4: Psychological Factors Can Be Causally Relevant: The Basic Solution to the Explanatory Exclusion Problem

8. 5: Kim's Misstep into Reductionism

9. Summary

Notes

Bibliography

Name Index

Subject Index